2חלקים מאוחדים י״ש

51

place for his skills and abilities. This was the natural extension of his work as
Noter, educator and ideological instructor. To be a Hagana commander meant
to learn, understand and instill; these three activities were Itzhak's guiding
principles, which he elevated to the highest possible degree to achieve the
desired results. For many years he was associated with security. He
endangered his life more than once; he was ardent and devoted, and he
exerted strong educational influence.

The Gadna, as well as its military context, was also a highly important tool for
the absorption of young immigrants. For them, Itzhak was the person through
whom they were to become familiar with the country and be acclimatized
within it. Without doubt, Itzhak knew well the value of strengthening character
and instilling loyalty to ideals, as part of training for the test of armed struggle.
As someone with an extensive, profound understanding of culture, he devoted
a great deal of time to these young people, offering them guidance through
lectures and discussions and leading them toward achievements; they, in
turn, would come to him for advice and report to him on events.

Itzhak Shemi came in contact with Itzhak Sadeh, commander of the Palmach,
in Joara for the first time. They would meet at conferences for commanders
and in joint operations. In addition, in the mid-1940s Itzhak was one of the
most essential recruiters for the Palmach. Collaboration between the Palmach
and the Hagana reached its height in the battle of Mishmar-haEmek.

Those who volunteered to defend the state underwent an induction ceremony,
conducted in secret in one of the caves of the Carmel Mountains with rituals
and badges.

The deliberations on the partitioning of the country served as an impetus for
hastening the implementation of setting up a continuous array of settlements
in the area, in order to ensure transportation routes and future borders. Along
with the change in method of defense, the mode of settlement in the area also
changed. The Zionist movement decided to make a concentrated effort to
settle the land. Their goal was to purchase lands in key places and to settle
them quickly in order to establish "facts on the ground". (To the east of Ein-
Shemer, on the Ephraim Mountains, Kibbutz Ma'anit was founded on lands
belonging to the Jewish National Fund.) Hagana operations were linked with
national activities; they served the nation and encompassed, despite the
underground conditions, hundreds of residents in the area and many
thousands of Jews in Israel and the Diaspora. At this time, the efforts of the
Hagana were directed toward purchase of weaponry, which had not yet been
obtained and was needed for training, preparing explosives and making
preparations for defense against the expected invasion. The Mossad for Aliya
Bet [institution for "illegal" immigration of Jews, which the British forbade],

52

which had organized the "illegal" immigration to the Land of Israel, now
exerted its efforts toward purchasing weapons in Europe and North America.
FOUNDING THE JEWISH STATE
During the 20th century a number of new nations came into being, but not one
of them had to withstand the danger of destruction and annihilation as did the
State of Israel. The grand British Empire equipped the Arab countries with
superior weapons and guidance, while the United States refused to provide
crucial aid to Israel.
After the Holocaust, it became clear that few had survived, and every Jewish
citizen in the Land of Israel had become a representative of the six million
who had perished in Europe. Now, there needed to be an even greater effort
to take care of the Jewish refugees, to bring them to the State of Israel, to
help them become absorbed in the population and to adopt the survivors.
Along with all the sorrow and mourning, there was silent agreement, as if they
had discussed it amongst themselves, of a decision to let go of what had been
"there", as if none of them had a past; there was only the New Hebrew
person, the New Israeli, born in the present and the future.

Training for face-to-face combat in the Carmel Forests

53

Badge of the district, Naphtali,
which is the Shomron – the
northernmost of the three districts of
the Alexandroni Brigade. The
battalion number was 131 and it
was situated (after the British
evacuation) in Hadera. Its
commander was Itzhak Shemi,
battalion commander with the rank
of major

Itzhak's motorbike driver's license. In order to recruit volunteers for
the Hagana it was essential to have a speedy, motorized vehicle,
and there was none better than a motorbike – which Itzhak had until
the War of Independence ended

54

COMMANDER

It wasn't enough for Itzhak to establish defense posts; they had to be
sufficiently equipped and the personal danger involved had to be minimal. His
Matchless motorbike [produced by a British firm and given or sold to the
Hagana as excess equipment] served him faithfully. Aside from one accident,
he managed to maneuver it well and would go quickly from one place to the
next, offering his opinion on the situation and doing his best to learn about
living conditions, participating in crucial deliberations and being involved in
sensitive and intricate issues.

Itzhak was seen as an open, broad-minded, level-headed commander with an
affinity for knowledge. He said, "If we are compelled to carry out the rebirth of
our people under conditions of hostile rule, the Hagana has one answer:
enhancing our forces and training our fighters for their mission" (the
commander's words, Nov. 1947). He knew how to exert stern yet tolerant
authority that others could accept.

He perceived the system of intensive instruction and training as a need of the
highest degree: physical effort and withstanding the climate, shortages and
fatigue. Brave and meticulous in their operations, the fighters required
discipline, responsibility and decisiveness. Yet their emotional connection to
the Land of Israel was no less important that their training and for this they not
only had to become familiar with the Jewish holy and literary sources, the
Bible, the land, Jewish history and heritage; they had to accept and identify
with them – for only with their help could the fighters achieve what was
required of them.

In the Shomron area, in the Wadi-Ara and Wadi-Milek passes, there were
Jewish and Arab communities that were closely connected. In many cases the
Arabs were spread out along the roads and paths which were highly important
transportation arteries; the Jews were mainly situated in the lower plain;
around them, on the mountain slopes, were Arab villages.

A great many British military forces were located in Itzhak's area of command;
they rarely intervened but their presence had to be taken into account. On
Sept. 20 1947 the British cabinet reached a decision to leave the Land of
Israel. Itzhak did his best to sustain an atmosphere of law and order in the
area and sought to avoid any injury. However, in the end, as the authorities
retreated in the last days of the British Mandate, Arab warriors moved into the
area and were housed in the Arab villages.

53

Itzhak's discharge document from service in the British police.
The Notrim were connected with the British authorities, from
whom they got guns, hunting rifles, ammunition and pistols.
Most of them were also associated with the Hagana and
exploited every opportunity to promote security in the Jewish
settlements in the Land of Israel
There were villages that refused to let the Arab warriors stay overnight, out of
fear of punishment by the Jews. Itzak did not think highly of the Arabs' ability
to cause damage as an organized body, since they seemed incapable of
cooperating with each other. Here and there, secret truce agreements would
be signed that stipulated laying down of arms between Arab villages and
neighboring Jewish settlements. (Itzhak specifically mentioned Giv'at Ada in
this regard in his memoirs.) The purpose was to distinguish between hostile
and friendly Arab villages, in order to placate and not aggravate the

54

relationships with those who were interested in peace. The population was
complex and full of contrasts.

U.N. VOTE AND ARAB INVASION

On 4 May 1947 the first attack by the Arab Legionnaires against the Jewish
quarter took place in Jerusalem. The result was 12 dead and 30 wounded. Six
months later the United Nations, in an historic decision, voted in favor of the
establishment of a Jewish state in Israel. In New York, in the afternoon of 29
Nov. 1947, it already nighttime in the Land of Israel; the news spread
throughout the country amidst great rejoicing.

In Syria the Salvation Army prepared to invade Israel from the east. This army
was well organized and had been trained by the Arab League. Until then, with
the exception of the Jordanian Legion, there had been no organized Arab
army. On 12 Jan. 1948 the British Foreign Office announced that Britain
would continue to maintain the Arab forces, in accordance with an agreement
that had been signed by Britain, Egypt, Iran and Jordan. With the mood of
British hostility and worsening Arab relations, the situation in Israel
deteriorated to one of war.

Fawzi al-Qawuqji was appointed commander of the Salvation Army in early
January 1948. He had over 7,000 fighters under his direct command (and that
of Adib Shishakli) by February 1948: 5,000 men and 2,000 more Arab
volunteers from surrounding villages. Few of them had received military
training, but most of them knew how to use a gun and had experience in
battle. They joined the Salvation Army enthusiastically and were certain they
would triumph. Among the commanders of this army were ones form Syria,
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Bosnia. They penetrated into the area of
the West Bank of the Jordan River, near Shchem (Nablus), equipped with
weapons and maintained by the Supreme Arab Council in Damascus.

If, until this point, the question had been how to defend the country against
Arab gangs, now Israel found itself in a totally new situation – surrounded by
independent Arab nations capable of raising, arming and training armies for
war. Their goal was to attack and exterminate the entire Jewish Yishuv in the
Land of Israel.

55

56

57

WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Israel reorganized itself for the transition from guerrilla warfare to battles with
regular armies. Within the framework of establishing the Hagana brigades,
Yitzhak was appointed commander of the 131st Battalion of the Alexandroni
Brigade; the Shomron (Naphtali) district was under his responsibility, and like
all the fighters in 1948, this battalion was also mobile (that is, could be called
upon to reinforce other battalions during battle) and had to be ready to
support other battalions if they required army units or ammunition. Yitzhak
was familiar with the Shomron areas through his deep acquaintance and
connections he had made over the years. The war, which broke out a few
hours after the UN ratification of the partition of Israel, required both resources
and a good deal of resourcefulness in order to attain – while fighting – what
was needed from alternative sources, since there was very little ammunition.
The principal asset was the people's army, which accepted the authority of the
Hagana leadership. This army proved itself despite disturbances from the
British (which continued even after the UN vote) and had the power and
efficiency to overcome the armed forces of the Arabs and the Salvation Army,
which had been sent in from Iraq to invade the country.

Many Arabs had already chosen to flee in the early stage of the war. At first
the city dwellers left, especially the more prosperous ones, and after them the
villagers escaped, too. The weakness of the Arabs' society, their inability to
cope and the fear of the Israeli forces led to their flight. Arab propaganda from
abroad exaggerated the situation with its descriptions of massive, horrendous
deeds that were liable to be committed by the Jews against the villages and
towns that would pass over to the young state.

Over many months the whole country was a battlefront, attacked by the
armies of the surrounding Arab countries and organized gangs. The frontlines
were close to population centers and the civilians' lives were deeply affected
by the events of war, even for those not situated at the front.

During the first months of the War of Independence, many of the battles were
waged in built-up areas and were characterized by killing of civilians. Yitzhak
toughened up his soldiers and filled them with confidence in their ability to
fight and defend, but despite their organization and devotion to their mission,
the conditions were very difficult. This was in part because the units of young
fighters, the Palmach, and the best weapons were taken to the frontlines, to
Jerusalem and the Galilee. Lacking any alternative, the battalion did its best
with the strength it had, proving itself worthy of the trust placed in it.

Along the roads and other routes, there were still attacks from ambushes and
there were victims of the violence. The Hagana's operational order warned to
take care not to injure Arab women and children.

58

The Jewish population, which numbered 600,000 in March 1948, lost one
percent of its total in the war – a huge sacrifice.

With increasing concern, Yitzhak followed the Arab's actions as they harassed
travelers on the roads near their villages. Weapons were needed; rifles,
machine guns and ammunition could only be dreamt of. Yitzhak was aware of
the situation and knew that it that they could not continue to view the
harassments as deeds of individuals acting alone. They could not restrict
themselves to responding by punishing individuals; a deterrent action was
needed. Arming the forces would be the first step to emerging from the
intolerable reality in which the state found itself the day after the UN decision.

The Hagana, and Zionism in general, were filled with a sense of urgency to
ensure the future existence of the State of Israel as an equal among equals in
the battle of the world's nations. Despite the harsh conditions and great
obstacles, the fighters' spirit improved, enabling them to take the initiative
again and again all through the war – as the enemy's weak points were
revealed.

Yitzhak trusted the leadership of the Yishuv and was proud of the country and
its achievements. In the matter of survival one could rely on no one, he
believed, as he absorbed the shock of the Holocaust and acknowledged the
fact that military defeat was not an option.

In April 1948, together with all the Hagana commanders, it was agreed that
the Alexandroni unit must give up half of its fighters with their weapons and
ammunition for the sake of the front in Jerusalem, which was in danger of
collapse.

BATTLE OF MISHMAR-HAEMEK

At this very time Fawzi al-Qawuqji and his Salvation Army began to attack
with the purpose of penetrating the center to Haifa and the coastal plain. At
that very time, as most of the Hagana forces were advancing toward the
entrances to Jerusalem, Qawuqji gathered approximately 1,000 soldiers,
cannons and ammunition and settled on the hills overlooking Kibbutz
Mishmar-haEmek. This kibbutz, situated on the Haifa-Megiddo road, at the
time comprised a key point for penetration from the Wadi-Ara and Wadi-Milek
passes. On the other hand, capturing Mishmar-haEmek was intended to make
capture of the Jezreel Valley settlements easier. The idea was to cut off the
north of the country from the south and in this way terminate the plan for
division that ensured territorial continuity for the State of Israel.

Qawuqji instigated the attack on the night of April 4 with a concentrated
bombardment of cannons, surprising the kibbutz members and Hagana
commanders.

59

Document from the period of battles against Kakun, summer
of 1948. Translation:
Transfer
Re: transfer of military post ……….. 14792005 from the Gad
district to the Naphtali district
Execution: The above military post was transferred on
29/8/48 at 19:00 hours by the battle headquarters officer of
haMa'apil to the operational officer of Naphtali district with a
wide-scale explanation of the area and the troublesome
places in which the enemy had stationed his men.
Communications: The telephone connection was also
transferred.
Signature of receiver: xxxx
Signature of conveyer: xxxx
Signature of witnesses: xxxx

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Military posts on the eastern front, 1948
"At the end of 1947 the Shomron district began to organize for the invasion.
The eastern frontline was long and winding; I had differences of opinion with
the settlements about recruiting fighters. Only in October did I get their
consent. Then I turned to the task of setting up military posts. The 131st
Battalion had 12 posts, the southernmost of which was in haMa'apil, opposite
Kakun, while the northernmost was above Gilad, beyond the Megiddo
Junction."
- Itzhak Shemi, quoted from a lecture he gave in Hadera, 3 Feb. 1985
BATTLE IN WADI-ARA
At dawn the Hagana sent the Palmach battalion and two armored companies
to come to the aid of Kibbutz Mishmar-haEmek, which was under siege. The
131st Battalion, under the command of Itzhak Shemi, advanced to Megiddo
through Wadi-Ara. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who had lost the element of surprise and
did not capture the kibbutz, continued to bombard it intermittently. He had the
advantage over the armored Israeli units, which suffered losses and whose
situation worsened. A British armored force reached the spot and called a
ceasefire, which the besieged utilized in order to evacuate the women and
children and get fresh ammunition.

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On 14 April the Arabs renewed their attack, advancing with cannons. Under
the command of Itzhak Sadeh were kibbutz members and Palmach and
Hagana forces. They let the Arabs approach until they were 300 meters away
before the Jewish forces opened fire. Surprised by the concentration of shots,
the Arabs retreated in great confusion with the Palmach in pursuit. Qawuqji
succeeded in retreating with his men in the direction of Jun, in the area where
the 131st Battalion was situated; bombarded, the battalion fought back with
the little ammunition and supplies they had. At the entrance to Wadi-Ara,
Itzhak Shemi and his men were amazed to see Qawuqji sitting in his
Oldsmobile (so sure was he of victory that he came to the front in an
automobile). The battle was short and was based on the mistaken impression
that the Israeli battalion had a lot of weapons. A solitary Davidka thundered
forth from time to time and its success was beyond anything imagined.
Qawuqji, the hero festooned with medals, abandoned his car in the middle of
the road, fleeing on foot into the mountains. This fact did not prevent him from
issuing a pronouncement the following day that "the Arabs won a big victory,
hundreds of Jews were slaughtered, the kibbutz was destroyed and the Arab
flag waves over its ruins".

EXISTENTIAL WAR

Since the Arabs were the ones who had begun the war, Itzhak was given an
order to focus the fighting forces on three goals:

- To capture strategically important spots from enemy hands
- To clear the roads for Jewish movement
- To prepare the Shomron district for the expected invasion

After the first baptism of fire, Itzhak devoted all of his abilities to calculating
preparedness and crossing of firing ranges, knowing that an existential war
lay ahead. The whole country had become a front: there were blackouts,
sirens, running to bomb shelters. Many participated in battles, guarding,
preparing fortifications and a network of trenches. The kibbutzim barricaded
themselves inside positions lined with planks of wood and sacks filled with
earth.

Although the British were still at their posts, they did not prevent the renewed
invasion of Qawuqji to the region of the Shomron Mountains, where the
Salvation Army had spread out from Tul-Karem to Megiddo and the Ruler
Road [so called because it was completely straight] from Meggido to Afula.
‫ הוספתי‬The invaders were situated on the higher areas of the Shomron and
had the overwhelming advantage of heavy weaponry.

"When the War of Independence broke out, I was given the
overwhelming responsibility of a battlefront with a length of 27 km (as
the crow flies) front and all the settlements on the home front; we had

62

few weapons and few men during this hour of trial. With great
trepidation about the future, we purchased weapons; the Czech rifles
and not yet arrived and we held onto the Hagana array that had been
determined for us, armed with the motto: You Will Not Pass! Opposite
the Iraqi brigade (three battalions) of regular soldiers, trained by the
British. Every day and every night we were sorely tested, for we were
protecting the dearest of all: our families and our homeland.

The time came and the Iraqis exposed their cannons and air fleet and
activated them. (An Egyptian air force plane was shot down.) The
women and children had to be evacuated from Kibbutz Ma'anit and
haMa'apil. I urgently called the operational officer of the Hagana, Yigael
Yadin and verified to him that against these favored forces, with an
Arab infiltration expected in the direction of Hadera and the coastal
plain, the country was liable to be hacked to pieces and the fate of the
Shomron settlements was dire. Yigal agreed with my analysis but said
that under the present war situation, he was unable to allocate any
more forces or weapons.

It was already midnight. In light of the situation, I summoned my
deputy, Avraham Myzel from Binyamina, and together we sat down
with maps and planned out the operation (two mortars, tripods for
machine guns, more mines, calling up reserve soldiers from the
settlements and especially, pre-emptive strikes…)

It was with sorrow that I accepted the necessity to wield a sword; the
symbol of our district (Naftali) was the doe…

- From a booklet that Itzhak Shemi prepared for the kibbutz archives

The battalion had two Davidkas – heavy, homemade mortars that, for lack of
anything else, offered some compensation for the lack of artillery. The
Davidka got its name from the Russian Katyushka in World War II. These
mortars were operated by sliding the shell into the barrel of the cannon; they
were exceptional at making a terrifying noise. Itzhak would use them in night
battles and the impression they made was unimaginable.

Securing movement on the roads was severely distressful for the Hagana.
Most of the Palmach fighters were tasked with accompanying convoys, and
the rate of losses among them was terribly high. The Arabs had the
advantage and they caught the convoys in crossfire from the posts they
controlled over the passageways on the main roads. The British did not lift a
finger and anticipated that the Salvation Army would not attack until after they
had left the country (15 May 1948).

CONTROL OF THE ROADS

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Already in 31 Dec. 1947 Shai [the information service, which also functioned
as an intelligence agency] reported that the Arabs intended to paralyze all
Jewish movement on the routes. They prevented Jewish vehicles from
passing. All the Hagana's efforts were in danger of collapsing. Itzhak lacked
weapons, commanders and fighters and yet he had been ordered to wrest the
roads
in the Shomron area out of enemy control, that is, from the hostile Arab
villages: from both sides of the coastal road and in Wadi-Ara and Wadi-Milek,
which were being used as bases for assembling the Arab fighters and sending
them off to attack.

Temporary truce after battle, in
Hadera, 1948. Itzhak is at left.
Second from right: Lamosh,
company commander in 131st
Battalion and member of Kibbutz
Gan-Shmuel

64

Itzhak with his daughter Hagar, 1948.
"The commanding officer of the
commanding officer", as they
affectionately called her in the battalion.
The car is that same Oldsmobile that
Qawuqji had driven; when he was shot
at, he abandoned the car on the
battlefield. His men scattered in all
directions and the car was taken for the
use of the commander of 131st Battalion,
which had blocked Qawuqji's way in 14
Apr. 1948 in the southern hills of Wadi-
Ara

65

Consultation before battle, 1948. Three commanders
of the Alexandroni Brigade in IDF uniforms. At right:
Itzhak Shemi, commander of 131st Battalion
Evacuation by the British was conducted gradually, making more and more
areas and posts available to the Arab fighters from which to attack Jewish
transports. These facts were well known to Itzhak; over years of experience in
the Notrut and the Hagana he had garnered knowledge and understanding
that he could make use of, in persistent preparation for the struggle that would
support and strengthen the right of his people to its country, its homeland.
He had no alternative. Considering the chance of defeating the invaders from
the east, he had to overcome the Arab marauders along the internal routes,
and this had to be done within a limited amount of time: he had only six weeks
left until the final evacuation of the British, which had been set for 15 May
1948.
After four months of skirmishes and constant Arab attacks (between Dec.
1947 and April 1948), the battalion succeeded in capturing and manning
those very places which would provide far-reaching and even crucial
achievements. But the war on the roads continued. In view of the gains by the
Arabs and the danger of invasion by the Arab armies, the battalion was
deployed for holding action against armies full of strength and vigor, at a time
when most the battalion fighters were wounded and exhausted. The Arab
countries plotted to destroy Israel. In the Shomron villages, hordes of
marauders prepared and did their best to carry out cruel massacres in the
agricultural settlements. The Shomron settlers went into action, hastily
establishing "facts on the ground" that would dictate the future borders of the
country. Hagana commanders were authorized to decide, at their own
discretion, which residents to deport from the villages situated along the vital
approach roads. Itzhak got specific instructions in which it was stated which

66

police stations and British army camps he had to take control of when the
British left. According to this plan, the area was secured with the thought in
mind that the Salvation Army would try to infiltrate onto the coastal plain. It
was essential to put an end to enemy activity and take control of the
mandatory government's installations and the rest of the services in the
country (transport, railway, electricity, telephone and so on) in the area.

Itzhak was given complete freedom in his decisions. He was dedicated to his
work and accepted full responsibility; he was the regional authority at that
time. He did not divulge his innermost conviction to anyone: that only the
bravest of the fighters would be capable of committing acts of daring in a
situation for which they had no prior experience. His personal grasp of the
situation could be summed up by self-discipline, daring and consistency; he
adhered faithfully to these principles in the days when even the smallest
mistake was liable to turn an ambush into a target of the enemy.

Under the command of Itzhak Shemi we went out one night, members
of Ein-Shemer, Mishmarot and Gan-Shmuel, to stage a lookout on
Khirbat Meiser and observe the Iraqi soldiers who had come to fight
against the State, the existence of which had only just been declared. It
was all so sudden and surprising; no one knew exactly the purpose of
the action… we lay down in wait. Suddenly and unexpectedly we
started hearing gunfire – the Arabs were shooting and there was
nothing we could do but flee.

- Recollection of David Ben Avraham, who had been Itzhak's first grade
pupil years before, in Kibbutz Ein-Shemer newsletter in 1958

The Hagana's advantage lay in its fighting spirit, with the calamity of the
Holocaust in Europe impressed upon its collective consciousness. Regretfully,
the national Arab movement took an entirely different course. From the
beginning, the movement wanted all of Palestine for itself and rejected the
various partition proposals, which the Zionists had accepted. "We look toward
a stable, sustainable peace," said Itzhak to his men, "but understanding the
situation regarding the struggle for our state compels us to reach certain
conclusions." He did not harbor hatred for the Arabs, yet he was highly critical
of them. In any case, the immediate result of the Arab media campaign was to
propagate fear and to spur on the Arab villagers in the region to flee in terror.
It was not long before this gap between the level of motivation of the Arabs
and Jews produced results on the battlefield, as small units of trained Jewish
fighters, armed with rifles and Molotov cocktails in the Wadi-Ara pass, drove
off much larger Arab forces possessing armor and artillery.

67

The Alexandroni Brigade was a large, unified one and was composed of
relatively older fighters. Ensuring the safety of Jewish vehicles on the roads
required constant vigilance.

Until April 1948 all the battles were waged at the initiative of Arabs. But they
yielded opposite results from those the Arabs had intended, ending with
victory by the Hagana and flight of Arab communities, who left for the time
being – determined not to live under Israeli rule but to await the promised
Arab invasion, after which they planned to return. Itzhak had no doubt that
only a firm stand in battle would secure the settlements in the Shomron that
were under his responsibility. The systematic destruction of all the Jewish
settlements on the arteries along which Arab armies advanced, demonstrated
the spirit of the military and political echelons of the Arabs. Itzhak's purpose
was to hang on, but at the same time he felt the compulsion to fortify the area
upon securable borders.

In the two weeks that remained before 15 May 1948, he could not have
known or guessed just how poorly organized the Arabs were for war. He was
positioned opposite Arab forces that were much bigger and were well
equipped with tanks, cannons and armor, at a time when the Hagana was
forced to suffice with vastly inferior mortars and improvised vehicles. Every
commander served as a sensor; Itzhak's understanding of the terrain was
significant. He was a partner in the proceedings and was familiar with the
considerations as he struggled with the essential questions in the area under
his responsibility: where and how to continue. He was capable of gathering
together his men all at once for special, complicated missions, checking every
detail and giving it its due importance to complete the operation successfully.

No one harmed the Arab villages that kept quiet. Itzhak was given free rein to
put Hagana policies into effect in the area, through permanent conquest and
by including entire territories in the borders of the new Jewish state. He was
assisted in this by his consultant for Arab affairs, Ezra Danin, and by Shai.

68

Command staff of 131st Battalion on the day the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
were established, 1948. Itzhak is seated in the center. Standing: far right,
Avraham Meyzel from Binyamina; fifth from right, Ervin Gronikh from Gan-
Shomron; second from right, Lamosh from Gan-Shmuel. Seated in second
row: second from right, Shakhar the driver; third from right, Avraham Levi from
Pardess-Hanna; fourth from left, Shlomo Natan, first lieutenant from Zikhron
Yaakov. Seated in first row: second from right, Elyashiv from Hadera

THE BRITISH DEPART
On 14 May 1948, immediately following the departure of the British High
Commissioner and senior personnel from Jerusalem, David Ben-Gurion
declared the founding of the State of Israel in the Tel-Aviv Museum. The Arab
invasion front indicated trouble; the general mood was full of both high hope
and deep concern. Battles against the Salvation Army were the first stage of
the invasion, from 15 May to 11 June, in which the Hagana managed to gain
the upper hand militarily. In fact, from the beginning of April on, the Hagana
was able to concentrate its forces and capture villages and even blocs of
villages. At the end of this stage, clear front lines had been established,
marking off a contiguous area in the hands of the State of Israel.
On principle, Itzhak Shemi avoided carrying out violent actions in the villages
that had not joined the violent outbreak. The instruction had been to attack
buildings and assets that had been in British hands and to avoid injuring
people. But since the Arabs had started the war, Itzhak had been given the
order to widen as much as he could the "bottleneck" of the Wadi-Ara pass.
The thin waist of the country – in some places a mere 16 km separated the

69

Arab lines from the Mediterranean Sea coast – was expanded after the
Alexandroni Brigade's victory in Kakun, to the northwest of Tul-Karem. The
131st Battalion advanced eastward through Wadi-Ara and conquered the
village of Lajun to the west of Megiddo Junction.
The commander of the northern front, Moshe Carmel, continued to progress
in the direction of Jenin, capturing the villages Tzendaleh, Mukeibleh,
Jelameh and Arana. This advance became a strategic asset, since the
nation's borders, determined in accordance with these battles, were several
times wider than those that had been established in the Partition Plan,
between Tul-Karem and the Gilboa. The nightmare of the invasion all the way
to the coast, through the narrow waist of Israel, dissipated.
And still the Arabs flooded the press with false information, continuing to brag
that they would conquer the whole country within two weeks at the most. The
concentration of Arab forces on the Shomron front was greater than ever.

Itzhak sits on the left in the jeep with the driver, Shakhar Tzelevich from
Hadera. Two days after the photo was taken, this very jeep ran over a mine
and set it off. Itzhak and the driver miraculously emerged safe and sound.
Spring 1948

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Alexandroni Brigade command staff, 1948. Itzhak is
at far left

Itzhak is second from left
The Hagana had entered the war for Israeli independence on Nov. 30, 1947;
at that time the Alexandroni Brigade was one of five brigades (Levanoni,
Alexandroni, Givati, Etzioni and Palmach). By the second half of the war,
these five had turned into 12 fighting brigades, by means of which the Israeli
Defense Forces succeeded in striking the army of invaders.
The Palmach alone tripled its forces and set up three brigades from them: the
Negev, Harel and Yiftach. The addition of 3,000 fighters of Etzel and 300
fighters of Lechi (the Hagana itself consisted of 120,000 fighters) are also to
be taken into account.
BATTLE OF MA'ANIT
Since reaching the Jenin area and the north of the West Bank of the Jordan
River, the Iraqis had not demonstrated any significant activity; however on 28
May an Iraqi battalion attacked Kibbutz Ma'anit, to the east of Ein-Shemer,

71

and this time the Iraqis were very well equipped. Units from the 131st Battalion
of the Alexandroni Brigade conducted a counterattack. The battle was tough
and the battalion retreated twice before it eventually managed to defeat the
Salvation Army.

A large area was captured to the east and south of Kibbutz Ma'anit, up to and
beyond the Arab village of Meiser, which remained uninvolved in the fighting.
These areas topographically commanded a view of the airfield to the south of
Ein-Shemer, which was still the only international airfield (until 12 July 1948,
when Lod airport was captured). Through this airfield came shipments of
weapons, medicines and even the country's gold for the first national bank.

Over the next three days Kibbutz haMa'apil suffered from severe Iraqi
bombardments. The two kibbutzim, Ma'anit and haMa'apil, were compelled to
evacuate their women and children to the rear; a few Israeli air force planes
bombed and shot at the Iraqis. Kakun accommodated a very large base of the
Iraqi army; on 5 June 1948 close to 4,000 soldiers were concentrated there.
On the spot the Iraqis positioned themselves on the ruins of a Mamluk fortress
[remnant of the Mamluk kingdom], commanding a view of Kibbutz haMa'apil,
the railway and the roads.

Bands of Arab fighters, operating independently, attacked convoys and
settlements. Here and there they fired at Jewish neighborhoods and planted
bombs. Itzhak implemented Hagana policy. From time to time he and his men
would go off to carry out retaliatory acts and to frighten the enemy, but no one
imagined, until Jan. 1948, viewing these activities as actual war.

In every Arab village there were several dozen marauders equipped with a
small amount of weapons and ammunition. Occasionally, these groups would
join forces and leave several villages together on short, hit-and-run attacks.
On the other hand, many Arab villages did their best to avoid involvement,
and preferred to assist the Hagana, due to generations of hatred toward their
Arab neighbors. In general, the Arabs fought without any real coordination
among themselves.

Although the Arabs were the ones who began the hostile activities, the Arab
society had fallen apart even before the Hagana went out to attack in April
1948, by which time hundreds of village inhabitants had already fled their
homes. With the crumbling of the Salvation Army after the battle on Mishmar-
haEmek on 4-15 April, the villagers understood that they were doomed to
lose. During this period the residents of Kisrai had already been expelled due
to motives connected with the bringing of illegal immigrants.

The end of the British mandate had been set for 15 May 1948. Depletion of
the British forces' military might in the country prevented them both from
interfering with Hagana and being able to join the enemy forces. Each of the

72

two opposing sides, Arabs and Jews, made plans to take over the police
stations and army bases that were being evacuated as well as to expel the
forces of the adversary from them.

In contrast to its explicit plan for taking over the bases, the Hagana had no
plan for expelling the Arabs from the Land of Israel. The village of Kisrai
(Caesarea of today) was an extremely active base of Arab warriors and
infiltrators from the Salvation Army, and was therefore destroyed in March
1948. In any case the village was situated on land that the Partition Plan had
allocated to the State of Israel. As opposed to this, in later stages, opening

the road to Wadi-Ara and pushing back the border in the area of the eastern
front of the Shomron district were necessary in order to expand the nation's
land for the future, at the expense of Jordan. This was due to the presence of
concentrations of enemy (Salvation Army) and particularly hostile bases from
which snipers shot at Jewish vehicles on the roads and attacked Jewish
settlements.

The battalion had to go off incessantly on military missions; it was a race
against time and everything was scarce. Shipments of significant quantities of
weapons from Czechoslovakia between March and May were to have a
decisive effect on the Hagana's victories. The battalion organized itself, the
fighters gained experience; in addition, there were local field corps at Itzhak's
disposal that could protect the settlements on the home front.

CONTROL OF EIN-SHEMER AIRFIELD

On 28 April, as the British were evacuating the airfield, the struggle for the
appropriation of the British bases in the Shomron was waged. Itzhak had
waited for this moment. The battalion was deployed all around, prepared to
push back any Arab force that tried to take over the place. Not far from there
were the Arab villages of Jat, Baka, Meiser, Barta, Ara, Arara and Qara, but
despite the presence of the Salvation Army of Qawuqji right next to them, they
chose not to enter the fray.

Following is the content of a lecture that was given on 3 June 1985 by Itzhak
Shemi in the Memorial House for Fallen Soldiers in Hadera:

… Passover 1948, the Ein-Shemer airfield was still in the hands of the
British air force. The Iraqi army, well-armed and prepared, was situated
to the east of it, in Baka al Garbiya, and stood ready to capture it the
moment the British army moved out. This would have separated the
Jewish settlements from each other and stuck a wedge in the territorial
continuity of the state of Israel, almost all the way to Hadera. The 131st
Battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade was prepared for the task it had

73

been given: to deal with the Iraqi brigade in order to gain control of the
airfield.

As the district commander, I decided to take advantage of the close
relationship Levi Adiv, the mukhtar [official Arab word for head of Arab
village] of Ein-Shemer had with the surrounding area. Levi had been a
friend of mine since our days in Vilna. He met with the British base
commander and told him, over a glass of beer, about the Zionist cause,
the nation-to-be, the Arab invaders and so on. The British commander
was convinced by "propaganda department of the district" (Levi) to help
the Jews, and promised to signal us half an hour before the British left
the base by having a squadron of bombers take off and circle the
airfield three times in the air.

The commander kept his word and the airfield was captured by the
battalion. Reserves of airplane fuel were found on the base; this type of
fuel was scarce and served the Israeli air force well. Until the capture of
Lod, this airfield was both highly beneficial and crucial to the nation.
Since the place was under my command, I would be notified every time
a precious shipment was about to arrive. All of the runways remained
within firing range of the Iraqis until the day the armistice agreement
was signed with Jordan on 3 April 1949.

STOPPING TANKS IN WADI-ARA

We knew that the Iraqis had tanks. We also knew that from the
topographical standpoint, there were two options for penetration:
through Wadi-Ara or through the runways. The airfield was closely
guarded and the way through Wadi-Ara was not yet a paved road, but
the dirt road there was good enough for tanks to travel on.

In those days the 7th Brigade of the armored corps was established and
was concentrated in the Naphtali district under the command of my
good friend, Haim Laskov. I would say jokingly that I was a battalion
commander who also had a brigade, since his men dug many defense
trenches in the Naphtali (Shomron) district. But the anti-tank trench that
had been dug to stop the Iraqis in Wadi-Ara was unsatisfactory in my
opinion. I was concerned, so I went to Laskov and told him I thought
we had to test it because there was some anxiety that a tank would be
able to run over the defenders in the trench. The sides of the trench
had to be tested to see if they would hold up. Laskov was certain that
the conventional technique, in which the tank first rises up and then
lowers (making it possible to attack it from underneath) was sufficient. I
was unconvinced; we held another test and saw that a tank could pass
over it – that is, the trench was not safe enough. We dug another

74

trench, this one two meters wide, through which a person could run in
order to attack the tank directly with Molotov cocktails. We practiced
with a heavy Caterpillar tractor; all the volunteers for the mission were
highly apprehensive.

The Iraqis bombed Zikhron Ya'akov in the springtime, apparently in
error, intending to bomb the runways. A house was destroyed and
there were some casualties. Two cannons were placed at the entrance
to Ein-Shemer and I did not believe that the day would come when we
would have to use them. They worked very well and our gunpowder
was excellent. All our fighters came through alive after difficult mission
we undertook when we came within firing range of the enemy.

By virtue of my knowing Russian, I was visited by a general from the
Red Army who had defected from Berlin and joined the Hagana. He
had been sent to us in order to check the defense array of the
battalion. When he realized that it was a map of our preparations that
lay spread out in front of him, he was unable to understand how one
battalion could hold onto a defense array of 27 km as the crow flies
instead of the normal 7 km. He got up and left, muttering, "only God
could offer advice in such a situation".

Until the Czech weapons arrived we had English and Canadian rifles
and what were called Macaroni – Italian rifles that had been picked up
in the Sahara Desert after the defeat of the Nazi army in World War II
(el-Alamein, 23 Oct. 1942). These rifles were not properly adjusted and
most of their ammunition was useless. The weapons were made
operational thanks to our weapons experts who repaired them very
skillfully, working diligently on every detail. When the Czech shipment
of weapons eventually arrived we sighed with relief – for the first time
we had real, effectual weapons and not junk that had been gathered up
in the desert. And then the day came when we were called upon to
transfer 80 rifles in good condition from the Naphtali district to
Jerusalem. Within four hours the Czech rifles had been sent off and the
battalion was again left with the Macaroni.

TRICKING THE ENEMY

Just 300 meters from the airfield were two hills (known to this day as
Glass Hill and Anemone Hill) which served as military posts for Iraqi
brigade soldiers. They planted land mines in the surrounding area.

To provide us with some reinforcement, I gave the gunners and
engineering corps the task of producing something that would look like
weapons, so as to deceive the Iraqis. Shortly afterwards, tanks – which
were actually nothing more than jeeps disguised as armor – appeared,

75

driving around, coming and going on the airfield, 5 km away from the
Iraqi artillery. At night the jeeps lugged chains that made a dragging
noise at a rate similar to that of… tanks. Or so I hoped…

In the same manner, fake 25 cannons made their appearance on the
airfield; we produced flashes by using black gunpowder and fired 81-
inch mortars at the same time, thus creating the illusion of real
cannons.

"Machine guns" also appeared that were actually made of wooden
boards in which we stuck rifle bullets that we set off by means of cables
of different lengths…

We believed that we had managed to fool the enemy, and perhaps we
did?! In any case the enemy, which posed a threat to us, did not make
any move!

The British continued to evacuate army bases and strategic points in
the area. I did my best to obtain the British bases before the Arabs
arrived; for this purpose I exploited all the skills and connections

CAPTURE OF POLICE STATION

I had and sometimes even resorted to bribery. In certain circumstances
I was assisted by Shai, the information service of the Hagana, which
was well organized.

On Passover 1948, despite the fact that the British army had left its
bases in Jenin, Tul-Karem and Kalkiliya, it had not left the Shomron,
but even so, had even given the Arabs some police stations with all
their equipment, weapons, vehicles, wireless communication and so
on. In our district, Naphtali, the Arabs were given the police station at
the entrance to Wadi-Ara (the Iron Junction) which constituted a wedge
in the heart of the settlements on the periphery and greatly upset the
stability of our line of defense. The Alexandroni Brigade decided to
capture it, and my battalion, 131, was given the Davidka for this
purpose.

Dan Even decided to blow up the police station, while I, as a young
district commander, decided that we should spare this valuable building
from destruction and prevent senseless deaths. With this goal in mind,
we initiated a plan of negotiations with the Arab police officer, a man
from Tul-Karem, who was in the station with 35 policemen. During the
night we bombarded them with 51 inch mortars. We knew that the
policemen and their commander would be very aggravated and would
be glad to find a way to leave the police station. We conveyed a letter
to the officer, in which we guaranteed his safety if he would agree to

76

meet us in the town of Karkur. He came and after a friendly discussion,
in which the mukhtar of the village of Arara translated, he was
persuaded to accept 300 Land of Israel pounds and agreed to
evacuate, under the condition that he could take all the weapons with
him. I was given the sum by the Jewish police commissioner at that
time, Y. Sakhar, and conveyed it to the Arab police representative and
the next morning we observed the policemen and their commander
leaving the building and going east. The way was checked to be sure it
hadn't been mined and when we reached the building we unfurled the
flag of Israel over the police station – and indeed, it is there to this very
day!

CAPTURING IRAQI POST

Our defensive array passed near Kfar Glikson and Givat Ada. I decided
that we should capture the Iraqi post, Umm el-Kharuz, which
dominated Wadi-Ara. The post was "softened up" at night with mortar
fire and we disturbed the Iraqis so much that they fled, leaving behind
their still-warm beds – and in fact, we had succeeded in capturing the
post.

The UN put up a big fuss and demanded that we return it.

I felt that the truce would end shortly and decided to buy some time.
Major General Dan even gave me an explicit order to retreat from the
frontline operations officer, Tzvi German. I conveyed a request to him
that at the least, before making us leave so dejectedly, he would visit
there, have a picture taken of himself on the background of the post
and take the opportunity to view Wadi-Ara. And so it was: after the
photograph was taken the truce ended and the post remained in our
hands. At the same opportunity I had a face-to-face meeting with the
Iraqi battalion commander through the mediation of a UN
representative, who demanded that the meeting be held in the post in
order to have proof to put on the official map.

The battalion lived in the military posts; the soldiers were almost never
given time off because of the tension and high alert in our zone. The
posts were assigned according to units (squads, platoons, companies)
and the types of weapons they had. I knew I had to prevent the enemy
from having the opportunity to break through the line between our
posts. For this we used some ingenuity: we had some simple Besa
machine guns [the British version of the Czechoslovak ZB-53 air-
cooled, belt-fed machine gun], which people from Hadera mounted on
movable tripods that looked like ones they had seen being used for
sophisticated machine guns.

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The Salvation Army ruled in Jenin, while in the Jordan Valley they were
poised on the border of the country. Our solders, all of them
praiseworthy, exhibited perseverance and determination, creating
decisive facts on the ground in the formation and security of the
nation's borders. We had a good home front, with defenders who
constituted a quarter of all the fighters.

IRAQI ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE AIRFIELD

On 11 July 1948 the frontline intelligence informed me of preparations
being made by the Iraqis for a major attack whose purpose was to
capture the battalion's airfield (Ein-Shemer) from us. Under my
command was a battery of 65-inch cannons (which we called
"cockroaches") as well as a dozen 81-inch mortars which we kept out
of sight and undetected.

The Iraqi cannons shelled the airfield and Kibbutz Ma'anit. The kibbutz'
water tower was perforated from the shelling and not one roof on the
kibbutz was left intact. Iraqi infantry, concealed in armored vehicles,
began to advance and cross the lines of our protective fire missions.

I decided to open fire with cannons and mortars and succeeded in
stopping the enemy, foiling its plans and protecting the airfield.

During the battle, the frontline intelligence officer rushed up with the
news that the telephone line had been cut, apparently by the advancing
armored vehicles, and that instructions and firing orders could not be
passed on. I sought a volunteer who would run along the airfield
runway (50 meters), exposed to enemy eyes, in order to reattach the
telephone communication line. A courageous soldier from Hadera
volunteered for the mission, ran right within sight of the enemy, amidst
bursts of machine gun fire erupting all around him, and succeeded in
his mission!

For this bold act I recommended him for a citation for bravery and he
was received a citation in the daily directive of the battalion.

The battle for Tantura was waged by Bentz, the brigade commander.
My battalion was given a number of missions in the rear of the sector.
After the conquest, which cost us many casualties, I went through the
wealthy village of Tantura and in order to protect the good name of the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), I demanded that the brigade leave before
nightfall and that the village be kept under my command. After an
exchange of words between myself (representing the essence of the
Hagana) and brigade headquarters (representing the essence of the
Jewish brigade in the British army) Dan Even ruled in my favor. The

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next day I transferred women to Tul-Karem the men to the Umm-
Khaled lock-up and the village was spared plunder.

VICTORY CELEBRATION
"He who has not seen the joy of the people of Israel upon the capture
of the 'Little Triangle' [enclave of Arab villages along the coast] has not
seen the joy of all strata of the Jewish people" [paraphrase of a
Talmudic tractate]. After enthusiastic acceptance of my proposal that
the moshava [small community] of Zikhron Ya'akov honor the brigade
following its victory, the moshava women baked delicacies for the
whole brigade.

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The celebration was held in the town park one evening. The park was
illuminated and although it was not large, there was enough room for
the whole regiment. The women ran around replenishing the
refreshments, drinks were plentiful and happiness was great; there
were tears in people's eyes –tears of joy and sadness…"

BATTALION COMPANIES

The next passage was written by Itzhak Shemi in honor of the Alexandroni
Brigade conference of the central district, which took place on 20 Oct. 1968:

After the end of the battles, I was replaced in my position by Lieutenant
General Tzur. He transferred the battalion to the Givati Brigade and
told me, "I understand everything except for one thing: the tremendous
strain you were under. One battalion against an entire brigade?! How
did you do it, under conditions of unrelenting stress, day after day and
night after night?"

Manning of the military posts was divided up among three of the
companies of the battalion. The fourth company consisted of sappers
and there was a backup company that included a kitchen unit and
hospital unit (with 13 beds). The first three companies would rotate
every two weeks, transferring from post to post.

On 31 May 1948, when the IDF was established, I went from one
military post to the next and swore in the soldiers. Their faces betrayed
their exhaustion; the lack of weapons, ammunition and clothing was
evident.

When the first ceasefire came into effect (11 June 1948) and we could
move about relatively freely, a conference of commanders was held in
Tel-Aviv. Only there did we fully comprehend the enormous degree of
danger Israel had been in during its first days of statehood. Kibbutzim
on the frontline and the defenders who had protected them were in a
state of collapse after the unending shelling they underwent.

Etzel was a nationalistic military organization which operated mainly against
the British presence in the Land of Israel. The Etzel had differences of opinion
with the Hagana and their warriors had left the Hagana by 1937. Their
concentrations of force in the Shomron area were in Zikhron Ya'akov, Hadera
and Binyamina. The Altalena was the vessel that was to have supplied this
organization with weapons. She had been prepared in Europe about 50 days
before the British left the Land of Israel. But in the meantime, the state had
been declared and the leader of Etzel, Menachem Begin, had proclaimed that
he would accept the authority of the war and that his fighters were committed
to joining the IDF along with all their equipment and weapons. Yet the reality

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was different. The Altalena, with guns and ammunition on board, reached the
coast of Israel and Begin refused to transfer her contents to the IDF. This is
what Itzhak Shemi wrote to his grandson, Daniel:

One clear morning I received a direct order from the lieutenant colonel
of the command to block the (only) road leading southward out of
Hadera, and not to let any vehicle pass. I was not informed of the
reason. Later on I discovered the Altalena, a ship bearing weapons,
had anchored off Kfar Vitkin. No one came by, until suddenly a
messenger appeared, bearing the passport of Peter Bergson [a well-
known Etzel member]. I had to arrest him and did so; a week later I
released him. Seven years afterwards, in 1955, we met in the presence
of a journalist and he told me, "I was on my way to Kfar Vitkin. At that
time I was Menachem Begin's deputy and was the person who had
purchased and armed the Altalena. My mission on that day was to
hand over the weapons to the Hagana…" And so, he was the
commander!!! The journalist who had arranged the encounter between
us filled page after page with notes from the meeting; his notes are
now to be found in the archives of the Etzel, where the arrest of Peter
Bergson is recounted. In fact, the ship sailed to Tel-Aviv; a military
ultimatum was issued for her surrender. Due to concern that a civil war
could break out because of Begin's ceaseless maneuvers, the Hagana
chose to sink the ship (22 June 1948) after 900 passengers had
debarked and most of the cargo had been unloaded.

Another affair I was involved in with Etzel was connected with Camp
80. The British officer of the camp was favorably inclined to Israel and
did his best to ensure that others would not make "trouble" for us. He
concealed the fact from the purchasers that we were taking fuel and
ammunition from the camp, for which we were grateful. One day Etzel
decided to "purchase" heavy weapons. Without making us privy to their
secret, they infiltrated Camp 80, dressed in British army uniforms, cold-
bloodedly murdered the elderly commander and managed to drag
three half-tracks out of there, which in any case they abandoned
halfway back to their place. The murdered major's replacement
imposed a heavy punishment of chopping down all the groves in the
area and blowing up the water tower in Pardess Hanna. This meant not
only completely cutting off our water supply but also, unbeknownst to
them, harming our communications network, since the top floor of the
water tower, built by the Hagana, served as a civil communications
station between north and south. Negotiations with the major were
unproductive; I then decided to have the women and children gather
around the tower in order to prevent it from being exploded. Shai
informed me that the major was absolutely intent upon carrying out the

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punishment. The matter was settled only after the district headquarters
set out in pursuit of the Etzel members. And thus 40 Etzel members
were brought to the Karkur police station, where they remained until
the order came to release them. Among the prisoners was the
operations officer of Etzel, Yariv Mevorakh, with whom I became
friendly since he was the representative of the prisoners. At first he
would brag "I escaped from Eretria and Kenya and I'll escape from
here, too!" In the end, following our conversations, he and his
comrades decided to join the Hagana and afterwards they even fought
alongside us in battle.

It should be kept in mind that this was a cruel, national war; the fighters
on the Israeli side were fierce warriors driven by ideology and
principles, for whom loyalty was above all. Every one of them, including
their leaders, was ready and willing to lay down his life for the cause.

TEGART FORTS

The British left behind a network of police buildings in Israel, which were
called the Tegart line; some of them are still standing. They were massive
fortresses equipped with everything needed to withstand conditions of war
and isolation. Sir Charles Tegart, a British engineer who had been appointed
to suppress terror revolts, was summoned to Israel from India following the
Disturbances of 1936-1939 to advise how to overcome the Arab revolt. His
main recommendation was to construct police stations at strategic sites; about
60 such stations were built all over the country; their majestic simplicity was
impressive. Around a square, inner courtyard, made of dark, gleaming
concrete without a speck of dust on it, there were stables, offices, jail cells,
storerooms, garages and fortifications. They were very sophisticated and
were tastefully built. Outwardly they looked like fortresses with lookout towers,
communications setups and loopholes for shooting. Five of them were built in
the Shomron region.

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Tegart fort. Photo from collection of National Archives
All of the British bases in the Shomron area were captured by the 131st
Battalion. A large supply base was located in the place that is now Giv'at-
Haviva. The largest center in the Mediterranean for training horses, dogs and
carrier pigeons was also situated there. Prestigious training competitions for
purebred and pedigreed animals were held there at the time, conducted
according to the elegant ceremonial procedures, with an orchestra of wind
instruments and polished military drills – all meant to glorify the British Empire
in its Golden Age in the Near Eastern region. The many invited guests would
gather there, among them Arab sheiks from the Gulf principalities. Itzhak
himself participated more than once in the trained dog competitions and his
boxer, Haïk, won a number of prizes.
In the place that is now the town of Givat-Olga, there was a coastal patrol
station that served for intelligence and communications and was equipped
with a sophisticated radar system.
The police stations that were captured served as exceptional lookout points;
the airfield was immediately put into operation. Itzhak was pleased, for this
unexpected reinforcement changed the balance of power between the forces.
But it was still necessary to improve fortification of the military posts, and this
was completed after many days and nights of hard work. When the conflict
erupted, the fighters and defenders were called in many times. Airplanes
circled the skies and dropped bombs.
When the IDF was established, uniforms were distributed to the units and
their commanders were required to display their ranks on their uniforms. The
131st Battalion was a link in the chain of attaining and securing Israel's
independence. The military posts constituted key positions. This strip of land

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was a section of the battlefront, on which the battalion was arrayed to defend
against tanks and machine guns.
The battalion experienced struggles and crises as well as exemplary
dedication and loyalty to the cause. Itzhak Shemi was a commander by virtue
of his actions and of devotion to his heritage. His men came a long way,
experienced distress and tense readiness; mutual affection and consideration
prevailed between the commander and his men.

Daily directive during first temporary truce, June 1948. Yitzhak is at
left; Shlomo Natan is next to him. Photographed on the airfield south of
Ein-Shemer. The airfield was captured in on 28 April 1948 and was the
only one in Israeli hands until the capture of Lod (later Ben-Gurion
Airport) on 12 July 1948. The first gold of the State of Israel,
ammunition, medicine and medical supplies arrived on these runways

Cooperation between the policymakers and the commanders in the field was
one of the best things that happened throughout the War of Independence.
Mutual appreciation and respect made up for the lack of experience, as most
of the process of establishing the system for running the nation took place
during the war.
JUNE 1948 U.N. TRUCE
The battalion headquarters was located in the center of Hadera, in buildings
of the formerly British base (now the Founders' Park, next to the Memorial
House for Fallen Soldiers). The battalion later moved to Camp 80 in Pardess
Hanna, which the British had evacuated during Passover 1948, all with other
bases in the Shomron area. The first truce was proclaimed by the UN for 6

84
p.m. on 11 June 1948. This ceasefire gave the IDF the opportunity to become
strong enough to win the war that had been forced upon it. Israel's triumph
came at the sorrowful price of 6,000 casualties, out of a Jewish population of
600,000 in Israel at that time.

The commander speaks: Itzhak Shemi addresses his men during first truce,
June 1948

Kanir (today Kibbutz Regavim), after its conquest, 1948

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Kanir was a hostile Arab village which actively participated in battles. The
Arabs of the western Shomron had weapons provided them by the
Bosnian (Muslim) units that served I the British army. The Bosnian-Muslim
population was situated in Tantura, Kasr a-Zarka, Kisari (a hostile village
that had been evacuated by the Hagana during the "illegal" immigration
period) and others.
The two photographs above were taken during a patrol conducted in the
village after it was captured by the 131st Battalion and before it was blown
up to prevent the Arab forces from returning and refortifying it. In fact,
immediately after the UN partition decision (in Nov. 1947) the Arab
population began to leave the parts of the Land of Israel that were
intended to pass into Israeli hands. The Arab departure was a new factor
and an important element during that period. The Arabs refused to live
under Jewish rule. "We will never acknowledge them," they declared; "We
will return only when they are no longer here". In contrast, there were
villages that refused to leave

SUMMARY OF BATTLES AND EXPERIENCES
This is what Itzhak Shemi recorded (for the Ein-Shemer archives) about the
battles that took place in the region:

As is known and has already been recorded, the 131st Battalion of the
Alexandroni Brigade was given the mission of holding onto a defensive
position against an Iraqi brigade (from Kibbutz haMa'apil which is
opposite Tul-Karem to Kibbutz Gilad in the north). Our main tasks were
to prevent infiltration via the airfield (today Sha'ar-Menashe) to Hadera
and to evacuate hostile Arab villages.

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The battalion – which was under my responsibility – fulfilled its mission.
It fortified itself against the Iraqis in 12 military posts and from time to
time initiated infiltration and conquest in this sector and fulfilled its tasks
until the beginning of the armistice agreement deliberations in Rhodes
in January 1949.

First of all we had to check out the area next to Tel el-Aswir (Arubot),
16 km east of Hadera. There our jeep drove over a land mine that had
been planted in the trail leading up the hill; the jeep was damaged but
my driver and I miraculously survived with only minor injuries. The Iraqi
forces began to penetrate into the area in order to link up with the
enclave of Arab villages along the coast called "the Little Triangle".

The entire region from Zikhron-Ya'akov to Wadi-Ara (Iron River),
including the coastal zone from the Emek-Hefer settlements in the
south to Haifa in the north, was populated by hostile Arab villagers. The
area from Zikhron-Ya'akov to Haifa was cut off, in contrast to the chain
of Arab villages, especially the wealthy village of Tantura (today
Kibbutz Nakhsholim) in which the Arabs had large numbers of efficient
weapons they had received from the Bosnians – those European
Muslims who had been recruited by the British Army and who
possessed huge storerooms of weapons.

Kibbutz Sdot-Yam was isolated on the coast and therefore we fortified
it by building a bunker and prepared it for what was likely to come, in
particular a possible attack from the sea.

These villages were captured in battles: Khirbet Wadi-Ara (with the aid
of reservists from our kibbutz), Kanir (today Regavim), Abashif, Savarin
(today Ramot Menashe) and Kufrain.

From time to time the UN, which monitored the progression of the
battles, would declare a ceasefire, usually for the Arabs' benefit. Later
the UN realized that it was unreasonable to leave us cut off from Haifa
so it declared a period of "24 hours of police action".

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In the first year of Israel's independence, State Day
was celebrated on 27 July 1948, the anniversary of the
death [20 Tammuz by the Hebrew calendar] of
Theodore Herzl (in Hebrew: Binyamin Ze'ev Herzl)
[father of modern political Zionism and visionary of the
State of Israel].
Commanders of companies B and C. Itzhak Shemi is
seated between them, wearing a so-called
Hittelmacher hat [the Yiddish word means "hat-maker";
the hats were produced and donated by an
anonymous American headwear manufacturer and
philanthropist who had heard that the IDF lacked
uniforms]

Yitzhak's license to carry a pistol on behalf of the Israeli
military police, dated 15 Sept. 1948

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The artillery corps was established in March 1948.There were
few cannons and they had to be moved swiftly from one front
to another. Photo by Peter Sela, courtesy of National Archives

Two major-generals, Dan Even (Alexandroni Brigade) and Moshe
Carmel (Carmeli Brigade) oversaw the implementation; they situated
themselves in Shfeya and supervised the series of battles from there.
The coastal area from Haifa to Sdot-Yam was captured, though not
without many losses; yet we were unable to capture the Arab villages
on the slopes of the rocky mountains. The major-generals turned to
Yigael Yadin, the operations officer [the chief-of-staff of that time] and
we got a couple of Messerschmitts [single-seat fighter planes of Czech
manufacture] with which to bomb from the air. The whine of the
Messerschmitts was what convinced the Arab fighters to surrender,
and after four nights they flew a white flag from one of the buildings.
I had the honor – as commander of the 131st Battalion, on the
boundary between commands (the Alexandroni and Carmeli Brigades)
– to participate in the ceremony of signing the bill of surrender; it was
signed by Attorney Mahadi from Ijzim (today Moshav Kerem-Maharal)
and others, including myself. And so my signature has been preserved
on that document for the generations to come.
At the same time, when we saw that the village of Ijzim had
surrendered and flown the white flag, we did not suspect that it had
been flown in order to attract and deceive us; we marched, the adjutant
and I, up the hill to sign the bill of surrender. As we ascended, our ways
parted due to a large rock in the middle of the path. In an instant a
sniper's bullet whizzed by and grazed my arm. We both quickly took

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cover and approached the village only after order had been restored.
We had again been saved by a miracle, since if the rock had not been
there the bullet would have struck my heart…

As a result of the surrender, all of the residents of the villages were
transferred to Tul-Karem.

During the attack on Tantura (25 May 1948), at dawn, we were
repulsed and suffered casualties, due to the enemy's superior
weapons. I proposed to the then brigade commander (Bentz-Ziv) to
request the use of a Sherman tank for half an hour from the 7th
Brigade, the armored brigade that had been organized under my
command at the airfield.

My suggestion was accepted. At 4 a.m. I sped on my motorbike to the
Ein-Shemer airfield, to the 7th Brigade commander, Chaim Laskov. I
didn't notice that the entire camp was arranged and in order; I took
Chaim aside and whispered to him, "Bentz is hesitant about attacking
Tantura…" Laskov stood quietly for a few moments, looked at me and
blurted out, "We're about to leave for Latrun! I'm giving you secret
information…" I sped back to Bentz, to the headquarters at the Zikhron
Ya'akov police station. I saw him standing in the road, awaiting the
results of my mission. I understood that he was still hesitating about
attacking and told him, "The tanks are moving" [without specifying to
where]. Encouraged, he set out to attack and we conquered [Tantura].

The village refused the Hagana's order to surrender; 13 Alexandroni
fighters and one sailor were killed in the battle and along with them
over 70 of the villagers. After they surrendered, the women and
children were separated from the men, who were transferred at my
command to Tul-Karem.

Years passed and whenever I ran into Bentz I would tease him, "Who
conquered Tantura?!" [for if I had told him that the tanks were going to
Latrun he might not have had the nerve to attack Tantura].

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Holiday in Hadera. First Independence Day. Itzhak stands at center; to his left
is mayor of Hadera, behind him is the commander of Company C. "… Today
the Israeli army does not quote sections from the book Der Judenstaat
[written by Herzl]; rather, it liberates the country itself, piece by piece, fiercely
and heroically in battle. United, ready and steadfast, we will bring the nation to
victory! You have won a great right – to be citizens of the State of Israel!" –
from the speech by Itzhak Shemi, battalion commander. "The nation lifts up its
eyes to its guides and leaders who have brought it to this point" – from the
speech by Dov Berman, mayor of Hadera

OPERATION POLICEMAN
Israeli vehicles on the roads continued to be attacked by snipers. The
villagers refused to cease their sniping or to surrender. This problem
had to be solved. In Operation Policeman (24-26 July 1948) we gained
control of the part of the coastal road.between Zikhron-Ya'akov and
Haifa. The villages of Ein-Radel, Jeba and Ein-Khud [today Ein-Hod]
were captured. In order to prevent refortification by the Arab forces in
the villages, the Hagana decided to destroy them. The explosives were
transported by the sappers' unit of the battalion under the command of
my friend, the well-known architect Avia haShimshoni.
The village of Ein-Khud was spared destruction because we didn't have
enough explosives, and that is my contribution to art…"
- Itzhak Shemi; written on Israel's 30th Independence Day

In the days following the battles, Hagana units systematically combed the
abandoned villages, searching for weapons and lone fighters.

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The Arab radio stations continued to broadcast relentlessly about the Arab
invasion and the defeat of the Zionists, after which the refugees were to return
to their homes.

Operation Policeman yielded very important results for travel on the strip of
coastal road from Hadera to Haifa and for the Shomron district. The Little
Triangle, which had been a small enclave along the coast, with its isolated
villages and tent camps situated on territory that had been allocated to be
under Jewish sovereignty, was evacuated, and the Arabs stopped their
aggressive activities in the sector. The evacuation spurred the villagers to flee
from the Ephriam Mountains and Hefer Valley; they abandoned their homes
and fled eastward or boarded boats and sailed northward to Beirut.

Opposite Kibbutz Gan-Shmuel was the village of Tcherkes, which was
populated by Cirrcassians who attacked vehicles on the Hadera-Afula road.
They bragged that they would capture Hadera, but instead they fled to the
Cirrcassian village of Rekhania in the Galilee.

In accordance with the government decision of 16 June 1948, the abandoned
villages were destroyed and in their place settlements for new immigrants
most of them refugees from the Arab countries, were built.

In this way, the villages of Ijzim, Tantura, Jeba, Sindiana, Kisrai and Savarin
became Kerem-Maharal, Nachshonim, Geva-haCarmel, Aviel, Or-Akiva and
Amikam.

These are the words of Moshe Shertok (Sharet) at that time:

… If someone from amongst us had stood up and said that we must
one day arise and exile all these people – it would have been
considered a crazy idea. But since this has occurred amidst the turmoil
of war, a war that the Arab people declared against us, and during the
voluntary flight of the Arabs themselves – then this is one of those
revolutionary changes after which the wheels of history do not reverse
themselves… the attacking enemy brought this upon itself… and it
must bear the consequences... all this is recompense… for the blood
that was shed and the destruction that was caused.

- From government deliberations, 16 June 1948

Although the Iraqi setup was still perceived as a lasting threat, the western
fringes of the bank had already been conquered and the corridor through
which Wadi-Ara runs had been widened. The national border was pushed
farther back following the battles of Kakun and Ma'anit, which were
particularly long and fierce (especially the battle for Tantura).

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The battalion had great success with the Davidka, the highly inaccurate,
homemade shell that made extremely loud noises and let off bright flashes
upon explosion, causing general panic (according to Arab sources). In order
to avoid casualties, Itzhak Shemi used the method of frightening the enemy
by making noise at night, for which he chose to utilize the Davidka and
mortars.

By this time the entire borderline from Tul-Karem to Megiddo had come under
Itzhak's command; the Salvation Army had been definitively repulsed. Israel
was preparing for the decisive battle [to conquer the West Bank]. Now
weapons were pouring in endlessly. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharet and other
ministers opposed renewal of the fighting, but preparations continued and yet,
no firing order was given. The tension was unremitting.

THE WEST BANK

Ben-Gurion considered the option of occupying the West Bank. In the
meantime, he was content with having the borders withstand the Arab
invasion.

Itzhak received an order to prepare for an operation to push back the Iraqi
forces from his frontline, that is, from the direction of coastal plain and up to
the Jordan River.

These are remarks from Itzhak's lecture in Hadera on 3 June 1985:

The days of battle were nearly over; the Givati Brigade had returned
from the south and part of the Alexandroni Brigade went south to
Falungeh and fought there instead of them. Then we joined forces, the
three brigades – Golani, Carmeli and Alexandroni – and made plans to
capture the West Bank. The method was to grasp it as if by forceps:
the Alexandroni Brigade prepared to enter the bank from the side of the
coastal plain, the Carmeli Brigade the Jezreel Valley. My battalion
was given the task of creating a diversion. We prepared an armored
train and had it advance along the old railway line from Hadera to Tul-
Karem. I knew that in Haifa there was an armored locomotive, to which
we added three train cars and loaded a set of cannons on them.
Everything was prepared with greatest secrecy. The train track had
been partially dismantled, so we appealed to the engineering corps to
solve the problem. We did calculations and took into account the
possible risks. The plan was proceeding, there was much to plan:
ammunition, water and so on. One night, one of a number of sleepless
nights, I received a large envelope, sealed with seven seals. Upon
opening it, I discovered that Sela Bet ["second rock", the name of the
campaign] had been canceled on the order of Ben-Gurion. We were
summoned to him and he explained to us commanders why he had

93
canceled the campaign moments before the end of the fighting: "We in
Israel comprise half a million Jews and we have just recently absorbed
half a million new immigrants; if we were to occupy the West Bank we
would have to deal with an additional population of one million Arabs
and that would be too much for us…"

February 1949: Visit of the Armistice Committee that was involved, under
the leadership of UN representatives. Above right: forward-most military
post of the 131st Battalion. The visit of the delegation in the battle zone of
1948 determined the armistice agreements and the international border.
The negotiations on the armistice agreements and setting borders were
conducted in Rhodes and signed on 3 April 1949

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Large map: state of

affairs in 1948-49;

enclave of Arab

population between

Caesarea and

Carmel, where the

Alexandroni Brigade

operated, is visible

south of Haifa bay on

coast. Inset: map of

1947 United Nations

partition plan of the

Land of Israel,

rejected by the Arab

countries

95

And so, instead of going to fight in a battle in which we could have won
relatively easily, and despite favorable international public opinion, the
Jewish majority in the population in the State of Israel was preserved.
In the end, and relying on the defensive battles that were waged to the
east of Kibbutz Ma'anit, we achieved, by peaceful means, the
agreement on armistice lines that included the mountainous fringes of
the West Bank. Land was added to the country from the West Bank
and the hills that were considered essential for our territorial security.

Immediately after the operation was cancelled, negotiations began on
armistice lines between Israel and Jordan. The common border was long and
winding, and passed through Jewish and Arab populations. The Kingdom of
Transjordan and the State of Israel were both new geographical entities; the
UN partition decision and the armistice line which the battalion had reached
had to be taken into account. These facts complicated the issues. The talks
took place on the island of Rhodes under the mediation of UN representative
Ralph Bunche, a notable American diplomat who later received a Nobel prize
for his achievement.

OPERATION LOT

In a separate action, limited forces from the Alexandroni Brigade advanced
from Be'er Sheva to Sodom, and from there continued by boat to Ein-Gedi;
this force took over the springs, Massada, and a considerable portion of the
eastern shore of the Dead Sea. This action, called Operation Lot [named for
the biblical figure associated with Sodom], was conducted without any
bloodshed.

The battalion received recognition for its military achievements. The areas'
boundaries were widened in many places. Jordan agreed to a borderline that
gave Israel an added, contiguous piece of land 5-8 km wide, from Kfar Kasem
in the south, through Wadi-Ara (the villages of Arara, Kalansuwa and others)
and from there east to Megiddo and the Ta'anachim pass north of Jenin. The
railroad line between Tul-Karem and Binyamina was included in the
boundaries of the State of Israel (and for many years served as Israel's only
train line between Haifa and Jerusalem); as well as the Little Triangle and the
three roads along which battalion battles were fought – Wadi-Ara, Wadi-Milek
and the coastal road between Tel-Aviv and Haifa.

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The 131st Battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade
becomes the 926th Brigade of the Givati Brigade
as the IDF undergoes reorganization, 1950. This
blank form, labeled "secret" and dealing with
changing of military passwords, bears Itzhak
Shemi's name at the bottom along with his rank of
major and title of 926th Battalion commander

97

This travel voucher was issued in Itzhak's
name; it is undated and bears the stamp
"emergency regulations"

Certificate of approval to award War of Independence
ribbon to Itzhak Shemi; signed by Haim Laskov,
commander of 7th Brigade, 1952

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Translation of official army letter above: