JOURNAL OF THE UEL UNDERGRADUATE CONFERENCE

Development in Three Dimensions.

Development, International Politics and
Migration:

Where do we go from here?

JOURNAL OF THE
UEL UNDERGRADUATE

CONFERENCE

5th November 2011
University of East London

London, England

Contents

• Community Radio in Africa – Complimentary factor or sole provider? Potential and restraints 4
of Community Radio in democratization processes in Africa. A case study of Uganda. 13
Anne-Sophie Lockner 18
28
• Why has Nigeria been so prone over the past thirty years to outbreaks of violent religious 39
conflict? 50
Christopher Hosker 60

• Decentralization and Peace: The Effects of Federalism on the Onset of Civil Wars 71
Clara Neupert-Wentz 80

• Challenges on Food Security and Forced Displacement in the 21st Century: the Somali Case.
Helena Tavares and Flávia Lorenzon

• “South Africa is a highly xenophobic society” - An assessment of the causes of xenophobic
attitudes.
Janine Graf

• Reproducing Inequalities: How Schools In Kenya Shape Gendered Power Relations Among
Adolescent Pupils
Lucy Bence-Wilkins

• Incorporating Destabilization, “Strategic Engineered Migration” And Proxyism Into The
Understanding Of The Localized Global Struggle For Resource Capture: A Comparative Study
Of The D.R. Congo And Iraq
Sohrob Kamali

• Gendered Asylum
Yasmine Nagaty, Mohamed Shibl

• What is the role of social movements as one actor in democratic consolidation? The case
of Chile.
Zac Bull

All papers were accepted for publication in November 2011.

2

I am proud to say that I was part of the team that created the first UEL Undergraduate
Conference, Development in Three Dimensions, held on the 5th November 2011.

The conference was run by students, for students. Set up to give undergraduates from the
realms of politics, development, migration, anthropology, economics and many other traditions

the chance to test their academic skills and present their work to their peers, the conference
also served to raise the flag of undergraduate research and to show people what the field

leaders of the future are thinking right now.

We students know very little about how the academic world operates after our degree. The
world of conferences, peer review and publishing is a mystery to us. We do not realise how
much we can gain in our future careers by being part of these processes. We may forsake the
opportunities it can give us. By holding conferences like this, we will continue to change this

perception, and we shall bring attention to something else.

Undergraduate research is an underused and undervalued resource. With our fresh minds and
energy, we are able to provide new points of view. Undergraduate researchers need support,

experience and knowledge of the academic world outside of their own university.

This brings me to the final reason for setting up the conference. We do not often make
meaningful contacts beyond our own universities. Because of this, we miss a great opportunity
for hearing other points of view, developing ideas and creating links that will last throughout

our lives.

The conference has only succeeded in part on these aims. This journal will accomplish the rest.

Inside you will find the best papers from the conference. Coming from researchers across the
world, the topics range from conflict in West Africa, to democratisation in Chile. Read, enjoy,

and remember their names, as you are likely to be hearing their ideas in the future.

Alan Gutsell
Founder, UEL Undergraduate Conference, Development in Three Dimensions.

3

Community Radio in Africa – Complimentary factor or sole provider?
Potential and restraints of Community Radio in democratization processes in

Africa. A case study of Uganda.

Anne-Sophie Lockner
University of Mannheim
[email protected]

Abstract:

In their effort to promote democracy around the world, important development actors as the UNO believe
that bringing forward independent and balanced media systems is an integral part of democratization pro-
cesses. However, achieving this in the African context has proven to be difficult due to highly restrictive and
censorial legislation. This has favored the emergence of community radio and made it increasingly attractive
for democratization actors: Predominantly working in a local framework and involving its audience demo-
cratically in content production, most community radio stations have shown to be successful in sidestepping
governmental as well as economic interests and promoting democracy at the same time. But to what extent
can community radio compensate for the absence of a complete and democratic media structure? The first
part of this paper provides the theoretical basis for this discussion: The functions of national media systems
in democratization processes will be determined on the basis of Voltmer’s media theory (2006). This will be
followed by applying the presented theory on community radio in Uganda, identifying the potential but also
the restraints of the medium. As a conclusion I will find that though community radio provides a solid basis
for democracy, it is far off from fulfilling all the necessary functions single-handedly.

1. Introduction as the consolidation of communal structures (Niel-
inger, 1998, p. 149; Servaes, 2009, p. 52).
Democratization in Africa has been one of the major
issues for development agents during the last sixty It is also social science that has become aware of the
years. Nevertheless, only a few countries on the con- importance of media and in research literature we
tinent are regarded as fully developed democracies. now mostly find three functions, which are held to
In 2005 only ten out of fifty-three political regimes be essential for the survival and stabilization of emer-
were classified as developed democracies while gent democracies (Blankson, 2007, p. 20; Mukhongo,
twenty states were comprehended to be authoritar- 2010, p. 349; Rozumilowicz, 2002, p.13; Voltmer,
ian, military or civil war regimes (Jakobeit & Tetzlaff, 2006, pp. 2-6): Supplying society with relevant infor-
2005, p. 138). mation, providing a forum where diverse opinions
can be discussed and finally acting as a “watchdog”
Although “adequate” democratization approaches concerning political actors and decisions. At the same
are a highly controversial issue among democratiza- time it is emphasized that media will remain unable
tion and development actors in general, some areas to fulfill their functions when denied even a mini-
of democracy promotion have already prevailed: mum degree of freedom and governmental support.
One of them is the promotion of free media. Niel- It is especially the lack of freedom, that has troubled
inger (1998, p. 149) states that this field is of major African media in the past decades: Despite of an
importance, since the media can have great impact extensive “democratization wave” in the late eight-
on the awareness of human rights and the impor- ies and early nineties in whose context many states
tance of democracy of citizens. Moreover, free media liberalized their media policies on paper (Blankson,
is necessary in order to monitor democratization pro- 2007, pp. 15-19; Wanyeki, 2000, p. 25), many jour-
cesses and respective government policies. In con- nalists are still unable to report freely: Apart from
sistency with the assumption that the media is one censorship joint with heavy penalization, harass-
of the protagonists of democratization processes, ments and assaults are common means to keep the
independent, decentralized media is aspired as well media quiet.

4

Of course, no exceptions are made for community p. 120). Although Nassanga (2009) applies a narrow
radio. But in spite of this they constitute an excep- definition, a broader one is normally to be found
tion in the African broadcasting structure: as it covers in the relevant literature (Manyozo, 2009, pp. 3-6;
only small local units and broadcasts on respective Wanyeki, 2000, pp. 26-30): While a community radio
native languages it becomes more difficult to control station is exclusively administrated and arranged by
the content of their programs. Moreover they are a community in the narrow definition, the broader
not financially dependent on the state or on private, approach implies those owned by development or
profit-oriented investors. educational organizations as well1. Despite those dif-
ferences both approaches emphasize the important
By the use of local languages and involving the role of the community in programming and content
community in the production process, they inhere production.
the unique ability of responding to specific cultural
conditions. This is what has made them particularly But what exactly is a community? In the context of
attractive to NGOs and IGOs, which increasingly community radio, the term concentrates on social
strive for founding and funding community radio associations within a geographical unit (Manyozo,
stations (Manyozo, 2009, pp. 2-4; Ocwich, 2010, pp. 2009, p. 2; UNESCO, 2001), where “[t]he sharing of
250; Wanyeki, 2000, pp. 28). economic and social life through trade, marketing,
exchange of goods and services” is one of the central
However, collaboration between community stations characteristics (UNESCO, 2001). And finally there is
and development actors have also proven to imply another important term which needs to be defined
potential for conflicts, as development goals are not in this context, since it is one of the major motiva-
always compatible with the maintenance of cultural tions of NGOs and IGOs to support community radio:
identity. Furthermore, the actual effectiveness of Development communication. This concept relates to
community radio has been questioned. Thus, only a communication strategy, which aims at explaining
limited research has been carried out on its long- and advertising development goals for the respective
term effects on society and governmental behavior community (Servaes, 2009, p. 51). It is built up on the
(Wanyeki, 2000, p. 34). Which advantages does com- assumption that development can only be achieved
munity radio really present in terms of accessibil- through the active participation of the population
ity and programming in comparison to other media concerned (UNESCO, 2001). However, the actual idea
in Africa? And in which aspects can it contribute to of “development means many different things to dif-
democratization? These questions will be examined ferent communities and constituencies“ (Wilkins,
on the basis of the Ugandan case after providing a 2005, S. 232). Coming to an agreement on the term
foundation of relevant definition and theory. is complicated by the fact that there have been sev-
eral paradigm shifts since the beginning of post-colo-
2. Conceptual, methodological and theoretical nial history. These again have strongly affected the
foundations objectives and methods of development communi-
cation (Servaes, 2009, pp. 50-53; Nassanga, 2009, pp.
In order to analyze the special case of Uganda, we 45-47). Notwithstanding the conceptual differences
first need to gain an understanding of the most rel- concerning development, nowadays its goals and
evant concepts dealt with in this paper. Moreover, it strategies are usually geared to the Millennium Dec-
has to be discussed in how far Uganda is an adequate laration’s values, such as liberty, equality, solidarity,
representative in the context of media system devel- shared responsibility and tolerance (Servaes, 2009,
opment in Africa. p. 52). And since these values are important corner
stones of democratic, pluralistic and liberal political
2.1. Community Radio and Development Communi- order, one can assume that democracy is an implicit
cation objective as well.

The term “community radio” is generally used for Servaes indicates that despite this norm consensus,
those radio stations which arrange themselves modern and cultural orientated development strat-
according to the principle “radio for and by the com- egies emphasize that there cannot be a universal
munity” (Manyozo, 2009, p. 2). In other words, it model of development, because ”development is an
refers to a radio station „which is collectively owned integral, multidimensional and dialectic process that
by the community, where the community participates
in management and programming” (Nassanga, 2009, 1. Religious and environmental organizations are included.

5

can differ from society to society, community to com- decision making must be a process of negotiation,
munity, context to context” (2009, p. 52). This para- which includes as many actors as possible.
digm is reflected in most contemporary approaches
of development communication as well: We find the •  Information Function: A basic principle of democ-
decentralization of media systems and the strength- racy demands that decisions are taken on the
ening of local media structures as crucial elements basis of the will of the people (representatively
in most strategies (Nielinger, 1998, p. 149; Servaes, or directly). But in order to avail themselves of
2009, p. 52). this power in a competent and rational manner,
citizens need to dispose of sufficient information
2.2 About the significance of the media in democra- and education. Therefore media has to provide
tization processes. citizens extensively with high quality information.
This function works with the assumption that
Before turning our attention to the complex relation when citizens base their decisions on “correct”
between media and democratization, it is necessary information the legitimacy of the respective politi-
to shed some light on the concept of democratiza- cal system will be increased.
tion. Rozumilowicz provides a quite simplistic expla-
nation of the term: “`Democratization‘ implies pro- •  Control Function: The media has to act as a
gress towards some ideal of democracy“ (2002, S. 9). watchdog of the democratization process. They
She adds that there is no further consensus about the need to monitor the actions of the political elite
term. I will abstain from compiling differing under- and remind them to their responsibilities towards
standings of democratization of actors in different the citizens of their country. Although it is held
contexts at this point, as I consider it more relevant to be an essential function, it is also clear that
to note that diverse cooperating democratization early stage democracies normally act under very
actors can have very divergent concepts of their pur- unstable and turbulent conditions. That is why in
poses and goals. These differences can be small and some cases the media needs to evaluate whether
insignificant in some cases, but they can also inherit the additional pressure they cause for the politi-
seriously conflicting interests in others. Thus, the cal system is still bearable for the new system or
term “democratization” does not only imply a variety whether it rather enhances riots and agitation,
of different means to achieve a common objective, which endanger democracy.
but it can even indicate substantially different objec-
tives in the first place. In the context of this paper In order to perform their duties media systems need
I will understand the term as a process aiming at to be independent from the state (Blankson, 2007,
the establishment of a polyarchic system of govern- p. 15; Mukhongo, 2010, p. 350; Rozumilowicz, 2002,
ment2, which advances the values of the Millennium p. 12). However, Rozumilowicz points out that a
Declaration of the United Nations. This broad defini- complete subjection to the logic of the free market
tion allows the inclusion of a wide range of under- instead is also harmful for democracy, since “market
standings of democracy. introduces its own prospects of tyranny“ (2002,
p. 13). Further it is important to note that political
As already mentioned earlier, theory orientated lit- transformation and the media are highly interde-
erature provides several basic functions of media in pendent (Voltmer, 2006, p. 6, quoted from Mughan
democratization processes. Voltmer (2006, pp. 2-6) & Gunther, 2000, S. 2): Every development or change
identifies three substantial ones: of respective behavior or actions will have effects on
the other one. A repressive legislation strategy for
•  Forum Function: The media is supposed to work instance will constrain the media’s ability to manage
as a “marketplace of ideas”, where groups as its function (Blankson, 2007, pp. 23-27). On the other
well as individuals can freely express and discuss hand the media can influence the government’s pri-
their opinions. In this context the media should orities via agenda-setting (Mukhongo, 2010, p. 349).
not work as a passive service provider, but pay a
lot of attention to balanced coverage. Thereby it 2.3 Uganda: All for one or one for all? What qualifies
will contribute to the development of a vivid civil Uganda for case study.
society. This function is based on the norm that
Choosing Uganda as a representative case has two
2. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the term “polyar- major reasons: One is related to the country’s politi-
chy“ consult Jakobeit & Tetzlaff, 2005, pp. 133-138. cal condition and the other one to its demographic

6

structure. also diverse types of social order systems. Uganda
represents this diversity to a sufficient extent (Chibita,
Uganda has experienced democratization attempts 2009, p. 298-300; Kayanja, 2002, p. 155; Ocwich,
since the late eighties. These are in line with efforts 2010, p. 249: There are around thirty-six languages
of several other countries in the same time period spoken by more than fifty different ethnic groups.
(Jakobeit & Tetzlaff, 2005, p. 156-160). The urge for Most of these spoken languages do not contain any
democracy in Uganda came along with free and com- similarities to the other ones at all. In spite of English
petitive elections as well as a new democratic con- being the first official language, it is only commanded
stitution, which now guarantees basic rights such as by a - mostly urban - minority of the Ugandans, who
the freedom of the press and the freedom of opin- could benefit from an extensive education. For the 80
ion. In 2005 Uganda even implemented a multi-party % of the population who live in rural places, English
system via referendum. Despite these achievements usually remains unknown. Even Luganda, the most
the country is still far away from gaining the status of spoken language in the country, is only commanded
a free democracy. This is due to a subjecting ruling by 17,3 % of the population. These extremely diver-
elite that impedes the establishment of a pluralis- sified social and linguistic structures are especially
tic principle of competition by enforcing repressive attractive conditions to community media, since
measurements against independent media, opposi- they promote the formation of local media in its very
tion and civil society (Kayanja, 2002, p. 159-161). The nature. Community radio becomes desirable to the
situation in the country can be described as semi- population when the traditional media system, con-
democratic: Thus there is a constitutionally estab- sistent of state owned and private broadcasters as
lished democracy, which is undermined in the con- well as print media, do not have sufficient capacities
stitutional reality. The described status of Uganda is to supply linguistic or ethnic minorities with informa-
typical of many African countries and presents very tion. Some traditional media outlets (especially in
similar challenges to the respective media systems the private sector) also simply lack interest in doing
(Mukhongo, 2010, p. 342). so, since it is not profitable. Uganda, as well as other
African countries are faced with that problem, caus-
“A lot of governments on the continent con- ing minorities to become outcasts in their own coun-
tinue to impose judicial end extra-judicial tries (Chibita, 2009, p.301; Wanyeki 2000, p. 25). In
barriers on journalists and media houses, in the next section I will inquire what community radio
a manner which defeats the professed goals can achieve and improve in that context.
of democratic governance and the purposes
behind constitutional provisions of a free press 3. Community Radio in Uganda: Framework, chances
and freedom of expression.” (Tettey, 2001, p. and challenges.
11)
In order to gain an understanding of the extent
Especially private broadcasters are often subjected in which community media can contribute to the
to heavy license fees and supervisory committees, democratization in Uganda, it is necessary to inquire
which has led to self-censorship in many cases the context that they are embedded in. Therefore
(Chibita, 2009, p. 300; Mukhongo, 2010, p. 348). Fur- we have to deal with Ugandan’s media system and
thermore, journalists frequently become victims of its role fulfillment in the first place. Subsequently it
physical attacks, arrests and the suspension of their will be possible to assess advantages and constraints
licenses when still deciding to speak the “inconven- of community radio in comparison to the traditional
ient” truth (Blankson, 2007, p. 22-27; Kayanja, 2002, set of media.
p. 168; Tettey, 2001, p.11). As I will show in a more
detailed manner later on Uganda has experienced a 3.1 Context assessment: Ugandan traditional media
“typical” African political development in that sense and the democratization process.
and therefore works as an appropriate representa-
tive. In 1989 free elections were held in Uganda for the
first time in its history. A new constitution, which
As already said before, the second reason refers to promised to defend the basic rights of its citizens, fol-
demographic attributes: Africa’s population is char- lowed in 1995 (Kayanja, 2002). And after independ-
acterized by a very high degree of diversity (Jakobeit ent free media had been banned by alternating dic-
& Tetzlaff, 2005, p. 61). There are not only a lot of tatorial regimes for several decades, it again became
different peoples and languages on the continent but

7

legal under the democratically elected government of State-run broadcasting consists of one television
Musevani. The legalization quickly induced a massive channel as well as one radio station. In the attempt
enlargement of the media market (Chibita & Fourie, of doing justice to the linguistic diversity of the coun-
2007; Kayanja, 2000, p. 156; Ocwich, 2010, p. 249): try, the radio station officially transmits programs in
While there had been only one single radio station twenty-four different languages. However, Chibita
in 1990, which was further state-owned, sixty-five (2009, p. 303) criticizes that most of these languages
stations were counted in 2000 (BBC, 2006) and hun- occupy a very short time slot combined, while lan-
dred fourty-four in 2008. Currently the majority of guages of the economic and administrative elite pre-
Ugandan radio stations are privately owned (Chibita, vail.
2009, p. 300, quoted after the Uganda Communica-
tions Commission). With regard to contents, entertainment formats and
music dominate the programming of Ugandan pri-
However the new regime also installed control vate radio broadcasters (BBC, 2006). But also talk-
instruments in order to prevent and to sanction show formats are becoming increasingly popular
critical reporting: Along with the new constitution, (Mwesige, 2009, p. 241).
a law on press and journalists was enacted in 1995:
It made a provision for the later established Media Compared to broadcasting the print sector is still of
Council, which is directly subordinated to the Ugan- minor importance. A very low illiteracy rate of about
dan Minister of Information. Among its competences 50 % and infrastructural restrictions limit the deliv-
are the ability to censor media reports and to penal- ery scope of newspapers. These are the main factors,
ize journalist for the breach of established rules (Kay- which keep print media behind (Kayanja, 2000, p.
anja, 2000, S. 161). Critical evaluation does also cor- 155). In 2002 only 1 % of the population used print
respond to the fact that broadcasters have to apply media as their main information source (BBC 2006,
annually for extension of their licenses. In this con- quoted after the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
text, Kalyango (2009, p. 206) observes that “the gov- On the contrary, radio is of high relevance for the
ernment occasionally suspended operating licenses Ugandan people. Nielinger (1998, p. 57) states, that
of critical FM stations, accusing them of producing most African societies are traditionally based on oral
content likely to damage their reputation“. Further- transmission of information. Thus it does not surprise
more, particularly small-scale broadcasters strug- that in 2002 49,2 % of the Ugandans declared to use
gle with the current system because it is difficult for the spoken word as their main source of information.
them to afford the high license fees (BBC, 2006). Radio came second with 47,8% (BBC, 2006, quoted
after the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Private and profit-orientated media has gained a lot
of weight in the Ugandan market since the middle Three sets of problem become evident when regard-
of the nineties. However, they only provide their ser- ing the traditional Ugandan media system (mean-
vices for a minority of the Ugandan people: Although ing commercial and state-owned media combined)
80 % of the population live in rural areas, ten out of under the criteria of Voltmer. The first one relates
fourteen television stations are based in the capital to concentration tendencies as well as the commer-
and exclusively broadcast in English and Luganda cial focus, which undermine the information func-
(Chibita, 2009, p. 303; Chibita & Fourie, 2007, p.22). tion. It particularly affects the rural majority of the
population. The depicted insufficiency also has direct
Theoretically commercial radio has the ability to consequences on the forum function: The restricted
reach a greater percentage of the population com- accessibility of media contents leads to a constraint
bined, due to their local orientation. This includes of the possibility to take part in public discussions.
the assumption that programming in the respec- As a consequence the media promulgates a distorted
tive local language is desirable for radio broadcast- picture of the actual civil society. And finally the abil-
ers. Yet an opposed trend has been observed for the ity to fulfill the control function is curtailed by the
Ugandan radio broadcasting: “[S]maller languages fact that repressive government actions prevent the
with no significant economic power behind them development of independent and critical journalism
tend to be gradually edged off the programming (Kayanja, 2000, p. 174). Summing up, the Ugandan
schedule“(Chibita, 2009, S. 301, quoted after Wilkin- media system is hardly to be considered as a democ-
son, 2005). Favored languages usually are English ratization actor in the sense of Voltmer’s theory.
and Luganda.

8

3.2 Opportunities: How community radio speaks 3.3 Challenges: Financial sustainability and internal

with the voice of the people. conflicts of aims.

The described concentration tendencies caused the Although community radio occupies a unique posi-
emergence of an information vacuum in the rural tion within the Ugandan media system, which is
area. Filling it with information has been one of the favorable to democratization in some aspects, it also
founding principles of community radio stations in faces certain constraints. First, there is to mention
Uganda (BBC, 2006; Nassanga, 2009b, p. 122). The the problem of funding and financial security (Man-
efforts to found community radios are combined with yozo, 2009, p. 8-10): Just like private stations, com-
the willingness of NGO’s and IGO’s to act as donors. munity stations also have to apply for licenses and
pay high fees every year. Moreover, a lot of money
In 1999 the first community radio station went on air3 has to be spent on equipment as well as vocational
and was called “Kibale Kagadi Community Radio”. It and advanced trainings for the staff. A permanent
was founded by a British foundation and the Ugan- campaign for funds is required to cover those costs.
dan NPO “The Uganda Rural Development” serving However, obtaining financial support has proven
the main objective to promote sustainable devel- to be difficult since most financial means of NGOs
opment in the field of education and agriculture. are project-bound and can only be granted when a
Within the following five years the establishment detailed project proposition is presented in advance.
of Mama FM and Radio Apac followed and by 2005 This again overburdens a community’s capacity in
the number of registered community stations had many cases. Besides complicated application proce-
officially raised to twelve (BBC, 2006, quoted after dures Manyozo (2009, pp. 8-10) criticizes the insta-
Uganda Broadcasting Council, 2006). Nowadays the bility of many sponsorship initiatives. In his eyes, one
three first mentioned stations are completely held by of the major challenges is developing a sustainable
their respective communities. However, the major- model of self-financing for community radios.
ity of community stations are owned by NGOs (BBC,
2006; Nassanga, 2009b, p. 50). Though being owned Most funding initiatives in Africa and Uganda are
by non-profit organizations usually comes along with based on the belief that participative media like com-
scarce financial means (Manyozo, 2009, pp. 8-10), it munity radio can give a vivid impression of the prin-
allows them to have a close link to their audience, ciples of democracy to their audience. However this
since it involves the local population in programming claim sometimes leads to cultural identity conflicts
and management. In practice, this has integrated as the “Senga”5 case illustrates: “Senga” refers to a
many aspects of local culture in program designs: specific program of one Ugandan community radio
Dralega (2009, p. 31) for instance, reports that some station, where young women are prepared for mar-
stations implemented “Herbalist” programs, where riage and their upcoming duties (Dralega, 2009, p.
traditional healers give individual suggestions for the 30). The program suggests strict subordination to the
cure of certain diseases. Another important program husband and emphasizes the women’s dependence
format is called “Ekimeeza”4. Though its origins are on him. Moreover, the program promotes the tradi-
to be found in commercial radio broadcasting, the tion of widows being passed on to one of the dead
format has been picked up and developed further husband’s brothers. It is evident that those practices
by community stations (Mwesige, 2009, p. 222; Nas- clash with the western understanding of democracy
sanga, 2009b, p. 52): It basically implies live trans- as well as the Millennium Declaration of the UN,
missions of discussions on current topical issues, which promote the equality of men and women.
which are intentionally held in public spaces. That Since there has only been very little research about
way it also enables people who do not have phones programming and effects of community radio in
or internet access and could not take part in studio Africa and Uganda on an aggregate level, it is difficult
discussions, to participate. Ekimeezas enjoy great to determine whether cases as “Senga” constitute an
popularity among the population and were success- exception or a common source of conflict. But seem-
fully defended against a governmental attempt to ingly the transfer between local culture and western
ban them in 2002 (BBC, 2006). development goals is a serious challenge for com-
munity radio actors and definitely deserves more
3. That was quite late in comparison to other African countries,
where the idea of community radio stations already arouse in 5. The word “Senga“ means “father’s sister“. It is a tradition that
the forties (Manyozo, 2009, p. 2). the aunt prepares her niece for marriage, when she reaches a
certain age.
4. The translation refers to a “round table”.

9

research in the future. Summing up we see that community radio is a rel-
evant actor in the area of empowerment of civil soci-
3.4 Community Radio: Sole provider or stop-gap ety. In this context community radio is able to par-
solution? tially balance out one of the major flaws of private
media by involving marginalized ethnic and linguistic
In this section I come back to my main research ques- groups in their programs. However, it is important
tion: What does and what can community radio con- to also realize that community radio is far off from
tribute to democratization processes in Uganda and compensating the shortcoming of the whole Ugan-
Africa? The answer is provided on the basis on the dan media system when it comes to democratization
previous analysis and Voltmer’s criteria: functions. Therefore one should understand commu-
nity radio as a complimentary element to traditional
•  Forum Function: Community radios strive for the media in terms of democracy promotion (Wanyeki,
integration of the complete local population and 2000, p.38).
among other aspects they work with participative
program formats to achieve this objective. The 3.5 What about Africa? – From specific to general
“Ekimeeza” model is an example of that. How-
ever, the small number of community stations in a To which extent can we generalize the specific case
country with twenty-two million inhabitants indi- of Uganda for Africa? As already mentioned, many
cates that only a small minority can actually ben- African countries have enacted repressive policies on
efit from their work. On account of this it might be media. In this context Freedom House (2007) states
reasonable to differentiate between two levels: that only eight states in Subsaharan Africa granted
On a national level the activity of community complete press freedom in 2007. As one might
radios cannot lead to the formation of a united expect, Uganda is not one of them.
and vivid civil society. Yet the stations contribute
to the establishment of a “micro-public sphere” Since political liberalization in the nineties many Afri-
(Ocwich, 2010, p. 250, quoted from Keane, 2004, can media systems find themselves completely sub-
p. 367) within their local units, meaning the shap- jected to the free market, which has led to the negli-
ing of a local public identity. Hence it can be con- gence of ethnic and linguistic minorities:
cluded that a forum function is performed only
in those communities, where community radio is „The Ugandan scenario is in many ways typi-
present. cal of the dilemma of Africa´s broadcast media
(and in particular the radio) in continuing to
•  Information Function: Covering political issues is provide linguistic diversity in a fast-commer-
not the main focus of community radio. Instead, cializing environment as they strive to remain
discussing immediate problems of the community political save and financially viable.” (Chibita,
as well as promoting sustainable development is 2009, p. 301)
considered to be important. Therefore one cannot
say that community radio fulfills an information Most radio broadcasters have exclusively specialized
function in the sense of imparting extensive politi- on urban areas (Blankson, 2007, p. 19; Nassanga,
cal education. 2009b, p. 43). In order to close this gap, African com-
munity radios mainly focus on rural areas (Ocwich,
•  Control Function: Nassanga (2009b, p. 54) identi- 2010, S. 242). Despite these general tendencies, it is
fies community radio in Uganda and East Africa as a important to note that implementation, funding and
platform, “where the government is held account- recognition of community radio are currently on dif-
able. However this statement might be questiona- ferent levels in different African countries. On one
ble for the case of Uganda, when considering that side there are countries like South Africa, where com-
community radios have to apply for licenses at the munity radio has a tradition of more than fifty years.
national Media Council. This urges them to keep a The respective government recognizes and even
low political profile (Chibita, 2009b, p. 54) as well funds community stations while education institutes
as commercial broadcasters do. Furthermore, like the Rhodes University have implemented devel-
community radios are small-scale organizations opment communication lectures in their journal-
with a local focus and neither have the financial ism curricula. On the other side there are countries
means nor the required contacts to cover political like Ethopia, where the government only recently
issues discussed in the capital. allowed local media in the context of decentraliza-

10

tion measures (Nassanga, 2009b, pp. 50-51). Acknowledgement

Almost all African countries share the common I would like to thank the Rationale Altruisten Man-
fact that the radio is by far the most relevant mass nheim Association very much, which encouraged me
medium for poor and rural people (Servaes, 2009, p. to particpate at the conference by giving me a gener-
58). For this reason advancing and funding commu- ous research grant.
nity radio is very likely to remain an attractive way of
promoting democracy and development in the forth-
coming years.

4. Conclusion Bibliography:

The inquiry showed that community radio is rather BBC World Service Trust, 2006. African Media Development
a complimentary factor in the democratization pro- Initiative: Uganda Country Report. Context. Radio. Available at:
cess, since it cannot provide single-handedly what <http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ trust/pdf/AMDI/
is demanded of a complete media system. However, uganda/amdi_uganda5_radio.pdf>. [Accessed 8 November
community radio seems to be quite successful when 2010].
it comes to stimulating participation and discussion
within small, mostly local groups. Moreover, in times Blankson, I., 2007. Media independence and pluralism in
when private media systematically excludes certain Africa: Opportunities and challenges of democratization
minorities from information supply, community radio and liberalization. In: I. Blankson and P. Murphy, eds. 2007.
exercises a unique and important integrative func- Negotiating democracy: Media transformations in emerging
tion as it becomes the only available source of infor- democracies. Albany: State University of New York, pp. 15-34.
mation for many.
Chibita, M.B., Fourie, P.J., 2007. A socio-history of the media
In the belief that no general development model can and participation in Uganda. Communicatio, 1, pp. 1-25.
apply to the enormous linguistic, ethnical and soci-
etal diversity in Africa, development actors increas- Chibita, M.B., 2009. The politics of broadcasting, language
ingly strive for placing their work in specific ethnic policy and democracy in Uganda. Journal of African Media
and local community contexts. This way they can Studies, 2, pp. 295-307.
incorporate specific practices, traditions and lan-
guages in their development strategy design. Right Dralega, C.A., 2009. Participatory ethos, multimedia
in fits the concept of community radio and there- experiments, and disjunctures in community media in Uganda.
fore has become quite attractive for international Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 1, pp. 24-41.
development actors. Thus it might not surprise that
the UNESCO (2001) calls community radio “the heart Freedom House, 2007. Press Freedom Declines in Sub-Saharan
of communication and democratic processes within Africa, Particularly in Horn and East Africa. Available at:
societies”. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&y
ear=2010&country=7940>. [Accessed 1 January 2011].
Despite the vast interest in their role as development
promoters, only a small amount of research exists Jakobeit, C. and Tetzlaff, R., 2005. Das nachkoloniale Afrika.
concerning the long-term effects of community radio Politik - Wirtschaft - Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
programming on society. While qualitative studies Sozialwissenschaften.
have been able to describe and analyze effects in
specific study cases, the lack of quantitative research Kalyango Jr., Y., 2009. Political News Use and Democratic
is problematic when it comes to the determination Support: A Study of Uganda´s Radio Impact. Journal of Radio
of general tendencies, problems and advantages. & Audio, 2, pp. 200-215.
Moreover, African community radio in general is a
rather recent phenomenon, which only emerged in Kayanja, R.D., 2002. The current state of media reform in Uganda.
the nineties or even later in most countries. In: E. P. Monroe, B. Rozumilowicz and S.G. Verhulst, eds. 2002.
Media reform: Democratizing the media, democratizing the
For these reasons it will probably still take a while state. London: Routledge, pp. 155-179.
until research can lead to valid statements on how
community radio shapes democratization processes Manyozo, L., 2009. Mobilizing rural and community radio in
in Africa in detail. Africa. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 1, pp. 1-23.

Mukhongo, L.L., 2010. Can the media in Africa shape Africa´s
political future? Journal of African Media Studies, 3, pp. 339-
352.

Mwesige, P.G., 2009. The democratic functions and dysfunctions
of political talk radio: the case of Uganda. Journal of African
Media Studies, 2, pp. 221-245.

Nassanga, G.L., 2009a. Participatory discussion programs as
‘hybrid community media’ in Uganda. International Journal of
Media and Cultural Politic, 1 & 2, pp. 119-124.

Nassanga, G.L., 2009b. An assessment of the changing
community media parameters in East Africa. Ecquid Novi:
African Journalism Studies, 1, pp. 42-57.

Nielinger, O., 1998. Demokratie und Good Governance in

11

Afrika. Internationale Demokratisierungshilfe als neues
entwicklungspolitisches Paradigma? Münster: Lit.
Ocwich, D., 2010. Public journalism in Africa: trends,
opportunities and rationale. Journal of African Media Studies,
2, pp. 241-254.
Rozumilowicz, B., 2002. Democratic change: A theoretical
perspective. In: E. P. Monroe, B. Rozumilowicz and S.G.
Verhulst, eds. 2002., Media reform: Democratizing the media,
democratizing the state. London: Routledge, pp. 9-26.
Servaes, J., 2009. Communication policies, good governance
and development journalism. Communicatio, 1, pp. 50-80.
Tettey, W.J., 2001. The media and democratization in Africa:
contributions, constraints and concerns of the private press.
Media, Culture & Society, 1, pp. 5-31.
UNESCO, 2001. Community Radio Handbook. Available
at: <http://www.unesco.org/ webworld/ publications/
community_radio_handbook.pdf> [Accessed 9 January 2010].
Voltmer, K., 2006. The mass media and the dynamics of political
communication in processes of democratization. In: E. P.
Monroe, B. Rozumilowicz and S.G. Verhulst, eds. 2002. Media
reform: Democratizing the media, democratizing the state
London: Routledge, pp. 1-20.
Wanyeki, L.M., 2000. The development of community media in
East and Southern Africa. In: K.S.T. Boafo, ed. 2000. Promoting
Community Media in Africa. Paris: UNESCO, pp. 25-43.
Wilkins, K.W., 2005. Reviews: Development in context.
International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 2, pp. 231-
233.

12

Why has Nigeria been so prone over the past thirty years to outbreaks of violent
religious conflict?

Christopher Hosker
School of Oriental and African Studies

[email protected]

Abstract:

Many regions in Nigeria have experienced widespread violence linked to religious tensions. The paper uses
anthropological analysis to understand the varying explanations for religious-based conflict across several
regions in Nigeria. The thesis put forward follows the work of Ruth Marshall and argues that it was the per-
ception of a ’moral state of exception’ amongst many Nigerians, which led to violence being made the norm.
Many inter-dependent conditions have existed within this complex social environment to make the Middle
Belt and Northern regions prone to religious conflict. I argue, however, that a salient factor in this was the
belief shared by Christians and Muslims that there was a perception of immorality in Nigerian society. This
study holds implications for a post-9/11 context, in which a further politicisation of religion may well maintain
this perception of immorality. In light of the violence in Jos in recent years, further anthropological research
of religious conflict is needed.

The problem concerning violence in Nigeria Christians and Muslims that immorality was rampant
is that not only is it linked with religion, but also is within Nigerian state and society. A moral ‘state of
inherently political in nature. Two controversies in exception’, as encapsulated in Ruth Marshall’s work
recent years in Nigeria, the debate over implement- and influenced by Giorgio Agamben’s bio-political
ing a Shari’ah judicial court in the North, and of Nige- interpretation of the term (Marshall, 2009; Agam-
rian membership into the Organisation of the Islamic ben, 2005), is here argued to justify in the minds of
Conference, are commonly placed as the fuel for the unemployed, in student movements, and com-
violent clashes between Muslims and Christians in mitted followers the use of extreme violence.
the North and Middlebelt. However, the problem is
far more complex than religious ‘fanatics’ enacting The theoretical approach adopted here is
violence on other citizens in Nigeria. Indeed, often influenced by Agamben’s political theory outlined
there was as much violence amongst Muslims, and in State of Exception. Intended as a response to an
disagreements between Christian groups, as there earlier interpretation of a state of exception, Agam-
was between the two faiths. Rather, the reasons ben’s examination of the legal suspension of the rule
why Nigerians of differing religious convictions have of law can be translated to a variety of contexts. The
violently clashed since the 1970s are multi-layered, concept of a state of exception can be seen as a con-
and because the incidence of religious violence have stitutional provision made to extend the powers of a
mostly concentrated around the Northern and Mid- government in emergency, and legitimate previously
dlebelt regions, I will limit the study to religious-based unlawful actions. Agamben explains, ‘As a figure of
conflicts in these areas. Poor socio-economic condi- necessity, the state of exception therefore appears…
tions for the majority of Northern and Middlebelt as an “illegal” but perfectly “juridical and constitu-
areas, with high urban unemployment; a perception tional” measure that is realised in the production of
of social and moral deprivation both in public and by new norms’ (Agamben, 2005: 28). This can variously
politicians; the provision of an answer through reli- be seen in Agamben’s examples of a permanent
gious piety; narrowed perceptions of identity into state of exception in Nazi Germany, and of post-9/11
the binary Muslim and Christian construct. All are America after the introduction of the PATRIOT Act
inter-dependent conditions for which violent con- (Agamben, 2005). This state of exception can also be
flict may arise in Nigeria. It is the contention of this useful in explaining the social conditions that led to
essay, however, that a significant factor in causing widespread religious violence in Nigeria.
violent conflict was a perception on the part of both
Ruth Marshall’s ethnography of Nigerian

13

Pentecostalism conveys Agamben’s concept into the conversion experiences’ (Marshall, 2009: 226). Seek-
socio-cultural context of Nigeria. The common per- ing religious hegemony over a population increas-
ception by many in Nigeria has been that there is an ingly populated within dense urban spaces undoubt-
‘extreme and pervasive character of “lawlessness” edly has an antagonistic effect. However, conversion
and “wickedness”’ (Marshall, 2009: 209) existing in alone cannot explain the explosion of extreme vio-
modern society. From both Christian and Muslim per- lence in recent years, when Islam and later Christian-
spectives, the actions of politicians, some religious ity have both attempted religious hegemony in West
leaders, vigilante groups and other social actors have Africa, not always to a violent effect.
variously been portrayed as corrupt and immoral.
This perception of corruption and amoral conduct in Religion, Falola has noted, has been integral
Nigerian politics and society has been widely cited to the workings of Nigerian politics well before vio-
(Smith, 2008). Marshall has shown that Agamben’s lent conflict erupted in the 1970s, ‘in the precolonial
state of exception, in which a government’s suspen- era, religion was integral to the state; it was part of
sion of the rule of law legitimates illegal actions, can identity construction, a means for power legitima-
also be used in non-state social formations, particu- tion, and a determiner of economic might’ (Falola,
larly in the context of religious groups and practice. 1998: 1-2). With this in mind, it can hardly be the
A ‘continual state of exception’ (Marshall, 2009: 210) emergence of religious groups influential in the polit-
is formed out of this perceived immorality in Nige- ical discourses of the Nigerian state, which singly
ria, and I argue this can provide the conditions in explains the eruption of the religious crises since the
which sporadic religious violence may be justified. I 1970s. Rather, it is the radical politicization of certain
will come back to this theoretical explanation to the religious groups that have contributed to the likeli-
violence last, as I consider it to be a significant factor. hood of violent clashes erupting in Nigeria, together
I will first, however, take the various social, histori- with a perception that their convictions are of sali-
cal, and political lines of argument, and consider how ence within a moral state of exception. Of the Maitat-
each are important to explaining religious violence in sine violence, Falola argues that, it ‘can be explained
Northern and Middlebelt Nigeria. as a consequence of Islamic fundamentalism on the
one hand, and of the political decadence and eco-
Both Christianity and Islam in Nigeria have had nomic troubles of the 1970s on the other...the riot-
long histories of conversion, not least in part because ers were attempting to cleanse society’ (Falola, 1998:
the religion with the majority, it has been perceived, 138). This analysis is reflective of a common percep-
would gain hegemony over religious (and political) tion in Nigeria, that society has become corrupted
discourse. Consequently, both religions took on the (Smith, 2008). A popular response by many has been
task of converting en masse, ‘Both major Nigerian to radicalize their forms of religious practices, which
religions tend to see one another as rivals fighting for increasingly overlaps with the political process. An
control of converts and of the state itself...“Spreading example of this can be seen by the demands made
the gospel” meant more than introducing Christian- by the Muslim Student Society for Islamic law, a
ity; it also implied fighting Islam’ (Falola, 1998: 37). rejection of the Nigerian constitution and full mem-
A violent discourse can thus be evidenced in con- bership into the Organisation of the Islamic Confer-
version. Moreover, the act of conversion not only ence (Kenny, 1996). Such politicization of religious
marginalizes the position of those following other formations, of even informal ones like a student soci-
beliefs, like traditional religious practices, and of non- ety, led to violent rioting in Kano in 1982, and the
belief, but also takes a large step toward the produc- burning of eight churches (Kenny, 1996: 358). Whilst
tion of the religious binary identity of Christian and authors like Ikenga-Metuh attribute the extreme vio-
Muslim. Authors like Y. B. Usman have argued that lence in the North of Nigeria throughout the 1980s
the importance placed over both religious groups by not as inherently religious, but as a political problem
the media in Nigeria during the various crises, have (Olupona, 1992: 17), the significance of religious dis-
allowed both religious parties to attain the public’s course cannot be removed from such events.
attention, and thus claim dominance, (Usman, 1987:
pp. 15-16). The drive for conversion is further high- The political and the religious in Nigeria
lighted by Marshall’s observation, that ‘the conver- cannot be separated; at least, not in the same way
sion of Muslims was a growing priority, and in con- as has been attempted in the West since the Enlight-
gregations Muslim converts were increasingly prized enment. Two controversies that have contributed to
and urged to give special testimonies about their the severity of the violence seen in many Northern

14

towns are the introduction of Shari’a and of member- and national identity.
ship into the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.
Neither can be singled out as political or religious, Scholarly interest in religious conflict in Nige-
although the state’s actions have far from alleviated ria has often focused on the intensely violent riots
the situation (Kenny, 1996: 342). Indeed, the state in the northern states, in Kano, Kaduna and the Jos
cannot be said to have remained impartial, when Plateau especially. This reflects the common percep-
considering scholars like Kukah view ‘the ascendancy tion of the territory of Nigeria split along a North and
of Hausa-Fulani hegemony has coincided with the South divide, with a Muslim-dominant population in
alienation and marginalisation of the non-Muslims’ the North, a Christian predominated South, and a
(Kukah, 1993: x). Religious conflict, it seems, is not religiously heterogeneous ‘Middle Belt’. As the most
only linked to the political, but also of the myriad cul- severe violence occurred within this Middle Belt in
tures living within Nigerian boundaries. This is in no towns like Jos and Kafanchan, the attention of schol-
small part due to the actions of politicians, who use ars have been caught by this (Kenny, 1996; Danfulani,
both religious and cultural ties to form a constituent 2002). Arguments based on Northern conflicts omit
basis to attain and retain power (Usman, 1986: 148). the broader national scale of the religious dichotomy,
however, as low-level religious conflicts have been
Religious conflict can be demonstrated to sustained in Southern Nigeria also. Furthermore, it
overlap with ethnic disputes, a salient case being has been suggested that many Africanist scholars
the various outbreaks of violence in the town of Jos. have been open to a religious bias in favour of their
Groups indigenous to the Jos Plateau, namely Berom, religious inclinations (Falola, 1998: 8-9). However, as
Anaguta and Afisare, (mostly Christian), compete Africanist scholars, a religious and ethnic inclination
with Hausa-Fulani (Muslim) settler groups over who may not be avoided in contemporary discourses sur-
has ownership of the town (Danfulani, 2002: 245-6). rounding religious conflict, and to do so may prove
Additionally, Southern Christian-educated groups, too impractical. For the Yorubas in the South, Laitin
Yoruba and Igbo and Tiv amongst others, migrated to has shown that religious affiliation matters little in
the town to fill in civil service jobs, who further con- defining an identity construct (Laitin, 1986: 183). Yet,
tributed to heterogeneity of the multicultural town religious heterogeneity exists as much in Yorubaland
(Danfulani, 2002: 246-7). It may be argued that, due as does in the Middle Belt, with some forty percent
to the political-historical migratory processes of the of Yorubas adhering to Islam (Laitin, 1986: 8). The
area, many citizens in northern towns like Jos choose reasons why Southern Yorubas remain outside of the
to emphasise religious affiliations rather than cultural more extreme religious violence seen in Northern
genealogy. The Christian Association of Nigeria in Nigeria is, Laitin maintains, because of the prece-
1990 organised mass protests against political mar- dence placed to their ‘ancestral cities’ as a hegemony
ginalisation of Christians in Northern towns includ- (Laitin, 1986: 16-7). Rather than existing in antago-
ing Jos, (Falola, 1998: 111), whilst Muslim groups in nistic relations, Yoruba Christians and Muslims both
towns like Kano increasingly demanded adherence accept the hegemony of their ancestry. Formation
to Shari’a (Last 2008: 48-9). This context of religious of identity along a shared genealogy creates a dif-
affiliation taking precedence has only increased since ferent set of political circumstances, therefore, and
the representation of the terrorist attacks in Septem- although religious conflict is less likely to surface, ten-
ber 2001 in America has been that of the ‘secular’ sions may still foster. The on-going crisis surrounding
West under attack by “radical Islamic extremism”. In the Niger Delta region is perhaps a prime example
Jos, violent riots from 7-12 September 2001 claimed of conflict born out of a political marginalisation of
over 3000 lives. The events in America were seen ethnic groups.
by some as ‘the triumph of Islam over the West, for
them synonymous with Christianity. Those celebrat- Violent conflict in Nigeria along religious lines,
ing went berserk, rampaging and looting businesses, it can be argued, has been created and sustained as
shops and stores belonging to Igbo Christian traders’ a consequence of the political manipulation of reli-
(Danfulani, 2002: 251). The discourse of religious gion. The socialist position of the causes of religious
dichotomy is powerful, as it creates a feared religious conflict can be embodied by Usman’s writings, ‘In the
‘Other’, and, particularly in Northern Nigeria, where case of the manipulation of religion in Nigeria today
Muslims and Christians are most equal, can be con- the purpose of this manipulation is to be found in
ducive to violence. Identity with a religious appear- the purposes and function of the classes who do this
ance can therefore be equally as hazardous as ethnic manipulation. Nobody denies that the class respon-

15

sible is the intermediary bourgeoisie’ (Usman, 1987: erbated by the common perception that both Nige-
21). Usman asserts the manipulation of religion by rian state and society is permeated by corruption
the ruling religious and political classes enables them and immorality (Smith, 2008; Marhsall, 2009). Both
to persist in their domination, as the division caused Christian and Islamic groups have used perceptions
by their actions splits the underclass of Nigerian of immorality and ‘wickedness’ to create a discourse
workers and peasants (Usman, 1987: 23). The forma- that Nigerian society is unstable, and which not
tion of an identity along the monotheistic religions of only vehement religious conversion and member-
Christianity and Islam may foster a climate of antago- ship would help in the struggle against it, but also
nism and violence, it can be argued, as each position that religious intolerance, even violence, is justifi-
may perceive state actions as favouring the other able, ‘such an order places the political present in a
(Jega, 2000: 36). From this perspective, politicians continual state of suspension or exception, in terms
use this division to retain office on their religious or of which the achievement of peace, justice, and the
ethnic constituency. Although Usman accounts for guarantee of life may be deferred until the “war”
the antagonistic behaviour of religious and political (against indiscipline, corruption, misrule, disorder,
elites, he does little to account for the reasons that underdevelopment) is over’ (Marshall, 2009: 210).
people allow themselves to be manipulated (Ibra- Rather than being an ‘instrument of peace’, from this
him, 1991: 127-8). Rather than solely being caused perspective religious factions inevitably cause a wide
by class antagonisms, on-going religious conflict dichotomy in Nigerian society, and provoke violent
in Nigeria can be explained by a populist ‘religious confrontation. Existing in a perceived ‘state of excep-
revival’ both of Christianity and Islam, their intra-reli- tion’, Christian groups like the Born-Agains aggravate
gious fractional rivalries, and of the belief that Nige- tensions through ‘aggressive evangelism, church
ria is a moral state of exception. planting, and a discourse of intolerance’ (Marshall,
2009: 229-230). Islamic groups too, were politicised
Outbreaks of violence in Northern Nigeria under the banner of Shari’a, as a reaction against
may also be linked to poor socio-economic condi- the immorality of modern secular society, which to
tions since the 1970s. Although an oil-rich nation, as some Muslim followers was tantamount to a ‘god-
oil prices fell at the beginning of the 1980s, a severe less’ society (Kenny, 1996: 347). As a consequence
economic depression characterised Nigeria through- of a perceived moral ‘state of exception’, violence in
out that decade (Marshall, 2009: 102). This was not Nigeria for both Muslims and Christians has not only
corrected as the Bretton Woods Institutions predicted been justified but also encouraged until the aims are
their Structural Adjustment would lift the economy achieved. This analysis provides an explanation to
after implementation in 1986. Rather, unemploy- the manipulation of religion, as both the severe eco-
ment was rife, with many people both in North and nomic crisis and a perception of extensive immorality
South without jobs (Marshall, 2009: 239). Move- in society allows followers of Christianity and Islam
ments like Maitatsine’s attracted many unemployed to believe that a state of exception justifies religious
(Kenny, 1996: 344), and unemployed youth had a antagonism and violence.
large role in riots in Kaduna 1987 (Kenny, 1996: 361).
However, whilst high unemployment and severe eco- What may explain why Nigeria has experi-
nomic crisis may indeed lead to violence, this leaves enced outbreaks of extreme violence in the name
out the reasons why people from all different social of religion for so many decades, therefore, depends
groups in Nigeria turned to the monotheist religions on the complex and particular socio-political, spa-
for support. Furthermore, solely a socio-economic tial and economic environment in the Middlebelt
explanation of violent religious rioting cannot explain and Northern regions of Nigeria. Over the last three
the religious fervour with which people have burned decades, Nigeria has seen a vastly increased politici-
churches and mosques, looted shops, and the kill- sation of religion, where a perceived lack of moral-
ing of many thousands of Christians and Muslims. ity within state practices and society, together with
It is more fitting to elaborate an explanation around severe economic depression and the fractionalisa-
the political persuasion of many in Nigeria that both tion within Christian and Muslim movements has led
modern state and society has fallen into a moral state to a prevalence of extreme violence. Whilst there are
of suspension, to which violent behaviour can be jus- a variety of theoretical perspectives that may frame
tified in the name of religion (Ter Haar, 2005: 303). an explanation to religious violence in Nigeria, it has
been the contention here that the perception of
Religious conflict, it can be argued, is exac- endemic corruption and immorality fostered a moral

16

state of exception. This perceived immorality justi-
fied the use of violence for Christians and Muslims
alike in Nigeria, and until corruption is adequately
addressed, it may continue to do so. Areas like Kano,
Jos and Kafanchan have shared episodes of riots,
looting and killings throughout recent decades, and
with 2010’s violence in Jos highlighting the continued
uncertainty in Nigeria, there is a clear need for fur-
ther ethnographic research.

Bibliography

Agamben, G., State of Exception, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005

Danfulani, U. H. D., and Fwatshak, S. U., ‘The September 2001
events in Jos, Nigeria’, African Affairs, 101, pp. 243-255, 2002

Falola, T., Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and
Secular Ideologies, Rochester: University of Rochester Press,
1998

Ibrahim, J., ‘Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria’, The
Journal of Modern African Studies, 29: 1, pp. 115-136, 1991

Ikenga-Metuh, E., ‘Religion as an Instrument of Peace in Nigeria’
in Olupona, J. K., Religion and Peace in Multi-Faith Nigeria, Ile-
Ife (Nigeria): Obafemi Awolowo University, 1992

Jega, A., ‘The State and Identity Transformation under Structural
Adjustment in Nigeria’ in Jega, A., (ed.), Identity Transformation
and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,
Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2000

Kenny, J., ‘Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a
“secular” state’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 26: 4, pp. 338-
364, 1996

Kukah, M. H., Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria,
Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books, 1993

Laitin, D., Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Culture
among the Yoruba, Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press, 1986

Last, M., ‘The Search for Security in Muslim Northern Nigeria’,
Africa, 78: 1, pp. 41-63, 2008

Marshall, Ruth, Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution
in Nigeria, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009

Olupona, J. K., Religion and Peace in Multi-Faith Nigeria, Ile-Ife
(Nigeria): Obafemi Awolowo University, 1992

Smith, D. J., A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and
Popular Discontent in Nigeria, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008

Ter Haar, G., ‘Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace?’
in Ostien, P., J. M. Nasir, and F. Kogelmann (eds.), Comparative
Perspectives on Shari’ah in Nigeria, Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum
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Usman,Y.B.,The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria 1977-1987,
Kaduna, Nigeria: Vanguard Printers and Publishers, 1987

17

Decentralization and Peace: The Effects of Federalism on the Onset of Civil Wars

Clara Neupert-Wentz
University of Mannheim / University of Bergen

[email protected]

Abstract:

A decisive characteristic of regimes is whether their structure is unitary or federal, with federalism represent-
ing the most extreme type of power distribution and thus leading to higher representation. While the topic
has been discussed widely in qualitative literature, little quantitative research has been done on the relation-
ship between decentralized state structures and the onset of civil wars. I hypothesize that federalism in gen-
eral lowers the chance of the onset of civil war by yielding to the political adjustment of regional needs, and
in turn decreasing chances of grievance motivated rebellion. Furthermore, I propose that this is only accurate
if regional representation is adequately accounted for. Conversely, if federal states are only represented by a
governor chosen by the central government, this negative relationship disappears. To test the effects of feder-
alism on the onset of civil war, I employ logistic regression using cross sectional time series data. Preliminary
results confirm the hypotheses. Federalism is thus not a tool to avert civil war per se, but depends on the
involvement of the sub-national units and the extent of autonomy through local representation to account
for civil peace.

INTRODUCTION chain of accountability runs in the inverse direction
and the regional politicians become agents of the
In the recent years, research on civil wars has turned government. This results in their inability to respond
its attention towards institutions. A decisive charac- to regional demands why therefore the positive influ-
teristic of political systems is whether their structure ence of federalism on peace evaporates.
is unitary or federal, with federalism representing
the most extreme type of power distribution. Within The paper proceeds as follows: first, previous
this paper I examine whether federalism decreases research that deals with federalism in the context of
the chances of civil war, with a special focus on one internal warfare shall briefly be outlined. Then the
of the potential benefits a federal structure brings general frameworks of civil war research shall be dis-
about: political representation. cussed. Following, the theoretical underpinnings of
institutional features in general, and federalism in
Diverging from previous literature on civil war and specific are examined in the light of their effects on
federalism, which is especially concerned with civil war. This will lead to the hypothesis that federal-
ethno-geographical reasons for insurgencies or once ism in general lowers the chance of the onset of civil
that are concerned with the degree of autonomy of war by yielding to the political adjustment of regional
given sub-national units and therefore secession- needs, and in turn decreasing chances of grievance
ist, territorial civil conflict, I concentrate on broader motivated rebellion. Furthermore, I propose that
effects. Sticking to the theories of New Institutional- this is only accurate if regional representation is ade-
ism it shall be argued that the structure itself shapes quately accounted for. Followed by a large-N analy-
behaviour, but that the fine-tuning of Institutions is sis employing logistic regression, data method and
decisive. That is, federalism is not a peace-preserv- variables are considered. Concluding it will be argued
ing structure per se. To scrutinize this argument, I that federalism may only forestall civil disputes under
employ logistic regression using cross-sectional time the condition that it lives up to its promise to allo-
series data to analyse the effects of federalism on the cate regional representation by giving some degree
outbreak of civil war. Furthermore, I hypothesize that of authority to the sub-units of a state.
the peace preserving properties of federalism may
only exist, if the federal states are capable to choose PREVIOUS RESEARCH
their own representative. If though the regional gov-
ernor is appointed by the central government, the Before the attention is drawn towards the theoreti-

18

cal development, previous studies dealing with the bels, 2006: 37).
effect of federalism on internal conflict shall be dis-
cussed. Finally, Nancy Bermeo (2002) analyses descriptively
the extent to which federal systems are “peace-pre-
The assumption that federalism is a pacifying state serving”. One finding of her study is the importance
structure by encouraging achievability of democracy of democratic federal structures. She states that
can be traced back to Madison’s Federalist Papers “each failed federal state that gave birth to a seces-
(Bednar, 2006: 7). Ever since, the literature dealing sionist civil war was either an outright dictatorship or
with federalism and its effect on intra-state disputes, an inchoate regime led by a nondemocratic party. No
or at least autonomy related research on inter- violent separatist movement has ever succeeded in
nal rebellion has focussed on two specific types of a federal democracy“ (2002: 108). Furthermore, she
conflicts: ethnic conflicts (Hale, 2004), secessionist suggests that besides democracy the technical set up
movements (Daftary, 2008), or both (Brancati, 2006; of federalism is decisive to its capabilities of imped-
Deiwiks, 2010). ing internal war.

Hale (2004), for example, descriptively and qualita- These contributions point to the fact that federal-
tively examines the degree to which ethnofederal- ism is of importance concerning the stability and the
isms are conflict-prone. He proposes that “ethnofed- inner peace prosperity, but they also give hints that
eral states are much more likely to avoid the most this is not a claim that is robust in general. Therefore,
extreme problems when any dominant ethnic group a specific look towards the institutional set up and
is institutionally divided or when no group’s region the processes within federal systems is necessary.
clearly dominates” (2004: 192) due to the fact that
the set up of the ethnofederalism is not dictated by In the proceeding section I will outline the theoretical
one core group. Concluding Hale argues that eth- underpinnings of these claims, starting with a glance
nofederalism may be a good solution for divided towards civil war research itself and then the role
societies, as long as it is well designed. that institutions play in explaining large-scale violent
disputes. Finally I will examine the different effects a
Brancati (2006) relates the question of ethnic con- federal structure may have on the prospects of peace
flict and decentralization to the institutional set up, with a special focus on representational issues.
that is in this case, to the presence of regional par-
ties. Focussing only on democratic states, his analysis CIVIL WAR, INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND FEDERAL-
reveals that their presence undermines the positive ISM
influence a decentred structure can have to preserve
ethnic conflict and secessionist movements (2006: This study focuses on intrastate wars and conflicts
681). within the period of 1972 until 1999. Number and
duration of internal warfare since the Second World
Bakke and Wibbels (2006) analyse the effect of insti- War are “not just extremely common, it is also per-
tutional features in federalisms on civil conflicts, with sistent” (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 4). Civil war is
a focus on fiscal decentralization, intergovernmen- commonly defined “[...] as violent conflict within a
tal fiscal transfers, and political copartisanship. The country between a government and one or more
peace preserving characteristics of federal states internal opposition groups, with sizeable fatalities on
depend on the wealth and ethnic composition of the each side” (Anderson and Carter, 2009: 104). The dis-
respective society, they argue. Suggesting that these tinction between a civil war and civil conflict is gen-
features of a specific society need to be taken into erally drawn in accordance with the fatalities of one
account, they conclude that the peace-preserving respective conflict, that is, a minimum of 25 battle-
properties of federalism depend “not only on the related deaths within one year, accounts for a civil
design of the institutions but also on how these insti- conflict. If the conflict causes 1000 fatalities in one
tutions respond to the characteristics of the societies year within the conflict it is defined as a civil war.
they govern” (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006: 37). These
characteristics are mainly conceptualized as the There have been countless attempts to scrutinize the
politicization of ethnicity and inequality. It is claimed factors affecting the likelihood of civil wars of which
for instance, that fiscal decentralization is only an I want to discuss the three most famous frameworks
indicator for peace if the respective society’s income in brief in the light of institutional structures.
is equally distributed across regions (Bakke and Wib-

19

Seminal Frameworks in which repression is exerted while the system is
designated by some democratic features that allow
The analysis of political systems and their features its citizens for some freedoms, which is an inauspi-
have been the focus of several studies on civil con- cious composition and as a result leads to unsteady
flict and war, predominantly deriving from the 'Greed conditions. Accordingly, an inverted U-shape curve of
and Opportunity' model as well as the 'Grievance' the risk of civil dissent emerges, with anocracies at
model. While 'Greed' may broadly be described as the tip of the curve (Hegre et al., 2001: 35).
the economic motivation, such as poverty, to rebel
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 18), Collier and Hoef- Another line of research has turned its attention
fler (2004) relate rebellion to opportunities, given by towards specific parts of political systems, namely
financial resources to organize, specific geographical executive recruitment (Fjelde, 2010; Carey, 2007).
properties such as mountainous terrain, low oppor- How executive leaders come into office is seen as the
tunity costs of rebellion but also to ethnical and reli- decisive stage determining the conflict potential of a
gious diversions within the society. Fearon and Laitin country, as the way an executive is selected shapes
(2003) argue that economic indicators, rather than the overall political system. Following this conjec-
societal cleavages are a “[…] proxy for state adminis- ture, it can be referred to issues of representation, a
trative, military, and police capabilities” (76). Derived major attribute of democracy. Hanne Fjelde (2010),
from that argument, Fearon and Laitin develop their for instance, examines the influence of executive
‘insurgency model’ within which it is argued that recruitment in authoritarian regimes building on the
the eruption of internal wars is due to weak govern- theory that executives may both exert and retain
ments (Wimmer et al., 2009: 318), an important indi- power through co-optation or coercion. The former
cator of the strength of state capacity. 'Grievances' leads a dictator to spoil its opponents converting
allude to imbalances in terms of economic equal- them into supporters, the latter being the forceful
ity, hostilities between different ethnic and religious marginalisation or elimination of antagonists (Fjelde,
groups, as well as political exclusion and repression 2010: 196). The choice between co-optation and
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 570) and has been gen- coercion “[…] depends on the institutions the regime
erally described as the “diversity-breeds-conflict” commands” (Fjelde, 2010: 198-199), that is, in this
(Wimmer et al., 2009: 317) assumption, driven by case, what kind of regime evolves, conditional upon
thoughts of schools arguing that homogenous socie- the executive's origin of recruitment.
ties are more peaceful. Contrary to this, Wimmer et
al. demonstrate that this is only true for states that These studies agree on the significance of recruit-
exclude parts of their population from the political ment processes and therefore accept the famous
decision-making process due to their ethnic origin assumption of comparative government research-
(Wimmer et al., 2009: 334). ers that institutions matter. Carey argues that “[…] it
is worth disaggregating political regimes to find out
New Institutionalism in Civil War Research exactly how different political institutions affect the
risk of internal violence” as “they shape the interac-
With regard to state capacity another route tion between state and non-state actors; they influ-
of research emerged, adopting state-centred ence the opportunity costs of dissent, both in violent
approaches. Deriving from grievance orientated and nonviolent forms” (Carey, 2007: 61 & 49). In
frameworks, this approach broadly takes the stance this paper the attention shall be drawn towards the
that, “a united and administratively competent most basic features of a political structure, namely
regime can defeat any insurgency […]” (Goldstone the degree of centralisation of a state1. This refers to
et al., 2010: 191) as a cause and effect of political the “state- centered approach” which focuses “[…]
stability. The widely accepted existence of “demo- on political structures and elite relationship, rather
cratic civil peace” (Hegre et al., 2001: 33) serves as than simply on state resources or insurgent capabili-
a pathway towards the prominent assumptions, stat- ties […]” (Goldstone et al., 2010: 191).
ing that democracies are less conflict prone due to
the stability of their systems. The same accounts for Following these contributions the notion that new
full autocracies, which is why systems somewhere in institutionalism has settled in the studies of the
between those extremes are deemed to be systems
suffering from instability, which may lead to civil con- 1. I was inspired to analyse the effect of federal and unitary sys-
flict. These so called anocracies are political regimes tems by Carey’s indication that other system characteristics like
the mentioned may also be of importance as to the outbreak of
civil war (Carey 2007, 50).

20

causes for civil war becomes obvious. One assump- closer control of opponent forces may be more easily
tion that all types of new institutionalism can agree co-opted or eliminated by being administratively
on is that institutions matter, or more precisely, that more regionally organised.
institutions and their specific design affect behaviour
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 937). They form the polity Although the above outlined literature predomi-
and thereby structure politics by defining constraints nantly focuses on federalism with regard to ethni-
within which actors have to choose their course of cally and culturally divided societies, federalism may
action. be established for different purposes. Decentralized
structures are to be found in very large states like the
Federalism can itself be described as a institution, or United States of America and India on the one hand,
at least is heavily influences the institutional set up on the other hand in plural states like Switzerland
of a polity. In the following section I want to examine or Belgium. By this, two major types may be distin-
federalism in the light of intra-state war. guished, namely congruent and incongruent feder-
alism. The former is also commonly labelled ‘sym-
Federalism as a ‘peace preserving’ State Structure metric federalism’ and aims to organise large states
(Lijphart, 1999: 195). In this case each federal unit
In this section I will first outline basic features of fed- is similar in its social and cultural composition. The
eralism and then scrutinize it in the face of civil war. latter draws lines between identity groups, dividing
Finally I will present my hypotheses. the country into units that defer from each other
in social and cultural terms. Therefore ‘asymmet-
The most entitative differential between unitary and ric federalism’ (Lijphart, 1999: 195) is a solution for
federal states is that federalism “[...] can be consid- plural societies within one state to allow for regional
ered the most typical and drastic method of divid- adjustment of specific political needs as well as polit-
ing power: it divides power between entire levels of ical representation according to the identity group.
government” (Lijphart, 1999: 185). More precisely
federal states are rather horizontally organised and Plurality may be referred to characteristics that build
obtain several power centres whilst unitary states up a heterogeneous set of identity groups within one
are clearly vertical in their order of decision-making state. In line with previous studies, the “diversity-
(Lijphart, 1999: 187). breeds-conflict” assumption should be neglected if
different groups are not excluded from the decision-
Riker (1964) defines a state as federal if it meets the making process as well as if they do not have to com-
following conditions: “(1) two levels of government pete (Wimmer, 2008: 335). Incongruent federalism
rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at is therefore a way of enabling different, somewhat
least one area of action in which it is autonomous, homogenous groups, to exert some influence by self-
and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely governing, which should solve problems of political
a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of power exclusion2.
each government in its own sphere” (Riker, 1964: 11).
With regard to congruent federalism, the same
Yet these three components that make up a fed- assumption concerning political representation
eral state already imply what can be thought of as and by that regional adjustment of regional needs
decreasing chances of grievance-motivated rebel- through the share of power may be applied. The size
lions on an abstract level, as sub-unit autonomy may of the population is a robust indicator increasing the
guarantee a higher degree of political representa- risk of the onset of civil war in the civil war litera-
tion and in that increase its effectiveness. As well ture (Blattman and Miguel, 2010: 24). In line with the
as that, in Lijphart's view the “non-concentration of above argument federalism may help to meet the
power”, as it is to be found in federalism, contrib- needs of the people and to organise or control a large
utes to the consensus model of democracies and is population more suitably. The existence of a federal
a basic instrument to divide power among executives structure may therefore help peaceful resolutions of
and therefore puts constraints on the state's govern- instate disputes by effective representation and the
ment, which – however it is set up – must yield to the
decision-making power of the entitled units (Lijphart, 2. Federalism, however, may very well exist in ethnic religious or
1999: 185). However this autonomy of federal units linguistic diverse states which cannot be labelled incongruent as
comes about, it facilitates decision-makers to fit poli- the identity groups are not territorial bound to one region or as
cies regional demands in some areas. Alongside this, the borders between the federal units are not properly drawn
between the respective groups (Lijphart 1999, 196).

21

customization of regional requirements. agents of the central government rather than the
electorate.
Nevertheless, as argued above, federalism is also a
decisive stage, usually established where it fulfils a One more argument against the disappearance of
certain purpose and if well working, promotes the the negative relationship between civil war and fed-
cooperation between the different sub-groups of a eralism that does not allow for effective representa-
state. Therefore it becomes necessary to loom when tion is that coercion and control by the government
federal systems may not enhance peaceful conflict can successfully be used to stabilize the system in
resolution, but rather lead to the onset of large- undemocratic manners. I argue contrarily that this
scale violent dissent. He (2007) argues that in “[…] kind of stability might decrease chances of civil war
an ill-functioning federalism, such a good working in general, but that this is not the case in a federal
relationship is absent and lead to discontent, espe- system as decentralized structures are established
cially when the centre tends to behave in a dictato- for reasons, deeply routed in the history of the state
rial manner ordering the sub-national governments (Bednar 2006: 5). The theoretical arguments lead to
to act without proper consultation” (He, 2007: 24). two Hypotheses:

I identify two categories of tiers of influence on Hypotheses 1: States with a federal structure face a
regional governor selection. The first contains the lower risk of civil war than unitary states
right of federal units to “appoint, elect or otherwise
choose their own representatives autonomous from Hypotheses 2: States with a federal structure in which
decisions by the central government” (Regan and regional governors are appointed by the central
Clark 2007b: 8). This clearly confirms Riker's condi- government face a higher risk of civil war
tions for states to truly be labelled federalism. The
second tier includes no formal or procedural influ- These shall be applied and analysed after the research
ence by the sub-units on the selection process, as design has been outlined in the proceeding section.
the representatives are appointed by the central gov-
ernment of the state. Doubtlessly, this typifies a very DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
limited form of sub-unit representation. Given that
vital features of federalism are the division of power For the empirical examination of my research ques-
and representation of regional minorities, the nega- tion, I generated a dataset including country-years
tive effect of federalism on the outbreak of civil war from 1972 until 1999. The structure of the data is
should decrease the lower the level of influence of cross-sectional time-series and includes all countries
the federal units. that exceed the population of 500.000 inhabitants.

On the one hand the first imaginable effect of the Dependent Variables
appointment by the central government is that this
may abolish all positive effects that federalism cap- To measure the dependent variables, I rely on the
tures, as its effects are the mechanisms leading to refined dataset of Gleditsch et al. (2002) “Armed
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. These are drasti- Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset” by Lotta Harbom
cally reduced, as the division of power and the direct and Peter Wallensteen (2010) “Armed Conflict, 1946-
representation are not given to a satisfying degree. 2009” which focuses on the onset of civil wars.
Still it can be argued that the sole existence of sub-
national units leads to higher involvement of regions I introduce four models with different dependent
into the decision-making process in comparison with variables in my analysis. First, I analyse the effect
unitary states. But with regard to the lack of account- of federal structures on the incidence of civil con-
ability towards the regions’ people, which is accord- flict and second on the incidence of civil wars. This
ing to Bednar (2006: 4) one of the driving features of implies that every country year in which a conflict or
the federals states, effective representation should war appears or continues according to the respective
not be expected. The office seeking motivation of definition the variable is coded one. The onset of civil
governors leading them choose policies that will ben- conflict is the third depended variable I introduce. A
efit the electorate is therefore inverted and the chain civil conflict is delineated by the observation of more
of accountability within a federal state runs up the than 25 and less than 1000 battle-related deaths.
hierarchical order and regional governors become Fourth, I analyse the effect of the independent vari-
ables on the onset of civil war, which is defined as a
conflict that counts for at least 1000 battle-related

22

fatalities in one year of the on-going conflict. Jenna Bednar (2005) rightly argues: “In rejecting a
structural definition of federalism because it fails to
Both of the latter are coded one only if a conflict or guarantee federal practice, we may be skipping over
war erupts, that is, if there was no conflict in the a clue that could help us to identify what makes a
country-year before the observation (Harbom and federation successful. Another word for practice is
Wallensteen, 2009: 1). While the specific conflict behavior, and institutional theory helps us to appre-
goes on, the variables are coded missing. By doing ciate the role that institutions play in affecting behav-
this, it is assured that the effect of the independent iour” (Bednar, 2005: 3).
variables are tested on the outbreak of disputes in
isolation while not misleadingly assuming that the To approximate this clue in terms of internal insur-
country-years of on-going disputes as peaceful times. gencies and hence the second hypothesis, I introduce
my second main variable federalism (no regional
The four models may be regarded as ascending in choice). Again a binary variable, it codes all struc-
contesting the effects of the indicators; as of course turally defined federal systems one, if the respec-
the onset of an insurgency is a more rare occasion tive sub-unit governors are appointed by the central
than its incidence counted in years. This is done for government and consequently the regions have no
two reasons: first of all, this serves as robustness test influence on the selection of their representatives4.
of the indicators and by that the hypotheses. Second This alludes to the practical application of federal sys-
of all, this is due to a problem emerging from the tems with respect to the effects of the structure. The
rather short period of 28 years of analysis. By also emergence of the process of the selection of regional
examining the effects on the incidence of disputes, governors may be due to constitutional regulations,
on-going conflicts setting on before 1972 are not sys- but may also be the result of de facto practice5.
tematically excluded from the model.
With reference to the different frameworks explain-
Independent Variables ing intra-state wars, the next section deals with the
theoretically relevant control variables.
The relevant data to analyse the impact of state
decentralisation on the onset of civil conflict is pro- Control Variables
vided by the dataset of the Institutions and Elections
Project (IAEP) by Patrick Regan and David Clark which The control variables used in this analysis are taken
“is a collection of data on political institutions and from the replication dataset of James Fearon and
practices, and political elections for all countries in David Laitin (2003).
the international system between 1972 and 2005”
(Regan and Clark, 2007a). GDP per capita (lag) is the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) divided by the population of a state in a given
To test the first hypothesis the independent variable country-year. Within the earlier outlined frame-
federalism is introduced. It is concerned with and works, it is proposed that high per capita income
defined by the relationship of the central govern- should decrease the chance of the outbreak of civil
ment and sub-national units. I coded it as a binary war. It is used as a proxy for state strength, which is
variable, coded one if there is ‘a strong central gov- thought to accompany the respective states capa-
ernment with semi-autonomous regional political bilities in terms of infrastructure and administrative
units or subordinate provincial governments’3. This capacities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 80). Borrowing
variable relies plainly on the constitution or guiding from the opportunity model it may also be argued
documents of a country and may therefore be seen that “higher development levels should discourage
as a purely structural one that does not contain any rebellion by raising the economic opportunity costs
information about the actual processes and practices
of a federal system. Although it may be argued that 4. This is not to say that regionally based selection of represent-
this contradicts in part the attention of New Institu- atives otherwise takes place in democratic elections. Neverthe-
tionalism towards the self-reinforcing relationship less, I argue that the regional choice of regional governors may
between structures and institutions, I stress that channel regional demands and responses in a more adequate
precisely this is an interesting measure of this study. fashion.

3. I would like to thank Professor Patrick Regan for providing me 5. There are many examples of constitutionally undefined prac-
with the explicit coding rules the dataset was conducted with tices that have been internalized and hence become unwritten
law. A good example for this is the number of Supreme Court
Justices in the United States, which is not determined constitu-
tionally but in practice always is nine.

23

of violence” (Sambanis, 2004: 836). Furthermore, lit- year. That is, if a score greater than five based on the
erature on fiscal federalism and on market-preserv- Polity IV index (Gurr and Jaggers 2009) is achieved7.
ing federalism stresses that federalism may contrib- Controlling for democracy is generally important due
ute to a more efficient economy leading to income to the ‘democratic civil peace’ assumption. More
benefits (Bednar, 2006: 6). Either way, a higher per specifically, it bears on the selection process of the
capita income should be negatively related to the sub-national units and the question about demo-
outbreak of civil war. cratic federal states. Hence, controlling for democ-
racy is crucial with respect to peace preserving state
Ethnic fractionalization is an indicator that I include structures.
into my models, by reason that first, high fraction-
alization has been identified as an important factor Furthermore, I introduce the variable type of gover-
increasing the likelihood of civil wars and second, it nor selection, from which the condition of the second
may be referred to incongruent federalism. In that, hypothesis is derived. It might be argued that the
it suits the theoretical argument of peaceful conflict variable federalism (no regional choice) is an implicit
resolution within heterogeneous societies6. The vari- interaction term, as it indicates change of influence
able I apply is “defined as the probability that two of federalism if no regional selection is accounted
individuals selected at random from a country will for. Therefore it is important to include the variable,
be from different ethnic groups” (Fearon, 2002: 21). which the latter is based on into all models, albeit
Accordingly, the higher the value of the indicator, the its interpretation is complicated. It is an ordinal vari-
more fractionalised a country. able ranging from regional choice (coded 1), over
appointment by central government (coded 2), to no
The variable Population (log) is the size of the popu- regional government (coded 3)8.
lation in the given country-year. The size of the popu-
lation “[…] is among the most significant and robust Method
explanatory variables in models of civil war onset”
(Sambanis, 2004: 822) and usually positively corre- To analyse whether federal state structures are nega-
lated with the outbreak of civil war. The variable is tively related to the outbreak of internal warfare and
especially interesting within this analysis, as federal- by that more peaceful in their character, I apply logis-
ism may account for problems resulting from large tic regression.
countries or overpopulation, referring to the congru-
ent type of federalism outlined above (Sambanis, I control for time effects by clustering the variable
2004: 836). Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin (2003) year and including it into my models. This increases
claim that states facing large populations are more the applicability of logistic regression to cross-sec-
prone to insurgency as they make it “[…] necessary tional time-series data formats and absorbs uncon-
for the center to multiply layers of agents to keep trolled effects, such as shocks, that affect the whole
tabs on who is doing what at the local level, and, population in the dataset (Jahn, 2006: 396).
also increases the number of potential recruits to
an insurgency for a given level of income” (Fearon RESULTS
and Laitin, 2003: 81). It therefore becomes apparent
that the size of the population might be an influential The empirical analysis gives evidence that state cen-
indicator that causes problems of which federalism tralisation and its institutions matter for civil peace.
can be the answer, by raising the degree of represen- In all models, the existence of federalism significantly
tation and control within large countries and giving reduces the risk of civil conflict and war in compari-
autonomy to its units and might therefore lower the son to unitary states. Therefore hypothesis 1 can
chance of disputes. clearly be confirmed and federalism entails a peace-
preserving function.
Democracy (lag) is a dummy variable measuring
whether the state is considered democratic in one 7. The Polity IV index is based on five components that trans-
lated into a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to
6. I use this variable - though heavily criticised in the literature +10 (full democracy) (Gurr and Jaggers, 2009). Countries scor-
(see for example Cederman and Giradin 2007) - for reasons of ing from -5 to +5 are usually referred to as anocracies.
comparability and simplicity. Including it into the model allows
comparison to other studies that do so. Indices like the Polari- 8. It is important to note that this variable contains all types of
zation Index or N* might lead to more convincing results (for a system and that no federal state is coded three in this variable,
discussion see for example Chandra (2006). but allocate within the two first options of the variable.

24

Turning to the second hypothesis, low political influ- the fact that federal systems are usually established
ence of federal units leads to a significantly increased where they fulfil a certain reason. This argument
danger of the onset of civil war and all other types allows the supposition that federalism is a good tool
of conflict. This confirms that a decentralised state to forestall extremely violent conflict. But conversely
structure is not peaceful per se, but needs the active an ill-functioning federalism, where needed most,
involvement of the sub-national entities. Lacking adds to the risk of internal warfare.
accountability to the respective sub-national constit-
uency, governors act in accordance with and advan- CONCLUSION
tageous towards the central government instead of
responding to regional demands. Besides the confir- Is federalism a remedy triggering civil peace? To dis-
mation of my hypotheses, this also approves the sug- sect this question I analysed the onset of civil war
gestions of previous studies, to have a closer look at by applying logistic regression using cross-sectional
the procedures and processes that typifies seemingly time series data from 1972 until 1999.
similar institutions.
Considering the findings of this paper, two conclu-
The control variables all run in the expected direc- sions may be drawn. First, it can be confirmed that
tion, although democracy is only significant for the turning the attention towards systemic features of
onset of civil war. All other control variables are con- states may help to inhibit unwanted results and fur-
stantly significant and thus confirm the presumptions thermore that institutions matter for civil disputes.
of the earlier outlined frameworks. Institutions regulate not only the political, but also
the social and even the economic life of people. Given
It is worth noticing that the strength of the coeffi- their provisions, they trigger the actions people take
cient and the significance is much stronger in the hold of. Yet secondly, how straight forward this may
case of the onset of civil war than it is in the case of seem, institutions differ heavily in their fine-tuning,
the onset of civil conflict. This is especially interest- which leads to the second main conclusion: federal-
ing as the more prevalent occasion of the onset of ism is approved to be a good way to solve problems
civil conflict usually leads to stronger results on the within a state by cooperation and constraining the
independent variables. This may be referred back to central government, but an ill-functioning federalism

25

is as risky as grown federalism is peaceful. First of all, Anderson, C. & Carter J. (2009) Principles of Conflict Economics.
federalism must fit the structures of a country. This A Primer for Social Scientists. New York: Cambridge University
is why simple decentralisation of states is no solu- Press.
tion to imminent danger of civil war. The establish-
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Second, it must not be a halfway federal design. As Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil War.
the empirical results suggest, not well-developed Oxford Economic Papers 56 pp. 563-595.
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damaging as one could expect. Fearon, J. & Laitin, D. (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.
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27

Challenges on Food Security and Forced Displacement in the 21st Century: the
Somali Case.

Helena Tavares and Flávia Lorenzon
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
[email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract:

Nowadays a complex link between climate change and forced displacement is increasingly being acknowl-
edged. It is also known that natural disasters and degradation can trigger conflicts and displacement. The
recent drought in Somalia is the most severe in 60 years. That country is facing one of the worst humanitarian
crises in the world these days, which is being the cause of a fast Somali Diaspora. According to United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), twenty years of conflict and waves of drought have uprooted a
quarter of Somalia’s 7.5 million population, who fled to Ethiopia and Kenya seeking for shelter. Many Soma-
lis are waiting until the last possible moment to flee, putting up with violence, crop failures and rising food
prices. Today, the concern with food security is an utter priority to help the mass of uprooted, and also an
extremely important issue since they are threatened by food shortages. Focusing on Somalia’s case, this
paper will provide a clearer comprehension about food security and forced displacement. An analysis of the
UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) joint efforts hereby
made to offer an overall view of the 21st century challenges on human security in Somalia.

Introduction Human Development Report of the United Nations
Programme for Development (UNDP), in 1994. The
“Climate change is the single most important human security concept interconnects seven core
threat to food security in the future.”1 characters: economic security, food security, political
security, community security, health security, envi-
After the recent global periods of food short- ronmental security and individual security. As regards
ages in 2006 - 2008, and currently in 2011, the pur- the environmental security, this UNDP Report (1994)
suit of food security became an ultimate challenge anticipated the current humanitarian crisis in the
for the international community. In the twenty-first Horn of Africa:
century, an extensive number of people are affected
by food insecurity, especially in the vulnerable north- The loss of human security can be a slow, silent
eastern Africa, also known as the Horn of Africa, process - or an abrupt, loud emergency. It can
where thousands had to flee drought to protect their be human-made - due to wrong policy choices.
lives. The climate change impact is another factor It can stem from the forces of nature. Or it can
often linked to the increase in the frequency and be a combination of both- as is often the case
severity of certain hazards, and when combined with when environmental degradation leads to a
vulnerability it can result in disasters2, similar to what natural disaster, followed by human tragedy3.
has happened in Somalia.
The current humanitarian crisis, represented
The notion of food security became popu- by Somalia’s actual catastrophe, is a combination of
lar in the beginning of the 90s when the concept different factors. Somalia conquered its independ-
of human security was established by the Annual ence only in 1960, after almost a century of coloni-
zation, followed by decades of exploitation, depend-
1. Al Jazeera/Olivier De Schutter, 2011. Fearing a Food ence, undiversified economy and corruption. Its
Crisis, Riz Khan Show. [Online Programme] 10/02/2011.. economical decline was exacerbated by the famine
Available at: http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/riz- of the early 1990s, which contributed to desperation
khan/2011/02/201121082142656256.html and lawlessness.

2. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduc- 3. UNDP, 1994. Human Development Annual Report. New
tion. 2009. Terminology: Basic terms of disaster risk reduction, dimensions of human security, p.23. New York: UNDP
Geneve: UNISDR. Available at www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-
terminology-eng%20home.htm

28

Some by-products of that crisis were popu- izations - the United Nations High Commissioner
lation displacement and forced land seizure. Com- for Refugees (UNHCR)5, the Food and Agricultural
bined to recurrent droughts and the famine of the Organization (FAO)6 and the World Food Programme
early 1990s these factors resulted in the fragmen- (WFP)7- to overcome the humanitarian crisis and
tation of the society into warring clans, struggling food insecurity in Somalia.
for resources and security. Though erratic climatic
conditions and unreliable rains in the Horn of Africa In the first section of the article, readers
have triggered some dreadful famines, recent stud- will be introduced to the food security concept, its
ies made by scholars such as Michel Chossudovsky threats and its former and current consequences in
have shown that modern famines are largely caused Somalia. In the subsequent section, an analysis of
by man4. According to this author, this is true for forced displacement applied in the Somali case will
Somalia’s famine in the early 1990s, in view of the be addressed, including the situation of Somali refu-
fact that Somalia has been without a central stable gees at Dadaab’s Refugee Complex, and the status of
government since 1991. A severe civil war took part the internal displaced people, known as IDPs, living
between Somali people and insurgent groups. around Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.

Al Shabab, an Islamic faction and the most The third section will provide a brief descrip-
feared group inside the country, mainly controls tion of UNHCR, FAO and WFP aid in the region of
southern Somalia, a place where chronic political concern, and their joint efforts to confront the crisis
instability lies since then. Many areas remain under in the Horn of Africa. In the last section, an evalua-
self-ruled control, and the lack of stability and law- tion of the major consequences of the humanitarian
lessness opened space to the piracy, corruption and crisis in Somalia will be given, along with the pres-
violence. entation of challenges regarding forced displacement
and human and food security to be confronted by
The long-term conflict plays a crucial role on the international organizations and the international
Somalia’s instability, threatening mostly the human community thereafter.
security and the national political stability. Yet, as cli-
mate change is being considered one of the main fac- Food Security in Somalia
tors of the recent forced migration flows and of envi-
ronmental insecurity in the world, the drought was The impact of natural hazards on global food
pointed in 2011 as the major cause of the massive security has been compounded by human factors,
flight of Somalis civilians, increasing the food insecu- which have the greatest effects on the most vulner-
rity and accelerating an alarming humanitarian crisis. able populations. The volatility in the commodity
markets relating to speculation by banks and hedge
At Dadaab, the world's largest Refugee Com- funds and the increased use of biofuels in the devel-
plex, in Kenya, the flight saga of the weakest can oped world, both contributed to spikes in cereals
be watched. Since July 2011 the world was able to and vegetable oil prices, according to specialists8. In
follow the displacement of thousands Somalis. After
escaping the conflict and the drought, a considerable 5. UNHCR’s mandate is to provide protection and assistance to
part of Somalia’s population is now uprooted. refugees and returnees and to achieve durable solutions for
refugees and other persons of concern.
This article aims at assessing Somalia’s situa-
tion in terms of food security and the current wave 6. FAO’s mandate focuses on raising the nutritional levels and
of forced displacement, based on the climate change living standards of the poor by saving and replenishing agricul-
catastrophe. Focusing on the Somali case, this paper tural assets, improving agricultural productivity and incomes,
will provide an interconnection between the 2011 and enhancing the ability of the poor to acquire and utilize
drought, the food insecurity in Somalia and the con- nutritionally adequate food effectively.
sequent influx of asylum seekers to Kenya and Ethio-
pia. 7. WFP is the food aid arm of the United Nations system, which
uses food aid to support economic and social development, to
The article will place a special focus on the meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associ-
joint efforts of three well-known international organ- ated logistics support, and, also promotes world food security
in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations
4. Chossudovksy, Michael. 2011. Somalia: the Real Causes of and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).
Famine, in Global Research. Canada.
8. Alyson Warhurst. 2011. Somalia, DR Congo top Maplecroft’s
food security risk ranking – Horn of Africa food crisis worsened
by human factors. United Kingdom: Maplecroft. Available at:
http://maplecroft.com/about/news /food_ security.html

29

agreement to analysts of the Food Security Risk Index required by all household members in order to lead
(FSRI),which was based on key elements of food active and healthy lives, without undue risk of losing
security as laid out by FAO, released by risk analysis such access”12, and presents four dimensions to be
and mapping company Maplecroft: considered13:

Food insecurity can not only cause humani- 1. Food availability: The availability of sufficient quanti-
tarian disasters; we have also seen it emerge ties of food of appropriate qualities, supplied through
as a contributing factor to societal unrest […]. domestic production or imports (including food aid).
As global demand for food grows due to rising This is often confused with food security but should
populations, food security will take on increas- properly be seen as only a part, albeit an important part
ing importance for governments and it needs of food security. The question is not only whether food
to be on the risk agenda of multinational cor- is available in a country but whether it is available in the
porations9. right place at the right time and there must be a mecha-
nism for ensuring that food of the right quality is made
In 2010 the food security situation in the available.
Horn of Africa was improving due to two consecu- 2. Food access: Access by individuals to adequate
tive seasons of good rainfall and above-average crop resources (entitlements) to acquire appropriate foods
production10. However, the lack of rainfall at the end for a nutritious diet. These resources need not be exclu-
of 2010 and during the 1st semester of 2011, has sively monetary but may also include traditional rights
led to a rapid and serious growth on human vulner- e.g. to a share of common resources. Entitlements are
ability and food shortages. The loss of livestock, the defined as the set of all those commodity bundles over
decreasing pastoralist incomes, the poor harvests which a person can establish command given the legal,
and the high food prices in the pastoral and agricul- political, economic and social arrangements of the com-
tural zones of Somalia have severely affected house- munity in which he or she lives.
hold access to food. In June 2011, the United Nations 3. Food utilization: Utilization of food through adequate
(UN) estimated that almost 3 million people in Soma- diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care. This brings
lia, approximately one third of the overall popula- out the importance of non-food inputs in food security.
tion, were facing food insecurity.On the same month, It is not enough that someone is getting what appears to
the UN estimated that acute malnutrition rates were be an adequate quantity of food if that person is unable
over 20 per cent in the entire southern Somalia. to make use of the food because he or she is always fall-
ing sick.
4. Stability of access1: Are individuals at high risk of
losing their access to food? An example of this situation
would be a landless agricultural labor who was almost
wholly dependent on agricultural wages in a region of
erratic rainfall. Such a person is at high risk of not being
able to find work in a situation of general crop failure
and thus going hungry, i.e. is vulnerable.

The food security situation is predicted to 1. FAO/TCAS.1996. Implications of Economic Policy for Food
remain at critical levels and even deteriorate in some Security – A Training Manual, p. 2. Italy: FAO
areas through September/October 2011, when the
rainfall is likely to be insufficient to satisfy water Crisis and Food Insecurity
needs in the region, leading to worsening water scar-
city from December 2011 into early 2012, according Although those concepts above were formu-
to the latest African Union Conference about the lated regarding the food security, its opposite – food
2011 Horn of Africa Crisis11. insecurity – can better represent Somalia’s situation.

The situation in the Horn of Africa and par- There are two dimensions in the food insecu-
ticularly in Somalia can be described as a severe lack rity concept14 that must be considerate: the house-
of food security. FAO defines food security as “year- hold level and the market level. In the household
round access to the amount and variety of safe foods level, food insecurity can be transitory during income
and savings shortfall, entitlement failure and health
9. Alyson Warhurst. 2011. Somalia, DR Congo top Maplecroft’s shocks; and chronic if there are insufficient assets
food security risk ranking – Horn of Africa food crisis worsened or intra-household resource sharing. At the market
by human factors. United Kingdom: Maplecroft. Available at:
http://maplecroft.com/about/news /food_ security.html 12. Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational
Questions (2000). Toward System-WideGuidance on Household
10. Alyson Warhurst. 2011. Somalia, DR Congo top Maplecroft’s Food Security and Nutrition. Final version from IFAD/FAO/WFP.
food security risk ranking – Horn of Africa food crisis worsened Revised July 2000.
by human factors. United Kingdom: Maplecroft. Available at: 13. Sumiter S. Broca. 2002. Food Insecurity, Poverty and Agricul-
http://maplecroft.com/about/news /food_ security.html ture: A Concept Paper. (ESA Working Paper No. 02). Italy: FAO.
14. Broca, Sumiter S. 2002. Food Insecurity, Poverty and Agricul-
11. AU/FAO/IFAD/WFP. 2011. One Africa - One Voice Against ture: A Concept Paper. P.8. Rome/Italy:FAO.
Hunger. In: African Union, Conference for the Horn of Africa,
Addis Ababa, 25/08/2011, Ethiopia: African Union.

30

level, change in food prices and food availability The armed conflict in Somalia may exacerbate
decline are the transitory points, while at long-run future droughts, since war and military activities have
relative prices and wages are the chronic ones. detrimental impacts on the environment. The lack of
state control or any other effective form of govern-
Along with other eastern African countries, ance has led to widespread misuse and overuse of
Somalia’s level of food insecurity is currently one of natural resources and environmental degradation.
the highest in the world. After almost 20 years of In addition, armed conflict can hinder the normal
armed conflict, droughts and floods, there is an acute movement of herdsmen and peasants displaced by
humanitarian crisis in Somalia. According to Vikram drought, land grabbing and new enclosures, trigger-
Kolmannskog, from the Norwegian Refugee Council, ing conflicts. Government’s absence also contributes
in Climate change, disaster, displacement and migra- to food insecurity at market level due to lack of con-
tion: initial evidence from Africa (2009): trol on food prices and availability.

The climate in Somalia is arid to semi- arid. While conflict has been a reality for most
The livestock and rain-fed agriculture, which Somalis for years, it is the drought that has taken
are main livelihoods and components of the them to the breaking point. For instance, in parts of
economy, directly depend on the weather Southern Somalia, one in three Somali children are
and environment. According to researchers, malnourished and, according to UNHCR, more than
international humanitarian agency staff, local 80 per cent of those fleeing Somalia are women and
NGOs and local people, the drought cycle children. Totally destitute women and children leave
has changed over the last decades from once everything behind and walk for days to reach camps
every ten years (when the droughts were given in Kenya and Ethiopia, where they can find refuge
names) to becoming an almost nameless con- and minimal life conditions. As stated by Damian Car-
stant15. rington (2011):

Over the first half of 2011, access to food in key areas We must start with the worst, in the horn of
of the Horn of Africa has declined. A marked increase Africa. In Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, human
in food prices in local markets since late 2010 means failings mean a severe drought has tipped mil-
that many of the poorest cannot afford to meet basic lions into famine. It's a textbook case of why
needs. A combination of poor crop production, dis- things go wrong. War begets poverty, leaving
rupted commodity flows from neighboring countries, food unaffordable. Devastated infrastructure
and movement restrictions have driven up prices at destroys both food production and the ability
a time when households are often most vulnerable to truck in emergency food. The collapse of
to food shortages – the lean season. While food inse- society means the effects of extreme weather
curity is predicted to remain at critical levels, agricul- such as drought cannot be dealt with. And the
ture (crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry) is a core fear of violence turns people into refugees,
survival strategy in the Horn of Africa, and serves as leaving their livelihoods and social networks
the primary source of food and income for an esti- behind16.
mated 80 percent of the region’s population.
Since the beginning of 2011, drought and
Consequences conflict-related displacement and refugee flows
steadily increased. In an average month in 2011,
The devastating effects of the drought have some 15 thousand Somalis flee their country and
been amplified by the ongoing-armed conflict inse- arrive in Kenya and Ethiopia. In June 2011, according
curity, extreme underdevelopment, poor infrastruc- to UNHCR, an estimated 54 thousand refugees fled
ture and the denial of humanitarian assistance. A to Kenya and Ethiopia from Somalia, which repre-
growing civil war exacerbates food insecurity, and sents three times the number of people who fled in
also Somalia’s complex dynamics of conflicts, dis- May. In the first half of 2011, the number of people in
asters and human mobility are factors that enable urgent need of humanitarian assistance increased by
a better interpretation of the fragile situation faced
these days. 16. Carrington, D., 2011. Food is the ultimate security need, new
map shows, The Guardian [online], available at <http://www.
15. Kolmannskog,Vikram, 2009. Climate change, disaster, dis- guardian.co.uk/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2011/
placement and migration: initial evidence from Africa. (Research aug/31/food-security-prices-conflict#> [Accessed 19 Septem-
Paper no. 180). New Issues in Refugees Research, p.5. ber 2011].

31

almost 850 thousand to some 2.85 million, one third flict in and around Mogadishu. When asked
of Somalia’s population. more in detail, however, it became clear that
many people first fled from Mogadishu to the
Forced Displacement in Somalia countryside or another town within Somalia,
but because of the current drought and envi-
The dynamics of human mobility is very com- ronmental degradation in these areas, they
plex. In Somalia, the reality of forced displacement were forced to move further19.
has been present for a long time. Since the 90s the
Somali civilians escaped the civil war by reaching This anecdotal evidence from Somalia indi-
neighboring frontiers and living in refugee camps in cates how complex the interaction of conflict, natural
order to save their lives. While some people may be disasters and displacement can be. In 2008 the issues
forced to move, others are forced to settle or do not regarding forced displacement were the same as the
have the resources to move. In 2011, due to the cir- present ones. Today, southern and rural Somali pop-
cumstances related to the worst drought in 60 years ulation mostly would first search for help in Moga-
and the long-term conflict, forced migration aug- dishu, the only safe place where the main NGOs and
mented in massive levels, leading the majority of the international organizations can locate their aid cent-
local population to Kenya and Ethiopia. ers. However, these displaced persons usually find
it impossible to reach this main aid reference, since
The current forced displacement in Somalia insurgent groups’ barriers throughout the country
is mostly related to drought and famine. The direct block their path. Therefore, they are forced to reach
relation between drought (believed to be worst as the frontiers to escape violence, death and, above
a result of climate change effects) and population all, famine.
flight is a recent and frequently discussed concept,
also believed to be an aggravating forced displace- Refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs)
ment factor in the twenty-first century, as stated
by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)17 in The multi-causality of movement also means
2008: that some persons displaced across a border in the
context of climate change could be considered refu-
There are complex linkages between climate gees. However, they do not fit the traditional refugee
change and human mobility. Current estimates law framework. Others, known as internally displaced
of the number of people who will be obliged people (IDPs)20, were displaced within their own
to move as a result of climate change and envi- country, being forced to flee or leave their homes to
ronmental degradation by the year 2050 range avoid the effects of climate change or conflicts, as in
from 25 million to one billion18. the case of Somalia. The IDPs are more exposed to
threatening conditions than the ones who got to flee
In the Somali case, drought contributes to across the border and be as far as possible from the
longer-distance displacement since 2008, according dreadful circumstances that led the plight.
to local researches and statistics:
Much of the movement is expected to occur
When asked why Somalis were coming to inside the country, so the internal displacement
neighboring countries like Kenya, both interna- should be a matter of international concern, since
tional humanitarian agency staff and displaced it affects a vast part of the population. As stated by
persons themselves first mentioned the con-

17. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC): is a unique 19. Kolmannskog,Vikram, 2009. Interview 22 and interview 43
inter-agency forum for humanitarian coordination and for its about Somalia’s human displacement. Climate change, disas-
members a policy development and decision making forum ter, displacement and migration: initial evidence from Africa.
involving key UN and non-UN humanitarian actors. The IASC [Research Paper no.180]. New Issues in Refugees Research.
was established in June 1992 in response to UN General Assem- Norwegian Refugee Council, 209.
bly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian
assistance. 20. Internally Displaced People (IDPs): persons or groups of
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave
18. Informal Group on Migration/Displacement and Climate their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a
Change of the IASC, 2008, Climate Change, Migration and Dis- result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situ-
placement: Who will be affected?: Working paper submitted ations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or
by the informal group on Migration/ Displacement and Climate natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
Change of the IASC, p.1. Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ internationally recognized state border.
docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf

32

Richard Black, in Demographics and Climate Change: “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign
Future Trends and their Policy Implications for Migra- domination or events seriously disturbing public
tion, Development (2008): order in either part or the whole of his country of
origin or nationality.”24
Finally, it is important not to overlook those
who are not displaced. While some remain Regional and complementary protection
because of resilient capacity, others may in for displaced people mostly broadens the refugee
fact be forced to stay. They do not have the status, like the Convention of the Organization of
resources and network to move21. African Unity (OAU) about Refuge and the Cartagena
Declaration, and tends to be different according to
International assistance is necessary to pro- the specific local need. Regarding the international
tect displaced people, and that was why the inter- protection, the 1951 Refugee Convention is still the
national protection instruments regarding refuge, cornerstone of the international refugee system. The
displacement, and statelessness were created. The UNHCR, as the UN agency for refugees, has been
international refugee law describes a refugee as a mandated to protect as refugees, persons who fear
person, who meets the criteria under the applica- serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical
ble refugee definition provided by international or integrity or freedom resulting from generalized vio-
regional refugee instruments, UNHCR’s mandate or lence or events seriously disturbing public order, in
the national legislation. addition to persons falling within the 1951 Conven-
tion definition. Besides, concerning the IDPs:
The refugee definition has evolved over the
past six decades. Under the 1951 Refugee Con- U NHCR´s original mandate does not specifi-
vention a refugee is a person who “owing to well- cally cover IDPs, but because of the agency’s
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, reli- expertise on displacement, it has for many
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social years been assisting millions of them, more
group or political opinions, is outside the country of recently through the "cluster approach”25.
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, Under this approach, UNHCR has the lead role
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that in overseeing the protection and shelter needs
country, or who, not having a nationality and being
outside of the country of his former habitual resi- 24. Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing
dence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Art. 1(2),
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”22 1969.

Movements across international borders 25. The cluster approach operates on two levels: the global
caused by environmental factors are not considered and local. At the global level, the approach is meant to build
eligible for the endowment of refugee status under up capacity in eleven key ‘gap’ areas by developing better surge
the 1951 Refugee Convention. The terms “environ- capacity, ensuring consistent access to appropriately trained
mental refugee” and “climate refugee”23 therefore technical expertise and enhanced material stockpiles, and
have no legal basis in international refugee law securing the increased engagement of all relevant humanitar-
framework. ian partners. At the field level, the cluster approach strengthens
the coordination and response capacity by mobilizing clusters
In Africa, the refugee definition has been of humanitarian agencies (UN/Red Cross – Red Crescent/IOs/
broadened to include persons forced to leave their NGOs) to respond in particular sectors or areas of activity, each
country not only as a result of persecution, but also cluster having a clearly designated and accountable lead, as
agreed by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Country Team.
21. Black, R. et al., 2008, Demographics and Climate Change: Designated lead agencies at the global level both participate
Future Trends and their Policy Implications for Migration, Devel- directly in operations, but also coordinate with and oversee
opment. Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Pov- other organizations within their specific spheres, reporting the
erty, University of Sussex, Brighton. England: RCMGP. results up through a designated chain of command to the Emer-
gency Relief Coordinator at the summit. However, lead agencies
22. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees1951. are responsible as ‘providers of last resort’, which represents
Art. 1A(2), as modified by the 1967 Protocol. the commitment of cluster leads to do their utmost to ensure
an adequate and appropriate response in their respective areas
23. “climate refugee” or “environmental refugee” : it is not of responsibility. The cluster approach was part of a package
recommended to use this terms official or unofficial documen- of reforms accepted by the International Accounting Standards
tation. Their use could potentially undermine the international Committee (IASC) in December 2005 and subsequently applied
legal regime for the protection of refugees and create confusion in eight chronic humanitarian crises and six sudden-onset
regarding the link between climate change, environmental deg- emergencies. However, the reform was originally rolled out and
radation and migration. evaluated in four countries: DRC, Liberia, Somalia and Uganda.

33

of IDPs as well as coordination and manage- zations (NGOs) partners in Kenya provide essential
ment of camps26. health, nutrition and sanitation services to the newly
arrived.
External displacement creates particular
needs, but those left behind also have grave pro- Breakdown Total Somali Refugee Somali Refu-
tection concerns, so an inclusive approach should by Country Population gee Arrivals in
address their needs. The UNHCR estimates that
there are approximately 74 thousand IDPs in Soma- KENYA 512,146 2011
lia, mainly including people from southern areas Last individuals
(Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bay and Bakool regions), but 93,939
also farmers and vulnerable families displaced from Updated individuals
areas around Dobley. Presently there are approxi- 04/10/2011
mately 910 thousand Somalis living as refugees in
Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen, about a third of
which fled Somalia in 2011.

Dadaab, Kenya: The World’s Largest Refugee Com- 162,644 33,738
plex households households

The Kenyan 2006 Refugees Act recognizes as Somali Registered Refugee Population – Information sharing
refugees those with well-founded fears of persecu-
tion on grounds of race, religion, nationality, mem- portal hosting by UNHCR27
bership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion, in accordance with the 1951 Convention relating During their long journey, some of these vul-
to the Status of Refugees. It also includes those who
flee due to one of the reasons set out in the wider nerable Somali civilians die on the road, while others
refugee definition (including for example generalized reach the host facilities almost dead. A great number
violence) of the 1969 Organization of African Union of the survivors are receiving especial treatments to
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refu- recover from dehydration, measles and malnutrition.
gee Problems in Africa. The UN refugee agency and its partners have made
steady advances in fostering health care and provid-
The case of some Somalis living in Kenya, ing nutrition to vulnerable refugees in several camps.
displaced due to climate-related disasters and con-
flict, illustrates how these uprooted persons can A major challenge is to make Dadaab an
receive a formal protection status, but much may empty place someday. The international commu-
still be needed to grant them an effective protection. nity should seek durable solutions for the problem
The Dadaab Refugee Complex houses the largest in Somalia, to set free the population whose life was
number of Somali refugees in the world, and is also ‘suspended’ during 20 years, and who cannot make
the world’s greatest concentration of refugees. The decisions or participate in the recovery of their own
first reason for the protracted existence of Dadaab’s country.
camps is the Somali conflict that is in progress for 20
years. A whole new generation of Somalis was born International Organizations Joint Efforts
in those camps.
The roles and responsibilities of international
Since January 2011, about 94 thousand humanitarian agencies are crucial, since affected
Somalis arrived in Kenya, and the major part sought states often have limited ability to protect their vul-
shelter at Dadaab’s camps. After the recent exten- nerable population. Humanitarian agencies should
sion of the Refugee Complex, the refugee population take a virtuous approach when addressing climate
was granted better living conditions. Nonetheless, change, disasters and displacement. Three impor-
many of the new arrivals stay at Dadaab’s surround- tant humanitarian agencies are focusing their work
ings. The UNHCR and its Non Governmental Organi- to provide assistance in the humanitarian crisis in the
Horn of Africa:

26. Internally Displaced People. UNHCR Website. Available at: 27. Available at:http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/regional.

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html php?id=65

34

• The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) will also undertake public awareness and advo-
is focusing its interventions in the Horn of Africa cacy to gain more support for its Somalia pro-
on increasing access to water resources by regen- gramme and revitalize the Mixed Migration Task
erating and constructing water wells; providing Force, which is composed of UNHCR, UNICEF31,
vital agricultural inputs, such as drought-tolerant and IOM32. In 2011, UNHCR will continue to focus
seeds, animal feed, forage and water for live- on providing emergency shelter kits and non-
stock; using cash transfers to mitigate the rising food items (NFIs) to people of concern in IDP set-
prices of staple foods and to protect against the tlements and elsewhere. It will also protect and
distress sales of productive assets, and providing assist refugees, while exploring the possibilities
immediate relief through cash-for-work activities; for voluntary repatriation, local integration and
protecting an essential foundation of livelihood resettlement33.
assets through plant and animal pest and disease
surveillance and control; improving community No single agency has either the resources or
water management practices and training farm- the capacity to deal with all the problems of hunger
ers on enhanced dry land crop and livestock pro- and underdevelopment. Consequently the joint work
duction systems; and investing in post-crisis early of these three agencies and other relevant agen-
recovery to restore livelihoods and strengthen cies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
households’ resilience to future shocks28. response to emergencies and humanitarian crises,
as the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis, is extremely impor-
• The World Food Programme (WFP) is currently tant.
providing food assistance to nearly one million
people in Somalia and will scale up its operations In 1994, FAO implemented The Food Security
during the 2011 to reach approximately 1.9 mil- Assessment Unit (FSAU), of which the most important
lion people in those parts of the country where role has been the independent analysis and therefore
they have access. Other agencies and NGOs like control of the emergency food needs requirements
CARE29, have taken responsibility for getting food in Somalia. The WFP and many other international
assistance to areas of the south, where WFP can agencies have been launching programmes and pro-
not reach. In July, WFP declared a corporate emer- jects in the region since then.
gency, elevating the crisis in the Horn of Africa to
the highest level of action. Currently WFP is rap- The WFP collaborates closely with FAO and
idly moving life saving food into the region, aiming the International Fund for Agricultural Development
to feed over 11 million people. WFP is aiming to (IFAD), especially in supplying food aid for house-
provide assistance to 3.7 million people in Soma- hold food security. The WFP also works closely with
lia, 3.7 million people in Ethiopia, 2.7 million UNHCR in both emergencies and during protract
people in Kenya, and an additional 226 thousand refugee situations, to deliver food to refugee popu-
refugees in Ethiopia and 496 thousand refugees in lations. According to Gil Loescher and others, in
Kenya30. the UNHCR- Politics and practice of refugee protec-
tion into the twenty-first century (2008), WFP and
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR:
(UNHCR) strategy for its operation in Somalia in
2011 evolves around evidence-based planning; Conduct joint assessment missions to refugee
innovative protection delivery; flexible response; camps and settlements, to ensure that refu-
and strengthened protection capacity. The agency gees are receiving a sufficient quantity and
diversity of food that is nutritionally balanced
28. Horn of Africa Crisis FAO Website. Available at: http://www. and culturally appropriate. The importance
fao.org/crisis/horn-africa/home/en/ of this partnership has increased over the
past decade, as a great number of host states
29. CARE is a humanitarian organization that fights global pov- require refugees to remain in closed camps and
erty, with special focus on working alongside poor women, that settlements with no opportunities to pursue
are at the heart of CARE’s community-based efforts to improve self-reliance. In such circumstances, refugees
basic education, prevent the spread of disease, increase access
to clean water and sanitation, expand economic opportunity 31. UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
and protect natural resources. CARE also delivers emergency
aid to survivors of war and natural disasters, and helps people 32. IOM: International Organization for Migration
rebuild their lives.
33. Somália. UNHCR Website. Available at: http://www.unhcr.
30. Horn of Africa Crisis. WFP Website. Available at: http:// org/pages/49e483ad6.html
www.wfp.org/crisis/horn-of-africa

35

are almost entirely dependent on the inter- leads, the other follows35. In addition, insecurity and
national community to provide them with the reduction of assets over time have made communi-
food they need to survive34. ties more vulnerable to seasonal climate cycles that
result in reduced food production. Soil degradation
In March 2003, FAO and UNHCR agreed on the can also trigger food crises and further undermine
importance of enhancing cooperation. This agree- the economic performance of weak and unstable
ment, called Strengthening the Cooperation between states, thereby leading to destabilization, collapse of
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United social systems and violent conflicts.
Nations (FAO) and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was based on the fact Insecurity has continued to obstruct inter-
that the majority of the world's refugee population national efforts to provide food aid and basic health
is hosted by, and originates from, developing coun- services in Somalia and other parts of the world. The
tries, where extreme poverty is one of the main fac- complex setting in this country hinders the delivery
tors contributing to both hunger and conflict-related of international aid. Other challenges are widespread
human displacement. corruption and troublesome access to some areas,
especially those controlled by Al Shabab. Last July
The joint efforts of UNHCR, FAO and WFP (2011), Al Shabab allowed the operations of actors
have been increasingly important to address the such as UNICEF and the International Committee of
lack of financial support and donations to this dra- the Red Cross (ICRC) in its territories, but kept pressing
matic situation in Somalia. Together they are able to the ban on agencies such as the United Nations Polit-
draw the world’s attention to the need of immediate ical Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the WFP, the UNDP
action to curb the worst humanitarian crisis of 2011. and several NGOs36. In many cases this has called for
In partnership, these three organizations are deliv- the international agencies to negotiate the continu-
ering emergency assistance airlifts to Somalia and ity of operations with local leaders, meanwhile many
other countries affected by the drought, to save time humanitarian workers are being kidnapped in Kenya
and assist the vulnerable population. Furthermore, and some locations near Somalia’s border and then
the media cooperation with these agencies is being brought to Somalia’s territory. All these events have
extremely helpful to broadcast what is happening in been connected to Al Shabab.
northeaster Africa.
While widespread violence makes aid opera-
Challenges and Final Remarks tions more intricate, its continuance inside the coun-
try’s most affected regions is imperative to restrain
As acknowledged previously, Somalia has the insurgent group actions. Immediate, generous
been devastated during two decades of conflict and and effective life-saving and livelihood support are
political chaos, which resulted in an ineffective gov- vital to prevent the crisis from expanding further to
ernment and poor infrastructure. The human and neighbouring countries, exacerbating current threats
economic impact of the conflict was dolorous, with to food and nutrition security.
large-scale loss of life, displacement of people, dis-
ruption of trade and destruction of the transportation Considering the food security situation, the
networks, so important to the delivery of humanitar- international organizations engaged in the recovery
ian aid. The twenty-first century brings inauspicious of the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa are imple-
challenges to Somalia’s recovery. menting programs and deliverance of food inside
Somalia and in its neighboring countries, especially in
The primary obstacle to economic growth refugee’s camps. According to the FAO Report about
and development in Somalia is the civil unrest. After
countless failed attempts of reconciliation, Somalia 35. Carrington, D., 2011. Food is the ultimate security need, new
has not had a central government since 1991, and map shows. The Guardian, available at: <http://www.guardian.
in the last 20 years a symbiotic relationship has been co.uk/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2011/aug/31/
shown between lack of food and conflict––where one food-security-prices-conflict#> [Accessed 19 September 2011].

34. Loescher, G., Betts, A. and Milner, J., 2008. The UNHCR- Poli- 36. Report of the independent expert on the situation of human
tics and practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first cen- rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari. 2011. UN General Assembly.
tury. 1st ed., Routledge P.86. Human Rights Council, eighteenth session, agenda item 10,
technical assistance and capacity–building.

36

the state of food in 201137, in the long term, invest- […] most of the forced migration and conflict
ment in agriculture and improving resilience among related to climate change is likely to remain
farmers remain key to providing sustained access to internal and regional. While the developed
food for all and reducing vulnerability to price volatil- countries bear the main responsibility for cli-
ity and natural disasters such as drought in the Horn mate change, one could question whether
of Africa, especially in Somalia. As narrated in this the dynamics of climate change, conflict and
report: forced migration can and should be portrayed
as a threat image of masses of refugees flood-
Improved seeds and farm management tech- ing over western borders. The sad truth is that
niques, as well as irrigation and fertilizer, that there will be real floods, and if nothing changes,
sustainably increase productivity and reduce many of the affected will have little choice but
production risk must be delivered to farmers, to return and risk further flooding40.
especially smallholders, by both the private and
the public sector. Governments must ensure This means multiple challenges to the crea-
that a transparent and predictable regulatory tion of food security patterns and to the warranty
environment is in place, one that promotes pri- of human security in Somalia. In a country where
vate investment and increases farm productiv- conflict has reigned for quite a long time, it is hard
ity. We must reduce food waste in developed to reconceive and manage some important changes
countries through education and policies, and that the Somali society must strive for.
reduce food losses in developing countries by
boosting investment in the entire value chain, The climate and environmental factor should
especially post-harvest processing. More sus- not overshadow others political and socio-economic
tainable management of our natural resources, factors of forced displacement and conflict. The first
forests and fisheries are critical for the food and utmost challenge is to end this conflict at once.
security of many of the poorest members of Organizing transitory measures or an international
society38. peace-building mission to rearrange the country’s
infrastructures might be the first step to fight this
Relating to the connection between forced violent and never-ending warfare. After establishing
displacement and food insecurity, the Somali case internal institutions, Courts of Law, safeguard of the
brings the latest opportunity to observe how sev- citizens, right of free-speech and popular represen-
eral variables are integrated in the climate change tation, a democratic government should be empow-
related displacement. As stated in the Norwegian ered to represent all the ethnic groups and minori-
Refugee Council Report ‘Future Floods of Refugees ties, converting Somalia in a real democratic state.
- A comment on climate change, conflict and forced Since there has never been serious famine in a coun-
migration’39, forced migration can be triggered by a try with a democratic government and a free press,
range of socio-economic and political factors, which as acknowledge by Amartya Sen41.
also enhances conflict. Governance and the role of
the state are often crucial factors and, in fact, coop- In conclusion, the 21st century brings plenty
eration rather than conflict may be the response to challenges to Somalia’s recovery. It is evident that
some environmental challenges. As displayed by the climate change plays a special role in the present
report: forced displacement issues in this particular region,
but also, as reported previously, the conflict and the
37. Diouf, Jacques; Nwanze, Kanayo F. and Sheeran, Josette. lack of governance is the key factor that enables
2011. Foreword of ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World changes within the Somali society. Nowadays, the
- How does international price volatility affect domestic econo- food security must be taken as a vital objective to
mies and food security?’ FAO, WFP and IFAD Report.. p.4. FAO, achieve the human security, leading Somalia to an
IFAD and WFP: Rome, Italy. authentic recovery and ending the protracted situa-
tion at Dadaab`s Refugee Complex.
38. Diouf, Jacques; Nwanze, Kanayo F. and Sheeran, Josette.
2011. Foreword of ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World 40. Kolmannskog, Vikram Odedra. 2008. ‘Future Floods of Refu-
- How does international price volatility affect domestic econo- gees - A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migra-
mies and food security?’ FAO, WFP and IFAD Report.. p.4. FAO, tion’, p. 4. Norway, Oslo.
IFAD and WFP: Rome, Italy
41. Sen, A .1993. Overcoming global hunger. Actions to reduce
39. Kolmannskog, Vikram Odedra. 2008. ‘Future Floods of Refu- hunger world-wide, Washington DC, US.
gees - A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migra-
tion’. Oslo, Norway.

37

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‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World - How does

38

“South Africa is a highly xenophobic society” - An assessment of the causes of
xenophobic attitudes.

Janine Graf
University of East London

[email protected]

Abstract:
In May 2008 a storm swept across South Africa, when black South African citizens violently attacked African
foreigners in townships across the country – ringing notions of a ‘rainbow nation’, pan-African solidarity and
equality in the new South Africa hollow.
Through qualitative research three overarching themes of possible causes of the xenophobic climate in South
Africa could be ascertained: (1) socio-economic reasons, (2) cultural aspects, (3) official and public discourse.
Backed by qualitative and quantitative data and examined in connection with the outbreak of xenophobic
violence in May 2008 it is determined how valid these hypotheses are.
The paper comes to the conclusion that all three hypotheses are indeed valid for explaining the occurrence of
xenophobic attitudes in South Africa. However they are connected with each other and thus have to be read
as an interconnected series of explanation. In fact, all these hypotheses seem to point towards two underlying
causes, the legacy of apartheid and problems with the transformation process.

Introduction bic climate is not a new phenomenon, but has been
penetrating society since the end of apartheid (Blank
In May 2008 a storm swept across South Africa, and Buchholz, 2008), significantly challenging the
when South African citizens violently attacked for- country’s transformation process. Steenkamp (2009,
eign nationals in townships across the country – kill- p. 439) expresses the impact of the xenophobic vio-
ing, raping, looting and destroying. Focusing on these lence succinctly: “Within a single month, notions of a
events, this paper seeks to find out why a significant ‘rainbow nation’, pan-African solidarity and equality
part of the South African population has xenophobic in South Africa were ringing hollow”.
attitudes.
As the events of May 2008 have triggered increas-
In 1994 South Africa held its first non-racial demo- ing scrutiny from both the public and academia this
cratic elections – marking the formal end of 342 paper examines three overarching themes of possi-
years of institutionalized racism (African Peer Review ble and in the literature frequently mentioned causes
Mechanism1, 2007; Crush, 2001). South Africa of xenophobia:
became a ‘rainbow nation’, whose strength lie in its
multi-culturalism and the coming together of people a) Socio-economic reasons
from diverse backgrounds (Butler, 2009, p. 33). b) Cultural aspects
c) Official and public discourse
However, contemporary South Africa remains a
country characterized by many problems such as The first section reviews theoretical approaches to
the deeply entrenched socio-economic inequali- the phenomenon of xenophobia, thereafter outlining
ties and brittle race relations (APRM, 2007, p. 30). the nature and scope it takes in South Africa.
In 2001, Crush (p. 7) asserted that “South Africa is
still one of the most race-conscious societies in the The xenophobic violence of May 2008 will be
world”, warning that “the legacy of apartheid and explored in the second section. It connects the find-
institutionalized racism will take decades to rectify”. ings of the first section with the specific context of
Discriminatory attitudes and practices continue to these events, as exemplified in the case study of the
manifest themselves, but now against a new victim; Alexandra Township.
‘The Foreigner’ (Harris, 2002, p. 169). This xenopho-
The third section reverts to the assumption made
1. Hereafter APRM in section one and validated in the case study; argu-
ing that all factors contributing to the xenophobic

39

climate in South Africa point towards two intercon- over another (Giddens, 1994; Yakushko, 2009).
nected, underlying causes.
Ethnicity refers to a group’s shared awareness of
Finally, this paper concludes by connecting all dis- common cultural values and norms that distinguish
cussed factors, outlining how these different levels of it from other groups (Giddens, 1994, p. 741). In this
explanations for xenophobic attitudes and violence sense ethnicity can be seen as a relational concept,
interact. having to do with insiders and outsiders of the col-
lective and the perception of its superiority (Bekker,
1. Theoretical Approaches to the Phenomenon of 2008, p. 4). Alexander (2008, p. 148) emphasizes that
Xenophobia in South Africa identities are socially constructed and not ‘given’.
This means that we are not born with an identity,
Xenophobia in General but develop it as we become aware of other groups
and of the ethnic differences between us and others
Xenophobia is the 'hatred or fear of foreigners', and (Phinney, 2001, p. 4821).
as such describes attitudes and prejudices that reject,
exclude and often vilify specific persons, based on Xenophobia in South Africa
the perception that they are non-nationals or out-
siders (CSVR, CoRMSA, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008; Despite the country’s transition from a racist regime
Giddens, 1994). Prejudice is closely linked to discrim- to a democracy, prejudice and violence continue to
ination, which refers to activities that deny the mem- mark contemporary South Africa in the form of new
bers of a particular group resources or rewards which discriminatory practices (Harris, 2002, p. 169). In fact,
are open to others (Giddens, 1994, p. 741). However, claims that South Africans were becoming increas-
although prejudice is very often the basis of discrimi- ingly hostile towards foreigners already began to sur-
nation, the two may exist separately, as individuals face in the mid-1990s, resulting in periodic incidents
may have prejudices which they do not act on, while of xenophobic attacks, which all lead up to the ‘‘per-
discrimination does not necessarily derive directly fect storm’’ in May 2008 (Crush, 2001; Steenkamp,
from prejudice (Ibid, p. 256). 2009).

Yakushko (2009, p. 44) says that xenophobia is a This rise of xenophobia accompanied the grow-
multidimensional and multicausal phenomenon ing amount of migrants entering South Africa since
intricately tied to notions of nationalism and eth- the end of the apartheid regime. As the country
nocentrism, both of which are based on the belief has developed into the economic powerhouse of
that one’s ethnic group or nation-state is superior to sub-Saharan Africa, it has also become the primary
others (Henderson, 2008, p. 748). Likewise Wicker destination for migrants from the rest of the conti-
(2001, p. 16650) relates xenophobia to the process nent (Castles and Miller, 2009; Maharaj, 2001), both
of social exclusion, by arguing that it is legally and illegally, causing migration figures to vary
considerably. This inability to provide exact numbers
A specific ingroup response that uses catego- has led to a vacuum, in which perceptions and emo-
rization in the form of stereotypes and preju- tions are open to manipulation, causing many South
dices, articulates real or imagined group inter- Africans to fear that the country is being over-run by
ests and pursues the goal of enhancing ingroup migrants (Landau, 2004; Valji, 2003).
cohesion through discrimination against the
outgroup. A survey undertaken by the Southern African Migra-
tion Project (SAMP) revealed that around 84% of
Xenophobia is also closely related to racism, as South Africans feel that their country is allowing ‘too
they are mutually supporting forms of oppression many’ foreign nationals in. Table 1 indicates a harden-
(Yakushko, 2009, pp. 47-48). Nevertheless both con- ing of South African attitudes towards immigration in
cepts are also distinct: while xenophobia targets only the period between 1995 and 2006. The proportion
foreign individuals, racism expresses itself in preju- of people willing to let anyone in decreased from 6%
dices against certain individuals. These prejudices to 2%, while the proportion of those wanting a total
are based on socially constructed notions of physical ban on immigration rose from 16% to 37% (Crush,
differences, which are singled out as ethnically signif- 2008, p. 24).
icant, thus emphasizing the superiority of one ‘race’

40

anLyeotne peLoeptle Plliamceitsstornict PPreoohpibleit that although white South Africans might well have
iwn awnhtso caosmloenign thbeernsuomf - cofrmoming higher levels of anti-foreigner sentiment, they tend
to enter as there foreigners other not act upon them, as they have little interaction
aavraeiljaobblse ewnhteorc(a%n) cou(n%t)ries with the migrants concerned. Black South Africans
(%) on the other hand tended towards greater contact
%) with migrants, thus providing more opportunities to
act on xenophobic feelings.
SA1of9ru9ict5ha 6 29 49 16
25 The second characteristic is that South African’s xen-
SAofruictha 6 17 45 25 ophobia is almost exclusively directed towards other
1997 37 Africans, who are referred to as amakwerekwere
(meaning ‘person who speaks an unintelligible lan-
South 2 12 53 guage’) - Kersting (2009, pp. 11-12) even speaks of
Africa an ‘Afro-phobia’.
1999
Why Do South Africans Have Xenophobic Attitudes?
South 2 23 38
A2f0r0ic6a Following the ‘perfect storm’ of xenophobic violence,
analysts, politicians and media commentators con-
Table 1 South African Attitudes to Immigration structed a wide range of explanations and hypoth-
eses. However, most of these explanations are too
Source: Crush, 2008, p. 24 one-sided2, as the causes of South African’s xenopho-
bic attitudes lie in a complex of economic, political,
The survey also revealed South African’s dissatis- social, and cultural factors, both contemporary and
faction with the volume and effectiveness of South historical (Dodson, 2010, p. 4).
African deportation policy, demonstrated in xeno-
phobic incidents where perpetrators demanded that a) Socio-Economic Reasons
all foreign nationals “go home”. Nearly 50% of South
Africans (strongly) support such a deportation of for- As maintained by APRM (2007, p. 10), since the end
eign nationals including those living legally in South of the apartheid regime the country’s economic per-
Africa, while only 18% strongly oppose such a policy. formance has improved, brining about a reduction
of absolute poverty, thus improving people’s mate-
Overall, the discrimination of foreigners in South rial and social conditions. Others, such as Steenkamp
Africa takes a variety of forms, ranging from pejora- (2009, p. 443), disagree, explaining that;
tive language to violence, penetrating not only the
private, but also the public sphere (Steenkamp, 2009, despite democratisation and the promises of
p. 441). Foreigners find less protection and support a better future, the South African ‘miracle’ has
from state institutions, as those institutions are per- not yet dramatically improved the quality of life
haps the most frequent site of human rights viola- of many South Africans living in the townships.
tions and abuses (Valji, 2003, p. 4), the best example
is the Department of Home Affairs, infamous for cor- Despite the government’s efforts to provide employ-
ruption and abuse. Moreover, a 2006 police survey ment opportunities, the most acute problem remains
found “pervasive xenophobic attitudes among police the high rate of unemployment, especially among
officers” (Misago et al., 2010, p. 35), resulting not black South Africans (APRM, 2007; Dodson, 2010);
only in large-scale raids and illegal arrests of migrants, according to the World Bank Development Indica-
but also the practice of extorting bribes from them tors (2011) 23.8% of the total labour force have been
(Harris, 2001, pp. 31-34). unemployed in 2009. Moreover, the new democratic
South Africa faced severe socio-economic develop-
The nature of xenophobia in South Africa has two ment challenges, such as between 5 and 8 million
remarkable characteristics. people living in shacks, little electricity and limited
access to clean water or adequate sanitation (APRM,
Firstly, although various studies have confirmed that
South Africans from all races are xenophobic towards 2. The existence of these one-sided explanations by media and
all foreigners, violence is largely perpetrated by black politicians are already a powerful indicator of their attitudes
South Africans against black Africans (Steenkamp, towards xenophobia. In fact, this kind of subjective discourse
2009, p. 442). Fine and Bird (2006, p. 48) argue perpetuates the problem, as can be seen later in the Section.

41

2007, p. 15). Although the South African government as it directs the anger and frustration over social
has made significant improvements in the delivery ills against foreigners, who are used as a scapegoat
of these social services, the outcomes of its socio- (Harris, 2002, pp. 171-172).
economic policies have progressed very unevenly
and much more needs to be done to ensure effective b) Cultural Aspects
service delivery (APRM, 2007, pp. 16-17).
All cultural hypotheses advanced by various schol-
It is fair to say that economic factors have been an ars and media commentators can be traced back to
important contributing factor to South African’s hos- South Africa’s history. Landau (2005, p. 8) argues that
tile attitudes towards foreigners. CoRMSA (2008) and the widespread discrimination that is a characteris-
Yakushko (2009) argued that frustration and anger by tic of the country’s society is the result of a mindset
South Africans at the worsening economic conditions rooted in apartheid era racial categorization, political
and the lack of service delivery have fuelled the rise of fragmentation, and isolation.
violence. The already existing competition amongst
the less well off for scarce resources is exacerbated The biocultural hypothesis of xenophobia offers a val-
by the widespread assumption amongst South Afri- uable framework for understanding the significance
cans that foreigners are stealing their jobs, houses, of visible difference in generating xenophobia, as
and other services and resources to which they them- these biological-cultural markers point out whom to
selves feel entitled (Dodson, 2010; Landau, 2004). target. Skin colour, accents and physical appearance
These perceived feelings of threat are explained by can all be read as signifiers (Harris, 2002, p. 174). This
the Realistic Conflict Theory, which suggests that exclusionary process based on race is rooted in South
“competition for access to limited resources results Africa’s apartheid history. Bentley and Habib (2008,
in a conflict between groups”, as the in-group views p. 9) point out that the consequences of these past
the out-group as a source of competition, causing racial policies still persist and continue to permeate
prejudices against them (Yakushko, 2009, p. 46). the way South Africans of different races perceive
one another. They even go so far as to claim that
A related theory conceptualising xenophobia in “there may be no country in the world as obsessed
terms of frustration, is that of relative deprivation, with race as South Africa” (Bentley and Habib, 2008,
which asserts that social discontent results from the p. 9).
subjective feeling that one is getting less than one
feels entitled to, i.e. when there exists a gap between Another cultural explanation of xenophobia, the iso-
aspirations and reality (Harris, 2002, p. 171). As Gid- lation hypothesis, situates foreignness at the heart of
den’s (1994, pp. 628-629) explains, hostility towards non-nationals. It suggests that sus-
picion and hostility towards strangers in South Africa
… once standards of living have started to rise, exists due to its history of international isolation as a
people’s levels of expectation also go up. If consequence of apartheid (Harris, 2002, p. 172):
improvement in actual conditions subsequently
slows down, propensities to revolt are created There is little doubt that the brutal environ-
because rising expectations are frustrated. ment created by apartheid with its enormous
emphasis on boundary maintenance has also
Tshitereke (1999, p. 4 cited in Harris, 2002, p. 172) impacted on people's ability to be tolerant of
states that there is a 'causal link between relative difference (Morris, 1998: 1125).
deprivation, xenophobia and collective violence', as
negative attitudes toward immigrants may be the This is made worse by the lack of history in incorpo-
result of perceived relative deprivation among South rating strangers or foreigners (Morris, 1998, p.1125).
Africans.
The isolation hypothesis is wedded to the discourse
Finally, the scapegoating hypothesis, advanced by of exceptionalism, which is rooted in the belief of
Harris, locates xenophobia in South Africa within South Africans that they are different from the rest of
the context of social transition and change, explain- Africa; that they are exceptional (Steenkamp, 2009,
ing hostility towards foreigners in relation to limited p. 443). Given South Africa’s successful reconcilia-
resources, such as housing and employment, cou- tion and democratization process, its political stabil-
pled with high expectations during the transition. It is ity and high level of industrialization, its citizens see
also intrinsically linked with the previously discussed the country as not really belonging to Africa. Instead
theories of group conflict and relative deprivation, Africa is seen as

42

some kind of strange backward continent char- ments that the “deluge” of migrants is respon-
acterized by primitivism, corruption, authori- sible for the current crime wave, rising unem-
tarianism, poverty and failed states (Neocos- ployment and even the spread of diseases.
mos, 2008, p. 590).
However, it is not only state institutions that play a
Ultimately, all these cultural hypotheses are con- role in “promoting” xenophobic discrimination and
nected with the process of identity-shaping and exclu- violence, but also the media. They shape public
sion. Leach et al. (2008, pp. 759-760) argue that this attitudes with highly emotional media images that
formulation of an ethnic/national identity has been portray exceptional South Africa as “flooded” or
central to the formation of modern nation-states, “overrun” by undocumented migrants from the rest
who have been established by consolidating certain of the troubled African continent, thus contribut-
common features, such as language and religion, into ing to the creation of a climate of fear of migrants
a national identity while other ethnic features were (CoRMSA, 2008; Fine and Bird, 2006). Stereotypes
excluded. This mirrors Bekker’s (2008, pp. 2, 4) claim of African foreigners are produced/reproduced, for
that ethnicity is a relational concept, rooted in the instance by constantly depicting them as 'illegal’s' or
distinction between insiders and outsiders; further aliens', terms that imply both criminality and differ-
stressing the fact, that “identities… are constructed ence. Moreover African migrants are presented as a
and manipulated, not ‘given’”. disease or a plague descending onto the country in
masses, creating the impression of an uncontrolla-
Immigration has a strong and wide reaching impact ble, unstoppable process (Harris, 2002, pp. 175-176)
on this ‘normal’ exclusionary process. The rejec-
tion of migrants paired with the refusal of citizen- A large scale analysis of English newspapers, con-
ship and rights to them can trigger the formation ducted by SAMP between 1994 and 1998, concluded
of ethnic minorities. These are groups which “have that “the coverage of international migration by the
been assigned a subordinate position in society by South African press has been largely anti-immigrant
dominant groups on the basis of socially constructed and unanalytical …, uncritically reproducing prob-
markers of phenotype …, origins or culture”; and lematic statistics and assumptions about cross-bor-
who possess a collective consciousness, for instance der migration” (Danso and McDonald, 2000, p. 1).
based on a common history and language (Castles Danso and McDonald (2000, p. 1-2) argue that at
and Miller, 2009, p. 35). best, the press has presented a very limited perspec-
tive on crossborder migration dynamics, thus leav-
c) Official and Public Discourse ing the South African public in the dark about the
real complexities at play. At worst, it has contributed
Considering South Africa’s history of isolation and its to the public xenophobia, inter alia by categorising
problems with incorporating strangers, the negative all migrants as “aliens” or “illegal immigrants” and
public opinion towards immigrants is furthermore reproducing racial and national stereotypes.
shaped by the biased information given by the media
and the authorities. In South African the official and ***
public discourse perpetuates stereotypes and gener-
alizations by using derogatory language, such as ‘ille- It is impossible to ascribe more or less importance to
gal aliens’ and ‘hordes’ (Morris, 1998; Steenkamp, a particular cause or hypothesis, as all of them are
2009). More specifically, African foreigners are rep- interconnected. As Harris (2001, pp. 171,174) points
resented as a threat to South Africa’s society and out, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive,
nation-building process (Harris, 2002; Morris, 1998). but offer different levels of explanation for xenopho-
bic attitudes and thus have to be read as intertwined
Neocosmos (2008, pp. 588-589) termed this the explanations. In conclusion it should be said that all
state discourse of xenophobia, arguing that state of the hypotheses are factors that significantly con-
institutions have provided an environment wherein tribute to and fuel the prevalent xenophobic climate
xenophobic violence has effectively been legitimized in South Africa. Moreover, it is not only the cultural
by the state. As early as 1998, Human Rights Watch hypothesis that can be ascribed to South Africa’s his-
(2008, p. 4) already warned that tory, but also the socio-economic factors and the
official/public discourse. In fact, all these hypotheses
South Africa’s public culture has become seem to point towards two underlying causes; the
increasingly xenophobic, and politicians often legacy of apartheid and problems with the transfor-
make unsubstantiated and inflammatory state-

43

mation process. Context of the Xenophobic Violence

2. Validating the Theories: The Xenophobic Violence In December 2007 Jacob Zuma had replaced the, by
of May 2008 then hugely unpopular, state president Thabo Mbeki,
ending the month-long fight between the two. Steen-
On Sunday, the 11th of May 2008, the “perfect storm” kamp (2009, p. 444) explains that “for the first time
began to sweep across the country. The xenophobic since the end of Apartheid, discontent with govern-
violence began in the township of Alexandra outside ment delivery (and Mbeki) could be voiced without
of Johannesburg, and rapidly spread to other town- compromising one’s loyalty to the ANC (represented
ships, informal settlements and inner-city areas in by Zuma)”, furthermore claiming that the xenopho-
the Gauteng province. Within days the violence had bic violence of May 2008 has been influenced by this
flared up in the KwaZulu-Natal, eventually reaching context. More crucially, Roussouw (2008) asserts that
Cape Town and its surrounding areas (Amnesty Inter- there has been a widespread expectation amongst
national, 2008; CoRMSA, 2008). citizens that Zuma would expel African foreigners
once he became President of South Africa. Indeed
Rampaging mobs, composed mostly of young males Mpilo Shange-Buthane3 (cited in Roussouw, 2008)
(but also of the elderly and women), attacked for- stated that xenophobic attacks ‘in Zuma’s name’
eign nationals, identifying them on the basis of their increased after he was elected4.
perceived nationality, ethnicity or migrant status
(Amnesty International, 2008; Coplan, 2009). They Furthermore, the Institute for Justice and Reconcili-
looted, destroyed and appropriated foreign-owned ation (IJR) (2008, pp. 5-6) asserts that the xenopho-
businesses and houses, raped, beat and burned bic attacks also need to be seen in the context of the
people to death, forcibly displacing foreign nationals upsurge in global volatility. The IJR suggests that the
from their areas/communities (Misago et al., 2010, rising food- and oil prices have triggered an increased
p. 164). economic vulnerability, leading to a significant rise
of protest activity, especially in developing coun-
Graphic images of the violent attacks were seen tries; “In many instances such economic insecurity
across the world, most the image of the burning has either instigated violence or deepened conflicts
Ernesto Nhamuave, a miner from Mozambique, sur- along existing domestic or regional faultlines” (IJR,
rounded by laughing onlookers, that is etched in the 2008, pp. 5-6).
memories of South Africans and the world (Eliseev,
2008; Dodson, 2010). The perpetrators of the economic violence voiced two
central accusations: that those foreigners are stealing
When the storm had passed over 600 people were jobs from South Africans and that their uncompeti-
injured, and sixty-two had lost their lives, mostly for- tive business practices undermine the ability of local
eigners from a range of African countries. Roughly entrepreneurs to make a living (IJR, 2008; Misago et
one-third of those killed were South African citizens, al., 2010). The IJR (2008, p. 6) believes that it is thus
who were attacked because they were mistaken for plausible to argue that
foreign nationals or because they were married to
foreigners (Afrobarometer, 2010; Amnesty Interna- the anxiety, caused by a rapid increase in the
tional, 2008 ). Estimates of people displaced from cost of living …, has been a catalyst to confront
their homes and communities range between 35,000 that which they - incorrectly - regarded as the
and 200,000, with large numbers of non-nationals most immediate threat to … security.
returning to their countries of origin, despite many
having been living in South Africa for several years Further contextual aspects that contributed to the
(CoRMSA, 2008; UNHCR, 2009a). According to the xenophobic climate and provided a fertile ground for
Minister of Safety and Security, 1,384 suspects had its escalation are rooted in the South African society.
been arrested; 342 foreign-owned shops looted, 213
of these had also been burnt; 143 shacks had been 3. Advisor with the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in
burnt of which 99 were also looted – some estimate South Africa
that migrants and South Africans lost millions of Rand
(Coplan, 2009; CoRMSA, 2008). 4. A list of incidents of violence against foreign nationals com-
piled by CoRMSA (2010, pp. 1-9) supports this claim: from
December 1994 to December 2007 it has listed twelve inci-
dents, while the period preceding the May violence (from Janu-
ary till 11th May 2008) alone has seen ten.

44

Misago et al. (2010, p. 169) points to strong evidence phobia and the violent exclusion of foreign nationals;
that many South Africans felt overwhelmed by a feel- the most recent incidents including taxi violence and
ing of being ‘swamped’ by current immigration levels, protests over service delivery (Misago et al., 2010;
which goes hand in hand with their lack of confidence Nieftaqodien, 2008). However, not all sectors within
in the state’s ability or will to ‘protect’ them from the the township experienced the violence. The area
perceived outside threat, provoking their choice of most affected was Sector 2, a predominantly Zulu
vigilante violence outside of state structures. populated area. Nonetheless there are also other
ethnic groups, and before May 2008 there have even
What exacerbated this situation even more is that been a significant number of migrants, particularly
South Africans have limited knowledge of their from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi (Misago
country’s immigration laws and policies (Misago et et al., 2010, p. 50).
al., 2010, p. 172). Most do not know of the differ-
ent migrant categories and that foreign nationals can The attacks on foreign nationals in Alexandra started
legally acquire permanent residence or citizenship. on Sunday night, the 11th of May 2008 and lasted for
Instead they are convinced that most foreigners are two weeks (Misago et al., 2010; Nieftaqodien, 2008).
in South Africa illegally and that whatever they pos- All foreign nationals, irrespective of their national-
sess has been acquired illegally. As the government ity, gender, legal status, or length of stay in the area
does not do enough to protect the country from were attacked, even South African women married
these illegal criminals, the community feels justified to foreign nationals. A large number of residents,
in taking action (Misago et al., 2010, p. 166). men and women, participated in the attacks, the
majority of them being hostel dwellers. The violence
Further contributing to this growing culture of vigi- was planned and actively led by Zulu-speakers from
lantism and perceived impunity is that perpetrators the hostels under the leadership of Indunas (leaders
of xenophobic actions have rarely been charged and based on a traditional model) and the local Commu-
rarer convicted, in some instances, even been actively nity Policing Sub-Forum (Nieftaqodien, 2008; Seale
protected by state agents (CoRMSA, 2008; Misago et and Maphumulo, 2008).
al., 2010). As the government also failed to respond
to evidence of increasing attacks, perpetrators and During the week preceding the outbreak of the vio-
potential perpetrators have been encouraged to lence, community meetings had been held where
commit violence without fear of consequences (Ibid). residents complained about foreigners taking away
jobs of local taxi drivers and the rising crime rates
Case Study: Xenophobic Violence in the Alexandra in the area, threatening to take matters into their
Township own hands and to remove foreigners from the area
(Ndlovu, 2008; Nieftaqodien, 2008).
“It started with community meetings about crime
and taxis and ended in an orgy of xenophobic vio- Misago et al. (2008, pp. 54-55), who conducted inter-
lence that tore one of Johannesburg's oldest town- views in the affected areas, report that residents in
ships apart” (Ndlovu, 2008). general perceived foreign nationals living in their
midst as a serious threat to their livelihoods. More
Alexandra is one of the most densely populated set- specifically they mentioned various reasons for
tlements in Johannesburg, a demographically and not liking foreigners; for instance that they illegally
culturally mixed place that has been home to people occupy government houses while locals are living in
from all over South Africa and the African continent shacks and that they run cheap businesses and are
(Misago et al., 2010, p. 47). The socio-economic situ- involved in illegal trading, which undermines local
ation of the township, however, is dire; in addition business capacity.
to high levels of unemployment (around 36%) much
of Alexandra does not have access to public services Nieftaqodien (2008, p. 68) emphasizes that any
and utilities such as electricity and water. Exacerbat- attempt to understand this hostility and violence
ing this problem is overcrowding, combining a lack of towards foreigners should be located in the poli-
existing infrastructure with hastily-erected informal tics of failed development and delivery. He argues
shack dwellings (ibid, p. 48). that Alexandra and other townships that experi-
enced xenophobic violence, are still the dumping
Alexandra has a long history of political unrest, as well grounds of the marginalised and alienated, and that
as organised and criminal violence including xeno- the township has hardly benefited from the coun-

45

try’s economic growth over the past decade. In this and society “not only resemble but perpetuate and
sense, many Alexandrans (or South Africans in gen- reproduce apartheid”.
eral), whose living conditions have not altered since
the end of apartheid, feel excluded and marginal- APRM (2007, p. 26) asserts that the vestiges of
ised from the new South Africa, grievances that have racism, deeply entrenched through several decades
largely been ignored by local administrations and the of apartheid rule, still remain in the South African
government (CoRMSA, 2008, p. 28), thus provoking society. This is perpetuated by the post-apartheid
South African’s to take matters into their own hands. state’s continued classification of people according
to apartheid groupings, which leads to a naturaliza-
This coincided with residents’ frustrations over the tion of the thinking of politics through the lenses of
inability or perceived unwillingness of local authori- racial and national stereotypes (Neocosmos, 2008, p.
ties to address residents’ concerns about the pres- 592), impacting on the way South Africans view and
ence of foreign nationals. Although most of the for- treat foreigners within their borders (APRM, 2007, p.
eign nationals had been living in that area for a long 27).
time and no mass influx was recorded in the recent
past, residents still had the general feeling that the Valji (2003, p. 8) points out that although the politi-
number of foreign nationals had increased signifi- cal landscape of South Africa has significantly shifted;
cantly, intensifying their frustrations (Misago et al.,
2008, pp. 56-58). Duma Mncube, working in one of immigration policy remains very much rooted
the hostels, expressed the people’s deep sense of in the thinking and assumptions of the past,
grievance and frustration, when saying that their not merely in its racially discriminatory impact
lives had not changed since the fall of apartheid but equally in its emphasis on the security par-
and that government development projects had not adigm of immigration.
borne fruit, causing them to feel left out. He said
"we're being treated like foreigners in our own coun- So whilst during apartheid the terms 'alien' or 'ille-
try while the foreigners are having a nice time” (cited gal' referred to blacks living in the homelands, today
in Tshabalala and Dibetle, 2008). these same terms, as well as the exclusion they sym-
bolise, have merely been shifted, used to create a
3. The Factors Underlying the Xenophobic Climate in new oppositional ‘other’, an ‘other’ that is essentially
South Africa defined as ‘non-South African’ (Misago et al., 2010;
Valji, 2003).
The previous sections critically examined the wide
range of hypotheses expounding South African’s xen- Problems Associated with the Transformation Pro-
ophobic attitudes. If read as an interconnected series cess
of explanation, they provide a valuable insight into
the prevalent xenophobic climate in South Africa. Yakushko (2009, pp. 45-46) proposes that “xenopho-
More crucially, their examination points towards two bia is often associated with times of economic and
interconnected causes that underlie all hypotheses: political instability”; situations in which the immigra-
the legacy of apartheid and problems with the trans- tion of large groups of people can result in the host
formation process. community’s reaction of feeling threatened by the
newcomers.
The Legacies of Apartheid
In South Africa disaffection with the transformation
The origins of xenophobia are to be found in the process inevitably means frustration with the gov-
racism, nationalism, violence, and isolation of the ernment’s failure to address the socio-economic
apartheid era. South Africans who in the past have legacies of apartheid. South African communities are
been racially divided and forced to live in designated particularly frustrated with the state’s apparent ina-
ethnic group areas, the ‘homelands’, still occupy pre- bility to create jobs, its poor service delivery and the
carious social, economic, and political positions. It is increased competition for resources and/or opportu-
those marginalized citizens that have been among nities, sentiments that are intensified by the feeling
the perpetrators of the attacks on African immi- of not being heard (CoRMSA, 2008; CSVR, 2008).
grants. Thus Dodson (2010, p. 12) argues that the
antiforeigner attitudes of the post apartheid state However, the most crucial reasons for dissatisfaction
are the widespread poverty and pervasive inequal-
ity. As government policies to address these issues

46

have failed, the levels of disparity between rich and lent, means. Although violence in contemporary
poor, already the highest globally during apartheid, South Africa is criminal rather than political in nature,
are even greater under democracy today (Valji, it is still viewed as an acceptable response in conflict
2003, p. 12). According to data by Gelb (2008, p. 80), resolution, thus leading to the use of violence as
in 2005 47% of the population have been living in legitimate form of xenophobic discrimination.
poverty. Inequality is even starker. In 2006, the Gini
coefficient was 0.73, which ranks South Africa under Conclusion
the top three most unequal societies in the world.
Even more disturbing is the ratio of average income The ‘perfect storm’ sweeping across South Africa in
between the richest and the poorest ten per cent, 2008 brought the problem of xenophobia to the fore.
a massive 255:1, meaning that the rich receive 51% To fully understand the nature and scope of xenopho-
of total household income, while the poor receive a bia in South Africa the various hypotheses, referring
mere 0.2% (Gelb, 2008, p. 80). to socio-economic reasons, cultural aspects, as well
as the official and public discourse, have to be read
Related to the pervasive poverty and inequality are as an interconnected set of explanations, also taking
the high expectations and aspirations South Africans into account the underlying causes, the apartheid
had for an improvement in their living conditions legacy and problems of the transformation process.
after the end of apartheid. These expectations have
not been fulfilled; instead there even exist a grow- Since apartheid ended the new democratic govern-
ing gap between aspirations and reality (Harris, 2002, ment has failed to meet the daunting socio-eco-
p. 171). This frustration is demonstrated in the Afro- nomic challenges it had promised to address. Instead
barometer survey (2008, p. 4), where, when asked poverty and inequality have become more deeply
whether their life today is better, the same or worse entrenched, unemployment has risen and service
than under Apartheid, 29% answered that it is worse delivery remains uneven and ineffective. Thus the
or much worse. Pillay (2008, p. 101) argues that if in economic conditions of many South Africans have
this situation a coherent political movement to chan- not improved; as exemplified in the dire situation in
nel that energy into effective mobilisation for social Alexandra, they still occupy precarious social, eco-
change is absent, the anger can be woefully misdi- nomic, and political positions. The already existing
rected. competition amongst them for scarce resources is
exacerbated by the presence of foreigners, as it is a
In South Africa the anger is being taken out on for- widespread assumption that they steal jobs, houses,
eigners, who are blamed for these social ills and and other services and resources, a belief that have
personal frustrations. Harris (2002) and Yakushko been voiced by many residents from Alexandra.
(2009), suggest that xenophobia and scapegoating According to the Realistic Conflict Theory this com-
are to be located within the context of social transi- petition causes prejudices, which can led to conflict.
tion and change, as the prejudice against immigrants Moreover, the gap between people’s hopes and the
can offer an emotional outlet for citizen’s fear and reality they face, leads to the perceived feeling of rel-
dissatisfaction. ative deprivation. Because it has been impossible to
voice such discontent during the Mbeki era, people
All these factors rooted in the legacies of apartheid got accustomed to vent their anger and frustrations
and problems with the transformation process can at migrants, making them the scapegoats for the gov-
be seen as reasons for the existence the xenophobic ernment’s failures.
climate in South Africa. However, having hostile and
discriminatory beliefs and feelings, does not mean As the apartheid regime entrenched the system of
that they have to be acted on. Thus the final question racial discrimination and categorization so deeply in
to be considered is why these prevalent xenophobic all spheres of life, it has effectively naturalized think-
attitudes turned violent. ing through the lenses of racial and national stereo-
types. Moreover the discriminatory practices and
Harris (2002, pp. 179-180) proposes that the violent methods used to identify the oppositional ‘other’
nature of xenophobia is a reflection of the high levels have merely shifted; instead of black South Africans,
of violence in society more generally. This ‘culture of they now target black foreigners, which they iden-
violence’ is rooted in the apartheid era, and describes tify based on biological-cultural markers. In addi-
a situation in which social relations and interactions tion the apartheid also impacted on South Africans
are governed through violent, rather than non-vio-

47

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49

REPRODUCING INEQUALITIES: HOW SCHOOLS IN KENYA SHAPE GENDERED POWER
RELATIONS AMONG ADOLESCENT PUPILS

Lucy Bence-Wilkins
University of East Anglia
[email protected]

Abstract:

Gender inequality is high in Kenyan society and schooling in Kenya has been criticised for harbouring high
levels of gender-based violence. This paper examines the reproduction of gender inequality in Kenyan society
by assessing the ways in which schools promote particular gender identities and power inequalities between
male and female adolescent pupils. It pulls together current research on masculinities and education quality,
and is relevant to the current drive among donors to invest in adolescent girls. The work of Madeleine Arnot
and Naila Kabeer forms the theoretical background from which primary research, gathered at a Kenyan
school over 12 weeks, is analysed. Similar studies by authors such as Fiona Leach will also inform the analysis.
I will argue that schools in Kenya are often sites where unequal gender relations are cultivated and normal-
ised. These relations become accepted by pupils, contributing to the reproduction of gender inequality in
society. I will argue that the main factors contributing to this are:
•  the sexualisation of female pupils;
•  the assertion of a dominant form of masculinity that legitimises violence;
•  a strongly gendered power hierarchy among the school staff;
•  authoritarian gendered discipline patterns; and,
•  non-reflective teaching methods.

1. Introduction stereotypes and unequal power relations, causing
pupils to accept gender inequality in wider society.
The primary focus of this study is gender relations
and identities, taking account of the schooling expe- Over the last decade adolescent girls have received
riences of adolescent girls, as well as boys, to assess attention from various development organisations
the role of the school in reproducing gender inequal- and campaigns, such as the UN Millennium Pro-
ity in Kenya. There are a number of factors that influ- ject and the Nike Foundation’s ‘Girl Effect’. They are
ence the development of gender identities among viewed as a strategic group whose empowerment
adolescents, such as the family and the community. would significantly contribute to growth and devel-
Nonetheless, the school also plays a significant role opment. There is also an increasing recognition of
in identity formation, because it is ‘to a large extent the need to ensure that schools provide good-quality
a microcosm of society’ where concepts of mascu- education and a safe environment for their pupils;
linity and femininity are transmitted to pupils (Leach therefore allowing schools to maximise their empow-
2003a: 389). ering potential and ability to have a positive impact
on the transformation of gender relations in society.
The commonly held view of education as a panacea
for gender inequality, poverty and rapid population Gender inequality and schooling in Kenya
growth assumes that simply ‘being present in a class-
room is somehow transformative’ (Unterhalter, 1999: Although Kenya is a country with a diverse range of
51). However, there is little evidence to suggest that cultures, societal definitions of masculinity and femi-
increased schooling for girls has significantly trans- ninity are often very rigid and indicators suggest that
formed gender relations in society, the labour market gender inequality is high. According to the latest
or the household (Colclough et al. 2003). Schools Kenyan Demographic Health Survey, 39 percent of
have the potential to empower pupils and challenge women aged 15-49 have experienced physical or
existing gender norms, but they can also reinforce sexual violence committed by a husband or a partner

50