#Issue : CCXVI fifffflffiflThe Mineral PivotGamble Behind NationalismMiddle-Income Economy Dreams DeferredZim Mergers AccelerateFunded Income Reshapes CBZ StoryEdgars Rewires Consumer Protection Model..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
In Focus040608MarketsWorld NewsZSE & VFEX Weekly Markets Dashboard2425262710111214Vision 2030 vs Poverty Reality : Zim Middle-Income DreamMerger Activity Surges : Corporate Strategy EvolvesThe AI Payment Age : Zimbabwe Must PrepareReading Beyond May Inflation : What Currency Movements Reveal About EconomyEconomic News and AnalysisGovernment Restructures Gold Sector : What Is at StakeZim Rewrites Critical Mineral Policy : The Ownership ResetZimbabwe’s Economic Footing : Stronger Than Collapse, Weaker Than It AppearsBusiness Around the WorldPolitics Around the WorldRegional Economic Watch222328Theequityaxis.net @equity axis @equity axis zimbabwe @equity axis @equity axis @equity axis 08677 197 791 @ aaronc[at]equityaxis.netEQUITY AXISFinancial Insights at your FingertipsGuest Column1517Zimbabwe's Mineral Ambition : Can It Deliver?Why is TSL Migrating : The VFEX Attraction Weekly Commodity PulseMarkets WatchZSE & VFEX WeeklyFinancial Markets At a GlanceThe AXiS CCXVI May 2026Cover PagePage 08Page 18Page 16Capital Markets 181920CBZ Recalibrates : Funded Income Gains MomentumEdgars Advances Inclusion : Retail Ecosystems Transform MarketsTSL and the Great Market SplitZSE ASI VFEX ASI ZWG INTERBANK RATE 15/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/0515/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/0515/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/05384.84 223.35 25.81395.34 227.55 25.92394.93 228.69 26.08392.28 231.53 26.22391.84 233.24 26.34392.11 236.12 26.321.89% 5.72% -1.93%ZSE TOP 10 INDEX MEDIUM CAP INDEX SMALL CAP INDEX 100.11100.11100.11100.11100.11100.110.00%381.44 426.23393.59 429.97394.47 423.88389.51 431.30387.48 437.85385.19 449.4115/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/050.98% 15/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/055.44% 15/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/05
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imbabwe's Mines Minister Polite Kam- bamura announced on 22 May 2026 that the small-scale gold mining sector is, with immediate effect, reserved exclusively for Zimbabwean citizens and wholly citizen-owned entities. No foreign individual, foreign-controlled company, or foreign beneficial owner may acquire, hold, or control any small-scale gold mining title, participate in its operation or man- agement, or enter into any arrangement, includ- ing tribute agreements, joint ventures, or syndi- cates, that confers economic or operational control to a non-Zimbabwean. The principle underlying the policy itself is sound and defensi- ble, though the USD 15 million investment threshold at its centre is so badly calibrated that it risks achieving the precise opposite of what the Ministry intends, and the policy arrives as the fifth significant abrupt regulatory shift in Zim- babwe's most consequential export sector in 18 months, at a moment when the cost of getting it wrong is measured not in millions but in billions.The analytical weight of this policy cannot be understood without first establishing what is being ring-fenced. Small-scale and artisanal miners delivered 34,875 kilograms of gold in 2025, approximately 75% of Zimbabwe's record national output of 46,729.1 kilograms. At gold prices of approximately USD 4,800 per troy ounce in May 2026, the highest level in record- ed history and more than double the average price of five years ago, the small-scale sector is generating gross annualised revenue approaching USD 5.4 billion. J.P. Morgan Global Research forecasts gold prices averag- ing USD 5,055 per troy ounce by the final quar- ter of 2026, rising toward USD 5,400 by end-2027. Every percentage point of production disrupted during the transition costs Zimbabwe approximately USD 54 million in gross annual revenue at current prices.The sector the government is restructuring is not a peripheral activity, but the single largest source of foreign currency in Zimbabwe's econ- omy, larger than tobacco, larger than platinum, and larger than any other productive category in the national accounts. The government's USD 12 billion annual mining revenue target by 2030 and its 50-tonne gold production target for 2026 are both directly exposed to how this policy is executed. At USD 2,000 per ounce, a 10% disruption in ASM formal deliveries would be a significant but manageable policy cost. At USD 4,800 per ounce, the same disruption is an eco- nomic event of the first order. The gold super-cycle transforms the stakes of every deci- sion made in this sector from consequential to potentially historic, in either direction.The analytical starting point must be the prob- lem the policy addresses, because dismissing the intervention without engaging its evidentiary basis is intellectually dishonest. Authorities esti- mate that gold smuggling costs Zimbabwe nearly USD 2 billion annually, representing approximately 37 cents of every dollar of small-scale gold value leaving through illicit channels rather than through the formal banking system and Fidelity Gold Refinery. That figure is not the product of speculative modelling. It is derived from the gap between estimated geo- logical output, FGR-verified deliveries, and recorded export earnings, a discrepancy that has been consistent across multiple auditing approaches and that points unmistakably toward structured informal export channels operating at industrial scale.That leakage is not primarily a Zimbabwean citizen problem. In documented cases across multiple districts, Chinese operators have entered claims, displaced Zimbabwean workers who previously operated the same sites, negoti- ated payments exclusively with the claim or farm owner while terminating the employment rela- tionships of every other Zimbabwean on the site, and operated without formal employment contracts, without environmental man- agement plans, and without any commu- nity investment of any kind. Residents of Shurugwi filed a petition to Parlia- ment as recently as March 2026, citing e n v i r o n m e n t a l destruction, public health risks, and human rights viola- tions at a Chi- n e s e - o p e r a t e d open-pit mine. Resi- dents in Mazowe, Kadoma, and Gweru have raised similar complaints over mechanised riverbed dredging, waterway contamination, and the displacement of Zimbabwean artisanal miners from claims they had historically worked.The Chinese government itself recognised the reputational exposure. The Chinese Embassy in Zimbabwe issued a formal notice warning its nationals and companies operating in Zimba- bwe to exercise caution and strengthen compli- ance measures following the government's policy shifts. A formal diplomatic warning from a sovereign government to its own citizens about their conduct in a host country is not a routine communication. It is an acknowledgement that the conduct in question has reached a scale and visibility that creates state-level reputational risk. That warning from Beijing is the external validation of exactly what the Ministry of Mines is domestically responding to, and it should be weighed as evidence by analysts who are tempted to dismiss the policy's rationale as purely protectionist.The analytical question is therefore not whether the problem is real. It plainly is. The question is whether this specific policy instrument is well-designed to solve it, whether its implemen- tation infrastructure exists, and whether the collateral damage of its most poorly calibrated provision, the USD 15 million threshold, is proportionate to the benefit of addressing a gen- uine harm.The small-scale gold ban does not arrive as a standalone measure. It arrives as the fifth signif- icant abrupt policy shift in Zimbabwe's mining sector in the past eighteen months, and that cumulative pattern is analytically inseparable from how the investment community will read this specific intervention.In December 2022, Zimbabwe banned raw lithi- um ore exports, a defensible beneficiation mea- sure that gave industry reasonable time to respond. In June 2025, the government announced a lithium concentrate ban effective January 2027, providing an eighteen-month runway for processing capacity investment. Bikita Minerals and Prospect Resources began responding: capital was mobilised, processing plant designs were advanced, and investment decisions were made on the explicit basis of the January 2027 timeline. Then, on 25 February 2026, the government imposed the concentrate ban with immediate effect, six months ahead of schedule and capturing materials already loaded onto ships at international ports. The sudden acceleration removed approximately 7% of total global 2026 lithium supply overnight and sent lithium carbonate futures on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange surging more than 9% in the hours following the announce- ment. Capital that had been invested on the basis of a government-stated timeline discov- ered that the timeline was not a commitment but an aspiration.One week later, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced the 90:10 ZiG payment requirement for small-scale gold miners, requiring them to take 10% of their proceeds in local currency. Govt Restructures Gold Sector*To Page 5The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 4What Is at StakeTZW
ASM gold deliveries collapsed 30.8% month-on-month in March 2026. The RBZ reversed the policy after three weeks. The reversal confirmed what the production collapse had already demonstrated: the policy had been introduced without adequate modelling of its transmission mechanism through the ASM sec- tor's incentive structure. A government that models its policies correctly before announcing them does not reverse them three weeks later because the empirical outcome contradicts the intended one.Now, less than two months later, comes the foreign ban on small-scale gold and the 98% local management requirement for all gold mines. The investment community observing this sequence does not evaluate each policy on its individual merits in isolation. It evaluates the pattern. And the pattern that emerges across the lithium timeline breach, the ZiG shock and reversal, the Critical Minerals Declaration with mandatory SPV requirements, and now the gold foreign ban is a regulatory environment charac- terised by unilateral announcements with mini- mal prior industry consultation, a willingness to change effective dates retrospectively and with- out notice, and an absence of demonstrated commitment to the timelines and frameworks on which investment decisions are made.Each policy, viewed individually, has a defensi- ble rationale. Viewed as a sequence across eighteen months, they describe a regulatory environment that is systematically tightening around the operating model of the country's largest foreign mining investor class without the consultation infrastructure, the implementation architecture, or the sequencing discipline that would allow the investment community to price and plan around these changes. The conse- quence is a rising sovereign policy risk premium on all Zimbabwe mining assets, not just the categories directly targeted by each individual measure. Discount rates rise, project timelines extend, and capital allocation decisions that were Zimbabwe-positive move toward neutral or negative. And the country that is correct on the substance of its resource nationalism loses the execution dividend of being right because it cannot demonstrate the process discipline that converts policy intent into investment-compati- ble implementation.The most damaging critique of the ban is about the specific number the Ministry chose, and the number reveals a fundamental conceptual error about what kind of foreign investor this sector needs and what distinguishes a compli- ance-positive investor from a compliance-nega- tive one.A publicly listed, formally structured, stock exchange-compliant junior mining company with professional management, transparent accounts, audited financials, independent direc- tors, and continuous disclosure obligations, the category of foreign investor that brings exactly the compliance discipline, environmental man- agement, formal employment, and production traceability that the Ministry says it wants, typi- cally operates with total initial capital investment of USD 500,000 to USD 8 million in the early stages of Zimbabwe project development. That is not because these companies are undercapi- talised. It is because responsible junior mining at the exploration and early development stage in an emerging market is capital-efficient by design, deploying capital in proportion to geo- logical risk rather than committing large sums before the orebody is defined. A Kavango Resources at its early stage, a structured junior entering Zimbabwe with a geological thesis, formal governance, and a VFEX or AIM listing, is not bringing USD 15 million on day one, it is bringing USD 1 million to USD 5 million and building toward larger deployment as the project de-risks.The USD 15 million threshold excludes this entire class of investor from the sector. It does not exclude the large, opaque Chinese mining conglomerate with the financial sophistication to inflate investment valuations through equipment appraisals, intercompany loan reclassifications, and overstated development cost declarations that push a nominally USD 8 million operation past the USD 15 million threshold on paper while the operational reality and the economic control structure remain indistinguishable from the proxy arrangements the ban is designed to eliminate. The Ministry has designed a filter that traps exactly the investors it should welcome and passes exactly the investors it should screen out. That is not a minor calibration error. It is a structural inversion that defeats the poli- cy's core purpose.The correct threshold is demonstrably not USD 15 million. A USD 500,000 minimum foreign investment threshold, combined with mandatory registration as a formal mining company with full beneficial ownership disclosure, mandatory environmental impact assessment and rehabili- tation bonding, mandatory formal NSSA-regis- tered employment contracts, mandatory 100% FGR delivery, and mandatory audited annual accounts filed with ZIMRA, achieves every objective the Ministry has stated at a fraction of the capital bar. That compliance framework filters for quality, for governance, for environ- mental accountability, and for traceability, which are the actual attributes that distinguish a responsible foreign mining operator from an extractive proxy structure. The USD 15 million threshold filters only for size, and in a sector characterised by informal capital, fictitious invoicing, and equipment-based investment inflation, size is trivially easy to fake.The 20 kilogram per month production threshold is more defensible than the investment thresh- old and operates on a fundamentally different logic that deserves recognition. Reports confirm that some large-scale miners have been using small-scale miners' networks to bypass the Reserve Bank's 30% local currency retention requirement, routing production through ASM channels to access the 100% hard currency retention that small-scale miners enjoy. This is regulatory arbitrage at industrial scale, and it represents a category of revenue leakage that is entirely distinct from gold smuggling to external markets but equally damaging to Zimbabwe's fiscal position.The 20 kilogram monthly threshold addresses this specific arbitrage mechanism with a compli- ance logic that is technically coherent. An oper- ator who must deliver 20 kilograms per month to FGR as the qualifying condition for the produc- tion threshold is producing at a formally docu- mented, traceable, and auditable scale. The FGR delivery record creates a production base- line against which estimated geological output, equipment capacity, and site characteristics can be reconciled. Anomalies between declared and estimated production become identifiable at a granularity that is not achievable with operators delivering sporadically or below threshold. The production threshold therefore embeds trace- ability as a structural feature of compliance rather than as an enforcement activity that must be initiated separately. It is the more technically sophisticated element of the policy design and represents the kind of mechanism-based gover- nance that the investment threshold, with its crude capital filter, entirely lacks.What the 98% Local Management Requirement Actually DoesThe 98% local management provision is the most consequential element of the policy for Zimbabwe's large-scale mining sector, and it has attracted less analytical attention than it deserves precisely because the small-scale reservation headline has dominated the com- mentary. The provision applies to all gold mines, not only to small-scale operations. Chi- nese-managed large-scale gold operations, including those that qualify as large-scale by investment or production volume and that are therefore exempt from the ownership reserva- tion, are required with immediate effect to ensure that 98% of senior and middle manage- ment positions are held by Zimbabwean nation- als.This is not a phased requirement with a transition timeline, but effective immediately. A large-scale Chinese gold mining operation in which operational management, technical direc- tion, metallurgical expertise, and financial con- trol are exercised by Chinese nationals, the typi- cal structure of Chinese-owned mining opera- tions in Zimbabwe, faces an immediate structur- al requirement that it cannot satisfy through existing staffing without terminating the employ- ment relationships of the foreign managers who constitute its operational core. The practical response options are either immediate mass departure of Chinese management, replacing them with Zimbabwean nationals who may lack equivalent operational experience in the specific technology the mine employs, or a cosmetic restructuring in which Chinese managers are reclassified into advisory or consulting roles while nominally Zimbabwean management structures are placed above them. The latter approach maintains the operational reality while satisfying the legal form, which is precisely the proxy structure dynamic the broader policy is designed to eliminate.The 98% provision therefore creates a compli- ance tension at the large-scale level that is structurally identical to the proxy ownership problem at the small-scale level: the operational reality and the legal structure diverge, and the gap between them becomes the location of the compliance problem that the policy was designed to close. If the Ministry enforces the 98% requirement at substance rather than form, it creates a genuine operational disruption at large-scale mines that has production, safety, and recovery consequences. If it enforces at form rather than substance, it produces a cos- metic reclassification that satisfies the letter of the requirement while leaving the underlying management dependency unchanged. Neither outcome is what the policy intends, and the ambiguity between them is a design problem that will manifest in enforcement practice.Zimbabwe's relationship with China is the most sensitive dimension of this policy cluster. China is Zimbabwe's largest bilateral creditor, the dominant buyer of its lithium, chrome, and PGMs, the primary source of the machinery and equipment that Zimbabwe's mining sector depends upon, and a party to multiple large-scale mineral agreements whose financ- ing terms and offtake arrangements form part of the structural architecture of Zimbabwe's exter- nal accounts. The small-scale gold ban affects Chinese nationals operating in ASM, a category that Chinese state policy has not publicly cham- pioned and whose departure China is unlikely to contest diplomatically. The 98% local manage- ment requirement, however, is a different instru- ment applied to a different class of Chinese presence: the large-scale, state-linked mining companies whose operations are embedded in Zimbabwe's credit and diplomatic relationship with Beijing at a structural level that ASM artis- anal operators are not.The Ministry's explicit carve-out, reaffirming that Zimbabwe remains open to responsible foreign investment in large-scale mining, value addition, beneficiation, and infrastructure, provides diplo- matic framing for the policy as sector-specific rather than anti-Chinese in design. That framing is correct as far as the small-scale ownership reservation goes. It is tested by the 98% local management requirement, which applies to the large-scale operations the carve-out is designed to protect. The internal consistency of protecting large-scale foreign investment while simultane- ously requiring it to immediately restructure its management composition is not a contradiction the Ministry has resolved in its public communi- cation, and that unresolved tension creates interpretive uncertainty that sophisticated inves- tors will price into their Zimbabwe assessment.The cumulative weight of events since February 2026 is the context in which Chinese state-linked investors, whose capital and tech- nology Zimbabwe needs at the large-scale level, are making forward decisions about Zim- babwe mining. The lithium concentrate ban on materials in transit, the ZiG shock and reversal, the Critical Minerals Declaration with mandatory *From Page 4The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 5CA*To Page 6
FThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 6 state SPV co-ownership in classified miner- als, and now the gold ban with its 98% manage- ment provision describe, from Beijing's perspec- tive, a regulatory environment that is moving systematically and without adequate notice in the direction of tighter state control and reduced foreign ownership security across Zimbabwe's most valuable mineral categories. That is not a description that makes new large-scale capital commitment straightforward to authorise, regardless of what the diplomatic language of any individual announcement says about wel- coming foreign investment. The signals are read in sequence, not in isolation.What Is Actually at Stake: The Full Risk and Opportunity MatrixThe revenue arithmetic at current gold prices makes the stakes of poor execution unusually severe. The ASM sector's April 2026 delivery of 2,110.66 kilograms was already 27.9% below April 2025's 2,926.11 kilograms, before the foreign ban. That pre-ban decline reflects the residual production disruption from the March 2026 ZiG shock, whose reversal recovered volume only partially and more slowly than the RBZ's three-week reversal window implied. If the foreign ban triggers a further 10% decline in ASM formal deliveries during the January 2027 transition period, and the production gap is not immediately filled by Zimbabwean replace- ments with adequate capital, equipment, and distribution to FGR, the gross revenue cost at USD 4,800 per ounce is approximately USD 150 million per tonne of lost output annualised. Against Zimbabwe's total gold export receipt target, that is a cost the government cannot afford in a supercycle and will struggle to explain to the communities whose empower- ment the policy is designed to advance.The distinction between a courageous sectoral policy and an expensive act of regulatory over- reach will not be made in Harare's press confer- ences. It will be made by four specific decisions: whether the Ministry revises the USD 15 million threshold to a compliance-based framework at a realistic capital level that admits structured junior miners while excluding informal proxy operators; whether the beneficial ownership verification infrastructure required to police proxy structures is built with the urgency the 1 January 2027 deadline demands rather than in the months after the deadline passes; whether the financial architecture to capitalise Zimba- bwean replacements at a scale sufficient to maintain or exceed current ASM production is mobilised before the transition rather than after it; and whether Zimbabwe's pattern of abrupt, poorly sequenced, inadequately consulted policy shifts is corrected by a more professional regulatory communication framework that preserves the substance of resource national- ism while restoring the process predictability on which investment decisions depend. The princi- ple is right, and the empowerment objective is legitimate. What remains to be determined is whether the execution will be equal to the opportunity, or whether Zimbabwe will look back on the gold supercycle of 2026 and 2027 the way it looks back on every other resource boom: with the knowledge that the wealth was there, and that policy got in the way.Z*From Page 5imbabwe formally published its Mineral Classification and Declaration on 22 May 2026, designating lithium, platinum group metals, cobalt, nickel, graphite, copper, rare earths, and chrome as Critical Minerals, while classifying gold, diamonds, coal, iron ore, and oil and gas as Strategic Minerals. The doc- ument does four things simultaneously: it estab- lishes mandatory state participation in mining through Special Purpose Vehicles, bans raw mineral exports without ministerial approval of a local beneficiation plan, sets government-deter- mined processing levels as the floor for all min- eral exports, and requires ministerial sign-off on all mining rights applications for classified min- erals. Read as a package, the declaration is the most significant single act of mineral resource sovereignty in Zimbabwe's post-independence history. Its consequences extend well beyond Harare, and they will be felt in Beijing, Brussels, Washington, and every capital where the geo- politics of the global energy transition is being decided.The analytical weight of this declaration cannot be understood without first establishing precise- ly what is being placed under a new ownership and governance framework. Zimbabwe holds the world's second largest platinum reserves, estimated at 2.8 billion tonnes, along the 550-ki- lometre Great Dyke geological formation. It holds the world's second largest chromium reserves, estimated at 10 billion tonnes. It holds the largest lithium reserves on the African conti- nent and ranks among the top six globally, depending on the estimation methodology. It supplies approximately 15% to 19% of the spodumene concentrate imported into China, the world's dominant lithium chemical processor and battery manufacturer. These are not mar- ginal positions in marginal markets as they are substantial shares of the critical input supply chains that determine whether the global elec- tric vehicle industry, the energy storage sector, and the hydrogen economy can scale at the pace that the International Energy Agency and every major central bank in the world has projected they must.The classification framework rests on five crite- ria. Minerals qualify as Critical or Strategic if their supply chains are highly vulnerable to disruption with potential to cause conflicts, if Zimbabwe holds significant reserves or production dominance in a mineral on high internation- al demand, if the mineral is essential as a raw material for manufacturing and downstream beneficiation, if it has the capacity to generate substantial direct and indirect local employment and national economic benefits, or if it has low occurrence and low grade but high value. These criteria are sound and broadly consistent with the classification frameworks adopted by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia, all of which have published their own critical minerals lists in the past three years as part of supply chain resilience strategies driven by geopolitical competition with China. Zimba- bwe is, in that sense, classifying its minerals in a language that the world's largest economies already speak. The legal consequences of that classification, however, go considerably further than designation, and it is in those legal conse- quences that the declaration's most consequen- tial analytical content lives.The mandatory State participation requirement through SPVs is the provision that will attract the most investor attention and the most sus- tained legal scrutiny. The declaration states that the State shall, through designated Special Pur- pose Vehicles, exercise a mandatory minimum shareholding in the exploitation of these miner- als. The minimum percentage shareholding is not specified in the declaration itself, and its determination will follow through subsidiary legislation or ministerial directive. That ambigui- ty is the most consequential unresolved ques- tion in the entire document, because the mini- mum shareholding percentage, the price at which the state acquires that stake, and the governance arrangements that accompany it will collectively determine whether the SPV mechanism is commercially viable for private co-investors or structurally extractive to the point of deterring the processing investment the policy demands. A 10% free-carry provision at no cost to the state is a meaningfully different instrument from a 51% acquisition requirement at a ministerially determined price. Both satisfy the declaration's stated requirement. Their effects on the investment case for classified mineral development in Zimbabwe are entirely different.The raw export ban and the approved beneficia- tion level requirement are the provisions with the most immediate operational consequences for the companies currently producing classified minerals in Zimbabwe. The ban on raw or unbeneficiated mineral exports without a condi- tional transitional plan approved by the Minister is the legal codification of a direction already being implemented, imperfectly and conse- quentially, since the December 2022 raw lithium ore ban. The February 2026 concentrate ban, which accelerated the beneficiation timeline by six months with no prior industry consultation and captured materials already in transit at the Port of Beira in Mozambique, demonstrated that the government will enforce these provisions with an urgency that does not align with the investment planning cycles of the companies operating under them. The 22 May declaration places that enforcement authority on a broader and firmer legal footing, extending it from lithium to the entire classified mineral portfolio.This is not Zimbabwe's first attempt at export restriction. It is, however, the first time that a comprehensive classification and restriction framework has been backed by early empirical evidence of the revenue outcome it is designed to produce. In the first quarter of 2026, the first full quarter under the lithium concentrate ban, total mineral sales reached USD 983.85 million, a 79% increase in value year on year despite only a 27% increase in volume.Lithium sales alone reached USD 178.64 million, a 106% increase in value on a 2% increase in volume. The export ban, by forcing processing, had raised the value per tonne of mineral leaving the country. The mechanism is precisely what the policy was designed to produce: where previously Zimbabwe exported spodumene concentrate at USD 200 to USD 400 per tonne and the processing margin was captured in China, the forced beneficiation shift is capturing a greater proportion of that margin domestically. The early evidence, based on one quarter under the full ban, is that the revenue capture theory of the policy is empirically valid.The sustainability qualification that the MMCZ data does not resolve is that the 106% lithium value increase is a function of both the process- ing uplift and the prevailing global lithium price at the time of export. Lithium carbonate prices have been volatile across the 2022 to 2026 period, moving from historic highs above USD 80,000 per tonne in 2022 through a severe Zim Rewrites Critical Mineral PolicyThe Ownership ResetZ*To Page 7
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 7! correction to below USD 10,000 in 2024 and a partial recovery since. A beneficiation policy that produces strong revenue in a partial price recovery environment but was designed and announced in a price collapse environment has a specific vulnerability: if the processing invest- ment mandated by the policy is committed at current prices and the price cycle turns again, the domestic processor carries both the capital cost of the mandated investment and the margin compression of a lower-price environ- ment, while the foreign operator who would previously have absorbed some of that risk through concentrate pricing is no longer present to share it.The PGM Sector Provides the Most Instructive Cautionary ParallelZimbabwe's experience with PGMs provides the most instructive cautionary parallel for the broader critical minerals framework, because the platinum sector illustrates precisely the gap between Zimbabwe's geological endowment and its institutional capacity to govern mineral wealth creation at scale. Zimbabwe holds the world's second largest platinum reserves. The Great Dyke has been producing platinum, palla- dium, and rhodium for decades through Zim- plats, Mimosa, and Unki. As of early 2026, the government reportedly owes Valterra Platinum over USD 100 million in unpaid export proceeds due to sovereign cash flow constraints. The platinum sector is simultaneously an export earnings engine for Zimbabwe and a creditor to its sovereign. The central bank's foreign curren- cy retention rules, which currently require exporters to surrender 30% of US dollar earn- ings in exchange for Zimbabwe Gold, have compounded the sector's operational costs and strained the relationship between producers and the regulatory environment.The platinum precedent demonstrates what Zimbabwe's mineral governance architecture has historically struggled to deliver: policy con- sistency, payment reliability, and a stable regu- latory environment that allows long-cycle capital investment to be planned and executed. A gov- ernment that owes its platinum sector USD 100 million in unpaid export proceeds while simulta- neously declaring that platinum is a Critical Min- eral and mandating state co-ownership in its exploitation is creating a structural contradiction that sophisticated investors will weigh carefully. The obligation to pay for state participation in new PGM mining projects is an obligation that sits alongside an existing USD 100 million credi- tor claim that has not been satisfied. The invest- ment community will ask a precise question: if Zimbabwe cannot service its existing obliga- tions to the sector's current producers, what is the basis for confidence that it will honour its obligations to the sector's future co-investors under the SPV framework?What the Declaration Means in the Global Critical Minerals CompetitionThe global critical minerals landscape in 2026 is defined by a competition between China, which has spent two decades building dominant posi- tions in the mining and processing of battery and clean energy minerals, and the Western economies, which are spending the 2020s trying to build alternative supply chains through instruments like the US Inflation Reduction Act, the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, and bilateral mineral partnership agreements. Zimbabwe's declaration places its classified mineral portfolio explicitly in this contested space, and its positioning within that space has conse- quences for the government's ability to attract the Western capital and technology partnerships that beneficiation at scale requires.For Western investors and governments, the declaration presents both an opportunity and a complication. The opportunity is that Zimbabwe has now formally acknowledged, in a legally binding document, that its critical minerals are strategically important and require structured development. The gov- ernment's willingness to use SPVs rather than outright nationalisation, to permit condi- tional raw exports under approved transitional plans, and to frame the policy within a develop- ment strategy rather than purely extractive nationalism creates an entry point for capital that is not available in mineral jurisdictions with more absolute state control. Zimbabwe's NDB accession negotiations, its IMF Staff-Monitored Programme, and its ongoing AfDB debt clear- ance process all indicate a government that wants international engagement rather than isolation, and the declaration's language is broadly consistent with that orientation.The complication is that mandatory state partici- pation, ministerial approval for mining rights, export restriction, and government-determined beneficiation levels create the kind of regulatory uncertainty that extends project timelines, raises the cost of capital, and makes Zimbabwe a less attractive destination for mining invest- ment than jurisdictions with more predictable and less interventionist frameworks. Australia, Canada, and the United States are actively competing for the same processing investment that Zimbabwe is trying to attract, and all three offer clearer property rights, more developed capital markets, more stable currencies, and more reliable power supply. The question Zim- babwe must answer is whether its geological endowment is compelling enough to attract the processing investment that its export ban now demands, in an environment where the institu- tional infrastructure to support that investment is still being built while the policy framework gov- erning it is still being defined.The China Question The most immediate and complex dimension of the declaration is its impact on Zimbabwe's rela- tionship with China, and it is precisely the dimension that the document's diplomatic language is least equipped to address honestly. Chinese companies currently dominate Zimba- bwe's lithium mining sector. Sinomine Resource Group owns Bikita Minerals. Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt controls the Arcadia lithium project, where its USD 300 million processing plant has been operational since 2023, processing 4.5 million metric tonnes of hard rock lithium into concentrate annually. Chengxin Lithium, Yahua, and Canmax hold significant Zimbabwe lithium positions. These companies own the process- ing plants, manage the logistics, dominate the export relationships, and supply the spodumene concentrate that feeds Chinese battery manu- facturing. The mandatory SPV shareholding requirement is, in commercial terms, a renegoti- ation of the terms under which they entered the market, conducted unilaterally and without prior negotiation.China absorbs approximately 70% of Zimba- bwe's lithium output and is the dominant buyer across most of the classified mineral categories. A policy framework that requires state co-own- ership in Chinese-operated classified mineral mines, restricts the export of the concentrate forms that Chinese processors are designed to handle, and sets government-determined bene- ficiation levels as the floor for exports is a policy framework that directly challenges the econom- ic model on which China's Zimbabwe invest- ment has been built. How Beijing and its corpo- rate affiliates respond, whether through renego- tiation, compliance, reduced investment, or the use of the institutional leverage that comes from being Zimbabwe's largest bilateral creditor and trading partner, will shape the practical outcome of the 22 May declaration more decisively than the document itself.The Chinese Embassy's earlier formal investor warning following the February 2026 lithium concentrate ban was diplomatically measured but substantively clear: Zimbabwe's changing regulatory environment requires investors to substantially strengthen risk prevention and compliance awareness. That warning, read alongside the mandatory SPV requirement and the ministerial approval requirement for all clas- sified mineral rights applications, describes a bilateral relationship that is under strain at precisely the moment when Zimbabwe needs Chinese capital and Chinese technical exper- tise to build the processing infrastructure that the declaration mandates. The Ministry's explicit reaffirmation that Zimbabwe remains open to responsible foreign investment in large-scale mining and beneficiation provides diplomatic cover. It does not resolve the commercial tension between requiring state co-ownership and retaining the foreign investor's capital com- mitment.The Institutional Gap Between Declaration and OutcomeThe 22 May declaration establishes the policy intent. The gap between intent and outcome, which is the gap that has characterised every previous iteration of Zimbabwe's resource nationalism agenda, will be closed only if the government can simultaneously enforce its ben- eficiation requirements on existing operators, attract new processing investment from credible industrial partners, maintain payment reliability across foreign currency earnings, provide the power supply that smelters and refineries require, negotiate SPV terms that are commer- cially viable for private co-investors, and specify the minimum shareholding percentage through subsidiary legislation at a level calibrated to attract capital rather than deter it.Building a lithium hydroxide refinery, a PGM smelter, or a ferrochrome plant to international specification requires billions of dollars of capi- tal, technically skilled management, reliable power supply at industrial scale, access to inter- national capital markets, and a regulatory envi- ronment stable enough to justify multi-decade investment commitments. Zimbabwe's history with each of those requirements is uneven. Its power sector, while improving through Hwange Unit 7 and 8 commissioning and the growing private solar sector, remains insufficient for large-scale industrial mineral processing at the volumes the declaration implies. Its capital mar- kets, while growing, cannot independently fund the USD 3 billion to USD 5 billion in processing infrastructure investment that reaching the gov- ernment's USD 12 billion annual mining reve- nue target by 2030 requires. Its regulatory track record, as evidenced by the lithium timeline breach, the ZiG shock and reversal, the unpaid Valterra proceeds, and the pattern of abrupt policy shifts documented since February 2026, is the primary constraint on its ability to attract the long-cycle capital that beneficiation at scale demands.The global demand picture is unambiguously favourable for Zimbabwe's classified minerals. Global demand for critical minerals is projected to grow threefold by 2040. The lithium-ion battery market, currently worth approximately USD 78.9 billion globally, is projected to reach USD 349.6 billion by 2034. PGMs are essential to hydrogen fuel cell technology, catalytic con- verter systems, and a growing range of elec- tronic applications. Chrome underpins the stainless steel production that Asia's indus- trial expansion demands. Rare earths are essential to the wind turbines and electric motors that the energy transition requires. Zimbabwe has the geology for all of them.The declaration of 22 May is the most ambi- tious mineral governance act Zimbabwe has ever produced. The institutional capacity to convert it into generational wealth is the variable that Zimbabwe's history has not yet resolved, and that history will not resolve for it.*From Page 6
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 8*To Page 9imbabwe’s economy has entered one of the most structurally complex periods in its post-dollarisation history. Stability has returned in visible areas of the economy. Super- market shelves remain stocked. Formal retail volumes have recovered. Listed companies are reporting double digit revenue growth. Gold exports continue to anchor foreign currency inflows. Inflation has slowed materially from prior crisis periods. Yet beneath that surface sits a deeper question that increasingly matters to investors, executives, policymakers, and lend- ers: does Zimbabwe’s current economic model possess the structural depth required for long-term sustainability?The answer is uncomfortable because the economy today stands on three dominant pillars that generate liquidity without fully generating industrial depth. Gold exports, diaspora remit- tances, and informality now form the central architecture of Zimbabwe’s economic survival model. Each pillar provides liquidity. Each pillar supports consumption. Each pillar stabilises foreign currency circulation. Yet each pillar also carries limitations that constrain the country’s ability to build a broad productive economy with deep multiplier effects.Gold now sits at the centre of Zimbabwe’s mac- roeconomic stability. The country’s export performance increasingly depends on bullion, with deliveries from small scale miners now accounting for the dominant share of output. This transition matters enormously because the structure of mineral production determines how much value cascades through the wider econo- my. Large scale mining operations historically created formal employment, supplier ecosys- tems, engineering contracts, infrastructure investment, tax visibility, pension contributions, capital market participation, and long invest- ment cycles. Small scale mining delivers strong forex inflows and supports rural incomes, yet the economic transmission mechanism is fundamentally different.A significant portion of small scale mining oper- ates with fragmented supply chains, limited beneficiation, low formal financing penetration, weaker tax capture, and thinner industrial link- ages. The liquidity enters the economy quickly, yet much of the broader productive spillover remains shallow. This creates a paradox where export earnings remain strong while industrial depth remains constrained. Zimbabwe there- fore records foreign currency generation without proportionate industrial expansion.This distinction explains why periods of strong gold prices do not automatically produce proportional manufacturing acceleration. The economy receives liquidity, yet capital accumu- lation remains uneven. Mining proceeds sup- port imports, consumption, transport activity, retail demand, construction, and informal trade, but the conversion of mineral wealth into long-term productive industrial ecosystems remains limited.The danger within this structure emerges during commodity volatility cycles. Zimbabwe’s eco- nomic stability increasingly depends on elevat- ed global bullion prices at a time when global capital markets remain highly sensitive to inter- est rate expectations, geopolitical risk, and reserve diversification trends. Gold currently benefits from central bank accumulation, geo- political fragmentation, sanctions risk, and global debt concerns. Those dynamics have created extraordinary support for bullion prices. Yet commodity dependence historically creates dangerous illusions of permanence.African economies repeatedly experienced this cycle. Angola’s oil boom created rapid liquidity expansion without sufficient diversification. Zambia’s copper dependence periodically amplified fiscal stress during commodity down- turns. Nigeria repeatedly accumulated forex strength during oil rallies before external shocks exposed structural weaknesses in manufactur- ing and fiscal systems. South Africa’s mining dominance similarly created long periods where commodity revenues masked weakening indus- trial competitiveness and deepening unemploy- ment pressures.Zimbabwe itself already carries historical expe- rience with commodity concentration risks. Tobacco became a major forex anchor for decades, yet dependence on one agricultural export exposed the economy to climate volatili- ty, sanctions complications, and shifting global market structures. Gold now occupies a similar strategic position, except under a far more infor- mal production architecture.Diaspora remittances form the second pillar supporting Zimbabwe’s current stability frame- work. Remittances now function as a shadow balance of payments support mechanism. They sustain household consumption, property development, school fees, health financing, retail demand, vehicle imports, and small busi- ness liquidity. In many urban areas, diaspora inflows effectively substitute for domestic wage weakness and constrained formal employment growth.Yet the remittance model itself now faces emerging global risks that many African econo- mies are only beginning to appreciate. The post-globalisation political environment is shift- ing rapidly toward economic nationalism, migra- tion tightening, labour protectionism, and inward-looking policy frameworks across devel- oped economies. The United States continues tightening immigration structures under political pressure surrounding domestic labour markets. Europe increasingly faces anti-immigration political momentum driven by economic stagna- tion, demographic anxieties, and social spend- ing pressures. Gulf economies are simultane- ously accelerating localisation policies across labour sectors.These developments matter directly for coun- tries heavily reliant on external labour migration. Remittances only remain resilient if migrant labour markets remain accessible and wage growth remains stable. Protectionist labour sys- tems gradually weaken both conditions. Zimba- bwe therefore faces the long-term risk of slower remittance expansion precisely when domestic structural dependence on those inflows contin- ues increasing.This dynamic already appears across multiple developing economies. The Philippines spent decades institutionalising labour export as a national economic stabiliser. Remittances creat- ed consumption resilience and foreign currency support, yet domestic industrial transformation remained slower than expected relative to the scale of labour exports. Nepal similarly became heavily remittance dependent, with external labour income sustaining domestic demand while productive capacity struggled to deepen proportionately. El Salvador and parts of Central America experienced comparable patterns where remittance-supported consumption exceeded local productive expansion.The deeper structural problem emerges when remittance inflows primarily sustain consump- tion instead of productive investment. Con- sumption stabilises economies temporarily. Pro- ductive reinvestment transforms economies permanently. Zimbabwe increasingly risks oper- ating within a model where forex inflows support import demand faster than productive domestic capacity expansion.Informalisation creates the third major pillar underpinning Zimbabwe’s present economy. The informal sector now dominates employ- ment generation, trading activity, transport sys- tems, retail distribution, construction labour, artisanal production, and increasingly even financial intermediation. Informality has deliv- ered remarkable resilience. It absorbed eco- nomic shocks that would have created cata- strophic unemployment in many economies. It preserved entrepreneurial activity during currency instability. It maintained domestic com- merce during periods when formal systems weakened.Yet informality simultaneously creates severe structural constraints on national development. Informal economies struggle to generate broad tax bases, long-term pension systems, scalable industrial financing structures, formal credit depth, reliable productivity data, export compet- itiveness, and large institutional capital pools. Businesses remain agile at micro scale yet national productivity expansion remains con- strained at macro scale.Zimbabwe’s financial system increasingly illus- trates this tension. Banks remain liquid yet private sector credit penetration remains rela- tively shallow compared to regional peers. Long-term industrial lending remains con- strained because much of the economy oper- ates outside fully formal collateral and reporting systems. Government consequently absorbs increasing domestic liquidity through treasury instruments because large-scale productive private sector borrowing demand remains struc- turally limited.This creates another dangerous cycle. The state increasingly depends on domestic finan- cial institutions for funding. Banks increasingly depend on government securities for returns. Productive private sector credit expansion remains constrained. Economic activity there- fore circulates strongly at transactional level without proportionate industrial deepening.Yet despite these structural weaknesses, Zim- babwe’s economy also possesses significant opportunities that many external observers underestimate.The first opportunity sits in formalisation through digital finance and tax system integration. Zim- babwe’s informal sector already demonstrates extraordinary commercial energy. Mobile money systems, digital payments, and tax digiti- sation now create pathways for gradual formal integration without destroying entrepreneurial flexibility. Kenya demonstrated portions of this transition through mobile finance expansion. Rwanda similarly used digital systems to improve visibility across fragmented commerce structures. Zimbabwe’s high mobile penetration and entrepreneurial culture create a potentially powerful base for gradual economic formalisa- tion.The second opportunity sits in beneficiation and downstream mineral industrialisation. Gold alone cannot sustainably anchor national trans- formation unless value addition deepens. Yet lithium, platinum group metals, chrome, and broader mineral processing now create oppor- tunities for industrial ecosystem expansion if policy consistency holds. Zimbabwe possesses one of Africa’s strongest combinations of miner- al diversity and industrial legacy infrastructure. The challenge is no longer resource availability. The challenge is policy predictability, energy stability, financing depth, and long-term investor confidence.The third opportunity emerges from regional supply chain shifts. Global geopolitics increas- ingly pushes companies toward supply diversifiZimbabwe’s Economic FootingStronger Than Collapse, Weaker Than It AppearsZ
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 9*From Page 8 -ication beyond traditional Asian manufactur- ing hubs. Southern Africa increasingly attracts strategic interest around agriculture, minerals, energy, logistics, and processing industries. South Africa’s industrial slowdown simultane- ously creates opportunities for secondary regional manufacturing hubs capable of serving SADC markets. Zimbabwe’s geographic posi- tioning remains strategically powerful despite current structural weaknesses.Agriculture equally remains underappreciated within the long-term opportunity framework. Zimbabwe still possesses strong agricultural potential across tobacco, horticulture, dairy, wheat, and broader value chains. Irrigation expansion, logistics rehabilitation, and agro-processing investment could materially deepen domestic industrial linkages if capital mobilisation improves.Tourism also remains significantly underdevel- oped relative to regional potential. Victoria Falls alone provides a globally competitive tourism asset capable of supporting broader hospitality, aviation, conferencing, and investment ecosys- tems. Regional tourism integration across Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe could materially expand forex generation beyond commodity concentration.The most important question therefore is not whether Zimbabwe’s economy is collapsing. It is not. The economy currently demonstrates remarkable resilience under extremely difficult structural conditions. The more important ques- tion is whether resilience alone constitutes sus- tainability.At present, Zimbabwe’s model survives through liquidity generation faster than productive trans- formation. Gold provides forex. Diaspora inflows support consumption. Informality sus- tains employment. Yet none of these pillars independently create sufficient industrial depth to guarantee long-term structural stability.This creates an economy that remains highly adaptive yet simultaneously vulnerable to exter- nal shocks. A major gold correction, aggressive global immigration tightening, prolonged climate disruption, or severe domestic fiscal slippage could expose the shallow foundations beneath current stability.The next phase of Zimbabwe’s economic trajec- tory therefore depends entirely on whether the country converts liquidity into productive depth. That means transforming mineral wealth into industrial ecosystems, informal commerce into scalable enterprises, remittance flows into investment capital, and macroeconomic stability into long-term investor confidence.The countries that escaped commodity depen- dence historically achieved one critical transi- tion: they used periods of liquidity strength to build productive complexity before external cycles turned against them. Botswana lever- aged diamonds into institutional stability and infrastructure. Vietnam transformed labour competitiveness into industrial manufacturing depth. Mauritius diversified from sugar into finance, tourism, and services. Rwanda aggres- sively institutionalised formalisation and logis- tics integration despite limited natural resourc- es.Zimbabwe now stands at a similar strate- gic crossroads.The current model can survive. Sustainability, however, requires structural evolution beyond liquidity-driven stability. The next decade will determine whether Zimbabwe transforms tem- porary resilience into durable economic archi- tecture or remains trapped inside a cycle where external inflows repeatedly stabilise an econo- my that never fully industrialises.Z
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 10*To Page 12imbabwe’s latest poverty datum line statistics for May 2026 provide one of the clearest indicators yet of the enormous economic distance that still separates the coun- try from its ambition of becoming an upper-mid- dle-income economy by 2030. While Vision 2030 remains one of the country’s most import- ant developmental aspirations, the latest house- hold consumption figures suggest that the living standards of many Zimbabweans remain sub- stantially below even the thresholds associated with lower-middle-income economies under international benchmarks established by the World Bank.According to the latest official figures, Zimba- bwe’s Food Poverty Line (FPL) for May 2026 stood at ZWG 916.59 per person per month, while the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) reached ZWG 1,337.37 per person. Using the prevailing exchange rate of ZWG 26.4138 per US dollar, the figures translate to approximately US$34.70 and US$50.63 respec- tively.The Food Poverty Line represents the minimum monthly amount required for an individual to afford the recommended daily energy intake of 2,100 calories, while the Total Consumption Poverty Line measures the minimum amount needed to purchase both food and non-food essentials in order not to be classified as poor. In practical terms, this means that an average Zimbabwean required just over US$50 per month in May 2026 merely to avoid falling below the national poverty threshold.When compared against international poverty benchmarks, however, the magnitude of the developmental challenge becomes far more apparent.The World Bank’s internationally recognised poverty thresholds, measured using 2021 purchasing power parity (PPP), classify coun- tries according to minimum daily consumption levels. The benchmark for low-income econo- mies is US$3.00 per day, equivalent to approxi- mately US$90 per month. Lower-middle-income economies are benchmarked at US$4.20 per day, or roughly US$126 monthly, while upper-middle-income economies are associat- ed with a threshold of US$8.30 per day, equiva- lent to approximately US$249 per month.Against these benchmarks, Zimbabwe’s TCPL of US$50.63 per month remains deeply below all three thresholds. The figure is approximately 44% lower than the minimum consumption benchmark associated with low-income coun- tries, about 60% below the lower-middle-income threshold, and nearly 80% below the upper-mid- dle-income benchmark Zimbabwe aims to achieve by 2030.The comparison is economically significant because it highlights the extent to which house- hold purchasing power in Zimbabwe still reflects survival-oriented consumption patterns rather than middle-income living standards. Poverty datum lines are not prosperity indicators; they merely estimate the minimum amount required for basic survival. A household earning slightly above the TCPL may still struggle to pay rent, transport costs, school fees, electricity, health- care expenses, and other essential services.As a result, escaping poverty statistically does not necessarily translate into economic security or middle-class stability. For Zimbabwe to realis- tically transition toward upper-middle-income status by 2030, household consumption levels would need to rise dramatically over a relatively short period. The arithmetic itself reveals the scale of the challenge. Zimbabwe’s current monthly poverty threshold of approximately US$50 would need to move substantially closer toward the World Bank’s upper-middle-income benchmark of US$249 monthly. This implies that minimum consumption levels would need to increase almost fivefold within four years for household welfare standards to approach upper-middle-income conditions.Historically, such rapid transitions are excep- tionally difficult to achieve. Countries that suc- cessfully moved into upper-middle-income status generally experienced decades of sus- tained industrialisation, export diversification, productivity growth, infrastructure expansion, and formal employment creation. Their transi- tions were usually supported by stable macro- economic conditions, strong investment inflows, rising manufacturing competitiveness, and steady improvements in real wages.Zimbabwe’s economy still faces substantial constraints across many of these areas.One of the country’s major structural limitations remains the dominance of the informal econo- my. A large proportion of Zimbabweans derive income from informal trading, small-scale agri- culture, artisanal mining, and other low-produc- tivity activities that generate unstable and often insufficient earnings. Even when national GDP figures improve, gains in the informal sector do not always translate into broad-based improve- ments in living standards.This creates a disconnect between macroeco- nomic growth and household welfare. For example, Zimbabwe may record strong export earnings from gold, tobacco, lithium, or diaspora remittances, yet these gains do not automatical- ly raise household consumption if formal job creation and wage growth remain weak. Eco- nomic growth that is concentrated in extractive sectors can improve national accounts without significantly transforming living standards for the broader population.Another critical issue is inflation and currency instability. Zimbabwe’s poverty datum lines are denominated in ZiG, meaning households remain vulnerable to exchange rate volatility and inflationary pressures. If prices rise faster than incomes, nominal wage increases lose real value, weakening purchasing power even when incomes appear to rise numerically.This is particularly important because middle-income economies are not defined solely by GDP size, but by the ability of households to sustain rising real consumption levels over time. Per- sistent inflation undermines savings, weakens consumer confidence, discourages long-term investment, and erodes real incomes. Without sustained macroeconomic stability, it becomes difficult for households to accumulate assets or move beyond subsistence-oriented expenditure patterns.The latest poverty figures also reveal the extent of consumption compression across Zimba- bwe’s economy. A monthly poverty threshold of approximately US$50 suggests that many households remain heavily concentrated around expenditure on basic necessities such as food, transport, and utilities, leaving minimal disposable income for savings, insurance, prop- erty ownership, investment, or educational advancement.That distinction matters because upper-mid- dle-income economies are characterised not simply by higher incomes, but by structural transformation and broader economic resil- ience.Typically, middle-income economies exhibit:• larger formal sectors, • stronger industrial bases, • growing middle classes, • higher savings rates, • deeper financial systems,Zwider access to mortgages and consumer credit, • improved healthcare systems, • higher educational attainment, • and more diversified exports.Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030 therefore requires more than achieving statistical GDP targets. The country would need broad-based structural transformation that meaningfully improves the economic capacity of ordinary households.Several key conditions would likely be neces- sary for such a transition. First, macroeconomic stability remains essential. Sustained exchange rate stability and lower inflation would help protect real incomes and encourage invest- ment. Second, Zimbabwe would need stronger formal employment growth capable of raising productivity and wages across the economy. Third, industrialisation and value addition would become increasingly important, particularly in mining and agriculture, where raw commodity exports currently dominate.Infrastructure development would also play a major role. Reliable electricity supply, transport systems, water infrastructure, and digital con- nectivity are critical for productivity growth and industrial competitiveness. In addition, improve- ments in healthcare and education would strengthen human capital, allowing the econo- my to move toward higher-value economic activity.Institutional confidence also remains crucial. Investor confidence is heavily influenced by policy consistency, governance quality, regulaVision 2030 vs Poverty RealityZim Middle-Income Dream& AnalysisZ
SWFThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 11*To Page 12*From Page 11 tory predictability, and property rights protec- tion. Without these conditions, long-term invest- ment inflows necessary for structural transfor- mation may remain constrained. Importantly, middle-income classification itself can some- times mask inequality. Some economies techni- cally achieve middle-income status while large segments of their populations continue to expe- rience poverty and low living standards. GDP per capita averages may therefore improve without broad-based welfare gains if growth remains concentrated among a narrow section of society. This is why poverty datum line analysis remains particularly important. It provides insight into the lived economic reality facing households rather than focusing solely on aggregate macroeco- nomic indicators. The latest figures suggest Zimbabwe remains substantially closer to low-income consumption conditions than to upper-middle-income welfare standards. A pov- erty threshold of roughly US$50 per month is still materially below even the World Bank’s benchmark associated with low-income econo- mies, let alone the US$249 monthly benchmark associated with upper-middle-income countries.Nonetheless, Zimbabwe still possesses several structural advantages that could support long-term transformation. The country has extensive mineral resources, significant agricul- tural potential, relatively high literacy levels, a strategic regional position, and a growing digital entrepreneurial base. If macroeconomic stabili- ty strengthens and productive investment expands consistently, household incomes could improve meaningfully over time.However, the scale of adjustment required before 2030 remains considerable. To move meaningfully toward upper-middle-income con- ditions within the next four years, Zimbabwe would likely require sustained high real GDP growth, lower inflation, stronger formal wage growth, industrial expansion, export diversifica- tion, infrastructure modernisation, and substan- tial increases in household purchasing power.The latest poverty datum line statistics therefore serve as an important economic reality check. They show that the journey toward upper-mid- dle-income status is not simply about achieving headline growth figures or meeting statistical targets. Ultimately, it is about whether ordinary citizens can progressively transition from surviv- al-level consumption toward genuine economic security, rising disposable incomes, and stable middle-class living standards.imbabwe’s corporate landscape entered 2026 with a noticeable acceleration in merger and acquisition activity, reflecting renewed strategic positioning across hospitality, logistics, aviation, financial services, and manu- facturing. The Competition and Tariff Commis- sion (CTC) Q1 2026 newsletter reveals a market increasingly characterised by consolida- tion, restructuring, and long-term asset reposi- tioning as firms respond to changing macroeco- nomic conditions, regional integration pres- sures, and evolving investment dynamics.Seven merger transactions were handled by the Competition and Tariff Commission during the first quarter of 2026. Two transactions received unconditional approval, while five remained under assessment by the end of the quarter. The scale and diversity of the proposed transac- tions illustrate how Zimbabwean and regional firms are recalibrating portfolios toward sectors expected to benefit from tourism recovery, trade expansion, infrastructure development, and financial sector restructuring.The most strategically significant approved transaction during the quarter was the proposed acquisition of Makasa Sun by ASB Hospitality. The transaction involved the acquisition of 100% shareholding in Makasa Sun, a property holding company associated with the former Kingdom Hotel in Victoria Falls. ASB Hospitality, an investment company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates and linked to Hyatt Regency Harare The Meikles Hotel, intends to renovate and reopen the dormant hospitality asset under a new hotel brand.The transaction carries significance beyond a standard property acquisition. Victoria Falls remains one of Zimbabwe’s most critical foreign currency generating tourism hubs, and the reac- tivation of a previously dormant hospitality asset signals rising investor confidence in the coun- try’s tourism recovery trajectory. The transaction effectively converts an inactive property into a productive tourism asset capable of generating employment, foreign currency inflows, supplier linkages, and downstream economic activity.From a competition perspective, the Commis- sion concluded that the transaction would not materially reduce competition because the geo- graphic markets served by the acquiring and target entities differ substantially. The target property was also inactive prior to the transac- tion, limiting the likelihood of anti-competitive market concentration. Instead, the acquisition is expected to reintroduce competitive capacity into the Victoria Falls accommodation market.The strategic implications of the transaction are substantial. Zimbabwe’s tourism sector has increasingly emerged as one of the economy’s strongest foreign currency anchors alongside gold, tobacco, and diaspora remittances. Inter- national hotel investment therefore carries broader macroeconomic importance because tourism recovery supports foreign exchange generation, infrastructure upgrading, and inter- national confidence formation.Another approved transaction involved the acquisition of Vertice Medtech by Vertice Bidco. Although the newsletter provided limited opera- tional details regarding the transaction, the acquisition reflects growing investor appetite within healthcare-linked sectors, particularly as African healthcare systems continue attracting private capital due to rising urbanisation, demo- graphic growth, and healthcare infrastructure deficits.The most commercially significant pending transaction during the quarter involved the proposed acquisition of Dokma Construction by CBZ Holdings. The proposed transaction signals an increasingly visible trend within Zim- babwe’s corporate sector where financial insti- tutions are expanding beyond traditional bank- ing activities into infrastructure-linked and real economy assets.CBZ Holdings has gradually positioned itself as one of Zimbabwe’s most diversified financial groups, with growing exposure to property, insurance, agriculture, and infrastructure financ- ing. The potential acquisition of Dokma could significantly strengthen the group’s strategic positioning within construction and infrastruc- ture ecosystems at a time when public and private infrastructure investment remains cen- tral to Zimbabwe’s medium-term economic ambitions.Infrastructure-linked acquisitions are particularly important within Zimbabwe’s current economic cycle because the country continues facing sub- stantial capital expenditure requirements across roads, energy, logistics, water systems, and urban development. Financial institutions capa- ble of integrating financing capability with infra- structure execution capacity may therefore gain substantial strategic advantages.The proposed acquisition of Caribbea Bay Hotel by Monomotapa Hospitality represents another notable transaction within the tourism sector. Hospitality investment activity has accelerated as operators position themselves ahead of anticipated medium-term tourism recovery, particularly within resort destinations linked to regional and international tourism flows.The hospitality sector experienced prolonged stress during earlier periods of macroeconomic instability and post-pandemic adjustment. Cur- rent merger activity suggests that investors increasingly view hospitality assets as underval- ued strategic opportunities capable of generat- ing significant returns once tourism inflows normalise further.The pending acquisition of Cheetah Logistics by Unifreight Africa Limited also reflects growing strategic emphasis on transport and supply chain integration. Logistics has become one of the most strategically important sectors within Southern Africa due to rising regional trade inte- gration, cross-border commerce, mining exports, and infrastructure corridor develop- ment.Zimbabwe’s geographic position within South- ern Africa gives logistics operators substantial regional relevance, particularly for trade routes connecting South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Consolidation within logistics therefore reflects attempts by operators to achieve great- er scale efficiencies, fleet optimisation, ware- housing integration, and regional network expansion.Supply chain competitiveness has become increasingly central to corporate profitability within Zimbabwe because transport costs significantly influence inflation, industrial com- petitiveness, export viability, and retail pricing structures. Logistics mergers consequently carry macroeconomic significance beyond ordi- nary corporate restructuring.One of the most intriguing pending transactions involved the proposed acquisition of Tanganda by Rutanhi Beverages. Tanganda remains one of Zimbabwe’s most recognisable agricultural brands with extensive exposure to tea produc- tion, macadamia exports, coffee, and horticul- ture.The proposed transaction potentially signals ZMerger Activity SurgesCorporate Strategy Evolves
WOThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 12*From Page 11 renewed investor interest in agro-processing and export-oriented agriculture, sectors increasingly viewed as critical to foreign curren- cy generation and industrial diversification. Zim- babwe’s agricultural sector continues shifting from purely primary commodity production toward higher value-added processing and export integration.The acquisition also reflects a broader continen- tal trend where beverage and consumer goods firms increasingly seek upstream control over agricultural inputs in order to strengthen supply chain security, reduce import dependence, and improve pricing stability.The proposed acquisition of Safair Holdings by Harith Aviation similarly points toward rising investor confidence within aviation-linked sec- tors. Aviation remains highly sensitive to macro- economic conditions, tourism flows, fuel prices, and regional trade activity. Increased transac- tion activity within the sector therefore often serves as an indirect indicator of improving medium-term business expectations.The Q1 merger pipeline collectively demon- strates that strategic capital is increasingly targeting productive sectors rather than purely speculative opportunities. Hospitality, logistics, infrastructure, aviation, and agro-processing all possess strong multiplier effects across employment creation, foreign exchange gener- ation, industrial activity, and domestic supply chains.The broader regional context also matters significantly. The CTC newsletter highlighted nine transactions notified under the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission frame- work during the quarter. These included trans- actions involving First National Bank Zambia, Standard Chartered Bank Zambia, Arla Foods, Baker Hughes, and Hartree Partners.This growing regional transaction activity reflects the increasing integration of African markets under COMESA frameworks, where corporate restructuring decisions now increas- ingly transcend national boundaries. Zimba- bwean firms therefore operate within a far more interconnected competitive environment than in previous decades.The launch of the new COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations during the quarter adds another important dimension to the evolving transaction landscape. The regulations introduce stricter suspensory merger controls, meaning qualifying transac- tions cannot proceed before regulatory approv- al.The strengthening of merger oversight mecha- nisms signals a broader shift toward more sophisticated competition regulation within the region. Regulatory authorities are increasingly focused not only on preventing monopolistic concentration, but also on ensuring that merg- ers support consumer welfare, market efficien- cy, innovation, and fair competition.The evolution of Zimbabwe’s merger environ- ment therefore reflects more than rising trans- action volumes. It reflects the gradual institu- tionalisation of corporate governance, competi- tion regulation, and strategic capital allocation within the economy.The composition of Q1 transactions also provides insight into investor expectations regarding Zimbabwe’s medium-term economic trajectory. Firms generally pursue mergers when they anticipate future earnings growth, stronger demand conditions, improved policy predictability, or opportunities for market consol- idation. The breadth of sectors represented in the Q1 transaction pipeline suggests that corpo- rate capital is increasingly positioning for medi- um-term expansion rather than short-term survival.Several risks nevertheless remain relevant. Zimbabwe’s operating environment continues facing currency complexities, elevated country risk perceptions, infrastructure deficits, and con- strained long-term financing conditions. Pending transactions may therefore still encounter financing, valuation, regulatory, or integration challenges before completion.The success of these transactions will ultimately depend not only on regulatory approval, but also on the ability of acquiring firms to unlock operational efficiencies, improve asset produc- tivity, and generate sustainable returns within a still-fragile macroeconomic environment.The first quarter of 2026 nevertheless marks an important signal for Zimbabwe’s corporate economy. Merger activity is increasingly moving toward productive asset expansion, regional integration, tourism recovery, infrastructure participation, and supply chain consolidation. Capital is no longer concentrating exclusively on defensive positioning. Firms are beginning to position strategically for growth.That transition carries substantial implications for Zimbabwe’s broader economic outlook. Sus- tained merger activity within productive sectors often precedes stronger investment cycles, higher employment generation, improved indus- trial capacity utilisation, and deeper regional economic integration. The Q1 transaction pipe- line therefore offers an early indication that sec- tions of corporate Zimbabwe are beginning to shift from stabilisation toward cautious expan- sion.Zimbabwe Must Preparertificial intelligence entered banking as a fraud detector. It is now becoming a pay- ment initiator. The IMF's April 2026 note, How Agentic AI Will Reshape Payments, identi- fies this as one of the most structurally signifi- cant shifts in financial systems since settlement infrastructure was digitised in the 1990s. The transition is from click-to-pay toward decide-to-pay, where autonomous software agents interpret objectives, evaluate options, and execute transactions with minimal human input. For Zimbabwe and the SADC region, the timeline between these technologies emerging and becoming embedded in daily commerce is compressing fast.Conventional AI in banking predicts. It scores fraud, generates credit risk, and flags sanctions matches. The human decides. Agentic AI acts. It receives an objective, formulates a plan, and executes across multiple systems without step-by-step human approval. The IMF propos- es a three-layer model to manage this. Layer one handles intent and orchestration, where the agent interprets the user's goal. Layer two enforces deterministic authorisation rules con- straining what the agent can commit to. Layer three executes settlement with legal finality. The architecture exists to keep probabilistic AI reasoning separate from deterministic financial execution. Settlement must remain rule-bound and auditable regardless of how the agent upstream reasoned its way to the instruction.The shift is from systems that help humans decide to systems that decide and act. This is not an incremental change. It is an architectural one.New technical standards, including Google's Universal Commerce Protocol, the Agent Pay- ments Protocol, and the Model Context Proto- col, are building the interoperability layer through which agents will coordinate financial activity at machine speed. Visa's Intelligent Commerce and Mastercard's Agent Pay are already running live agent-initiated payment pilots. What would once have taken years is The AI Payment AgeA*To Page 13
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 13*From Page 12 New technical standards, including Google's Universal Commerce Protocol, the Agent Pay- ments Protocol, and the Model Context Proto- col, are building the interoperability layer through which agents will coordinate financial activity at machine speed. Visa's Intelligent Commerce and Mastercard's Agent Pay are already running live agent-initiated payment pilots. What would once have taken years is now materialising in months.Evolution of AI in Payment Systems, 1980s to 2020s.Africa leads the world in mobile money penetra- tion, with over 40 percent of adults holding mobile money accounts. EcoCash, Airtel Money, MTN Mobile Money, and Flutterwave process hundreds of millions of transactions annually outside traditional banking rails. The architecture is innovative and fragmented in equal measure. Intra-SADC remittance costs consume 12 to 25 percent of the principal because money passes through USD or ZAR as intermediaries. Wallets are not interoperable across SADC countries. Banks still run batch settlement. SADC-RTGS connects eight member states at the bank level but does not reach wallet or merchant ecosystems. The region has high mobile penetration and high payment friction simultaneous- ly, and these twin conditions are precisely where agentic AI delivers structural value.Cross-border payment orchestra- tion, real-time multi-currency liquidi- ty optimisation, automated AML and KYC compliance, and fraud preven- tion that acts rather than flags are the four use cases the IMF identifies as near-term targets. For Zimbabwe specifically, the multi-currency envi- ronment, with ZiG, USD, and legacy ZWL balances operating across instruments with different settlement timelines and regulatory treatment, creates the exact treasury manage- ment complexity where agentic AI operates at a precision human desks cannot match. Diaspora remittances from South Africa, the UK, and the US are a material forex inflow channel, and AI-orchestrated corri- dor selection in real time reduces the cost of those flows directly.Zimbabwe's banking sector runs predominantly on Oracle FLEXCUBE and Infosys Finacle, sourced from Indian technology firms whose platforms underpin large parts of Eastern and Southern African banking. Standard Bank runs Finacle across 16 African countries. FLEX- CUBE dominates across the Ecobank group. At the mobile money layer, Tech Mahindra's Comviva powers Airtel Money and built the EcoCash con- nectMoney architecture that produced Africa's first MasterCard debit card linked to a mobile wallet. These vendors determine the pace and architecture of AI integration into core banking functions. Infos- ys Finacle has launched a generative AI copilot, embedded machine learning for transaction analytics, and cloud-na- tive API architecture. Oracle FLEXCUBE is migrating toward cloud-native deployments as the prerequisite for real-time agent-compati- ble connectivity. For Zim- babwe's banks, most of which run FLEXCUBE on-premises, cloud migration is the capital investment that unlocks the AI integration layer. Temenos T24, deployed across SADC, is investing 20 percent of revenues in AI-integrated R&D annu- ally. Backbase offers an AI-enhanced engage- ment layer that sits above existing cores without requiring full replace- ment, a realistic near-term option for insti- tutions constrained on migration budgets.AML and KYC compli- ance consumes 15 to 25 percent of operational budgets across African banking institutions. Agentic compliance systems that operate con- tinuously against transaction flows, resolving exceptions without human review queues, reduce that cost directly. Banks in peer markets have reported 20 to 35 percent reductions in compliance function budgets after AI-driven automation. Net interest margin improvement from AI-optimised liquidity management is a separate profitability gain. Banks carrying excess reserves as a liquidity buffer hold less excess when AI provides real-time precision on positions. Released capital is deployable into earning assets, which is material for a sector where NIM compression has persisted through the ZiG stabilisation period.The IMF's central risk concern is that probabilis- tic AI reasoning is structurally incompatible with the deterministic settlement layer of a payment system, where legal finality requires binary, reproducible outcomes. The three-layer model exists to enforce that separation. Banks that do not enforce it introduce systemic settlement risk. A second risk is correlated agent behaviour: when institutions deploy AI agents trained on similar data and using similar models, their responses under stress converge, amplifying rather than absorbing market move- ments. Zimbabwe's concentrated banking sector, where a small number of institutions dominate transaction volume, is structurally exposed to this channel. Cybersecurity is a third dimension. An agent holding delegated financial authority is a high-value adversarial target, and the RBZ's 2024 sector assessment found satis- factory but not uniform cyber maturity across the market.Zimbabwe's regulatory architecture is ahead of most SADC peers. The RBZ's Fintech Regula- tory Sandbox, launched in 2021, provides a supervised live testing environment. The National Fintech Steering Committee coordi- nates across regulators and government minis- tries. SI 17 of 2025 established a formal licens- ing framework for payment service providers. The RBZ's 2025 Monetary Policy Statement committed to monitoring AI adoption across the sector. Directive RU 2024/02 introduced remote biometric onboarding, modernising the KYC infrastructure that agent-mediated identity verifi- cation requires. The gaps are equally clear. Existing frameworks cover human-initiated transactions through deterministic systems. They contain no provisions for mandate-based authorisation by AI agents, no legal finality rules for agent-initiated transactions, no liability allo- cation standards for AI payment errors, and no systemic risk monitoring for correlated agent behaviour. The RBZ and Ministry of Finance need a dedicated AI governance framework covering these provisions. The fintech sandbox needs explicit expansion to accommodate agentic AI pilots structured around the IMF's three-layer architecture. Regional harmonisa- tion of KYC standards, mandate authentication protocols, and liability frameworks across SADC is the institutional prerequisite for safe cross-border agentic payments. Zimbabwe's active engagement in SADC payment integra- tion, and its connection to PAPSS, positions it to shape those standards rather than receive them.The IMF is careful to describe agentic AI in pay- ments as emerging, not arrived. For Zimbabwe and Southern Africa, the honest position is that payment infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, and core banking systems are meaningful steps behind the frontier where agentic inte- gration becomes operationally viable. That is a compressed plan- ning horizon, not a reason for pas- sivity. The Indian platforms under- pinning the sector are actively build- ing toward AI capability. The SADC interoperability agenda is advanc- ing. The RBZ has the institutional architecture on which accelerated preparation can be built. The institu- tions and regulators that treat the IMF's three-layer model as a design standard, invest in core connectivity, engage on regional AI governance, and extend capital frameworks to price AI operational risk will shape how this transition operates in this hemisphere. The shift from click-to-pay to decide-to-pay is underway. The question is whether Zimbabwe's banking sector arrives as an actor or a recipient.
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 14ZIMSTAT has availed the May 2026 inflation data, and, when read at face value, it appears as Zimbabwe’s mone- tary environment is approaching the stability that the RBZ has been guiding towards. ZiG annual inflation eased to 4.4% from 4.8% in April. USD month-on-month inflation decelerat- ed to 0.3% from 1.1%. Fuel prices held steady at USD2.08 and USD2.09 per litre for petrol and diesel respectively. These are not trivial achievements in an economy that spent much of the preceding decade unable to produce a single meaningful inflation figure, let alone a low one. However, the signals that matter most in May 2026 are the base effect dynamics, the currency markets, and the structural tension between two inflation regimes operating simul- taneously in the same economy, each telling a different story about where prices are actually going and not the ones in the headline CPI release.The most significant data point in May is the divergence between USD year-on-year infla- tion, which rose to 2.8% from 2.2% in April, and USD month-on-month inflation, which fell to 0.3% from 1.1% in the same period. These two numbers are moving in opposite directions, and understanding why requires engaging with the base effect rather than treating the annual figure as a current price signal. When USD year-on-year inflation rises while the monthly rate decelerates, it means that the comparison period a year earlier, May 2025, was character- ised by deflationary or near-flat USD prices that are now creating a statistically elevated annual comparison even as actual current price pres- sure eases. Zimbabwe's USD economy was experiencing deflation and very low inflation in the second quarter of 2025 due to the demand compression of a newly dollarizing economy adjusting to USD-denominated pricing following the late 2024 and early 2025 policy changes. The consequence is that May 2026's modest 0.3% monthly price increase is being reported against that weak prior-year base, making the 2.8% annual figure look like acceleration when it is actually deceleration in real time. Therefore, it is imperative to note that in anchoring your rate expectations to this annual USD inflation level, you are rather reading a lagged signal and not a current one.The local currency, ZiG, inflation trajectory also carries a different but equally important dimen- sion. The monthly sequence of 3.8% in Febru- ary, 4.4% in March, 4.8% in April, and 4.4% in May describes a bell curve rather than a trend, and it almost precisely matches the governor’s own pre-announced guidance that inflation would temporarily increase towards June before returning to steady state. What the RBZ's guid- ance did not address, and what the trajectory is beginning to illuminate, is the mechanism through which the June return to steady state is supposed to occur given the currency dynamics that have unfolded since that guidance was issued. The ZiG depreciated 0.08% against the USD on the official interbank market in April and has fallen a further 4.06% as at 26 May, one of the most significant single-month depreciation in recent history. The parallel market, which historically leads the official rate by four to eight weeks, has so-far depreciated 6.06% in May alone, a magnitude that has no recent prece- dent in the ZiG's short history. In a market where import prices are transmitted to consumer goods within weeks, the currency move of May is the inflation data of July, and the RBZ's June steady-state forecast was constructed before the May exchange rate break occurred. Parallel market movements are real-time aggre- gation of market participants' collective assess- ment of the ZiG's credibility as a store of value, informed by their own liquidity conditions, import financing needs, and inflation expectations. A depreciation of this magnitude (6%), following two months of genuine ZiG appreciation that had built confidence in the currency's stability architecture, is a signal that the conditions which sustained the appreciation, the tightening of foreign currency supply to the informal market and a brief period of ZiG demand from businesses converting to meet statutory obliga- tions, have partially reversed, and that the underlying demand for USD as the preferred store of value has re-asserted itself with yet again increasing force. The 3.23% parallel market appreciation in April, which was briefly celebrated as evidence of improving ZiG senti- ment, now appears as the local maximum before a correction that has been significantly larger than the gain it reversed.The RBZ's 35% policy rate is where the mone- tary framework's internal contradictions become most visible. Against ZiG inflation of 4.4%, the nominal real interest rate is approximately 30.6%, an extraordinarily punishing cost of capi- tal that is inconsistent with any economic expansion objective. The RBZ's Governor has defended the rate on the grounds that reducing it prematurely would reignite inflation, a position that is theoretically coherent in isolation. But it becomes harder to sustain when the currency is depreciating at 4% monthly on the formal market and 6% monthly on the parallel, because currency depreciation of this speed is itself inflationary through import cost pass-through, and no interest rate level can simultaneously arrest currency depreciation and suppress demand inflation if the deprecia- tion is being driven by structural USD demand rather than excess ZiG liquidity. Instead of addressing the source of the ZiG's May weak- ness, the 35% rate is taxing the legitimate ZiG-denominated economy at 30 percentage points above inflation while the currency depre- ciates anyway, which is the worst available combination for productive investment and credit growth.On the other hand, ZERA's decision to hold fuel prices at USD2.08 and USD2.09 at the most recent price revision, is performing a genuine deflationary service to the broader price level. Fuel is a direct input into transport costs, which transmit into food, manufactured goods, and service prices across the economy, and each month that ZERA absorbs the upstream cost pressure without passing it through to consum- ers suppresses between 1.5 and 2 percentage points of potential inflation in the CPI basket. But the mechanism by which this remains sus- tainable in a depreciating currency environment is not indefinite. The fuel build-up structure, as the ZERA April price revision demonstrates, is anchored to the USD FOB import price, which is priced in hard currency and does not fall when the ZiG depreciates. Thus, the only factor curtailing further inflationary pressures is the exclusive use of foreign currency in fuel trans- actions because if the ZiG depreciation of May persists or accelerates, the ZiG-equivalent fuel price will rise even if the USD pump price is held flat, as more ZiG units are required to purchase the same USD fuel cost.Nonetheless, another deeper structural tension revealing itself is the dual-currency economy's inherent inability to produce coherent price signals across both currency systems simulta- neously. When ZiG inflation is 4.4% and USD inflation is 2.8%, the 1.6 percentage point spread implies that ZiG-priced goods are appre- ciating faster than USD-priced goods, which should incentivise holding USD rather than ZiG and should therefore sustain demand for paral- lel market currency conversion, which is precisely what the 6.06% parallel market depre- ciation confirms. The ZiG's inflation advantage over USD is not large enough to compensate holders for the capital loss from ZiG deprecia- tion, and this negative carry, in which the currency loses more through exchange rate movement than it gains through inflation protec- tion, is the structural dynamic that the RBZ's steady-state forecast needs to address before it can be taken at face value. The forecast may well prove correct if the May depreciation reflects a temporary liquidity dislocation rather than a sustained reassessment of ZiG value.Reading Beyond May InflationWhat Currency Movements Reveal About EconomyZ
ZThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 15*To Page 16Zimbabwe's Mineral Ambitionn 25 May 2026, Zimplats Holdings Limit- ed issued a holding statement to the Australian Securities Exchange acknowledging the Zimbabwean government's announcement of 22 May 2026, which classified platinum group metals and seven other minerals as critical minerals under a new policy frame- work. The company said it expects the govern- ment to provide further detail in due course and confirmed that it is actively engaging with authorities to understand the full implications of the classification. Chief Executive Officer Alex Mhembere, who signed the statement, described the relationship between Zimplats and the government as strong and constructive, and committed the company to working in part- nership with the State on responsible resource management and shared value creation. The immediate implication is that Zimbabwe's larg- est platinum producer has chosen public engagement over public resistance.Zimplats is the Zimbabwean operating arm of Impala Platinum, the Johannesburg listed group known as Implats, and it is the largest producer of platinum group metals in the country. Its oper- ations sit on the Ngezi and Selous sections of the Great Dyke, the 550 kilometre geological formation that holds the world's second largest platinum reserves. The company is consistently among the largest single contributors to the Zimbabwean economy through foreign currency generation, direct employment, fiscal payments, and infrastructure development. Its relevance to the critical minerals debate arises from a single fact that most readers overlook, which is that Zimplats is already doing voluntarily what the new framework now seeks to compel. The com- pany is part way through a capital expansion programme of roughly US$1.8 billion that includes a smelter expansion, a base metal refinery, a sulphuric acid plant, a sulphur dioxide abatement plant, and a 110 megawatt power station. The expanded smelter, commissioned in late 2024, more than doubles in-country smelting capacity from 135,000 to 380,000 tonnes of concentrate a year, and the company reports that it has run with no concentrate stock- piles and no concentrate exports. This is the precedent that strengthens the framework's credibility, because it demonstrates that deep beneficiation in Zimbabwe is technically achiev- able when a credible operator commits the capi- tal.The 22 May declaration works through four binding provisions that together convert a list of minerals into a new set of ownership and trade rules. The first establishes a mandatory mini- mum State shareholding in the exploitation of every classified mineral, held through designat- ed Special Purpose Vehicles, with the exact percentage left to subsidiary legislation or minis- terial directive. The second bans the export of classified minerals in raw or unbeneficiated form unless the Minister of Mines approves a condi- tional transitional plan with a timeline for local processing. The third sets government-deter- mined beneficiation levels as the floor for any export, which means concentrate is treated as a stage to move beyond and not a ceiling to settle at. The fourth requires ministerial approval for every application for mining rights over a classi- fied mineral. The transmission from policy to market outcome is direct. A decision taken in Harare now reaches into the shareholder regis- ter, the export licence, and the project timeline of every operator in the classified categories, which changes both who owns the asset and how quickly it can be developed.The clearest evidence of how this transmission reshapes value sits in the trade data. In the first quarter of 2026, the first full quarter under the lithium concentrate ban, total mineral sales reached US$983.85 million, an increase of 79 percent in value on a volume increase of only 27 percent. Lithium sales reached US$178.64 million, an increase of 106 percent in value on a volume increase of only 2 percent. The gap between those two numbers is the entire policy thesis expressed in a single statistic, because it shows that forcing material through a process- ing stage raised the value captured per tonne leaving the country. Platinum group metal sales reached US$543.97 million over the same period, with concentrate volumes close to dou- bling. The cost side of the ledger moves in the opposite direction. Operators carry the expense of building and running processing capacity, they face a foreign currency retention rule that requires 30 percent of United States dollar earn- ings to be surrendered in exchange for Zimba- bwe Gold, and they depend on a national power grid that has historically struggled to supply heavy industry reliably.The exposure created by the framework is not evenly distributed. The Chinese companies that dominate Zimbabwe's lithium sector, which include Sinomine, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Chengxin Lithium, Yahua, and Canmax, carry the heaviest exposure to the mandatory State shareholding provision, because they built their Zimbabwean businesses under ownership assumptions that the declaration now reopens. The established platinum producers, namely Zimplats, Mimosa, and Unki, face renegotiation risk on the same provision, although their exist- ing beneficiation investment gives them a stron- ger compliance position from which to negoti- ate. Junior explorers and new entrants face the heaviest exposure to ministerial discretion, because every mining right they seek now passes through a single approval point that adds time and political risk to projects that are not yet generating cash. The final layer of expo- sure sits outside Zimbabwe entirely, in the global battery, stainless steel, and energy tran- sition supply chains that depend on Zimbabwe- an lithium, chrome, and platinum group metals as inputs.Read against Zimbabwe's own record, the dec- laration reflects consistency of direction and persistence of an old weakness at the same time. The chrome sector is the cautionary prec- edent. Zimbabwe first banned raw chrome ore exports in 2011 to force local smelting, then lifted the ban in 2015 after the smelting capacity failed to materialise, with chromium ore output estimated to have fallen by close to half and ferrochrome prices and power costs cited as the reasons the policy did not hold. The government reinstated the chrome ban in 2021 and 2022 and now enforces it as an absolute prohibition, anchored by the planned Palm River industrial zone that pairs a two million tonne ferrochrome smelter with a 1,200 megawatt power complex. The lithium story follows the same escalating logic, moving from the raw ore ban of December 2022 to the concentrate ban of February 2026 that followed the discovery of undeclared stock- piles at the port of Beira. The persistent weak- ness is reliability as a counterparty. The govern- ment reportedly owes Valterra Platinum more than US$100 million in unpaid export proceeds, which is the kind of gap that undermines the confidence the framework needs to attract the capital it now demands.Zimbabwe is not acting alone, and the regional record offers both encouragement and warning. At least 13 African countries have introduced export restrictions, bans, or beneficiation requirements on critical minerals since 2023. Namibia banned the export of unprocessed lithi- um, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and rare earths in June 2023. Ghana adopted a Green Minerals Policy in 2023 that prohibits raw lithium exports and later extended the approach to bauxite and iron ore. Tanzania moved to ban unrefined lithium exports and to require a mini- mum level of in-country value addition. Mali tightened State control and increased its equity stakes through a revised mining code, Botswa- na required mining firms to sell a 24 percent interest in new concessions to local investors, and the Democratic Republic of Congo banned cobalt exports before replacing the ban with export quotas after consultation. The single most instructive case sits outside Africa, in Indo- nesia, which banned raw nickel ore exports in 2020 and lifted its share of global nickel produc- tion from around 31 percent in that year to roughly 60 percent by 2024. That outcome carries a warning Zimbabwe should read close- ly, because the processing boom was financed and controlled largely by Chinese capital, it drew a World Trade Organisation challenge, and it brought environmental and community costs that the headline revenue figures conceal.Country Measure Years Status / outcomeZimbabwe Raw lithium ban, then concentrate ban, chrome ban, and a full critical minerals declaration 2022 to 2026 Q1 2026 mineral value up 79 percent, processing capacity still buildingNamibia Ban on unprocessed lithium, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and rare earths 2023 Several integrated processing projects advancingGhana Green Minerals Policy banning raw lithium, later bauxite and iron ore 2 0 2 3 to 2024 Refinery and value addition drive underwayTanzania Ban on unrefined lithium with a minimum value addition before export 2024 Early stage implementationDR Congo Cobalt export ban, later replaced by export quotas 2025 Quota regime man- aging a dominant global supply shareBotswana Local investors must hold a 24 percent stake in new concessions 2025 O w n -Can It Deliver?O
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 16*From Page 15 reinstated the chrome ban in 2021 and 2022 and now enforces it as an absolute prohibition, anchored by the planned Palm River industrial zone that pairs a two million tonne ferrochrome smelter with a 1,200 megawatt power complex. The lithium story follows the same escalating logic, moving from the raw ore ban of December 2022 to the concentrate ban of February 2026 that followed the discovery of undeclared stock- piles at the port of Beira. The persistent weak- ness is reliability as a counterparty. The govern- ment reportedly owes Valterra Platinum more than US$100 million in unpaid export proceeds, which is the kind of gap that undermines the confidence the framework needs to attract the capital it now demands.Zimbabwe is not acting alone, and the regional record offers both encouragement and warning. At least 13 African countries have introduced export restrictions, bans, or beneficiation requirements on critical minerals since 2023. Namibia banned the export of unprocessed lithi- um, cobalt, manganese, graphite, and rare earths in June 2023. Ghana adopted a Green Minerals Policy in 2023 that prohibits raw lithium exports and later extended the approach to bauxite and iron ore. Tanzania moved to ban unrefined lithium exports and to require a mini- mum level of in-country value addition. Mali tightened State control and increased its equity stakes through a revised mining code, Botswa- na required mining firms to sell a 24 percent interest in new concessions to local investors, and the Democratic Republic of Congo banned cobalt exports before replacing the ban with export quotas after consultation. The single most instructive case sits outside Africa, in Indonesia, which banned raw nickel ore exports in 2020 and lifted its share of global nickel production from around 31 percent in that year to roughly 60 percent by 2024. That outcome carries a warning Zimbabwe should read closely, because the processing boom was financed and controlled largely by Chinese capi- tal, it drew a World Trade Organisation chal- lenge, and it brought environmental and com- munity costs that the headline revenue figures conceal.Comparative view of African mineral export restrictions, with Indonesia as the benchmark case. Sources: McCarthy Tetrault, Devex, Climate Change News, S&P Global, MMCZ.The Zimbabwean data so far supports the opti- mistic reading of the policy, with one important caveat. The full year 2025 mineral sector gener- ated US$3.4 billion, an increase of 14 percent in value on a 61 percent increase in volume, and the early 2026 quarter then delivered the sharp value gains described above. The chart below isolates the core signal, which is the widening gap between the value and volume of mineral sales under the export restriction framework.Value gains far outran volume in the first full quar- ter under the export curbs.The caveat is that the value gains rest partly on favourable global prices that Harare does not control. Platinum rose by roughly 127 percent through 2025 on a fourth consecutive year of market deficit, and Bank of America expects platinum to average around US$2,450 an ounce in 2026, which flatters the platinum group metal numbers independently of any beneficiation effect. The government's stated target of US$12 billion in annual mining revenue by 2030 implies more than tripling the 2025 figure in five years, and that arithmetic cannot be solved by price alone. It requires lithium hydroxide refineries, expanded platinum group metal smelting, and higher-grade ferrochrome capacity that does not yet exist in Zimbabwe at the required scale.This is where the Caledonia transaction becomes the most useful signal in the entire market. In January 2026, Caledonia Mining Cor- poration went to the United States bond market seeking US$100 million in convertible senior notes to fund its Bilboes gold project, and demand exceeded US$600 million within three days, which allowed the company to upsize the issue to US$150 million at a coupon of 5.875 percent over seven years, raising about US$130 million in net proceeds. Caledonia paired the raise with a gold price hedge that locks in a floor of US$3,500 an ounce for 3,000 ounces a month through to the end of 2028, and it sits inside a four-part funding plan for a project carrying a total capital requirement of roughly US$584 million. Bilboes, located north of Bula- wayo in Matabeleland North, is expected to pour first gold in late 2028 and to reach around 200,000 ounces a year from 2029, which would make it the largest gold mine in the country. The lesson for every audience is the same, which is that the binding constraint on Zimbabwean mining capital is structure and credibility and not jurisdiction by itself. International institutional investors funded a Zimbabwean asset many times over because the project arrived hedged, feasibility tested, listed across the NYSE Ameri- can, AIM, and VFEX, and managed by a team with a long operating record at the Blanket mine.The advice that follows divides cleanly across three audiences. For the government, the forward priorities are to specify the SPV share- holding percentage quickly so that operators can price the equity dilution, to settle the Valter- ra arrears as a signal of counterparty reliability, to fix the power supply that beneficiation depends on, and to protect the certainty of the transitional plans so that ministerial discretion does not harden into unpredictability. For exist- ing operators, the lesson is the Zimplats lesson, which is to move ahead of compliance by invest- ing in processing early and by negotiating SPV terms from a position of demonstrated commit- ment. For international investors weighing entry, the path is to price the discretion premium hon- estly, to demand the hedging and staged fund- ing structure that the Caledonia deal modelled, and to read the terms on which the State sets its first SPV stakes as the truest indicator of wheth- er the framework is a partnership or a deterrent.The declaration of 22 May is the most ambitious act of mineral governance Zimbabwe has produced since independence, and its ambition is matched only by the difficulty of executing it. The country has the geology, the global demand is moving in its favour, and the macroeconomic backdrop of falling inflation, an IMF monitored programme, and an active debt clearance process is more supportive than at almost any earlier point. What remains unresolved is the variable that has defeated every previous version of this agenda, which is whether the State can be a reliable partner, a consistent regulator, and a competent co-owner all at once. The market has already shown, through an oversubscribed gold bond and through a plati- num producer that is building rather than retreating, that capital will back Zimbabwe when the structure is sound. The question the next 18 months will answer is whether the government can be as disciplined a counterparty as the investors it is now asking to build the future of its mineral wealth.
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 17SL Limited has announced its plans of delisting from the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and subsequently list on the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange (VFEX) by way of introduction. However, this is not a departure from the ordinary but rather the logi- cal conclusion of a trajectory that has been building since Zimbabwe's macro-economic upheaval of 2020 and 2021. The Board's resolu- tion on 30 March 2026 formalises what the Group's financial position and performance has long implied, that a business generating over 97% of its revenues in United States Dollars has limited reason to remain priced in ZiG.For starters, in understanding the chain of migrations from ZSE to VFEX, Zimbabwe's hyperinflationary season which intensified from 2019 through 2021, eroded the real value of ZSE-listed equities by over 100% in USD terms even as the nominal values surged. Investors who held ZSE equities through that period suffered capital destruction measured against any hard currency benchmark. The official inter- bank exchange rate itself became an unreliable reference point, with internally generated con- version rates applied by corporates, a practice that Grant Thornton flagged in its qualified audit opinions on TSL's financial statements for three consecutive years. This structural currency instability is precisely the environment in which stock market valuations in local currency terms become detached from economic reality.TSL is generating 97% of its revenues in United States Dollars. Following a dip in EBITDA to US$10.0 million in FY2023, impacted by high finance costs, discontinued operations, and a 42% deterioration in net profit, TSL rebounded sharply in 2024, with EBITDA climbing to US$17.7 million and profit reaching US$10.5 million, representing an 85% improvement on the prior year. The H1 FY2025 results, covering the six months to 30 April 2025, sustained that momentum as revenue grew 8% to US$19.7 million while profit from continuing operations surged 43% to US$4.3 million. This operating recovery is precisely what makes the timing of the VFEX migration significant. TSL is migrating from a position of financial strength rather than distress, carrying total equity of US$65.6 million and a gearing ratio that has declined from 17% to 16%.The ZSE's structural limitations have become increasingly evident when viewed through this lens. As at end of April 2026, the exchange carried a total market capitalisation of US$3.29 billion across 37 active counters, compared to VFEX's US$3.49 billion across just 14 active listings. That VFEX, with fewer than half the listed entities, commands a larger aggregate market value reflects the compounding effect of high-value migrations and initial listings of com- panies that were not affected by the 2020-21 exchange volatility-led value erosion. Econet's delisting from the ZSE and the subsequent listing of Econet InfraCo on the VFEX is the most defining of these shifts. TSL's own market cap, at an interbank-equivalent of US$86.8 million as at 27 May 2026, represents a material market-cap transfer that will further compress ZSE's weight in Zimbabwe's capital markets, particularly as other expected delistings such as First Mutual Properties proceed.The value-traded differential between the two exchanges, US$254.5 million on the ZSE versus US$125.5 million on the VFEX from Jan- uary to April 2026, is frequently cited to suggest the ZSE remains more liquid, but this compari- son requires careful adjustment. The ZSE trades in ZiG, a currency that constitutes less than 20% of Zimbabwe's transactional economy despite being the official legal tender. Because most economic activity is conducted in US dollars, ZiG exists in structurally scarce supply relative to circula- tion demand. Investors seeking to deploy ZiG balances, earned through ZiG-denominat- ed wages, vendor pay- ments, or government transactions, naturally channel those funds into the ZSE, inflating traded volumes in ZiG terms even as the underlying USD-equivalent values remain modest. The VFEX, priced in USD, attracts genuinely investable foreign-cur- rency capital but oper- ates in a tighter pool. The liquidity advantage of the ZSE is therefore partly a function of currency scarcity rather than economic activity depth.For TSL specifically, the VFEX migration addresses a fundamental valuation mismatch. A group whose earnings, assets, and dividends are overwhelmingly USD-denominated but whose equity is priced in ZiG creates an inter- pretive burden for investors. The ZiG-to-USD interbank conversion applied to derive the US$86.8 million market cap is itself subject to the same exchange-rate instability that has historically misrepresented listed values on the ZSE. Listing on the VFEX through an introducto- ry listing removes that translation layer, allowing the market to price TSL directly in the currency that reflects its economic substance. The accompanying tax incentives reinforce this case, that is, no capital gains tax on share disposals, dividend withholding tax for foreign investors halved to 5%, and trading costs at 2.32% against 4.15% on the ZSE.TSL's balance sheet has also been actively rationalised in anticipa- tion of this transition. The disposal of three sub-optimally perform- ing investment proper- ties, reclassified as assets held for sale under IFRS 5, is partly intended to fund the US$25 million acquisi- tion of a 51.43% stake in Nampak Zimbabwe. That transaction, pend- ing shareholder and regulatory approvals at the time of the H1 FY2026 results, will significantly expand TSL's packaging foot- print and diversify earn- ings beyond its current agricultural and logis- tics core. Migrating to the VFEX at this juncture positions TSL to attract the institutional USD capital that such a growth phase demands, as the VFEX's liberalised exchange control frame- work allows foreign investors to repatriate both dividends and disinvestment proceeds without restriction. The Group has also indicated it holds US$12 million in undrawn loan facilities earmarked specifically for the Nampak transac- tion, which, combined with proceeds from the property disposals, provides a credible funding bridge.The broader market context indicates that the ZSE-to-VFEX migration pipeline will accelerate. The ZSE's position as Zimbabwe's primary listing venue is being renegotiated not through regulatory decree but through the rational choic- es of USD-earning companies whose equity is increasingly mispriced in a local currency-de- nominated environment. TSL, with 364.5 million shares in issue, a top-10 shareholder base representing nearly 90% of the register, and VFEX Listings Committee confirmation of ade- quate marketability, is well-positioned for the migration to proceed without disruption to exist- ing investors.Ultimately, TSL's proposed VFEX listing will align the currency in which the company is valued with the currency in which it operates. That alignment, supported by a recovering earn- ings trajectory, a strengthening balance sheet, and a growth acquisition in process, makes the migration strategically coherent rather than opportunistic. The question for shareholders voting at the EGM on 19 June 2026 is not whether the VFEX is superior in the abstract, but whether TSL's USD-denominated future is better reflected there than on an exchange pric- ing in a currency that accounts for less than one-fifth of Zimbabwe's real economic activity. On balance, the answer is unambiguous.Why is TSL MigratingThe VFEX AttractionT
CMThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 18marketsBZ Holdings Limited, Zim- babwe’s largest financial services group by assets and deposits’ first quarter perfor- mance for the period ended 31 March 2026 presented a more constructive story than the head- line profit decline initially appeared to show. Profit after tax fell to ZWG 361.34 million from ZWG 537.53 million in the com- parable period last year, and total income eased to ZWG 1.33 billion from ZWG 1.41 billion. Taken in isolation, those num- bers show earnings pressure, but when read through the full operating context, they reveal a financial services group begin- ning to shift its income engine toward a more sustainable bank- ing model under a tighter regula- tory and cost environment.The most important develop- ment in the result was the growth in funded income. Funded income rose to ZWG 658.48 million from ZWG 627.63 million, supported by an increase in loans and advances to custom- ers. This is the cleanest evidence that CBZ is beginning to lean more deliberately into balance sheet utilisation at a time when the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s 2026 Monetary Policy Statement is reshaping the economics of fee based banking. For years, Zimbabwean banks have relied heavily on transaction income, account charges, commissions and fees. The downward review of bank charges now forces the sector to rely more on traditional intermedia- tion, where banks mobilise deposits and deploy them into productive lending.CBZ is well placed for that transition because it starts from a position of scale. Customer depos- its closed the quarter at ZWG 27.83 billion, almost unchanged from ZWG 27.76 billion in the prior period, confirming the stability of the group’s deposit franchise during a quarter marked by global uncertainty, higher fuel costs and tighter operating conditions. A stable depos- it base matters because it gives CBZ the fund- ing platform required to expand lending without placing undue strain on liquidity. The regulatory backdrop makes this shift more urgent. The RBZ’s February 2026 Monetary Policy Statement removed account balance enquiry charges, scrapped cash deposit fees and capped cash withdrawal charges at 2 percent. These measures improve affordability and support financial inclusion, especially for customers who have long carried high transac- tion costs. For banks, the same reforms reduce the scope for easy fee income. CBZ’s non funded income moderated to ZWG 878.09 million from ZWG 938.03 million, largely due to the absence of once off treasury bill gains recorded in the prior year. Commission and fee income still rose 4.9 percent to ZWG 524.17 million, showing that the group’s transactional base remains active. The direction of policy, however, is clear. Future earnings quality will depend increasingly on lending depth, capital efficiency and risk disciplined asset growth.That is where CBZ’s balance sheet strength becomes strategically important. The group closed the quarter with total assets of ZWG 40.81 billion, supported by a liquid and well cap- italised position. All regulated subsidiaries remained compliant with minimum capital requirements, and the group continued targeted recapitalisation across business units. This cap- ital position gives CBZ flexibility at a time when weaker institutions may struggle to fund growth, absorb cost pressure and respond to regulatory change simultaneously. The group’s ability to maintain strong buffers also preserves confi- dence among depositors, regulators and inves- tors.The capital market response reinforces that confidence. CBZ Holdings’ share price gained 40 percent during the quarter to close at ZiG 16.09, lifting market capitalisation to ZiG 8.4 billion. That performance was ahead of an already strong market environment, with the ZSE All Share Index rising 29 percent and the VFEX All Share Index advancing 41.1 percent. Investors appear to be looking beyond the near term profit decline and pricing in the group’s scale, franchise depth and capacity to benefit from a more credit driven banking cycle.The operating environment also gave CBZ sev- eral areas of support. Domestic macroeconomic stability held through the quarter, with US dollar annual inflation rising only marginally from 1 percent in January to 1.3 percent in March, and ZiG inflation moving from 4.1 percent to 4.4 percent. Exchange rate stability supported pric- ing confidence and helped preserve balance sheet predictability in a dual currency environ- ment. At the same time, the strong agricultural season created a broad base of economic activ- ity. For a bank with deep exposure to agricul- ture, trade, payments and corporate banking, this provides a meaningful demand base for lending, trans- actional banking and value chain financing.The cost environment remained challenging. Brent crude prices rose sharply as Middle East tensions disrupted key energy supply routes, and local diesel prices increased 34.9 percent to US$2.05 per litre during the quarter. That raised logistics, production and operating costs across the economy. For CBZ, the consequence is twofold. Its own operating costs come under pressure through branch, trans- port and technology infrastruc- ture expenses, and clients in fuel sensitive sectors face higher working capital needs. This creates credit risk, yet it also creates demand for structured financing solutions. Banks with strong risk systems and sector knowledge can convert that pressure into disciplined lending opportunities.The real story of CBZ’s Q1 performance is therefore transition. The group is entering a period where scale alone will no longer be enough. The next phase of banking perfor- mance will be defined by how efficiently large banks convert deposits into earning assets, how carefully they price credit risk, and how suc- cessfully they replace regulated fee income with high quality funded income. CBZ’s first quarter numbers show pressure, yet they also show the resources required to respond: a stable deposit base, rising funded income, capitalised subsid- iaries, strong liquidity, a diversified portfolio and investor confidence.The group’s outlook remains supported by domestic stability, agricultural recovery and con- tinued demand for financial services across productive sectors. Policy reforms will keep reshaping revenue dynamics, and global com- modity and energy volatility will continue raising operating complexity. CBZ’s advantage lies in its ability to absorb those pressures from a posi- tion of balance sheet strength. The quarter con- firms that the bank is no longer operating in the easy fee income cycle that defined much of the sector’s recent profitability. It is moving into a cycle where disciplined lending, capital alloca- tion and customer depth will determine earnings quality.For CBZ, that shift could become an opportuni- ty. A group with the largest financial services footprint in the country, a strong deposit fran- chise and growing funded income has the capacity to lead the sector’s move from transac- tion led earnings to productive financial interme- diation. The Q1 result is therefore best read as the early stage of strategic repositioning. The profit line weakened, but the core banking engine strengthened, and that is the more important development for the rest of 2026.CBZ RecalibratesFunded Income Gains MomentumC
XThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 19C imbabwe’s retail sector is increasingly evolving beyond traditional merchandis- ing into integrated consumer ecosys- tems that combine credit, insurance, financial wellness, and household support services. The latest Edgars Club Magazine Q1 2026 issue highlights one of the clearest examples of this transformation through the Edgars Hospital Cash Plan, a product that reflects the growing convergence between retail finance and social protection.The Hospital Cash Plan (HCP) represents more than a conventional insurance-style offering. It reflects a broader shift in how retailers across emerging markets are positioning themselves within consumers’ daily financial lives. In econo- mies characterised by constrained disposable incomes, limited insurance penetration, rising healthcare costs, and informal employment structures, products that provide flexible finan- cial cushioning during periods of vulnerability are increasingly becoming commercially strate- gic.Edgars’ approach is particularly notable because the plan does not operate as a tradi- tional medical aid scheme. Instead of paying hospitals directly, the product provides cash payouts to policyholders after hospitalisation exceeding 48 hours. This distinction fundamen- tally changes the product’s value proposition.Medical aid products typically focus on health- care cost reimbursement, often leaving house- holds exposed to secondary economic pres- sures that emerge during illness. Income disrup- tions, transport costs, school fees, groceries, caregiving expenses, and temporary reductions in household productivity frequently create deeper financial stress than medical bills them- selves, particularly within low and middle-in- come households.The Edgars Hospital Cash Plan directly addresses this gap through liquidity support rather than narrowly defined medical reimburse- ment. The flexibility of unrestricted cash payouts therefore makes the product significantly more adaptive to the realities of Zimbabwean house- holds.The structure of the plan is intentionally designed around affordability and layered access. Three cover tiers are available namely Gold, Platinum, and Rhodium. Adult monthly premiums range from US$1.50 to US$4.50, while dependent premiums range between US$1.00 and US$2.50.The payout structure scales proportion- ately with contribution levels.The pricing architecture demonstrates a sophis- ticated understanding of mass-market afford- ability constraints. A US$1.50 monthly premium places the product within reach of lower-income consumers, while the higher-tier Rhodium pack- age creates a premium option for middle-in- come households seeking larger coverage buffers.The product’s strategic brilliance lies in its align- ment with Zimbabwe’s socioeconomic realities. The country’s labour market remains heavily informalised, meaning millions of households lack employer-sponsored healthcare benefits, formal income protection mechanisms, or com- prehensive insurance cover.In such environments, hospitalisation frequently triggers cascading household financial distress. Families often liquidate productive assets, delay school fee payments, reduce food consumption, or increase informal borrowing in order to absorb temporary income shocks. Hospital cash plans directly target this vulnerability.The inclusion of dependents further strengthens the product’s relevance. Coverage extends to spouses, children, and additional dependents, thereby increasing household-level financial resilience rather than individual-only protection.Several additional features significantly enhance the competitiveness of the offering. The inclusion of dreaded disease cover for illnesses such as cancer materially improves the product’s long-term value proposition. Chronic illnesses are among the most financial- ly destructive household risks because treat- ment costs are prolonged and often accompa- nied by sustained income disruption.Immediate accident cover also adds practical value by eliminating waiting periods for acciden- tal hospitalisation. A three-month waiting period for illness claims remains standard practice across many insurance products and therefore does not materially weaken competitiveness.One of the strongest differentiators is the absence of mandatory medical examinations. Traditional insurance products frequently exclude large sections of lower-income popula- tions because underwriting procedures become administratively burdensome or financially inac- cessible.By removing medical examination requirements and covering pre-existing conditions including HIV/AIDS, Edgars significantly broadens finan- cial inclusion. This aspect is particularly import- ant within the Southern African context where HIV prevalence rates remain materially signifi- cant. Insurance exclusion of pre-existing condi- tions has historically limited access to formal protection products for vulnerable groups. Inclu- sive underwriting therefore strengthens both the social and commercial value of the product.The additional account-holder benefits further deepen customer retention incentives. Hospital- isation exceeding seven days triggers a US$200 account credit relief benefit, while death benefits include clearance of outstanding account balances. These additions transform the product from a standalone hospital support mechanism into an integrated retail-financial ecosystem.This strategy mirrors international trends increasingly visible across retail, fintech, and consumer finance industries. Globally, retailers and digital financial platforms are increasingly embedding insurance products into broader customer ecosystems. South Africa’s retail groups including Shoprite, Pepkor, and Mr Price have significantly expanded value-added finan- cial services targeting low and middle-income consumers. These offerings frequently include funeral cover, microinsurance, credit protection, mobile financial products, and hospital cash plans.Kenya’s Safaricom ecosystem similarly trans- formed financial inclusion through integrated mobile financial products layered onto the M-Pesa platform. Indian retail-finance ecosys- tems increasingly combine e-commerce, micro- credit, healthcare financing, and insurance products into unified consumer platforms.Latin American fintech firms such as Nubank and Mercado Pago have also aggressively expanded into embedded insurance and finan- cial wellness solutions as part of broader cus- tomer ecosystem strategies.Edgars’ Hospital Cash Plan therefore aligns Zimbabwe with a growing global shift where firms no longer compete purely through product sales alone. Competitive advantage increasing- ly comes from ecosystem integration, customer retention, data relationships, and financial service layering.The economics behind this strategy are compel- ling. Retail businesses operating within highly competitive consumer markets face growing pressure on traditional merchandise margins. Embedded financial products create additional recurring revenue streams while simultaneously increasing customer stickiness.Customers benefiting from integrated financial support products are generally more likely to remain loyal to the retailer, maintain account activity, and deepen long-term engagement with the brand. The Hospital Cash Plan also carries macroeconomic significance within Zimbabwe’s broader financial inclusion landscape.Insurance penetration across many African economies remains structurally low compared to global averages. High premium costs, limited financial literacy, complex claims processes, and weak trust in formal insurance institutions have historically constrained adoption.Microinsurance and simplified protection prod- ucts are increasingly viewed as one of the most effective mechanisms for broadening financial resilience among underserved populations. The Edgars model succeeds because it simplifies the consumer proposition. The product avoids complex technical structures and instead focus- es on a direct value message that households immediately understand: hospitalisation creates financial stress, and the plan provides cash sup- port during that period.Simplicity often becomes one of the most pow- erful competitive advantages within emerging market financial products. The use of monthly subscription structures also aligns effectively with household cash flow realities. Large annual insurance payments are frequently unaffordable for lower-income consumers. Monthly contribu- tion systems reduce entry barriers and improve accessibility.The account-holder integration model is equally strategic. Automatic membership inclusion creates immediate baseline participation while encouraging customers to expand coverage toward dependents.This structure effectively leverages Edgars’ existing retail account ecosystem to distribute financial protection products at scale. Customer acquisition costs therefore remain significantly lower than those faced by standalone insurance providers. The broader implication is that Zim- babwe’s retail sector is gradually evolving into a hybrid commercial-financial ecosystem.Edgars Advances InclusionRetail Ecosystems Transform MarketsZ*To Page 20
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 20*From Page 19 Retailers increasingly operate not only as merchandise sellers, but also as providers of credit, payment systems, wellness support, insurance products, and household financial solutions. This evolution reflects changing con- sumer needs within economies where house- holds increasingly seek integrated financial flex- ibility rather than isolated product offerings. The timing of the product expansion is also econom- ically relevant.Zimbabwe’s inflation environment has stabilised considerably compared to previous years, although household purchasing power remains constrained. Consumers are therefore becom- ing more focused on financial predictability, risk management, and income protection.Products capable of cushioning temporary eco- nomic shocks are likely to experience stronger demand under such conditions. The Edgars Hospital Cash Plan ultimately demonstrates how innovation within emerging markets frequently arises not through technological complexity alone, but through contextual adap- tation.The product works because it responds directly to lived household realities. Healthcare shocks in Zimbabwe rarely create purely medical prob- lems. They create liquidity crises, consumption disruptions, educational interruptions, and income instability. Providing flexible cash sup- port therefore addresses a wider economic problem than conventional medical aid struc- tures alone.The Q1 2026 Edgars Club Magazine conse- quently offers more than a product update. It provides insight into the future direction of retail finance within Zimbabwe and across emerging markets. Consumer ecosystems are becoming broader, financial inclusion models are becom- ing more adaptive, and retailers are increasingly positioning themselves at the centre of house- hold financial resilience. That transition could ultimately become one of the most important structural shifts within Zimbabwe’s consumer economy over the coming decade.SL’s delisting circular means Zimbabwe’s capital markets are now entering a deci- sive structural separation phase where the country’s largest corporates increasingly choose between two very different market philosophies: hard currency capital preservation on the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange or deeper domestic liquidity on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange.The circular itself joins a rapidly expanding list of migration decisions that are steadily redraw- ing Zimbabwe’s financial architecture. Simbisa Brands moved first. National Foods followed. Seed Co International established the offshore precedent earlier. Econet Wireless exited the ZSE entirely. First Mutual Properties is evaluat- ing delisting options. The movement is no longer isolated. It is systemic.Publicly, the rationale appears straightforward. Companies consistently cite USD-denominated trading, reduced currency volatility exposure, easier dividend repatriation, offshore investor access, and stronger capital raising flexibility as the major advantages driving VFEX migration.Yet the pace of migration now reveals a much deeper corporate conclusion. Zimbabwe’s larg- est firms increasingly believe the future of seri- ous capital formation cannot sustainably happen inside a local currency market frame- work.That conclusion matters because listed compa- nies ultimately reveal their true long-term expectations through balance sheet positioning, treasury structures, and capital market choices rather than public commentary. Entire listing migrations are not administrative exercises. They are strategic judgments about where man- agement teams believe investor confidence, valuation stability, and capital preservation will remain strongest over time.TSL’s positioning fits neatly within this wider transition. The group operates across logistics, packaging, agriculture, warehousing, distribu- tion, tobacco auction systems, and infrastruc- ture-linked operations. These sectors increas- ingly function inside heavily dollarised supply chains. Equipment imports require hard curren- cy. Regional suppliers demand forex certainty. Institutional investors increasingly seek USD dividend preservation. Treasury management itself increasingly revolves around hard curren- cy optimisation.The VFEX therefore provides something the ZSE structurally struggles to offer: a cleaner valuation environment anchored in US dollars.For years, the ZSE operated less as a conven- tional capital market and more as a defensive inflation hedge. Share prices frequently detached from underlying business fundamen- tals because investors primarily sought protec- tion from local currency erosion. Price discovery became distorted by monetary instability. Equity prices accelerated during inflationary episodes regardless of operational performance because stocks increasingly functioned as alternative stores of value.The VFEX emerged partly as a response to that dysfunction.Its architecture promised dollar-based settle- ment, reduced exchange rate distortion, offshore investor accessibility, and stronger alignment between business fundamentals and market valuation. Initially, skepticism dominated market perception. Liquidity was thin. Trading activity remained weak. Listings were limited. Questions surrounded settlement systems, cap- ital mobility, and policy durability.Yet every migration strengthened the exchange’s institutional legitimacy.Each large issuer joining the VFEX increased confidence that the platform itself could eventu- ally mature into Zimbabwe’s premium institu- tional market. The process became self-rein- forcing. Companies moved because other com- panies had already moved.Yet the migration wave also exposes one of the most important unresolved contradictions inside Zimbabwe’s financial system.The biggest listed company across both exchanges still remains on the ZSE.Delta Corporation’s decision to stay introduces the strongest counterargument against the growing belief that the VFEX automatically represents the superior strategic destination for every corporate issuer.Delta’s position matters enormously because the group remains Zimbabwe’s single most liquid and institutionally important equity count- er. Management has consistently maintained that the company does not currently anticipate major external capital raising requirements and therefore prioritises market liquidity and investor accessibility over currency denomination alone.That distinction is critical.Delta’s argument effectively says the ZSE still provides something the VFEX cannot yet fully replicate: depth of local liquidity.Pension funds, insurance companies, and domestic asset managers still hold the largest concentrated pools of investable capital inside Zimbabwe’s financial system. Much of that liquidity continues operating primarily through the ZSE ecosystem. Daily trading activity, turn- over support, and broad institutional participa- tion remain structurally deeper on the domestic exchange.This creates a major divide in corporate strate- gy.Companies migrating to the VFEX increasingly prioritise long-duration hard currency position- ing, offshore investor participation, and future capital raising flexibility. Delta’s stance prioritis- es liquidity depth, active institutional trading, and continued access to domestic savings pools that still dominate Zimbabwe’s market structure.In practical terms, the migration story is no longer simply about dollarisation. It is increas- ingly about different corporate funding philoso- phies.A company expecting future offshore capital raising requirements naturally gravitates toward the VFEX. A company with dominant domestic cash generation, strong operating cash flows, and limited immediate funding needs may still find the ZSE strategically advantageous because liquidity itself supports valuation.This is an enormously important point often overlooked in simplistic discussions surround- ing the migration wave.Valuation is not determined by currency denom- ination alone. Liquidity itself materially affects pricing.A company can theoretically achieve cleaner USD-based valuation metrics on the VFEX while simultaneously suffering weaker trading depth if institutional participation remains too narrow. Thin liquidity eventually creates valua- tion ceilings because large investors struggle to enter and exit positions efficiently.This remains the VFEX’s single biggest structur- al challenge.Zimbabwe’s economy remains heavily dollar- ised transactionally yet still relatively shallow institutionally. Large pools of long-duration USD capital remain limited. Pension funds continue rebuilding after years of currency transitions and asset erosion. Insurance balance sheets remain constrained. Foreign participation remains cautious because international inves- tors still assess Zimbabwe through the lens of policy reversals, convertibility fears, and sover- eign risk uncertainty.The consequence is that the VFEX now faces a race between migration momentum and liquidity formation.TSL and the Great Market SplitT*To Page 20
ZA''Term of The WeekUnderstanding the termSimilar to most bonds, debentures may pay periodic interest payments called coupon payments. Like other types of bonds, debentures are documented in an indenture. An indenture is a legal and binding contract between bond issuers and bondholders.The contract specifies features of a debt offering, such as the maturity date, the timing of interest or coupon payments, the method of interest calculation, and other features. Corporations and governments can issue debentures.Governments typically issue long-term bonds—those with maturities of longer than 10 years. Considered low-risk investments, these government bonds have the back- ing of the government issuer.Corporations also use debentures as long-term loans. However, the debentures of corporations are unsecured. Instead, they have the backing of only the financial viability and creditworthiness of the underlying company.A debenture is a type of bond or other debt instrument that is unsecured by collater- al. Since debentures have no collateral backing, they must rely on the creditworthi- ness and reputation of the issuer for support. Both corporations and governments frequently issue debentures to raise capital or funds.Debenture*From Page 20 Listings alone do not create a successful exchange. Capital depth does.This challenge becomes even more important when examining future capital raises. Zimba- bwe’s largest corporates increasingly favour the VFEX because they believe it offers stronger long-term fundraising potential. Yet meaningful capital raising capacity requires substantial investable liquidity pools capable of absorbing large issuance volumes.The ZSE historically benefited from infla- tion-driven institutional positioning where pen- sion funds aggressively rotated local currency liquidity into equities as preservation instru- ments. The VFEX operates under entirely differ- ent conditions. Capital must arrive in actual US dollars.Zimbabwe’s domestic USD pools remain rela- tively constrained compared to the scale required to sustain large frontier-market equity issuance cycles. Much of the available dollar liquidity circulates transactionally rather than institutionally. Businesses operate cautiously with working capital. Consumers remain defen- sive. Long-term savings pools remain underde- veloped relative to larger frontier exchanges.This creates a genuine risk that VFEX valua- tions could eventually confront liquidity limits despite strong migration momentum.High-quality counters may initially command premium valuations because investors prioritise currency stability and dividend certainty. Yet sustained valuation expansion requires continu- ously expanding capital inflows. Without deeper liquidity formation, the market risks becoming structurally top-heavy with strong issuers com- peting for relatively narrow institutional capital pools.This dynamic already appears across multiple frontier exchanges globally.Nigeria repeatedly experienced periods where fundamentally strong companies traded inside shallow institutional liquidity environments. Ken- ya’s exchange periodically struggled with con- centration risk despite hosting East Africa’s larg- est corporates. Zambia’s LuSE similarly battled to convert commodity-driven corporate strength into consistently deep trading liquidity.Even sophisticated emerging markets have confronted similar transitions. Dubai gradually developed separate financial market layers serving domestic and international investors differently. Kazakhstan’s Astana International Exchange pursued offshore-oriented positioning to attract foreign institutional participation beyond local liquidity limitations. Mauritius simi- larly evolved into a dual financial structure balancing domestic and offshore capital sys- tems. Zimbabwe increasingly appears headed toward a similar separation model.The VFEX increasingly positions itself as the premium institutional USD market designed for offshore-facing corporates, regional investors, diaspora capital, and hard currency capital preservation. The ZSE increasingly evolves toward a domestic liquidity market anchored by pension funds, insurers, local asset managers, and companies heavily exposed to domestic consumption cycles. The future direction of pen- sion funds themselves will likely determine how far the VFEX can ultimately scale.Historically, pension funds anchored Zimba- bwe’s equity market. Yet years of monetary instability materially weakened institutional balance sheets. Many funds now operate defensively, prioritising preservation over aggressive equity accumulation. The broader domestic savings base itself remains relatively shallow compared to the scale required to propel the VFEX toward genuine frontier-market significance. This means the exchange’s long-term growth likely depends heavily on attracting external capital pools.Regional institutional investors remain one potential source. Diaspora participation also carries substantial opportunity given Zimba- bwe’s large external population and growing appetite for formal investment structures. Inter- national frontier-market allocations remain the hardest category to secure because confidence recovery inside global capital markets com- pounds slowly after prolonged periods of insta- bility.This is why policy consistency now matters more than exchange design. No exchange sus- tainably succeeds if investors remain uncertain about settlement certainty, capital mobility, con- vertibility protections, tax treatment, or future regulatory direction. Confidence itself becomes the primary currency inside frontier capital mar- kets.Every major corporate departure weakens over- all market attractiveness. Liquidity narrows into fewer counters. Institutional relevance gradually erodes. Valuation inefficiencies deepen. Retail participation increasingly dominates trading patterns. Market breadth contracts steadily.The danger for the ZSE is therefore not sudden collapse. It is gradual hollowing out.Large exchanges rarely disappear abruptly. They slowly lose strategic significance as premium issuers migrate elsewhere. Yet Delta’s continued presence slows that process materi- ally.As long as Zimbabwe’s largest and most liquid company remains on the domestic exchange, the ZSE retains institutional relevance. Delta effectively acts as the anchor preventing a full psychological collapse in confidence surround- ing the domestic market.At the same time, Delta’s position also acts as a stress test for the VFEX itself. Its refusal to migrate confirms that the liquidity question remains unresolved at scale.The possibility of major regional counters such as Old Mutual or PPC eventually returning through VFEX structures could dramatically accelerate the exchange’s institutional evolu- tion. Old Mutual especially carries enormous symbolic importance because its historical pric- ing once evolved into an alternative exchange rate benchmark during Zimbabwe’s most vola- tile monetary periods.A future return under a stable VFEX framework would represent far more than a listing event. It would signal partial restoration of institutional confidence in Zimbabwe’s broader financial architecture itself.Such developments could materially deepen market capitalisation, improve analyst cover- age, attract foreign institutional attention, and strengthen trading relevance across the entire exchange ecosystem.Yet even under optimistic scenarios, Zimba- bwe’s capital markets are unlikely to return to their old structure. The future increasingly points toward a dual-market system reflecting Zimbabwe’s wider economic reality itself: a country simultaneously operating through ZiG and USD circulation, domestic and offshore savings preferences, formal and informal eco- nomic systems, and parallel liquidity pools with different risk perceptions.TSL’s delisting circular therefore represents far more than another corporate migration.It confirms that Zimbabwe’s capital markets are no longer evolving around one unified centre of gravity.They are separating into two distinct financial worlds with fundamentally different currencies, liquidity structures, investor expectations, and long-term strategic purposes.The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 21
Africa's economic growth slows in 2026 but projected to reboundDespite a slight slowdown in economic growth this year due to the war in Iran, Africa's econom- ic outlook remains strong, the African Develop- ment Bank said in its annual report released on Tuesday.Africa's economic growth will slow this year to 4.2 percent - down from 4.4 percent last year - as geopolitical tensions roil supply chains, the African Development Bank (AfDB) said on Wednesday.But the continent's growth is holding firm, the Bank said, outstripping Europe and Latin Ameri- ca, and is projected to rebound to 4.4 percent in 2027.For now, rising energy and import costs are taking a toll. East Africa - the continent's fast- est-growing region - is projected to ease to 5.9 percent growth, down from 6.6 percent in 2025. A rebound to 6.4 is expected next year. – nytimesWorld Bank upgrades Sub-Saharan Africa growth forecast over inflation dropSub-Saharan African economies are expected to grow by a faster 3.8% this year due to reced- ing price inflation, the World Bank said on Tues- day. Back in April, the institution had forecast an initial 3.5% growth for the region in 2025. In its biannual Africa's Pulse report, the bank said this upgrade was due to lower inflation and improved foreign trade. The region's median inflation rate declined to 4.5% in 2024 and should stabilise between 3.9 and 4% annually by 2026, the bank predicted.Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to accelerate to reach an annual average of 4.4% in the next two years. This improvement is driven by growth forecasts upgrades for major regional economies like Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and Nigeria. But the World Bank remains concerned with trade uncertainty due to high debt burdens, a lack of jobs, and the policies of United States president Donald Trump. - BloombergMorocco's Royal Air Maroc suspends 12 routes, citing rising cost of fuelMorocco’s flag carrier Royal Air Maroc says it’s suspending 12 routes to several African and European destinations due to the rising price of kerosene.The company also cited a slowdown in demand on certain international routes, prompting the group to temporarily adjust its network.Affected routes include those from the airline’s Casablanca hub to Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Yaounde and Libreville.Flights from Marrakech to Lyon, Marseille, Bor- deaux and Brussels are also on hold. So are those from Tangier to Malaga and Barcelona.The company said the suspensions are provi- sional and will be reassessed according to fuel prices and market demand.Disruptions to international shipping due to the US-Israel war against Iran have seen kerosene prices soar. One of the biggest cost for airlines, sudden fluctuations in the cost of fuel can quick- ly affect profitability, particularly on routes facing weaker demand. - reutersWorld Bank: Iran war forcing more African nations to seek emergency fundingThe World Bank says that the Iran war is forcing more African countries to seek emergency financing.According to an internal World Bank document seen by Reuters, 27 countries have activated crisis financing mechanisms since the conflict began in February.The war has disrupted energy markets and global supply chains. Fertiliser shipments to developing countries have also been affected.Kenya is among the countries that have already requested urgent financial support from the World Bank amid rising fuel prices.Experts and the Africa Centers for Disease Con- trol are warning that the economic shock could hit vulnerable African economies hard.The World Bank says its emergency tools could quickly mobilize up to $25 billion for countries facing crisis. - cnbcFuel crisis threatens to bring Malawi to a standstillFuel shortages are increasingly disrupting daily life and business activity in Malawi, as global oil prices rise amid ongoing instability in the Middle East.In the capital Lilongwe, long queues of trucks and private vehicles have formed outside filling stations, with drivers often waiting for hours — sometimes days — to access diesel.Transport companies say the scarcity is already affecting their operations, slowing the move- ment of goods and threatening supply chains across the country.The Transport Association of Malawi says the crisis is linked in part to global market pressures and disruptions in key shipping routes in the Middle East, which have driven fuel prices sharply higher.With trucks unable to operate at full capacity, businesses warn of wider knock-on effects, including shortages in shops and delays in agri- cultural distribution during a critical season. - wsjMorocco diaspora remittance boost econo- myRemittances from Moroccans living abroad con- tinue to play a major role in the Moroccan econ- omy. According to the latest data from the Exchange Office, diaspora remittances exceed- ed $12.4 billion by the end of 2025.Already in 2024, these remittances had reached over $11.7 billion, representing more than 8% of the Kingdom's gross domestic product. This strategic resource allows Morocco to maintain its position among the leading recipients of remittances in the Middle East and North Africa region, according to the World Bank.Behind these figures, more than 5 million Moroccans live abroad, primarily in Europe. France remains the top destination country, followed by Spain, Belgium, and the Nether- lands. - DWGhana wraps up $3 billion dollar IMF bailout programmeOfficials in Ghana said on Friday that the gov- ernment has wrapped up its International Mone- tary Fund bailout programme, ending a $3 billion emergency support package.Accra said it had helped restore macroeconom- ic stability and debt sustainability ahead of schedule.Ghana’s presidency said inflation has reduced significantly, the currency has strengthened, and public debt has declined sharply.In December, President John Dramani Mahama announced the country would gradually exit the IMF programme thanks to reforms undertaken since 2024 when he start his second, but non-consecutive term in office.At the time, he described the economy as being in a fragile state, characterised by high inflation, significant youth unemployment, and a loss of investor confidence.- MT NewswiresEthiopia bets on Dangote fertiliser plant to boost food securityNigerian industrialist Aliko Dangote visited Ethi- opia over the weekend as part of efforts to deepen the group’s investment in the country, including the development of a large-scale urea fertilizer plant in Gode.The Ethiopian government and the Dangote Group had initially agreed on a $2.5 billion deal for the project, which is expected to produce 3 million metric tonnes of urea annually. The gov- ernment says the plant is central to its goal of making Ethiopia self-sufficient in fertilizer production while also positioning the country as a major regional exporter.Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described food security as a “strategic intervention” as Ethiopia and the Dangote Group move ahead with plans for a major fertilizer plant in the coun- try’s Somali region.Abiy said the project reflects a shared vision between Ethiopia and the Dangote Group.“Our interest is to have him in many areas because he’s delivering. As a government, we want to support him and realize our common vision. It’s a win-win for both of us,” the prime minister said. - Retail Insight NetworkZimbabwe smallholders take up tobacco as crop reboundsTobacco production in Zimbabwe is rebounding to record levels as farmers look for more profit- able and resilient crops. But the sector is domi- nated by contract farming, often for Chinese companies, that leaves farmers dependent and struggling to break even.Rows of green tobacco plants stretched towards the bush in a vast field of a crop that has rebounded to record levels in Zimbabwe, driven largely by smallholders contracted to Chinese firms.A few dozen aspiring tobacco farmers inspected the broad leaves on a field day of training in the cultivation of the plant, of which Zimbabwe is Africa's leading producer.Among them was Read Sola, 64, one of more than 300 farmers now growing tobacco in the southern Matabeleland region, which historical- ly is not tobacco country. - reutersExposure to Mozambican debt cuts profits at country’s five largest banks by 70%The five largest banks in Mozambique recorded a combined 70.4% drop in net profits in 2025, penalised by exposure to Mozambican public debt following rating downgrades.According to data compiled by Lusa from the annual reports and accounts released in recent days by the five largest banks, including two led by Portuguese banks, the Mozambican banking sector totalled profits of 5,099 million meticais (€68.7m), representing an absolute decrease in net profits of 12,131 million meticais (€163.5m). - Bloomberg.American Airlines picks SpaceX's Starlink for in-flight Wi-Fi on more than 500 planesAmerican Airlines plans to outfit more than 500 of its narrow-body aircraft with Starlink, handing another win to Elon Musk’s SpaceX unit that has made inroads with major carriers for in-flight Wi-Fi.American was evaluating Starlink and Amazon Leo as recently as March for the service.The airline announced Tuesday it would install Starlink on about 500 of its narrow-body Airbus planes, like the A321neo, starting early next year. American spokesman said the carrier doesn’t have immediate plans to change provid- ers on its Boeing fleet, which uses a mix of Viasat and Panasonic. - cnbcBusiness Around The World The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 22
DR Congo Community activists raise aware- ness about Ebola epidemicCommunity activists from Goma in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo are using theatre, music, talks, and discussions to raise awareness of the dangers of Ebola.Provinces in the region are at the centre of an outbreak of the deadly haemorrhagic virus which has already resulted in over 200 deaths.Through songs and theatrical performances, the women remind audiences what Ebola is and how one should behave to prevent its further spread.Esther Vira, who organised the awareness debate, said it is essential to combat misinfor- mation about the disease.” - Bbc.U.S. regulator moves to withdraw $5 million penalty against Winklevoss’ crypto exchangeThe U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commis- sion asked a judge on Wednesday to vacate the agency’s $5 million penalty against a cryptocur- rency exchange founded by twin brothers who donated to President Donald Trump’s election campaign in 2024.The CFTC said regulators should never have accused Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss’ Gemini Trust Company of making false state- ments in connection with its bitcoin futures busi- ness. - Abcnews.Dell wins a $9.7 billion Pentagon software deal after cozying up to TrumpThe Department of Defense on Wednesday announced a five-year, roughly $9.7 billion deal with Dell to provide a suite of software to the U.S. military.The award, known as the Microsoft Department of War Enterprise Software Agreement II Core Enterprise Technology Agreement, calls for Dell to provide Microsoft 365, advanced cloud sub- scriptions and on-premises licensing capability.Dell Federal Systems, a unit of the company dedicated to serving government, won the con- tract after a competitive process, Defense Department Chief Information Officer Kirsten Davies and acting Navy Chief Information Offi- cer Barry Tanner told reporters at a Wednesday briefing at the Pentagon. It comes after Michael Dell, founder and CEO of Dell Technologies, pledged $6.25 billion last year to fund invest- ment accounts for children known as “Trump accounts.”Dell is a major buyer of Windows PC licenses, and it has a long-running partnership with Micro- soft. - TheGuardian.First group of Ghanaians to be repatriated from South Africa arrive homeThe first group of almost 300 Ghanaians repatri- ated from South Africa amid anti-immigrant protests there, arrived home in Accra on Wednesday.They were welcomed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, as patriotic songs blasted over the airport speakers.Around 800 Ghanaians have registered with the High Commissioner for repatriation flights saying they no longer feel safe in South Africa.Accra organised them in response to a wave of protests and violence targeting both document- ed and undocumented foreigners in the country.One of the repatriated Ghanaians said he had built a salon in a container but that when the attacks began, it was broken into and looted.\"I tried selling my salon but couldn’t find a buyer. I left and ran away because if you have life, you have everything. So I lost my salon,\" he said.\"It has never been easy for us in South Africa over the past few weeks,\" said Victor Atsu Togbe, another returnee, thanking the govern- ment for taking them “out of the lion's den\". - Npr.Russian strike injures 11 in Odesa daytime attack, children among injuredAccording to regional authorities, the victims included two children aged 11 and 12, while several adults were taken to hospital. Emergen- cy services said the attack sparked a major blaze that spread across 1,800 square metres, affecting commercial buildings in a busy part of the city. Firefighters and rescue teams were deployed as thick black smoke rose above the area. Officials said a pet shop, a liquor store and a post office were among the premises dam- aged by the strike. The head of Odesa's military administration, Oleh Kiper, reported that three of the injured were in serious condition. Emergency service representative Maryna Averina said around 50 firefighters were involved in the response opera- tion, while psychologists provided support to affected residents. Authorities said the casual- ties suffered injuries ranging from burns and shrapnel wounds to head trauma and acute stress reactions. The attack highlights the con- tinuing threat facing civilians in Ukraine's coast- al regions. - Aljazeera.Nigerian Muslims celebrate Eid al-Kabir amid cost of living crisisMuslims gathered for prayers in the Nigerian city of Lagos on Wednesday as they marked Eid al-Kabir, Islam’s most sacred festival.Worshippers dressed in colourful traditional attire arrived at mosques and open prayer grounds in the early hours of the morning for congregational prayers.The annual celebration comes amid rising food and transport costs making it difficult for some families to buy a sheep for the traditional slaughter.Also known as Eid al-Adha, the day honours Prophet Ibrahim’s willingness to sacrifice his son in obedience to God’s command, before a ram was slaughtered instead. - BBC.Uganda shuts border with DR Congo in a bid to contain Ebola outbreakUganda shut its border with the Democratic Republic of Congo on Wednesday in a bid to contain the Ebola outbreak that has hit its neigh- bour, the health ministry announced.The east African country has recorded seven cases of the Bundibugyo strain of Ebola since the outbreak was identified in the DRC on May 15.\"Uganda is temporarily closing the border with the DRC with immediate effect,\" health ministry permanent secretary Diana Atwine told report- ers.\"The only exceptions are for authorised Ebola response teams, humanitarian operations, food and cargo transportation, and security under strict health screening and monitoring proto- cols,\" she said.- Reuters.Yoweri Museveni signals continuity as Uganda unveils new cabinetUganda’s President Yoweri Museveni has unveiled a new Cabinet and the message is clear: continuity over change.Key allies including Vice President Jessica Alupo and Prime Minister Robinah Nabbanja have kept their positions, while longtime political heavyweights like Rebecca Kadaga and Janet Museveni remain firmly in government.But there are notable shifts. Former UN diplo- mat Adonia Ayebare takes over Foreign Affairs, while Kiryowa Kiwanuka now heads the power- ful Defence Ministry, signaling tighter control over security as Museveni begins another term.Several veteran ministers were dropped, includ- ing Moses Ali and Finance Minister Matia Kasaija, as younger technocrats enter strategic portfolios.Analysts say the reshuffle balances loyalty, regional influence, and the rising political network of Museveni’s son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba. - AIM.Canada orders 21-day isolation for travellers from Ebola zonesCanada is tightening border and immigration measures after a rise in Ebola cases in parts of central and east Africa.The federal government says the steps are aimed at limiting any potential spread of the virus as outbreaks continue in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and South Sudan.From this week, travellers arriving from the affected countries will be required to isolate for 21 days.Officials say the changes are being introduced under the Quarantine Act and take effect on Sat- urday.They stress the risk to Canada is currently low and that no travel-related cases have been detected.Anyone entering the country who has been in the affected regions within the past three weeks will still be allowed in, including citizens and permanent residents. - Zambianobserver.Nigeria's former VP Atiku Abubakar clinches his party's presidential nominationFormer vice-president and veteran Nigerian politician, Atiku Abubakar, has accepted the African Democratic Congress (ADC) party’s nomination as its presidential candidate.\"I wish to express my profound appreciation for the privilege which you have bestowed on me of leading our great party, the African Democratic Congress, into to the next elections as the presi- dential candidate,\" he said.Atiku outperformed two rival aspirants in a primary election and positions him for an historic fourth run for the post.In a post on X after his victory, he commended the party for demonstrating that democracy was alive in Nigeria, despite what he said was the ruling party’s efforts to crush it.He said that in the ADC, members were allowed to express their views, to have ambitions, and contest for elective positions in a free, fair, and transparent process.Atiku has accused the government of engineer- ing leadership crises in opposition parties and harassing political rivals. - Polity. Trump opposes Russia or China taking Iran’s highly enriched uraniumPresident Donald Trump on Wednesday poured cold water on the prospect of Iran transferring its store of highly enriched uranium to Russia or China as part of any deal to end the war with the U.S.“No, I wouldn’t be comfortable” with that arrangement, Trump said during a Cabinet meeting at the White House.The Kremlin, which has the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, has previously said it would accept Iran’s enriched uranium to help facilitate a peace deal.China has also been speculated to be willing to take in that material, news outlets have report- ed.Trump declared in a Truth Social post Monday that Iran’s enriched uranium will be destroyed, either in the U.S., in the Islamic republic itself, or “at another acceptable location.” - Cnn Politics Around The World The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 23
The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 24WeeklyCommodity PulseIn the past week, aluminium eased 1.2% as Wednesday's ceasefire extension announcement temporarily relieved the most acute fears of further UAE and Bahrain smelter disruption, triggering measured prof- it-taking after the prior week's 2.9% rebound. SHFE aluminium fell 1.25% over the period per Alcircle market data. LME stocks held broadly steady, while Chinese demand remained firm on the back of positive manufacturing output data.Emirates Global Aluminium's warning that full capacity restoration could take over a year has not been withdrawn, and Bahrain's ALBA operations remain at reduced capacity. The metal continues to trade well above pre-war 2025 levels, underpinned by China's production capacity ceiling, accelerating EV and solar panel deployment, and grid infrastructure investment. The $3,400/t level is widely viewed as strong technical support for any further consolidation.Nickel retreated 2.2%, its first weekly decline in four weeks, as profit-taking set in after the prior week's surge to two-year highs near $19,437/t. SHFE nickel fell 2.19% over the period. Wednesday's ceasefire exten- sion announcement provided a brief reprieve for Hormuz-linked sulphur supply-chain fears that had been a key driver of the prior rally, leading short-covering to reverse partially and speculative length to be trimmed.Despite the week's pullback, the structural drivers underpinning the nickel bull case remain firmly intact. Indonesia's RKAB ore quota discipline continues to constrain primary nickel feed into processing circuits., The INSG's revised 2026 market balance forecast, projecting a small deficit rather than the previously expected surplus, continues to attract medium-term buyers on dips toward the $16,500–$17,000/t range.Platinum gained 1.5%, in the past week, tracking safe-haven gold closely as the Strait of Hormuz closure extended into its third week with no clear resolution in sight. The metal reached a weekly high of $2,108/oz on Wednesday following the ceasefire extension announcement, as lower oil prices improved the cost outlook for autocatalyst-reliant automotive sectors. South African producers continued to highlight elevated Cape of Good Hope rerouting premiums, adding 12–14 days per voyage, which sustained a structural logistics cost floor under PGM prices.The Iran-related disruption to palladium refining chains continued to bolster platinum substitution demand in automotive and industrial applications. European electrolyser projects accelerated PGM procurement as hydrogen fuel cell investment timelines were brought forward. With platinum holding above the key $2,000/oz support level for a third consecutive week, medium-term positioning remains constructive. In the past week, copper posted a fourth consecutive weekly gain, rising 4.1% as the persistent Hormuz supply disruption continued to tighten the copper cathode supply corridor into Asia. SHFE copper gained 4.07% over the period. Iranian restrictions on tanker traffic, with Gulf oil tanker flows running at near-zero, raised logistics premiums across the base metals complex, adding a meaningful cost floor to copper delivered into Asian markets.Robust Chinese manufacturing PMI data reinforced demand-side confidence, while Chile's mining permitting reforms provided additional medium-term supply optimism that paradoxically attracted speculative buying ahead of anticipated project announcements. Copper ended the week at $13,295/t (~$6.03/lb), with technical analysts flagging the $13,000/t level as a well-established support floor. LME inventory at approximately 180,000 tonnes continues to suggest the market is drawing toward a tighter supply balance.In the past week, gold traded in a volatile $4,790–$4,855 range, oscillating with each diplomatic development in the US–Iran conflict. Iran's re-closure of the Strait of Hormuz on Monday 18 April, announced directly in response to the US refusal to lift its naval blockade, provided an immediate safe-haven bid, lifting gold back above $4,837. Wednesday's ceasefire extension announcement briefly softened prices to $4,790 as oil fell sharply and rate-cut hopes were briefly revived. However, Iran's seizure of two tankers in the strait the same evening, despite the ceasefire extension, reignited uncertainty. By Monday 26 April, the collapse of second-round peace talks sent Brent above $108, supporting gold's recovery to $4,850. BMO Capital Markets noted that Asia-based sellers have consistently capped the metal near the $4,850 level, limiting the full safe-haven premium from being priced in.Brent surged 13.4%, its largest weekly percentage gain on record, as the Strait of Hormuz remained effectively closed and second-round US–Iran peace talks unravelled. Confirmed daily price points from CNBC: Tuesday 21 April $98.48 (JD Vance's Pakistan trip delayed, talks stalled); Wednesday 22 April $101.91 (ceasefire extended but Iran seized two tankers); Thursday 23 April $103.68 (Hormuz traffic still at near-zero); Monday 26 April $108.23 (talks collapse entirely). The Strait of Hormuz, which had carried approximately 20% of global daily oil flows, remained essentially closed.Rystad Energy's chief oil analyst confirmed Gulf state production had fallen to 14.3 million barrels per day in April, a decline of 3 million bpd versus March and approximately 13 million bpd below pre-war levels. Energy Aspects founder Amrita Sen described the supply situation as \"a complete mess,\" noting most tankers had repositioned toward the US to load alternative supplies. The IEA designated this disruption the largest supply shock in history.
MarketswatchZim Inflation Retreats, ZiG Holdshe Zimbabwe Gold continued its tightly managed official trading trajectory through the week of 18–26 May, with the interbank rate holding in a range of approximately ZiG25.40–25.50 per dollar, a band so narrow it registers as effectively flat on a weekly basis. The RBZ's reserve money discipline, underpinned by the 35% policy rate and systematic sterilisation operations, continues to anchor the official rate with the consistency that has characterised the ZiG since October 2024's tightening. On a month-on-month basis the official rate has weakened by approximately 0.45% — the most gradual and deliberate of depreciations.The most significant development in the ZiG narrative this week came on Tuesday 27 May, when the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) published its Consumer Price Index report for May 2026. The data offered a constructive signal: ZiG year-on-year inflation eased to 4.4% in May, shedding 0.4 percentage points from the April 2026 rate of 4.8%. Month-on-month ZiG inflation fell more sharply, declining to 0.5% from 1.1% in April, a drop of 0.6 percentage points. ZimStat attributed the moderation primarily to easing non-food prices, with non-food month-on-month inflation falling sharply to 0.1% from 1.2% in April. Food and non-alcoholic beverages inflation remained unchanged at 0.8% during the month.ZimStat CPI release, 27 May 2026: ZiG year-on-year inflation 4.4% (down from 4.8% in April), ZiG month-on-month 0.5% (down from 1.1%). The weighted blended month-on-month rate eased to 0.4% from 1.1% in April, the largest single-month deceleration since the Middle East conflict began driving prices higher in March.Regional MarketsRand: Hike Looms, Pressure BuildsThe South African rand endured its most turbulent week since late March, with the currency swinging sharply as the April inflation print reshuffled expectations around the SARB's upcoming policy decision. The rand opened the reporting period at R16.57 per dollar on 18 May, broadly where it had traded through much of the month, before strengthening to R16.44 on 20 May and R16.44 on 21 May as markets absorbed early signals from the inflation data release. The relief was short-lived.On Tuesday 20 May, Statistics South Africa confirmed that headline consumer price inflation rose to 4.0% year-on-year in April, up sharply from 3.1% in March. Core inflation also quickened, rising to 3.6% from 3.2%, signalling that price pressures were no longer confined to the energy and transport components directly linked to the Middle East conflict but were beginning to spread into the broader price basket. South Africa's April CPI of 4.0% year-on-year ,up from 3.1% in March, was the single most significant domestic data point of the week. It shifted the SARB MPC debate from hold to close-call hike and repriced South African rate expectations almost overnight.Kwacha: Steady, Near Three-Year HighThe Zambian Kwacha held firm through the week of 18–26 May, trading near ZMW18.82 per dollar on 25 May, a level confirmed by Investing.com's daily data showing today's range as ZMW18.76 to ZMW18.82. The kwacha has moved between a low of ZMW18.79 and a high of ZMW19.11 over the past month, with a 30-day average of ZMW18.91, implying that the currency has been consistently hovering near its strongest levels of the past three years.The kwacha's resilience this week is particularly notable given the challenging global backdrop. Renewed US strikes in the Middle East on 22 May and the associated dollar-strengthening pressure weighed on many emerging market currencies, but the kwacha absorbed the shock without a meaningful depreciation. This reflects the structural buffers that have accumulated over the past 18 months: Zambia's IMF programme compliance, which has been maintained through multiple review cycles; copper prices that have remained above US$13,000 per tonne on sustained global energy transition demand; and the Bank of Zambia's inflation management, with the CPI declining to 7.1% in March from 7.5% in February, reducing the inflationary pressure that might otherwise prompt a weaker exchange rate.Pula: Range-Bound, Watching RandThe Botswana Pula traded in a relatively quiet range through the week of 18–26 May, with the exchange-rates.org data confirming a current rate of 1 BWP = US$0.0742 (implying approximately BWP13.48 per dollar), modestly stronger than the BWP13.86 seen in mid-April and reflecting the pula's partial recovery from the conflict-era lows of BWP14.27 in late March. The currency's movement through this week tracked the rand closely, as it has throughout the year, with the pula finding support on days when the rand strengthened (notably 20–21 May and the 26 May recovery) and softening modestly on days when the rand came under pressure from the inflation data.Domestically, Botswana's inflation has ticked down to 4.0% from 4.1% in February, a marginal improvement that keeps the data squarely within the Bank of Botswana's 3–6% target band and removes any urgency for a policy rate adjustment from the current 3.5%. The structural diamond sector challenges remain unresolved: global rough diamond demand continues to face headwinds from lab-grown competition, and Debswana's royalty revenues have not recovered to pre-2024 levels. GDP growth of 3.1% for 2026 is projected, supported by tourism rather than minerals, and the pula's near-term trajectory will continue to be shaped primarily by the rand and global risk sentiment rather than by domestic fundamentals.Naira: Drifts Wider, Holds RangeThe Nigerian Naira traded in a broadly stable but modestly softer range through the week of 18–26 May, with the official NFEM rate drifting from approximately ₦1,373.50 per dollar on 19 May, to ₦1,375.46 on 25 May. The movement represents a gentle drift of approximately 0.14% over the week, remaining within the narrow corridor that the CBN has established through its managed float framework and periodic market interventions.The parallel market has remained in the ₦1,395–1,397 range through much of this week, with AbokiFX confirming the black market sell rate at ₦1,397 on 25 May against the CBN official rate of ₦1,375.46, a spread of approximately ₦22, or roughly 1.6%. This spread has been gradually widening since the landmark near-convergence of 7 April (where it touched ₦0.20) and reflects the resurgence of structural corporate demand for foreign exchange as Q2 business cycles intensify, combined with some seasonal importers restocking ahead of the second half of the year. The spread remains historically narrow and well within the range consistent with the CBN's unified exchange rate framework.Shilling: Firm, Modest Gains The Kenyan Shilling had a lively week by its own extraordinarily stable standards, with Wise's historical data confirming that the USD/KES rate moved between a high of 129.90 on 25 May and a low of 129.05 on 21 May, the shilling's strongest and weakest points of the period respectively. The 0.65% weekly range is wider than the shilling's characteristic pattern but remains modest relative to regional peers: in the same week, the rand moved by approximately 3% and the naira drifted by 0.14%. The shilling's net position at week's end is broadly flat, consistent with the stability that has characterised the currency throughout 2026.The shilling's strongest session on 21 May coincided with the global dollar softness that accompanied partial ceasefire optimism in the early part of the week, as US and Iranian negotiators in Pakistan were reported to be making incremental progress. The subsequent drift toward KSh129.90 on 25 May reflected the reversal of that optimism following the 22 May US strikes and the renewed Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz. The shilling absorbed the entire cycle within a band of less than 0.7%, a testament to the depth of Kenya's reserve buffer (US$13.35 billion, 5.68 months of import cover) and the CBK's managed float framework.The AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 25T
ZSE & VFEX WEEKLY COMMENTARYhe ZSE recouped prior week's losses in the week under review as demand for stocks climbed owing to safe-haven seeking as inflation soars. The ZSE All Share Index strengthened by 1.89% week-on-week to Friday to close at 392.11 points, driven by a growth in market heavies and medium caps. Year-to-date, the ZSE All Share Index is up 41.1% (39.3% in US$ terms), which compares to a 27.7% nominal growth (26.8% in US$ terms) registered in 2025, and a 117.6% nominal growth (14.4% in US$ terms) achieved in 2024. Since the beginning of the month, the ZSE mainstream index has gained 7.4% (3.4% in USD terms), buttressing a nominal 1.8% (1.8% in US$ terms) growth achieved in April.Share Index jumped by 4.15% against prior week to close at 231.53 points, driven by 7 risers which outweighed 5 laggards. The market has strengthened by 3.1% since the beginning of May, countering a -8.4% decline registered in April. The All-share index has climbed 33.6% year-to-date, compared to a staggering 70% growth achieved in 2025, and a mild growth of 4.1% registered in 2024. An aggregate of US$5,542,681 exchanged hands this week, up from US$3,621,541 traded in the prior week.On currency markets, the exchange rate has sustained stability for over a year amid a prolonged contractionary monetary policy since September 2024. A policy rate of 35%, since then, which has remained above the exchange premium which presently hovers at an average 31%, has significantly discouraged speculative borrowing and trading. Consequently, the parallel ex-rate has remained stable, with a positive year-to-date movement. The ZiG depreciated by -1.93% against the USD on the interbank market this week to close at ZWG26.32 per each US$.TThe AXiS CCXVI Tuesday 26 May 2026 26ZSE ASI VFEX ASI ZWG INTERBANK RATE 15/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/0515/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/0515/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/05384.84 223.35 25.81395.34 227.55 25.92394.93 228.69 26.08392.28 231.53 26.22391.84 233.24 26.34392.11 236.12 26.321.89% 5.72% -1.93%ZSE TOP 10 INDEX MEDIUM CAP INDEX SMALL CAP INDEX 100.11100.11100.11100.11100.11100.110.00%381.44 426.23393.59 429.97394.47 423.88389.51 431.30387.48 437.85385.19 449.4115/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/050.98% 15/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/055.44% 15/0518/0519/0520/0521/0522/05
TOP 5 WEEKLY RISERSTOP 5 WEEKLY FALLERS FINANCIAL MARKETS AT A GLANCE 2025AFDISARISTONBATCFIDELTADAIRIBORDHIPPOMEIKLESOKSEEDCOSTAR AFRICATSLTanganda 1580.48616300.056003076.26295.5960306.95311.36944014649524.269815806.8516673.956002952.14270.000295931311.3694405.91474.0047681386.125Latest PriceZiG CentsPrevious WeekZiG CentsConsumerStaplesRTG 18.009 18.009Latest PriceZWL CentsConsumer Previous WeekZWL CentsCAFCAG/BELTINGSMASIMBANAMPAKUNIFREIGHTZECO1450.0511.95343.9597.251500.00181300.11234985.31750.0018Latest PriceZiG CentsIndustrialsSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsARTZDRPROPLASTICSTURNALLWilldaleRioZim6.80541459.01764756.8054142.59.02475Latest PriceZiG CentsMaterialsSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsTN CYBERTECHZIMPAPERS157.0214.857.02Latest PriceZiG CentsICTSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsMASHHOLDFMP111121.25129.8105.4407Latest PriceZiG CentsReal EstateSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsTANGANDAFMPNAMPAKCAFCAZSE LTD524.27121.2597.251450.05110.0013816121501035.8%15.0%14.0%11.5%10.0%COUNTER PRICE CENTS CHANGE % CHANGE MASHHOLDUNIFREIGHTARISTONFBCHTSL111.00150.006.001000.81649.00 (19) (25) (1) (99) (32)-14.5%-14.3%-12.4%-9.0%-4.7% COUNTER PRICE CENTS CHANGE ANGE Interbank Market Rate 26.32-1.93% ZSE Top 10 Index 381.442.36% ZSE All Share Index 384.842.58% NGSE All Share Index 249,175.4-0.46%11,1450.13%BSE All Share Index LuSE All Share Index 25,888.21-0.37%VFEX All Share Index 223.35-1.52% JSE All Share Index 115,162.1-2.31%CBZFBCHFIDELITYFMLNMBZZBFHZHLZSE Holdings16001000.8157.8513186.119652552069.964711016001099.7657.8513186.6667520.0553065100Latest PriceZiG CentsFinancialSectorPrevious WeekZiG Cents249175.4392.11NGSE All Share Index NGSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW -0.5% MoM 22.3% YTD 60.1%114052.9392.11JSE All Share Index JSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW -0.4% MoM -4.2% YTD -1.5%392.11168.45ZSE Materials IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Materials IndexWOW -0.7% MoM -6.4% YTD 5.2%392.11311.31ZSE Consumer Staples IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Consumers Staples indexWOW 4.1% MoM 13.6% YTD 33.2%392.11449.41ZSE Medium Cap IndexZSE All Share indexMedium Cap indexWOW 5.4% MoM 20.6% YTD 61.6%392.11385.19ZSE Top 10 IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Top10 indexWOW 1% MoM 5.9% YTD 36.7%392.11860.26ZSE Consumer Discretionary IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Consumer Discretionary indexWOW -1% MoM 3.3% YTD 14.5%392.11400.34ZSE ICT IndexZSE All Share indexZSE ICT IndexWOW 0% MoM 3.2% YTD 48.8%-4.4%8.8%Interbank MarketInterbank MoM Mvt.ZSE All Share index25888.21392.11LUSE All Share IndexLUSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW -0.4% MoM -4.5% YTD -0.1%392.11236.12VFEX All Share IndexZSE All Share index VFEX All Share IndexWOW 5.7% MoM -2% YTD 33.6%392.11297.69ZSE Financials SectorZSE All Share indexZSE Financials indexWOW -2.5% MoM -1% YTD -1.7%392.11189.22ZSE Industrials Index (New)ZSE All Share indexZSE Industrials Index (new)WOW 3.5% MoM 31.5% YTD 37.8%392.11652.53ZSE Real Estate IndexZSE All Share index ZSE Real Estate IndexWOW 0.2% MoM 4.9% YTD 6.0%11145392.11BSE All Share IndexBSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW 0.1% MoM 0.3% YTD 1.0%
Regional Economic WatchThe joint venture will be backed by $30 million of new investment from Wonderful Group, ZCCM-IH said in a statement. The move is meant to restore the 95-year-old facility to supply critical inputs to Zambia’s copper, construction and agricultural sectors, after operational difficul- ties at the facility led to insolvency in 2018.The facility’s revival will be implemented in three phases, with the first phase focused on the construction and commissioning of a lime produc- tion plant with a capacity of 600 metric tons per day. The second phase will deliver either a cement processing plant or a second lime production plant, ZCCM-IH said, and the third phase will be further expansion based on market conditions.Wonderful Group will hold 55% of Ndola Lime through a $25 million equity contribution and a $5 million shareholder loan. ZCCM-IH will hold the remaining 45% interest via the contribution of operating assets and the write-off of $9.8 million of historic debt.2) Zambia is expected to record another bumper maize harvest, with output of about 4.9 million metric tons in the 2025/26 crop season, up about one-quarter from the previous season, a crop-forecasting survey showed on Tuesday.This season’s projected maize harvest would be the highest ever record- ed, surpassing the previous season’s record output of about 3.9 million tons, the agriculture ministry said in a post on Facebook.Another record maize crop could help further bring down inflation, which has been slowing in recent months, and mean the country does not need to import the staple grain.Speaking at an event where the survey results were released, a senior agriculture official said favourable weather and the distribution of farm- ing inputs had helped secure another record harvest. The country’s total maize requirements are estimated at about 4.2 million tons, the survey showed.In the 2023/24 season, Zambia’s maize harvest was devastated by the worst drought in living memory.Slowing inflation gave Zambia’s central bank space to cut its main inter- est rate this month, bucking a global trend during the Iran war where many central banks have kept lending rates on hold. Annual inflation slowed for a fourth month in April to 6.8%.South AfricaSouth African farmers are expected to harvest 2.5% more maize in the 2025/2026 season compared with the previous one, the government’s Crop Estimates Committee (CEC) said on Tuesday. The CEC’s fourth summer crop forecast estimated the 2026 maize harvest at 17.064 million metric tons, up from 16.65 million metric tons harvested the season before. The last estimate, on April 23, had put the 2026 harvest at 16.835 million metric tons. The harvest is expected to consist of 9.179 million metric tons of white maize, for human consumption, and 7.885 million metric tons of yellow maize, used mainly in animal feed.AfricaAfrica’s economic growth is expected to slow slightly to 4.2% this year from 4.4% last year, the African Development Bank said, as Middle East tensions push up fuel and food costs, before picking up again in 2027.Despite last year’s shocks from trade and geopolitical tensions, the 54-nation continent remained one of the world’s fastest-growing regions alongside Asia, outpacing Europe and Latin America, the AfDB said in its annual outlook published on Tuesday.Growth in 2025 was driven by higher farm output, improved macro-eco- nomic policies and higher commodity prices. Africa’s biggest regional development bank said it expected growth next year to return to 4.4%, with forecasts based on the assumption that the Middle East shock will last for two-three months.KenyaThe Trump administration is expected to deploy U.S. public health officers to Kenya to staff a potential quarantine facility there amid the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday.The facility, which was pending approval from the Kenyan government as of Tuesday, is intended for Americans who have been exposed to or at high risk of testing positive for the virus in the region, as well as those who test positive, the report said, citing people familiar with the matter.Some members of the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, a uniformed branch under the Department of Health and Human Services, have received notices to deploy, the report said.GhanaIn May, 2026, Fitch upgraded Ghana's sovereign rating from 'B-' to 'B', with a positive outlook. For a country that was on the edge of default three years ago, it is a strong signal.The reasons behind the upgrade are straightforward. Public debt fell by 21 percentage points in 2025, driven by a sharp appreciation of the cedi and a serious fiscal consolidation effort. Foreign exchange reserves jumped by $5.4 billion over the year to reach $12.3 billion, covering 3.6 months of imports. And inflation, which had hit record highs, came down to 3.2% in March 2026, its lowest level since 1999.Mozambique1)Mozambique’s foreign currency shortage caused the closure of more than 500 companies and the loss of around 15,000 jobs, based on a study released on Tuesday by the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP).“The core motivation of this study lies in the persistent shortage of foreign currency that we have been monitoring and the stability of the exchange rate, which is misaligned with market conditions,” Teresa Boene, a researcher from the non-governmental organisation (NGO), said in Maputo.She revealed these findings during the presentation of the Analysis of the macro-fiscal impacts associated with the persistent foreign currency shortage and the exchange rate: The case of Mozambique (1990–2024). Data gathered from interviews with business managers and private-sec- tor associations indicate that difficulties in accessing foreign currency reduced companies’ import capacity by approximately 40%, directly affecting production and economic activity.2) The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) needs US$107.660m to support approximately 1.8 million Mozambicans affected by climate events until 2031.FAO says in its Mozambique: Floods Recovery Plan, 2026–2031 report, released on Monday, that severe floods struck Mozambique earlier this year, “severely disrupting the country’s agrifood systems and damaging crops, livestock, fisheries and critical agricultural infrastructure across some of the most productive areas”.The Rome-based UN agency said the crisis affected more than 724,000 people and damaged around 440,000 hectares. The economic conse- quences remain substantial, with total damages and losses estimated at 30.4 billion meticais (approximately US$486m). The agricultural sector accounts for nearly 73% of total losses.Zambia1)Zambia’s state investment firm ZCCM Investments Holdings said on Wednesday it has partnered with Chinese-owned Wonderful Group to revive a near-century-old industrial-scale lime and cement production facility in the country’s Copperbelt region.ZCCM-IH and Wonderful Group will develop and operate the integrated lime and cement production facility through a new joint venture vehicle named Ndola Lime Limited.28 The AXiS CCXV Monday 18 May 2026