The AXiS CCXIV (214)

#Issue : CCXIV fifffflffiflGPD Growth Deepens2026 Pins on Stability and ExecutionChina Removes Africa TariffsHormuz Crisis Puts RBZ to TestSA-Zim Migration CrisisXarani and the Platform Bet.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

In Focus04050708MarketsWorld NewsZSE & VFEX Weekly Markets Dashboard2425262710111214151617Understanding CLAFA-2 Clearly : What It Means for ZimbabweThe Fractured Rainbow : SA-Zim Migration CrisisTale of Two Exchanges : Zim Equity Markets -April 2026Surging Power Import Bill : Zim Edges Toward a Billion in Regional PaymentsCereal Surplus Claims Grow : Maize Import Bill Keeps RisingFuel Tax Trade-Off : Relief at Pump, Pressure at TreasuryZimbabwe Cedes Major Stake : Victoria Falls Tourism ProjectEconomic News and AnalysisTo National Output In focus : 2025 GDP Growth Outpaces Initial Projections War on the Strait : The Cost and Solutions Closer Home SA Apples Lead Trade : China Removes Africa TariffsBreaking Inflation Script : Hormuz Crisis Puts RBZ to TestBusiness Around the WorldPolitics Around the WorldRegional Economic Watch222328Theequityaxis.net @equity axis @equity axis zimbabwe @equity axis @equity axis @equity axis 08677 197 791 @ aaronc[at]equityaxis.netEQUITY AXISFinancial Insights at your FingertipsCapital Markets 19 Xarani and the Platform Bet : What FBC Holdings Is Building, and Whether It Can WorkWeekly Commodity PulseMarkets WatchZSE & VFEX WeeklyFinancial Markets At a GlanceThe AXiS CCXIV May 2026Cover PagePage 05Page 08Page 12ZSE ASI VFEX ASI ZWG INTERBANK RATE 23/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/0423/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/0423/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/04362.13 231.49 25.26357.42 231.21 25.22362.47 228.60 25.19359.61 230.22 25.29362.84 224.15 25.30365.17 228.92 25.340.84% -1.11% -0.32%ZSE TOP 10 INDEX MEDIUM CAP INDEX SMALL CAP INDEX 100.11100.11100.11100.11100.11100.110.00%363.21 382.65356.79 385.27362.30 388.57358.59 389.33361.27 395.17363.18 399.4723/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/04-0.01% 23/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/044.40% 23/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/04

imbabwe’s latest GDP release changes the tone of the 2026 macro debate. The economy has moved from post-drought repair into a broader expansion cycle driven by agriculture, mining, financial services, industrial volume recovery and stronger household demand. ZimStat’s fourth quarter release places nominal GDP at ZWG448.5 billion in Q4 2025, up from ZWG420.2 billion in Q3, while constant-price GDP came in at about ZWG19.1 billion, from ZWG19.0 billion in the previous quarter. The quarter was therefore slower at the margin, with market-price GDP up only 0.3% quarter on quarter, after 1.1% in Q3 and 9.1% in Q2. Even with a softer closing quarter, Equity Axis computations from the constant-price GDP series put 2025 real GDP at about ZWG74.3 billion, up from ZWG68.7 billion in 2024, trans- lating to annual growth of about 8.1%. The composition matters. Zimbabwe’s 2025 recovery was built across several engines of real activity. Agriculture led the incremental expansion, mining widened the external earn- ings base, finance deepened the transmission of liquidity into formal activity, and manufactur- ing gained from volume recovery as demand conditions improved. In Q4, the largest sectoral anchors were mining and quarrying at 15.47% of constant-price GDP, manufacturing at 14.59%, wholesale and retail trade at 11.11%, agriculture at 11.09%, and financial and insur- ance activities at 10.70%. Those five sectors accounted for well above half of measured real output in the quarter, giving the recovery a broader base than the low-growth cycle that followed the 2024 drought shock. The strongest message comes from agriculture. After a difficult 2024 season, agriculture, fishing and forestry rose by about 25.9% in 2025, according to Equity Axis calculations from the ZimStat constant-price tables. Its contribution to annual GDP growth was around 2.4 percentage points, the largest among major sectors. The sector also recovered sharply in Q4, growing 16.37% quarter on quarter after a contraction in Q3. This recovery is important because agricul- ture carries a larger transmission effect in Zimbabwe than its direct GDP weight alone. A better season improves rural incomes, raises demand for fast-moving consumer goods, sup- ports milling, logistics and packaging, reduces pressure on food imports, and improves confi- dence across informal and formal retail chan- nels. Mining delivered the second major pillar. Real value added in mining and quarrying rose by about 10.5% in 2025 and contributed roughly 1.5 percentage points to annual real GDP growth. This matters because mining sits at the intersection of real output, export liquidity and currency confidence. Gold prices remained a major tailwind through the period, and the wider commodity cycle strengthened foreign-currency inflows at a time when the domestic economy needed external buffers. Mining’s Q4 perfor- mance softened by 2.83% quarter on quarter, after a very strong Q2 and a marginal Q3 gain, yet this looked like sequencing within the production cycle rather than a reversal of the sector’s role in the recovery. Manufacturing deserves closer attention because the sector tells a different story from the usual Zimbabwean macro narrative. Real manufacturing value added rose by about 4.8% in 2025. The rate appears modest relative to agriculture and mining, yet the sector’s 14.8% annual GDP share makes even mid-single-digit expansion meaningful. Proprietary Equity Axis volume tracking also points to double-digit volume growth across several industrial catego- ries in 2025 and into Q1 2026, consistent with management commentary from listed and non-listed operators. This matters for earnings, labour utilisation and tax collections. It also points to a demand cycle that has become less dependent on financial revaluation and more dependent on physical throughput.The finance sector added another layer to the recovery. Financial and insurance activities grew by about 8.7% in real terms in 2025, con- tributing close to 0.9 percentage points to growth. This sector’s expansion needs careful interpretation. Part of the outcome likely came from transaction activity, formal intermediation, insurance repricing and a higher nominal base, yet the real growth reading points to a sector benefiting from improved activity in the underly- ing economy. Banking, insurance and payments businesses normally gain when agriculture, mining, wholesale trade and manufacturing expand at the same time. The issue for 2026 will be whether financial activity supports productive credit, or stays concentrated in transaction fees, short-tenor lending and sovereign-linked balance sheet positioning.Retail and transport give the clearest demand-side confirmation. Wholesale and retail trade grew by only 2.0% in 2025, although it remained the third-largest Q4 sector at 11.11% of GDP. Transportation and storage grew by about 15.8% for the year, with a 3.5% GDP share. The transport reading is particularly important because it tracks activity across supply chains: agricultural movements, mining logistics, import channels, distribution into retail, and cross-border flows. When transport grows faster than retail, it often points to rebuilding stock cycles, stronger freight intensity, and improved industrial movement ahead of final household demand. That makes the 2026 demand outlook stronger than the retail number alone would imply.The external environment also shifted in Zimba- bwe’s favour. The removal of the U.S. Zimba- bwe Sanctions Regulations from the Code of Federal Regulations in 2024 did not immediate- ly unlock capital markets, although it changed the architecture of country risk by reducing one layer of formal restriction. Re-engagement has since become a macro variable rather than a diplomatic slogan. The recent move to return 67 farms seized from nationals of Denmark, Swit- zerland, Germany and the Netherlands, all cov- ered under bilateral investment protection agreements, adds to that story. It connects land resolution, debt relief, Western re-engagement and future investment credibility. For a country still shut out of conventional external financing, this creates an opening that can lower the non-commercial risk premium if matched by National Output In Focus*To Page 5The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 42025 GDP Growth Outpaces Initial Projections TZ

consistent policy execution. The 2026 base case therefore sits higher than it did a year ago. The IMF currently projects Zim- babwe’s real GDP growth at 5.0% in 2026, while the World Bank’s latest Macro Poverty Outlook places 2026 growth at 4.6%, supported by rising remittances and another good agricultural season. Those forecasts sit below the stronger 2025 outturn implied by the latest ZimStat series, although they still confirm Zimbabwe as one of the region’s faster-growth stories if macro discipline holds. Equity Axis sees a practical 2026 range of 5% to 7%, with the lower end anchored by agriculture and mining resilience, and the upper end requiring stronger industrial volumes, continued remittance growth, improved electricity availability and a cleaner re-engagement path.Remittances remain underappreciated in this growth cycle. They support household con- sumption, housing activity, education payments, healthcare spending and informal-sector liquidi- ty. Combined with agriculture-led rural income, remittances help explain why demand can remain resilient even when formal wages lag inflation or bank credit remains expensive. The economy is receiving income support from export commodities at the top, diaspora trans- fers at household level, and agricultural recov- ery across rural districts. That combination can sustain volumes longer than a credit-led rebound would.The opportunity set is clear. Agribusiness, logis- tics, packaging, fertiliser distribution, irrigation, milling, cold chain, consumer staples, construc- tion materials and mining services sit in the strongest part of the cycle. Banks and insurers can grow quality earnings if they finance work- ing capital, capex and insured production risk rather than mainly riding transaction flows. Man- ufacturers with access to reliable power, hard-currency inputs and regional distribution channels can convert demand recovery into margin expan- s i o n . Export- ers can benefit f r o m h i g h e r com - m o d i t y p r i c e s and improved country engagement. The state can also capture higher revenue without raising tax pressure if growth lifts formal volumes.The constraints are equally clear, the first of which is money supply discipline. Zimbabwe’s recovery depends on confidence in currency and pricing stability. Any fiscal slippage, qua- si-fiscal funding, excessive local-currency injec- tion or forced conversion pressure would quickly move from the money market into exchange expectations, supplier pricing and retail replace- ment costs. The second is the Iran war and wider Middle East risk. The World Bank has already warned that the conflict has raised fuel and fertiliser costs across Sub-Saharan Africa, with particular pressure on energy importers and economies with limited fiscal space. For Zimbabwe, this is a direct cost shock to mining, agriculture, manufacturing and transport.The third risk is commodity pricing. Gold and other minerals have helped rebuild external buffers, but the same concentration that sup- ports the upswing can amplify a downturn. A sharp correction in gold or platinum group metals would tighten export liquidity, reduce fiscal receipts from royalties and taxes, and weaken the confidence base behind import cover and currency stability. The fourth risk is political. CAB3, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 3 Bill, has become a gover- nance-risk variable because it proposes major constitutional changes, including a shift in the presidential election framework and changes to office terms. Markets will price the process through the lens of stability, legitimacy and external confidence. This is the strategic point for policymakers and corporates. Zimbabwe has entered 2026 with a stronger real-economy base than the market had priced a year ago. The GDP numbers vali- date the recovery in agriculture, confirm min- ing’s central role in external liquidity, and show *From Page 4The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 5Cfrica’s exposure to the Iran war is now moving beyond the Strait of Hormuz headline. The deeper issue is the way the conflict is changing the cost base of African companies. Fuel, freight, fertiliser, power backup, aviation, insurance and imported inputs are all being repriced at the same time. That combination is forcing companies to redesign operating models while consumers remain too stretched to absorb full price increases.The Strait of Hormuz remains the starting point because it sits at the centre of the global energy system. The EIA describes the strait as a major oil transit chokepoint through which nearly 20% of global oil supply flows, and its short-term energy outlook notes that Brent averaged US$103 per barrel in March after rising US$32 per barrel from February, with daily prices reaching almost US$128 on 2 April. The IEA also places Hormuz at around 20 million barrels per day and roughly 25% of world seaborne oil trade, with significant LNG volumes moving through the same corridor.This has created a broad African cost shock. Reuters reported in early April that African gov- ernments had imposed sharp fuel price increas- es as the Iran war pushed global oil prices higher, with oil-importing countries especially exposed because most of the continent’s petro- leum products are imported. Kenya’s retail fuel prices were later raised sharply, with petrol up 16.1% and diesel up 24.2%, after the cost of imported petroleum products rose 68.7%. South Africa responded differently, extending fuel tax cuts for two months to cushion households, while making clear that lost revenue would later be recovered through other channels.The IMF has framed the wider economic conse- quence plainly. Its analysis says the war is reshaping energy, trade and finance, with expensive energy straining import-dependent economies and slowing growth. A later IMF assessment said Africa was facing mounting risks just as growth gains were taking hold, with oil exporters benefiting from higher prices while still exposed to volatility and procyclical spend- ing risk. The World Bank’s Africa Economic Update also identifies heightened energy price volatility and fertiliser disruption as key chan- nels affecting the region.The winners and losers are separating quickly. Oil exporters gain revenue and Nigeria is the clearest example, with analysis estimating a US$4 billion windfall for Nigerian oil companies after Bonny Light crude rose from around US$70 to nearly US$117 per barrel. Import-dependent economies face the opposite adjust- ment. Their governments either pass the cost to consumers, absorb part of the shock through tax relief, or allow fiscal deficits to widen. Each option carries a cost.Companies are now doing the work that policy cannot fully do. Gold Fields provides one of the cleanest corporate examples. The group said the Iran war had pushed up input costs across fuel, freight, LNG, explosives and cyanide. Reu- ters reported that Gold Fields expects an addi- tional US$40 to US$50 per ounce in production costs at an assumed oil price of US$100 per barrel, with diesel costs up sharply, freight up 40%, LNG up 30%, and explosives and cyanide up 10%. The company kept its annual produc- tion guidance, helped by stronger output and operating interventions such as fuel-efficient haulage systems.That is the playbook now emerging across Africa. Companies are not simply raising prices. They are trying to protect unit economics by increasing output, improving efficiency, chang- ing energy sources and reworking procurement. The goal is to spread a higher fixed and variable cost base across larger volumes while delaying the full pass-through to final consumers.War on the Strait The Cost and Solutions Closer Home A*To Page 6

FZ Telecoms are taking a different route. Africa’s mobile networks depend heavily on diesel genera- tors, especially in mar- kets where grid power is unreliable. ABC News reported that Africa has about 500,000 cellphone towers and that rising diesel costs are pushing operators toward solar and battery systems. MTN operations in South Sudan reportedly cut fuel spending by about 30% after adopting solar, while Airtel Africa, working with ENGIE Energy Access, reduced diesel use by over half at sites in Zambia and Congo. That is a defensive margin strategy with long-term upside. A shock that begins as diesel inflation can accelerate network modernisation and lower future operating costs.Airtel Africa has also had to manage capital market timing. Reuters reported that the company delayed the IPO of Airtel Money to the second half of 2026, citing market uncertainties linked to the Middle East war and the expectation that higher energy costs could lift inflation and compress short-term margins. This demonstrates a second channel of impact. The war is not only affecting expenses. It is also changing valuation windows, fundraising deci- sions and investor appetite.Aviation and tourism sit in the most exposed layer. Reuters reported that jet fuel concerns linked to the Iran war were clouding airlines’ summer plans, with the crisis creating one of the largest aviation disruptions since COVID-19. IAG, the owner of British Airways, cut its 2026 outlook after projecting a jet fuel bill of about €9 billion, even with 70% of remaining fuel needs hedged. African tourism destinations that depend on long-haul travellers will feel this through higher airfares, lower route capacity and softer bookings from high-spending mar- kets.Agriculture is the most socially sensitive trans- mission channel. Sudanese farmers, already hit by domestic conflict, are facing fertiliser price increases from US$11 to US$50 per bag and fuel costs rising from US$2.50 to US$8 per gallon. The same mechanism is visible across Southern Africa, where fuel, fertiliser, transport and irrigation costs now sit at the centre of farm viability.A leading agricultural entity in Zimbabwe told Equity Axis in confidence that it has seen cost increases by around 30%, covering diesel, fertiliser and other inputs. The country’s largest dairy producer is seeing increases in the same range across its operating chain. These trends show a market-wide repricing of production costs. The immediate difficulty is that compa- nies cannot easily raise final prices by a similar amount. Consumers remain price-sensitive, retailers resist frequent adjustments, and formal producers compete with informal channels that do not carry the same compliance and over- head burden.As a consequence, margins are beginning to compress. Companies have been protected partly by stronger volumes and demand recov- ery. Higher throughput spreads fixed overheads across a wider revenue base. In dairy, beverag- es, agriculture and FMCG, this volume effect is currently absorbing part of the cost shock but that support has limits. If fuel and input prices remain elevated, volume growth alone will not carry the full adjustment. Margins will come under pressure unless businesses find deeper structural savings.As part of mitigating strategies, telecoms are already moving faster into solar and batteries. Mines are investing in fuel-efficient haulage and power optimisation. Agro-processors can reduce exposure through solar refrigeration, biomass, efficient boilers and irrigation energy management. The companies that treat energy as a strategic input will defend margins better than those managing fuel as a monthly expense line, taking into account that some changes may require huge outlays which may not be budget- ed for. The second strategy is procurement redesign. Companies will need longer-term supplier con- tracts, pooled procurement, forward buying where balance sheets allow, and regional sourcing optionality. Fertiliser, packaging, chemicals and spares have become risk lines. Businesses with visibility on inventory and replacement cost will price and plan better than competitors that react after supplier quotes change.Route optimisation, load consolidation, hub-and-spoke distribution, rail use where prac- tical and shared haulage can reduce exposure to diesel, is another explorable strategy. This is especially important in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and inland parts of Southern Africa where distance to ports raises every landed cost. Logistics will become a profit driver, not a back-office function.Companies may also consider, product mix management as a way to circumvent the crisis. They will need to push categories with stronger margins, faster turnover and lower energy inten- sity. Smaller pack sizes can maintain affordabili- ty, while premium formats can protect margin where brand power allows. This is already common in consumer goods markets where demand exists, though household cash flow cannot support large price jumps.The fifth strategy is contract discipline. Busi- nesses selling to large customers should increasingly build escalation clauses linked to fuel, freight and exchange rates. Fixed-price contracts have become dangerous where input prices can move by double digits within a month. Infrastructure contractors, logistics providers, food processors and distributors need pricing frameworks that adjust with mea- surable cost indices.Disciplined capital allocation can give compa- nies an advantage. Projects with long payback periods will face higher hurdle rates. Compa- nies will prioritise investments that reduce energy use, lower waste, improve throughput or strengthen hard-currency earnings. Airtel’s IPO delay and IAG’s cut to capacity expectations show that even global groups are adjusting cap- ital plans as cost and market risk rise.Higher input costs require larger inventories and bigger cash buffers. This can strain businesses even when demand is strong. Banks will become more selective in funding inventories where repayment depends on price increases that may not be accepted by the market. Com- panies with better cash conversion, stronger debtor control and USD-linked revenue will obtain funding on better terms.Opportunities are also opening and these include solar, battery storage, energy manage- ment systems, efficient irrigation, local fertiliser production, regional warehousing, supply chain finance and data-led logistics all become growth markets. African companies that solve the cost shock for other businesses can grow faster than those merely absorbing it. Locally, this creates room for firms in power systems, cold-chain efficiency, grain logistics, fertiliser blending, local packaging and route-to-market technolo- gy.There is also a regional integration opportunity. South Africa is cushioning fuel costs through temporary tax relief. Kenya has adjusted pump prices while trimming VAT on fuel. Zambia has used fuel tax relief at fiscal cost. Zimbabwe has generally allowed stronger pass-through into domestic prices. These differences create arbi- trage across sourcing, logistics and market entry. Businesses that can procure regionally, price in multiple currencies and shift supply routes quickly will have an advantage.The Iran war has made cost resilience a board-level issue. Energy, freight and inputs now determine competitiveness as much as market share and brand strength. African com- panies that survive this phase will be the ones that redesign operations so that each litre of diesel, each tonne of fertiliser, each container moved and each unit produced carries more value.The near-term priority is practical. Companies should protect cash, track replacement cost weekly, build pricing triggers into contracts, push volume where demand is still present, cut energy intensity, shift capex toward efficiency and strengthen USD revenue lines. The Iran war has turned volatility into an operating condi- tion and African businesses are already responding. The stronger ones are using the shock to become leaner, more energy-secure and more regionally connected. That is where the opportunity sits.*From Page 5The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 6

The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 7he early hours of May 1, 2026 marked more than the arrival of a shipment. Twenty four metric tonnes of South African apples cleared customs in Shenzhen and quietly signaled a structural shift in global trade. This was the first consignment to enter China under a newly expanded zero tariff policy that now applies to almost the entire African continent. It is a policy change with immediate commercial effects and deeper geopolitical meaning.For the apples, the impact was direct. Tariffs that previously stood at around 10 percent dropped to zero. That single adjustment reshaped pricing, margins, and competitiveness overnight. Importers reported savings of roughly 20,000 yuan on just one shipment. At scale, these savings compound quickly. What looks like a technical tariff change begins to influence market access, consumer prices, and trade flows.This is not an isolated gesture. China has extended zero tariff treatment to 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic ties. That effectively covers the entire continent except one. Eswatini remains outside the arrange- ment because of its diplomatic relation- ship with Taiwan. That exclusion high- lights how trade policy is not only economic. It is political, strategic, and deeply tied to global align- ments.The timing matters. Global trade is becoming more restrictive. Major economies are leaning toward protectionism. The United States is moving toward higher import barriers under renewed policy direction. Against that backdrop, China is moving in the opposite direc- tion. It is lowering barriers, wid- ening access, and positioning itself as an open market for developing economies.The scale of the opportunity is significant. China is already Africa’s largest trading partner, a position it has held for 17 con- secutive years. Bilateral trade reached 348 billion dollars in 2025. The removal of tariffs across nearly all African exports introduces a new phase in that relationship. It changes the structure of incen- tives for exporters, investors, and governments across the continent.The immediate beneficiaries are clear. Agricul- tural exporters gain a direct price advantage. Products that previously faced tariffs between 8 and 30 percent now enter the Chinese market duty free. Cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana becomes more competitive. Kenyan coffee and avocados gain pricing power. South African citrus and wine enter at lower cost points. Egyp- tian oranges already illustrate the scale. A single shipment of 516 tonnes into Shanghai avoided tariffs worth 320,000 yuan.These are not marginal gains. They reshape competitiveness in one of the largest consumer markets in the world. For African producers, this opens the possibility of scaling exports beyond traditional markets in Europe and regional trade blocs. For Chinese consumers, it expands access to a wider range of products at lower prices.Kenyan avocados offer another example. A shipment of 24 tonnes entering Shanghai bene- fited from tariff exemptions worth 26,000 yuan. South African wine shipments saw reductions of around 21,000 yuan. Importers estimate that retail prices could fall by between 15 and 20 percent. Price reductions at that level are not cosmetic. They influence demand, substitution patterns, and long term market positioning.The policy also signals something broader about China’s trade strategy. It is not only about importing goods. It is about reshaping supply chains. Zero tariffs create an incentive for firms to invest in African production, particularly in value added manufacturing. If goods can be produced in Africa and enter China duty free, the continent becomes more attractive as a production base.That shift matters for African economies. Many countries remain exporters of raw commodities with limited processing capacity. The zero tariff framework creates an opening to move up the value chain. It encourages investment in processing, packaging, and manufacturing within Africa rather than exporting raw materi- als. Over time, this could alter the structure of African exports and reduce dependence on primary commodities.There is also a balancing dimension. China Africa trade has often been criticized for being skewed. Africa exports raw materials while importing manufactured goods. By lowering tariffs on a wider range of African products, China is attempting to rebalance that relation- ship. Whether this succeeds depends on how African economies respond. Access alone does not guarantee transformation. Production capacity, logistics, and standards still matter.South Africa’s position as the first beneficiary is not accidental. It reflects both scale and readi- ness. South Africa has established export sys- tems, quality standards, and logistics networks that allow it to respond quickly to new opportuni- ties. The apple shipment is symbolic, but it also reflects structural advantages within the conti- nent. Larger and more industrialized economies are better positioned to capitalize on policy shifts.That raises an important question. Will the ben- efits be evenly distributed across Africa. The answer is likely no. Countries with stronger infrastructure, better access to finance, and established export sectors will move faster. Others may struggle to take advantage of the opportunity despite having tariff free access. This creates a risk of widening gaps within the continent.The exclusion of Eswatini adds another layer to the analysis. It is the only African country not included in the zero tariff arrangement. The reason is not economic. It is diplomatic. Eswati- ni maintains formal ties with Taiwan. China’s policy makes it clear that trade preferences are linked to political alignment. This is not unusual in global trade, but it is rarely this explicit.For Eswatini, the cost is immediate. Its exports face tariffs that competitors from neighboring countries do not. That places its producers at a disadvantage in the Chinese market. It also sends a signal about the conditions attached to market access. Trade policy is being used as a tool of diplomatic influence.The broader implication is that economic inte- gration is increasingly shaped by geopolitical considerations. Access to large markets is no longer only about competitiveness. It is also about alignment. Countries are navigating a landscape where trade, politics, and strategy are intertwined.From a Chinese perspective, the policy reinforc- es its position as a central node in global trade. By opening its market to African exports, it strengthens economic ties, secures supply chains, and expands its influence across the continent. It also contrasts its approach with more restrictive policies elsewhere, positioning itself as a partner in develop- ment rather than a barrier.From an African perspective, the opportunity is real but condi- tional. Tariff free access lowers one barrier. Others remain. Infrastructure constraints, production capacity, compliance with standards, and logistics all determine whether countries can fully benefit. The policy creates potential. Realizing that potential requires domestic investment and policy align- ment.There is also a long term strategic angle. If firms begin to invest in African manufacturing to serve the Chinese market, this could accelerate industrialization. It could create jobs, build skills, and deepen integration into global value chains. The risk is that without strong local poli- cies, value addition remains limited and benefits are uneven.The first shipment of South African apples is therefore more than a trade event. It is an entry point into a new phase of China Africa economic relations. It reflects shifting global dynamics, emerging opportunities, and underlying inequal- ities.Trade policy is often discussed in abstract terms. This moment makes it tangible. A tariff removed in Beijing changes the price of fruit in Shenzhen. It alters the incentives of a farmer in South Africa. It shapes the prospects of an exporter in Kenya. It influences investment deci- sions across the continent.The question now is how Africa responds. Access has been granted. The market is open. The advantage lies in who can move fastest, scale production, and meet demand.South Africa has made the first move. Others will follow. The outcome will depend on whether this moment is used to expand capacity, deepen value addition, and build more balanced trade relationships. The opportunity is clear. The distribution of its benefits remains uncertain.TSA Apples Lead TradeChina Removes Africa Tariffs

The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 8he Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's latest quarterly monetary policy review projected that Zimbabwe's inflation would temporarily increase in the near term before returning to steady state by June 2026, contingent on the assumption that the Middle East conflict driving global fuel price escala- tion would begin to ease within that window. However, it has not eased. The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world's daily oil trade transits, has been effectively closed since 28 February 2026, when the US-Israel military operation against Iran triggered Iran's blockade of the waterway. The International Energy Agency has charac- terised the disruption as the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Oil prices have surged to a four-year high above USD 125 per barrel, with analysts beginning to predict widespread jet fuel short- ages and a spike in global inflation. A ceasefire was announced between the US and Iran on 8 April, but even after the ceasefire, ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained far below pre-war levels. On 4 May, the Iranian military warned the US to keep out of Hormuz. There is no reopening date, neither there is a resolution timeline. The RBZ's June inflation cooling assumption is built on a geopolitical scenario that, as of the first week of May 2026, has not materialised.The Strait of Hormuz, 34 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, facilitates the transit of around 20 million barrels of oil per day, representing roughly 20% of global seaborne oil trade, primarily from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Qatar. The closure has not merely disrupted the routing of that oil. It has structurally removed it from the global supply balance. The oil produc- tion of Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE collectively dropped by a reported 6.7 million barrels per day by 10 March, and by at least 10 million barrels per day by 12 March. To contex- tualise that figure, the world consumed approxi- mately 103 million barrels per day in 2024. A 10 million barrel per day disruption represents nearly 10% of global daily consumption evapo- rating from the supply side in a fortnight.OPEC+ has agreed to a modest, largely sym- bolic oil output increase of 188,000 barrels per day for June, far below what is needed to com- pensate for the disruption. The symbolic nature of the response is explained by a geopolitical fracture within the organisation itself. The UAE announced its withdrawal from OPEC+ after chafing at production quotas that constrained its capacity of 4.85 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia and Russia say that OPEC+ will hold, but the cartel's credibility is challenged, the UAE's exit signals how the next oil price war will be fought, each producer for itself. The organisa- tion whose production decisions have anchored global oil price expectations for five decades is fracturing at precisely the moment the market needs coordinated supply management most urgently. The result is a global oil market in which supply is constrained by war, the coordi- nating mechanism for managing that constraint is fragmenting, and buyers are competing for available non-Hormuz supply at prices the market has not seen since 2022.How This Reaches Zimbabwe's InflationZimbabwe does not produce crude oil. It imports all of its refined petroleum requirements, petrol, diesel, jet fuel, LPG from external markets that are priced directly off Brent crude. The Strait of Hormuz crisis has therefore entered Zimba- bwe's economy through three distinct channels simultaneously.The first is the direct FOB price channel. When ZERA raised petrol to USD 2.23 and diesel to USD 2.11 effective 2 April 2026, it cited the FOB price for diesel having risen 33.16% and FOB petrol having risen 5.96% since the prior review, movements directly traceable to the Hormuz supply disruption's effect on global refined prod- uct markets. The government introduced a diesel tax suspension and accelerated the E20 ethanol blending mandate, holding the 18 April prices at petrol USD 2.08 and diesel USD 2.09, but those interventions are finite and fiscally costly. The three-month diesel tax suspension expires in June or July 2026. If the Strait of Hormuz is still disrupted when that suspension lapses, Zimbabwe faces a diesel price revision toward the USD 2.65 level that ZERA's own modelling identified as the unmodified market price, a 27% increase from the current adminis- tered price.The second channel is the freight cost transmis- sion. Every imported good that arrives in Zimba- bwe, manufactured inputs, pharmaceutical products, machinery, food commodities arrives via shipping routes whose freight rates have been materially elevated by the Hormuz closure. The closure disrupted 20% of global oil supplies and significant LNG volumes, with the IEA's head describing it as the greatest global energy security challenge in history. Rerouting tankers around the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 10 to 15 days to voyage times from the Gulf and adds meaningfully to per-unit shipping costs. Those freight cost increases are already in the cost structure of Zimbabwe's March 2026 import bill of USD 1.074 billion and will compound progressively if the disruption extends through the second half of 2026.The third channel is the fertiliser price transmis- sion. Over 30% of global urea, widely used and produced from natural gas, is exported from Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz. Zimbabwe's agricultural sector, which is simul- taneously projecting a 2025-26 growing season surplus while importing USD 53.2 million of maize per month is dependent on imported fertiliser for the Pfumvudza input scheme that underpins smallholder maize productivity. A sustained urea price shock from the Hormuz closure enters Zimbabwe's next growing sea- son's input costs before any seed goes into the ground, raising the cost of food production in a country that is already spending over USD 500 million per year importing food.The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has main- tained its monetary policy rate at 35%, one of the highest nominal rates in the region explicitly to contain second-round effects from the fuel price shock. The logic is orthodox, tight money prevents the fuel price increase from becoming a generalised wage-price spiral. The 35% rate is the instrument with which the RBZ intends to anchor inflation expectations while the fuel shock passes through the first-round price level adjustment and dissipates.That logic holds if the shock is transitory. It collapses if the shock is persistent. The distinc- tion between a transitory supply shock, a tem- porary port closure, a brief routing disruption and a persistent structural disruption, a war that has been running since 28 February with no confirmed resolution date and a geopolitical negotiating dynamic in which Iran keeps reject- ing US proposals and the US keeps rejecting Iran's proposals, is the analytical fault line that the RBZ's June inflation cooling assumption is sitting on. A transitory shock justifies holding rates at 35%, absorbing the first-round price level increase, and waiting for the inflation rate to normalise once the shock passes. A persistent shock requires either accepting a structurally higher inflation rate or tightening policy further, neither of which is consistent with the business community's calls for rate reduc- tion or with the ZWG's monetary stability narra- tive.ZimStat's April 2026 CPI confirmed ZWG annual inflation at 4.8%, USD annual inflation at 2.2%, and weighted annual inflation at 2.8%, with transport as the leading driver of the 1.1% month-on-month rate across all three mea- sures. The provincial data added a dimension the headline conceals: Matabeleland North's ZWG annual inflation is running at 10.7%, more than double the national average, reflecting the fuel premium's amplified impact on longer supply chains and more remote communities. The national headline is manageable at 4.8%. The provincial distribution is not uniformly man- ageable, and the provinces experiencing the highest inflation are also those with the least economic capacity to absorb sustained cost-of-living increases.TBreaking Inflation ScriptHormuz Crisis Puts RBZ to Test*To Page 9

ZThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 9*From Page 8 Why June Is No Longer a Credible Cooling DateThe RBZ's expectation of inflation returning to steady state by June 2026 was premised on the assumption that the Middle East conflict would moderate sufficiently to ease global fuel price pressure within that timeframe. The evidence as of May 2026 runs in the opposite direction. Even after the US and Iran announced a ceasefire on 8 April, ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained far below pre-war levels, and on 4 May Iran warned the US military to keep out of the Strait. The maritime disruption has taken on a structural permanence that a temporary ceasefire has not resolved.Oil executives from the Gulf and global oil trad- ers have said that even when shipping through the Strait of Hormuz reopens, it will take several weeks if not months for flows to normalise. That normalisation lag means that even a genuine, durable resolution of the Iran-US standoff, which has not occurred, would not immediately transmit to lower global oil prices. It would trigger a recovery process measured in months, not days. The RBZ's June cooling assumption required that the conflict had substantially eased by late April or early May to allow supply chains to normalise before June prices are set. That window has closed.The honest June 2026 inflation outlook, based on the current state of the Hormuz crisis rather than its projected resolution, is for ZWG annual inflation to continue rising toward 6% or above as the diesel tax suspension's expiry adds a further fuel price shock to an index that is already being driven by transport and food. USD annual inflation is likely to remain above 2%, the Federal Reserve's own target, through- out the second quarter given that Zimbabwe's dollarised consumption basket is exposed to global shipping and commodity cost inflation that the Strait of Hormuz disruption is generat- ing. The weighted inflation rate, which blends both currency baskets, will move in the same direction as both components are simultane- ously elevated.The RBZ's 35% rate is the instrument available to it. It can hold rates, tighten further, or cut. None of those three choices resolves the Strait of Hormuz. Monetary policy cannot reopen a shipping lane. It cannot reduce the FOB price of refined petroleum imported from markets priced off Brent crude at USD 125 per barrel. It cannot prevent freight cost increases from filtering into the import cost of every good Zimbabwe buys from the global market. What monetary policy can do, and what the 35% rate is attempting to do, is prevent those supply-side cost increases from generating a domestic demand-side spiral in which workers demand higher wages to com- pensate for higher prices, businesses raise prices further to cover higher wage costs, and inflation becomes self-sustaining at a structural- ly elevated level rather than a one-off price level adjustment.Whether that containment succeeds depends on the duration of the external shock. A two-month Hormuz disruption produces a price level adjustment that a 35% rate can contain. A six-month disruption, which is where the calen- dar now points, given that the closure began 28 February and is still active in May with no reso- lution date, produces a sustained cost-push that becomes progressively harder to distinguish from structural inflation. The longer the disrup- tion runs, the more plausible it becomes that the fuel and freight cost increases will generate the secondary wage and price responses that the RBZ is specifically holding rates at 35% to prevent.The Middle East is not Zimbabwe's problem to solve. But it has become Zimbabwe's inflation problem to manage, and the RBZ's June steady state assumption, built on a geopolitical scenar- io that the facts on the ground have not deliv- ered, requires revision before the market prices it in on the bank's behalf.

TThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 10*To Page 11he Second Round Crop, Livestock and Fisheries Assessment report for the 2025/26 season was released in mid-April 2026. It arrived at a moment when expectations were high after a relatively favourable start to the farming season. The report is commonly referred to as CLAFA-2. It represents the most comprehensive and near-final picture of agricul- tural performance in Zimbabwe for that season, drawing from farmer surveys, satellite data, institutional inputs, and field verification across all provinces.At its simplest, CLAFA-2 answers one question. Did Zimbabwe produce enough food, and what does that mean for households across the coun- try? The answer is not straightforward. The numbers point in one direction. The lived reality points in another.The report shows that agriculture grew by 5 percent, with total cereal production reaching 2,739,712 metric tonnes. When combined with carryover stocks of 136,902 metric tonnes, total cereal availability rises to 2,876,614 metric tonnes. This places the country in a surplus position, with expected excess grain ranging between 550,945 and 964,945 metric tonnes, depending on consumption assumptions. On paper, Zimbabwe has produced enough to meet national food requirements.The complexity begins when those numbers are unpacked. Maize remains the dominant crop, and production increased slightly from 2.29 million tonnes to 2.35 million tonnes, a 2 percent rise. This stability masks sharp regional dispari- ties. Provinces such as Mashonaland West recorded strong gains, contributing significantly to national output, while others like Manicaland experienced steep declines of up to 46 percent. These variations were driven by uneven rainfall distribution and mid-season dry spells that affected crops at critical growth stages between late January and mid-February.Traditional grains present an even more uneven story. Total production reached 390,272 metric tonnes, composed of sorghum at 290,216 tonnes, pearl millet at 87,677 tonnes, and finger millet at 12,379 tonnes. Within this aggregate, performance diverged sharply. Sorghum production fell by 34 percent, while pearl millet experienced a dramatic 53.8 percent decline, dropping from 188,261 tonnes to 87,677 tonnes. In contrast, finger millet production increased by 29 percent. These movements reflect both climatic stress and a gradual, uneven transition toward more resilient crops.The national cereal balance sheet suggests sufficiency. The spatial distribution of that suffi- ciency tells a different story. Several districts in southern and eastern Zimbabwe, including Beit- bridge, Buhera, and Chivi, are projected to face deficits, with cereal availability lasting as little as 3 to 4 months. Others fall in the 5 to 6 month range, while large parts of the north and west enjoy more than 12 months of supply. The impli- cation is clear. National surplus does not elimi- nate local shortages.This disconnect between aggregate production and household-level access highlights structural weaknesses in distribution, income, and market integration. Food exists in the system. Access to it is uneven.Crop performance also reflects deeper agro-ecological realities. Regions 2a and 2b, which account for less than a third of planted area, contributed approximately half of national maize output, supported by higher yields of up to 2.36 tonnes per hectare. In contrast, drier regions such as Region 4 used about 30 percent of total land but achieved significantly lower yields of around 0.84 tonnes per hectare. This imbalance reinforces the importance of aligning crop choices with ecological conditions, a strategy the report notes is gaining traction but remains incomplete.Losses during the season further illustrate vulnerability. A total of 110,657 hectares of maize and 27,837 hectares of sorghum were written off due to a combination of drought stress, excessive rainfall, waterlogging, and pest pressures. These losses occurred despite what is broadly described as a good season, underscoring the volatility that now characteris- es agricultural production.Horticulture provides a more positive signal. Perennial crops expanded by 10 percent in area and 5 percent in output, driven by investments and market demand. Crops such as mango, avocado, and blueberries recorded growth rates between 10 and 17 percent. At the same time, Irish potato production declined by 18 percent, although the country remains self-sufficient in table potatoes.Livestock production presents a picture of stability with gradual growth. The national cattle herd reached 5,760,439, a modest 0.3 percent increase. The structure of ownership is signifi- cant. Smallholder systems account for approxiTUnderstanding CLAFA-2 ClearlyWhat It Means for Zimbabwe& Analysis

SWThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 11*To Page 12*From Page 10 -mately 90 percent of the herd, indicating that rural households remain central to livestock production. Beef output rose by 8.8 percent, reaching 102,988 metric tonnes, while the offtake rate remained stable at 10.5 percent.Poultry production showed stronger momen- tum. Broiler meat output increased by 18 percent, from 205,880 tonnes to 243,276 tonnes, and per capita consumption rose to 15.3 kilograms. Egg production expanded by 16.4 percent, reaching 100.8 million dozen, while the indigenous chicken population grew by 29 percent, reflecting both commercial expansion and household-level production.Other livestock indicators reinforce moderate growth. Goat offtake stands at 23 percent, sheep at 16 percent, with relatively high repro- duction rates of 88 percent for goats and 73 percent for sheep. Dairy production increased by 6.2 percent, reaching 154.9 million litres, supported by a 7.5 percent increase in the dairy herd.The fisheries sector, while smaller, shows nota- ble expansion. Total fish production reached 35,151 tonnes, a 12.3 percent increase, with aquaculture units growing by 46.3 percent. This points to diversification within the food system, although the sector remains limited in scale relative to national needs.Government programmes under Rural Develop- ment 8.0 and Pfumvudza/Intwasa continue to play a central role. The data shows mixed outcomes. Sorghum seed distribution increased by 45 percent, while maize seed distribution declined by 33 percent. Borehole drilling fell sharply by 57 percent, and fruit tree distribution dropped by 97 percent. These figures suggest that while policy frameworks are in place, imple- mentation remains uneven across interven- tions.Climate conditions remain the underlying driver of variability. The season began with generally favourable rainfall, particularly in southern regions. However, performance was ultimately shaped by distribution rather than totals. Dry spells in late January and early February coincided with critical crop stages, while excessive rainfall in some areas caused waterlogging and crop damage. This dual pattern of drought and excess moisture reflects a shifting climate reali- ty that complicates planning and reduces predictability.Taken together, the findings of CLAFA-2 point to a system that is functioning but under strain. Zimbabwe is capable of producing sufficient food at a national level. The challenge lies in translating that production into consistent, equi- table access across all regions.The report reveals a set of overlapping dynam- ics. Agricultural output is growing, but unevenly. Climate resilience is improving, but slowly. Policy support is present, but inconsistently applied. Smallholder farmers remain central, yet operate within constraints that limit productivity and stability.The most important insight is not the surplus figure. It is the coexistence of surplus and shortage within the same system. That is what CLAFA-2 ultimately captures.oreign Labour, Sectoral Competition, and the Rising Tide of Xenophobia in South AfricaDriven by nearly three decades of political and economic volatility in Zimbabwe, the migration corridor between Zimbabwe and South Africa has become increasingly complex and dramat- ic, evolving from a traditional regional labour exchange into a volatile socioeconomic flash- point. However, while the documented immi- grant population represents just 4% of its total citizenry, it has generated immense levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, vigilante mobilisation, and periodic violence that rival far larger and wealthier receiving nations. The instinctive polit- ical explanation is that immigrants are stealing jobs from South Africans. The empirical expla- nation is considerably more complex, and con- siderably more uncomfortable for both sides of the debate. The truth lies not in the raw head- count of foreigners but in where, specifically, they compete because the pressure is not evenly distributed across the economy, and it is precisely in the zones of highest concentration that hostility ignites.It is imperative to first resolve an apparent statistical contradiction that sits at the heart of the immigration debate. Immigrants are roughly 4% of the total South African population, yet they occupy an estimated 9% of the total South African labour force. Notably, these figures are not contradictory as rather, they measure differ- ent universes. The 4% denominator includes children, elderly, and economically inactive people. The 9% labour force share, on the other hand, reflects the fact that immigrants migrate specifically to work. They are overwhelmingly adults aged 25 to 44, arriving with a singular economic purpose. Across both formal and informal sectors combined, this translates to approximately 1.4 million immigrant workers active in the economy. By global standards, this is a modest figure. Across OECD countries, immigrants constitute between 15% and 18% of the labour force in the United States and Ger- many respectively, and an average employment rate of 70.9% prevails among immigrants region-wide. South Africa's immigrant employ- ment rate sits closer to 32%, reflecting the struc- tural barriers of documentation, xenophobia, and informal sector precarity that define the South African migration experience. The para- dox, therefore, is that, immigrants are simulta- neously too economically marginal to be the primary cause of South African unemployment, yet too concentrated in specific sectors to be economically invisible.Informal retail and the spaza shop economy constitute the single highest-pressure zone in the entire immigration-labour interface. The sector is valued at between R150 billion and R200 billion annually, with over 100,000 outlets nationwide, and the majority are now operated by immigrant traders, principally Somalis, Ethio- pians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, and, critically, Zimbabweans. Recently, Delft, Cape Town, recorded a surge in foreign spaza ownership from 43% to 78% within just two years, driven by cooperative purchasing networks, shared labour arrangements, and trading hours that South African-owned micro-enterprises structur- ally cannot replicate. While this reflects superior business modelling and not criminal activity as would be purported, in township economies where unemployed South Africans have the fewest alternative economic options, the displacement is tangible, daily, and experienced as a personal insult. The informal retail sector also recorded the steepest employment losses nationally in Q4:2025, shedding 293,000 work- ers in a single quarter, a contraction that, while driven principally by macroeconomic pressures, is readily attributed by affected communities to foreign competition.Construction ranks second in the pressure hier- archy. Male immigrants are concentrated in con- struction at 14.8% of their employed cohort, a sector where semi-skilled and unskilled labour demand is elastic and wage discipline is weak. Zimbabwean workers, often accepting cash-in-hand arrangements below the legal minimum wage threshold, undercut local wage floors in ways that are economically rational for The Fractured RainbowSA-Zim Migration CrisisF

TWThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 12*To Page 13*From Page 11 contractors but deeply corrosive to local liveli- hoods. Domestic work and private households present a subtler but significant pressure point as female immigrants are most visibly repre- sented in private household employment at 9.4% of their female employed population, a sector where Zimbabwean women (typically literate, English-speaking, and disciplined) com- mand employer preference over local equiva- lents in the perceptions, whether justified or not, of middle-class South African households. This generates a distinct strand of resentment that is gendered and intimate in character, operating at the household rather than community level. Hospitality and catering absorbs a further signif- icant share of Zimbabwean formal-sector work- ers, who benefit from Zimbabwe's higher aver- age literacy rates relative to regional peers. Pro- fessional services like healthcare, education, finance generate the least tension of any sector, precisely because immigrant workers there fill documented critical skills gaps rather than com- peting head-to-head with equivalently qualified local workers.Immigrants represent 4% of the population but occupy 9% of the labour force, a 2.3x amplification that reflects their working-age demographic concentration. Yet their employment rate of approximately 32% combined (45.8% for men, 18.2% for women) sits less than half the OECD immigrant employment average of 70.9%. This is not a country that successfully integrates immigrants into its formal economy. It is a coun- try where immigrants compete primarily in the informal margins, in exactly the spaces where the most economically vulnerable South Africans also operate. That overlap, not immi- gration per se, is the combustion point.The distinction between the anti-Zimbabwean and anti-Nigerian dimensions of South African xenophobia is important and is not reducible to a single narrative. Hostility toward Zimbabwe- ans is primarily economic in character as they compete in labour markets, occupy spaza shop positions, take domestic work contracts, and move into the same township housing stock as the South African poor. Unlike visibly distinct immigrant communities who occupy separate economic niches, Zimbabweans compete in the same occupational and social spaces as South Africans, making the competition feel like usurpation rather than co-existence. By contrast, the anti-Nigerian backlash carries a heavier moral and reputational dimension. Nigerian criminal networks have been documented as operating in South Africa in drug trafficking, financial crime, and environmental exploitation by organ- ised crime indices.South Africa’s foreign population is heavily skewed toward Gauteng, which hosts nearly half of all international migrants, followed by the Western Cape and Limpopo. Within these prov- inces, specific areas have become demograph- ic hubs, with suburbs like Hillbrow and Yeoville often described in populist rhetoric as being \"overrun,\" a term that ignores the structural urban decay that preceded the arrival of migrants. For Zimbabweans, the supply chain of migration is anchored in specific Zimbabwean towns, with Beitbridge, Bulawayo, and Harare serving as the primary engines of outflow. Beit- bridge, as the immediate border hub, accounts for a massive portion of the transit and manual labour supply, while Bulawayo and Harare supply a mix of industrial workers and white-col- lar professionals. This geographic density means that the impact of migration is not felt evenly across South Africa but is concentrated in specific neighbourhoods where public infra- structure, such as clinics and schools, was already underfunded and under pressure.Ultimately, the conclusion is not comfortable for either the nativist movement or the liberal universalist response to it. South Africa's xeno- phobia is neither entirely irrational nor economi- cally justified. It is the predictable product of overlapping scarcities, of jobs, housing, public services, and political credibility, landing on a society that was promised economic liberation and received, instead, structural inequality with a democratic face. The immigrants who bear the violence of that disappointment are not its cause but rather evidence of the same broken regional economy that pushed them across the Limpopo River in the first place. Until South Africa addresses the domestic architecture of its unemployment crisis, the skills deficits, the failing schools, the infrastructure collapse, the regulatory barriers to small business formation, no deportation policy will reduce the anger. The immigrants are not the disease but a symptom of the same disease that is consuming the South Africans who have turned against them.n April 2026, Zimbabwe’s equity markets registered structural shifts where liquidity, pricing behaviour, and market relevance began to diverge in a way that is redefining the role of both the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange. The ZSE entered the month carrying the residual effects of Econet’s exit, and what followed was not merely a cyclical slowdown in activity but a sharp exposure of how concentrated and fragile liquidity had become.April 2026 produced one of the most striking divergences in the concurrent histories of Zim- babwe's two equity exchanges, and the full meaning of that divergence only becomes visible when the two markets are read together rather than in isolation. On the ZSE, value traded dipped by 84% from the all-time high of ZWG3.14 billion recorded in March to ZWG0.51 billion, a four-month low, while shares traded fell 91% from 601.5 million to 53.6 million. On the VFEX, value traded surged to US$89.33 million, the highest monthly outturn since the exchange's inception. The ZSE's index gained 1.8% in the same month that its volumes imploded. The VFEX's index fell 8.4% in the same month that its trading activity broke records. These are not contradictions but con- sequences, and they trace a coherent trajectory about where Zimbabwe's capital is moving, why, and at what structural cost to the exchange it is leaving behind.The ZSE's volume collapse is not, at its core, a demand issue but rather a supply one. Econet Wireless, which had for some time been one of the largest drivers of ZSE liquidity, providing the float and the institutional interest that gave the exchange its character as a functioning market rather than a collection of thinly traded counters, delisted this quarter. Its departure removed not just a large counter but one of the exchange's primary liquidity engine, and what remains is a bourse where capital is rotating within a dramat- ically reduced universe. Delta Corporation stepped into the vacancy, contributing 66% of aggregate value traded in April, up from 13% in March, and that single statistic encapsulates the structural problem the ZSE now faces. A market in which one counter accounts for two thirds of all activity is not a market in any meaningful plural sense, but a single-stock platform with peripheral participants, and its pricing signals carry the interpretive weight of a monopoly rather than a market. NMBZ's 29% contribution added a secondary anchor, but the remaining trio of Dairibord, Masimba, and CBZ sharing 3% between them makes the depth picture no less stark. The top five counters accounted for 98% Tale of Two ExchangesZim Equity Markets -April 2026I

AThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 13 of aggregate trades in April, essentially unchanged from 99% in March, which confirms that the concentration dynamic preceded Econet's departure and has simply become more visible in its absence.What makes the ZSE's April performance genu- inely unusual, and analytically significant beyond the liquidity numbers, is that prices rose while volumes collapsed. The 1.8% index gain in both nominal and real terms, following a 0.9% growth in February, is positive nominal perfor- mance in a period of turnover reduction. The explanation lies in the nature of the residual holders rather than the arrival of new buyers. The investors who remain on the ZSE after Econet's departure are predominantly those using equity as a store of value against currency uncertainty, and they are not selling. The ZiG's continued oscillation on the interbank market, depreciating by 0.08% against the US dollar in April, sustains the motive for this defensive positioning even as the exchange's overall market capitalisation contracted 26% against the prior month to ZWG83.5 billion (US$3.29 billion in hard currency terms) purely as a mechanical consequence of Econet's removal from the float. In this light, the absence of sellers creates the appearance of price resilience, but the depth required to absorb any meaningful exit by the remaining anchor positions is simply not present. Any capital flow of institutional scale through the ZSE's current structure would move prices disproportionately, making the index's surface stability a misleading guide to the market's underlying fragility.Foreign investor participation in April tracked the aggregate decline but with a contextually important qualification. Foreign inflows fell to ZWG93.54 million, down 83% against the prior month, and outflows fell 91% to ZWG152.62 million. Both declines reflect the elevated base created by Econet's exit trades in February and March rather than a withdrawal of foreign inves- tor interest in Zimbabwe's market. Foreign inflows as a share of total value traded actually increased from 17% in March to 18%, while outflows fell from 53% to 30%, which suggests that the foreign investors who remained active in April were net buyers rather than net sellers at the margin. The persistence of foreign participa- tion, even at reduced absolute levels, is a meaningful signal about the residual investment thesis for the ZSE's remaining counters.Meanwhile, the VFEX's April performance was, by contrast, defined by activity rather than stasis. The US$89.33 million in value traded represented a 489% increase against the prior month and surpassed every previous monthly record since the exchange opened. This was driven by a combination of the listing of Econet Infraco, which brought significant institutional interest and capital deployment into the bourse, and the profit-taking activity of investors who had accumulated positions in the March rally. The 8.4% decline in the VFEX mainstream index, which might suggest a deteriorating market, is properly understood as price discov- ery under genuine trading conditions rather than a distressed sell-off. A market that produces record turnover simultaneously with a broad price correction is one in which buyers and sell- ers are meeting at scale, and that functional quality is more valuable as a market character- istic than a price gain achieved on thin volumes would be. The VFEX's overall market capitalisa- tion retreated 10% against the prior month to US$3.49 billion, but still 6% higher than the ZSE's despite the ZSE having more listings, which is the clearest available expression of the structural premium investors are attaching to hard currency denomination and regulatory clarity in Zimbabwe's current investment envi- ronment.In our view, there is a redistribution of Zimba- bwe's equity market architecture, and it is proceeding at a pace that the respective exchanges' own development trajectories had not fully anticipated. Capital that once anchored to the ZSE through Econet's gravitational pull is finding its way, through Econet Infraco's listing and through the broader investor preference shift, to the VFEX. While this may not be a zero-sum transition in the short term, because the ZSE's remaining counters continue to attract defensive domestic positioning, the medi- um-term question about which exchange serves as Zimbabwe's primary capital formation venue is being answered incrementally through each month's performance, and April's outturn point- ed unmistakably in one direction.Ultimately, ZSE's April performance reinforces a market that is undergoing a fundamental liquidi- ty restructuring rather than a temporary volume correction. Delta's emergence as the dominant counter at 66% of aggregate trades is symptom- atic of a bourse that has effectively become a single-stock liquidity event with peripheral participation, and the 98% concentration in the top five counters exposes how fragile the ZSE's price formation mechanism has become in the absence of a counterweight of Econet's scale. The ZSE is now increasingly a market where the illusion of stability is maintained by the absence of sellers rather than the presence of buyers, and any meaningful shift in sentiment from the anchor counters could produce price adjustments that the current depth is wholly inadequate to absorb.On the VFEX, the record US$89.33 million in monthly value traded, achieved simultaneously with a broad price correction, confirms that the VFEX is developing the transactional depth that defines a functional institutional market rather than a directional trading venue. Whether this transition deepens will depend on the pace of new listings migrating to the VFEX and on whether Econet Infraco's debut proves capable of sustaining the liquidity expansion beyond the initial post-listing window, but the directional signal from April is that the VFEX is becoming the primary destination for capital formation while the ZSE consolidates into a domestically anchored, defensively positioned exchange whose role in the broader market architecture is being redefined in real time.*From Page 12

The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 14imbabwe has spent USD 881.7 million importing electricity between January 2021 and March 2026, according to a monthly import series derived from ZimStat External Trade Statistics. The cumulative figure spans sixty-three months during which the Zim- babwe Electricity Supply Authority and its suc- cessor entities consistently failed to generate sufficient domestic power from Kariba South, Hwange Thermal Power Station, and the coun- try's embedded generation base to meet nation- al demand, sourcing the deficit instead from Mozambique's HCB (Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa), South Africa's Eskom, and Zambia's ZESCO at costs that have run at an average of approximately USD 13.4 million per month across the full five-year period.The annual totals computed from the monthly series tell the story of a power system that has not resolved its structural generation deficit across any single year in the dataset. Zimba- bwe spent USD 152.1 million on electricity imports in 2021, USD 207.8 million in 2022, USD 162.1 million in 2023, USD 207.7 million in 2024, and USD 117 million in 2025. The first three months of 2026 have produced USD 35.1 million, a quarterly pace that annualises to approximately USD 140 million. Not one of these years reflected a country that has resolved its generation shortfall, but a country managing the cost of its dependency at different price points and import volumes as regional hydroelectric conditions, domestic generation performance, and foreign currency availability fluctuate.The highest single monthly electricity import figure was October 2022 at USD 37.4 million, occurring within a 2022 full-year total of USD 207.8 million, the joint-highest annual figure alongside 2024's USD 207.7 million. The 2022 spike has a specific and well-documented cause, Kariba Dam's water levels fell to critically low levels in 2022, forcing ZESA to reduce Kariba South Power Station's output substan- tially from its installed capacity of 1,050 mega- watts. The October 2022 single-month record of USD 37.4 million reflects the intersection of Kariba's water level crisis, regional electricity market pricing that escalated as drought condi- tions across the Zambezi basin reduced hydro- power availability simultaneously at Cahora Bassa and Kariba, and the ZESA management decision to prioritise supply to priority industrial customers and urban centres over load-shed- ding intensity.The combination of constrained supply and elevated import pricing was the mechanism that produces individual month spikes, not opera- tional failures on the import procurement side, but the structural consequence of an undiversi- fied generation base that concentrates over 50% of domestic capacity in a single hydroelec- tric source whose output is directly correlated with Zambezi catchment rainfall, which is itself subject to the same El Niño and La Niña cycles that produce Zimbabwe's agricultural droughts (now Hwange carries the load).The most significant observation in the electrici- ty imports was the 2025 decline to USD 117 million, the lowest full-year figure during the five-years by a considerable margin. Zimba- bwe's domestic generation capacity did not materially improve in 2025 relative to 2024. ZETDC's transmission losses remained elevat- ed. Hwange Thermal Power Station, whose Units 7 and 8 expansions added approximately 600 MW of nameplate capacity, has operated at availability rates below design specification due to coal supply constraints, boiler maintenance issues, and the working capital pressures that have characterised ZESA Holdings' and ZETDC's operational environment throughout the period.Kariba South's output in 2025 improved from its 2022 crisis levels as Zambezi basin rainfall partially recovered, providing some domestic generation relief, but not at a magnitude consis- tent with a USD 90 million reduction in annual import expenditure against 2024. The more likely explanation is import compression driven by foreign currency constraint. ZESA's and ZETDC's ability to pay for imported electricity is directly dependent on foreign currency availabil- ity, either from the RBZ's foreign currency allo- cation system or from ZETDC's own revenue collection in USD from industrial and commer- cial customers.IPEC's pensions report for FY2024 disclosed that ZETDC owed ZWG 266 million in pension contribution arrears, of which ZWG 137 million had been outstanding for more than 180 days, a direct indicator of cash flow pressure at the utili- ty. An entity that cannot remit pension contribu- tions deducted from its workers' salaries is also an entity managing its USD import commitments within tight liquidity constraints.Import compression, buying less electricity from HCB, Eskom, and ZESCO because the foreign currency to pay for it is not avail- able, has a direct cost that does not appear in the import expendi- ture data. That cost is load-shed- ding, the hours per day that indus- trial, commercial, and residential customers receive no power, producing productivity losses, equipment damage from voltage instability at grid restoration, and the diesel generator fuel cost that businesses and households sub- stitute for grid power at a price considerably above the electricity tariff.A lower electricity import bill in 2025 was not unambiguously good news if it was achieved by leaving demand unmet rather than by generating more power domes- tically. Zimbabwe's electricity import expenditure of USD 846.8 million across sixty-three months covers power sourced primarily from three regional suppliers. Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, whose 2,075 MW installed capac- ity on the Zambezi River feeds directly into ZESA's grid via the high-voltage DC transmis- sion line to Apollo substation near Harare, is the dominant import source, typically supplying 200 to 400 MW on a contract basis.Eskom in South Africa supplies additional import capacity, subject to South Africa's own generation constraints and the rotating load-shedding that characterised Eskom's 2022-2024 period of peak operational stress. ZESCO in Zambia supplies more limited volumes through the Hwange interconnection. A country sourcing one-fifth of its electricity from imports at an average cost of USD 160 million per year is not experiencing an energy crisis at its margins, but managing a structural genera- tion deficit that has been present across every year of this administration and every administra- tion before it.The electricity crisis coincides with Mutapa Investment Fund's announcement of a USD 500 million energy investment pipeline, the largest single item in its 2026 capital mobilisation agenda alongside the USD 400 million com- modity offtake deal and USD 75 million bank syndication. Mutapa's energy investment target, if deployed into Zimbabwe's generation base through solar, thermal rehabilitation, or indepen- dent power producer offtake agreements, could materially reduce the electricity import bill within three to five years of commissioning. A 300 MW solar facility operating at Zimbabwe's solar irradiation levels generates approximately 600 million kilowatt-hours per year, equivalent to approximately USD 60 million in annual import substitution at current electricity import pricing.The structural argument for import substitution in electricity is more straightforward than in maize, Zimbabwe cannot manufacture solar radiation, but it receives more of it per square metre than almost any country in Southern Africa, and photovoltaic technology costs have fallen approximately 90% since 2010. The con- straint is not resource endowment, but capital mobilisation, and the Mutapa USD 500 million energy pipeline is the most concrete public statement that the capital mobilisation impera- tive has been recognised at the level of the country's sovereign investment fund.Surging Power Import BillZim Edges Toward a Billion in Regional PaymentsZ

The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 15imbabwe spent USD 128.4 million importing maize in the first three months of 2026, January at USD 30.3 million, February at USD 44.9 million, and March at USD 53.2 million, according to ZimStat External Trade Statistics. The March figure is the largest single monthly maize import bill recorded in the first quarter of any year since 2021 to date, and it was generated in the same month that Zimba- bwe's Cabinet, on 21 April 2026, was preparing to announce a national cereal surplus of between 550,945 and 964,945 metric tonnes for the 2025/2026 growing season. Both facts are official and are accurate. Together, they consti- tute the sharpest statement of the gap between Zimbabwe's agricultural projection system and its real-time import behaviour that the trade data has yet produced.Annualised at Q1 2026's pace, Zimbabwe's full-year maize import bill for 2026 is tracking at approximately USD 514 million. That figure would make 2026 the third consecutive year in which Zimbabwe has spent more than USD 440 million importing a crop that Cabinet projections in each of those years described as approach- ing sufficiency. It is not a coincidence, but a pattern, and the monthly data from January 2021 through March 2026 provides the most precise available record of both its scale and its mechanics.The March 2026 figure of USD 53.2 million in maize imports is the trade data's most direct commentary on the Cabinet's surplus narrative. The timing gap explanation, that March imports cover the carryover shortfall from the 2024-25 growing season while the 2025-26 surplus has not yet been harvested and distributed, is correct as a statement of the agricultural calen- dar. In March 2022, when Zimbabwe genuinely produced above its 2.2 million metric tonne con- sumption threshold, maize imports for the month were USD 1.9 million, the lowest March reading in history. In March 2024, when the El Niño drought had collapsed domestic produc- tion to 635,000 metric tonnes, March imports were USD 16.2 million, building toward the cata- strophic full-year total that followed.March 2026 at USD 53.2 million sits closer to the drought-year March readings than to the surplus-year reading. That positioning does not confirm that the Cabinet's surplus projection is wrong, it confirms that import demand in March 2026 is at a level inconsistent with a country whose domestic supply is meeting its consump- tion requirement. The June-August 2026 monthly figures, when a genuine harvest surplus suppresses import demand to its sea- sonal trough, will be the definitive empirical test. In 2022, the genuine surplus year, imports fell below USD 2 million per month across that trough. In 2025, a year of improved but insuffi- cient harvest, the trough barely reached USD 1.3 million before rebounding sharply to USD 24.4 million in September. The 2026 mid-year trough will tell the story no Cabinet crop assess- ment can: whether the surplus is real, or wheth- er it is another in-season optimism that the post-harvest arithmetic does not sustain.The monthly maize import series from January 2021 to March 2026 describes something more significant than a drought-year emergency. It describes the structural relationship between Zimbabwe's production base and its consump- tion requirement, a relationship in which the country's best harvest years barely clear the threshold and its average years produce a multi-hundred-million-dollar import bill that the formal surplus narrative consistently fails to account for.In 2021, a good harvest year, Zimba- bwe spent USD 112 million on maize imports. The year began with USD 26.2 million in January and USD 32.1 million in February as the carry- over South African maize covered the prior season's gap. From June through October, imports collapsed to near-zero, USD 181,902 in June, USD 269,342 in July, USD 198,777 in August, as the new domestic crop entered the market. By Decem- ber, imports had crept back to USD 795,434. The seasonal signature is clear, partial domestic sufficiency suppresses imports mid-year, but the country begins draw- ing on imports again before the next harvest season has begun. USD 112 million across a good year confirms that Zimbabwe has not been self-sufficient in maize in any recent year, including years the government described as surplus-producing.In 2022, the series reached its closest point to genuine self-sufficiency. Full-year maize imports totalled USD 35.9 million the lowest annual figure in the five years. January and February 2022 recorded USD 154,621 and USD 144,662 respectively. The mid-year months remained below USD 6 million. The 2021-22 growing season produced approxi- mately 2.3 million metric tonnes of maize against a 2.2 million metric tonne consumption requirement, the only year in the series where production demonstrably cleared the consump- tion threshold. The trade data confirms it with a specificity no crop assessment can match: a country actually producing above consumption imports USD 144,662 of maize in February, not USD 44.9 million.In 2023, imports surged to USD 149.5 million as the regional maize market tightened ahead of the approaching El Niño season and Zimba- bwe's 2022-23 domestic production, while better than the drought year that followed, fell below 2 million metric tonnes. A June-July trough was present, USD 257,271 in June, USD 136,944 in July, but the October-December surge to levels above USD 20 million per month signalled that the market had already priced in the forthcoming production failure. December 2023 at USD 49.4 million was the series' first month above USD 40 million.In 2024, all twelve months exceeded USD 33 million. The lowest was September at USD 33.7 million. The highest was December at USD 84.7 million, the peak month since 2025. The mid-year trough that every prior year since 2021, the June-August period when the new harvest enters the market and suppresses import demand, was completely absent. Zimba- bwe imported USD 48.1 million of maize in June 2024 and USD 72.9 million in July 2024, months that in 2021 recorded USD 181,902 and USD 269,342. When 635,000 metric tonnes of domestic production meets 2.2 million metric tonnes of consumption, there is no seasonal respite. The full-year 2024 import bill reached USD 602.6 million, a 303% increase on 2023 and the largest annual maize import figure in Zimbabwe's recorded modern trade history.Zimbabwe began 2025 with USD 74.7 million in January and USD 55.0 million in February, drought-era carryover demand. Seeing improved in-season crop prospects for the 2024-25 growing year, the government intro- duced a ban on maize imports to protect domestic farmers who had delivered to the Grain Marketing Board.The ban's visible effect appeared in June 2025, imports fell to USD 4.6 million. July 2025: USD 3.8 million. August 2025: USD 1.3 million. The lowest monthly figure since the 2021 seasonal trough. Then September 2025: USD 24.4 million. October 2025: USD 55.5 million. November 2025: USD 47.3 million. The ban had reversed. The arithmetic had reasserted itself: ZimStat's Post-Harvest Survey measured the 2024-25 harvest at 1,819,819 metric tonnes, 380,000 metric tonnes below the 2.2 million tonne consumption requirement, and 470,000 metric tonnes below the 2.29 million tonne in-season projection that had informed the ban's introduction.The full-year 2025 maize import total was USD 443.5 million, a year of improved harvest, an import ban, and Cabinet surplus projections combined producing a foreign currency outflow almost three times larger than any pre-drought year in the series. That is not a policy failure at the margin. It is evidence that Zimbabwe's import dependency is structural, not cyclical, not caused by a single drought, not eliminated by a single better harvest, and not susceptible to administrative elimination through import bans that cannot change the arithmetic of a produc- tion base whose long-term average sits approxi- mately 30% below what the population requires.The Fiscal Cost That Does Not Appear in the Surplus NarrativeZimbabwe's maize import bill for 2024 and 2025 combined reached USD 1.046 billion, one billion US dollars spent in twenty-four months import- ing a crop that in-season projections in both years suggested was approaching sufficiency. At the March 2026 import pace, the combined three-year total from January 2024 to Decem- ber 2026 will approach USD 1.6 billion if the current trajectory holds. That is the fiscal cost of the gap between projection and reality, mea- sured precisely in the ZimStat trade series, month by month, at the border.The June-August 2026 monthly import figures are the moment of truth. If the 2025-26 harvest surplus is genuine and validated by ZimStat's Post-Harvest Survey, those months will show the deep trough that 2022 showed, imports below USD 2 to 5 million per month as domestic supply temporarily eliminates import demand. If they do not fall below USD 10 million by July 2026, the surplus narrative will have failed its most basic empirical test. No crop assessment, Cabinet briefing, or ministerial announcement carries the diagnostic weight of a monthly Zim- Stat trade figure. The maize import data for July 2026 will be published in August or September 2026. It will be the most important agricultural data point of the year.ZCereal Surplus Claims GrowMaize Import Bill Keeps Rising

*To Page 17The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 16Subsidise What Moves the Economyimbabwe’s fuel pricing debate has moved beyond the simple question of whether pump prices are high. The more important issue is whether the fiscal structure embedded in the pump price is now working against the productive economy at a time when regional peers are deliberately using tax policy to soften the oil shock. The April 2026 ZERA build-up showed petrol blend at about US$2.23 per litre and diesel at about US$2.11 per litre, while in May the prices moved lower to US$2.08 for blend E20 and US$2.09 for diesel. The decline month-on-month is notable, but it does not change the structure of the problem.In the April build-up, taxes and levies on blend were US$0.857 per litre, equivalent to about 38% of the pump price, while diesel carried a much smaller explicit taxes-and-levies of US$0.025 per litre. This means a full removal of the taxes and levies would have reduced blend from US$2.23 to roughly US$1.37 per litre, while diesel would have declined only marginal- ly from US$2.11 to about US$2.08. The asym- metry matters because petrol relief would have a visible effect on households, small businesses and urban transport costs, while diesel relief, under this build-up, would require a broader review of the entire pricing formula beyond the narrow taxes-and-levies.Zimbabwe consumed 2.1 billion litres of fuel in 2025, a 31% surge on the prior year that ZERA attributes to rising industrial output, expanding mining operations, and increased transport volumes consistent with the country's estimated 6.6% GDP growth. The regulator projects that level will reach 2.5 billion litres in 2026, implying an import bill approaching USD2.2 billion for the year. Within this context, the structure of what Zimbabweans actually pay at the pump, and specifically how much of that price is govern- ment-mandated cost rather than imported com- modity cost, carries consequences that extend well beyond a fuel station forecourt.Diesel 50, the dominant fuel consumed in Zim- babwe at approximately 1.75 billion litres annu- ally, carries total taxes and levies of only USD0.025 per litre, representing just 1.2% of its pump price. The remaining USD2.085 is accounted for by the import cost, logistics, administrative, distribution, and margin compo- nents. Blend E5, consumed at roughly 0.75 billion litres annually, carries taxes and levies of USD0.857 per litre, representing 38.4% of its USD2.23 pump price. Therefore, the fiscal arith- metic of scrapping taxes entirely, at 2026 projected volumes, yields an annual revenue loss of approximately USD686 million for the government, USD43.75 million from diesel and USD642.75 million from blend fuel. Against Zimbabwe's estimated GDP of USD22 to 25 billion, it represents 3% of economic output and a significant share of the government's annual fiscal revenue.For the government, fuel is one of the easiest tax bases to collect in a highly informal econo- my, and thus, this is the fiscal cliff Treasury is trying to avoid. In a budget already operating with limited room, a sudden removal of fuel levies would either require expenditure com- pression, replacement taxes, higher borrowing, or arrears accumulation. That is why Zimbabwe has hesitated while Zambia, Namibia and South Africa have used levy reductions to cushion consumers. Their fiscal structures provide more space to shift the burden temporarily. Zimba- bwe’s room is narrower because formal taxpay- ers are already carrying a large share of the budget, and fuel remains one of the few high-yield collection points. The seemingly straightforward policy response, removing diesel's USD0.025 per litre tax entire- ly, is where the analysis reveals a more structur- ally difficult problem. Diesel's pump price is overwhelmingly an import cost problem, not a tax problem. The aforementioned April 2026 fuel price build-up shows a diesel FOB price of USD1.8161 per litre, which together with logis- tics and financing costs brings the CIF Feruka cost to USD1.885 per litre before a single dollar of government levy has been applied. This means that even in a world of zero diesel taxa- tion, the pump price would fall only from USD2.11 to USD2.085, a reduction of two and a half cents that would be commercially imper- ceptible to any industrial user. Diesel is expen- sive in Zimbabwe not primarily because of gov- ernment policy but because Zimbabwe imports a refined product with high energy density from international markets at prevailing commodity prices, through a logistics chain that adds further cost. The path to cheaper industrial diesel therefore cannot rely on tax relief alone. It requires active price intervention in the form of a direct subsidy that bridges the gap between what the market delivers and what industrial competitiveness requires.If government were to target a diesel retail price closer to US$1.60–US$1.65 per litre, the impli- cations for the economy would be materially different from a broad fuel subsidy programme. Such a framework could be achieved through a hybrid structure where taxes and levies on diesel are entirely removed while part of the subsidy gap is cross-financed through maintain- ing relatively higher levies on blend. Since blend is less dominant in industrial usage, the distor- tionary effect on productive sectors would be lower while still preserving an important reve- nue stream for Treasury. The structure would be that the government scraps all taxes and levies on diesel, removing the USD0.025 per litre and bringing diesel to USD2.085, and then subsidis- es diesel further to a target price of USD1.65 per litre. This subsidy of USD0.435 per litre is funded through the existing levy structure on blend fuel, whose tax component of USD0.857 per litre on 0.75 billion litres of annual consump- tion generates approximately USD642.75 million per year. The diesel subsidy, at 1.75 billion litres multiplied by USD0.435, costs USD761.25 million annually, of which the blend tax revenues cover USD642.75 million, or approximately 84.4%. The residual funding requirement of approximately USD118 million, together with the USD43.75 million in diesel tax revenue foregone, creates a gross fiscal outlay of approximately USD805 million. This is the cross-subsidy mechanism that blend consum- ers, who are predominantly private motorists, fund a subsidy that reduces the input costs of Zimbabwe's entire productive industrial sector. The blend pump price remains unchanged under this arrangement, unchanged from the status quo, because the existing levy structure provides sufficient cross-subsidy revenue to fund most of the diesel price intervention with- out requiring a further levy increase on blend consumers.The economic recovery that this intervention generates is what transforms the fiscal arithme- tic from a straightforward cost into a near break-even proposition. Industries currently paying USD2.11 per litre of diesel would pay USD1.65, a 21.8% reduction. On 1.75 billion litres of annual diesel consumption, this trans- lates into USD805 million in annual fuel cost savings flowing directly to the corporate sector, specifically to mining, manufacturing, agricul- ture, and logistics companies whose diesel spend is a major line item in their cost strucZFuel Tax Trade-OffRelief at Pump, Pressure at Treasury

The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 17he recent decision by Cabinet to cede a 61 percent stake in the Masuwe Special Economic Zone development in Victoria Falls to JR Goddard Private Limited represents one of the most significant public private restructuring moves in Zimbabwe’s infrastruc- ture and tourism investment landscape in recent years. The project, situated on 1200 hectares of state land, signals a deliberate shift in how the state is engaging private capital to unlock large scale developments in strategic tourism corri- dors. At its core, this arrangement is not only about land development but also about redefin- ing risk sharing, investment mobilisation, and the long-term political economy of state-owned assets.The Masuwe Special Economic Zone is designed as an integrated tourism city combin- ing villas, lodges, high end residential holiday homes, a shopping mall, a hospital, and sup- porting infrastructure. This design places it within a growing global trend where tourism destinations are no longer limited to leisure attractions but are instead built as mixed use economic ecosystems. The inclusion of essen- tial services such as health infrastructure indi- cates an attempt to move beyond seasonal tourism dependency and towards a permanent settlement and service economy model anchored in tourism demand.The decision to allocate 61 percent ownership to JR Goddard Consortium while the state through the Mosi Oa Tunya Development Com- pany retains 39 percent raises important analyt- ical questions about asset control, fiscal strate- gy, and development urgency. On the surface, the structure appears to favour private capital significantly. However, it also reflects a practical response to capital constraints faced by the state in financing large infrastructure projects. The private consortium brings in an investment commitment of 66.9 million United States dollars while the state contributes land valued at 25.6 million United States dollars. This asym- metry in capital input explains the equity distri- bution and highlights how land is increasingly being used as a sovereign asset to attract development finance.From an economic standpoint, the project can be interpreted as a form of infrastructure led growth strategy. The scope of works including road surfacing, road upgrading, water pipeline construction, sewerage systems, effluent reuse ponds, and a power substation indicates that the real value creation lies not only in tourism structures but in enabling infrastructure. Such infrastructure has spillover effects beyond the project boundary, particularly for surrounding communities that are likely to benefit from improved water access, transport connectivity, and energy supply. This positions the project as a hybrid between a private investment and a quasi-public infrastructure expansion.The governance structure of the joint venture also deserves attention. The project is set under a 25-year structured profit recoup period with a proportionally represented board chaired by the state linked entity. This long-time horizon reflects the capital-intensive nature of infra- structure led tourism development where returns are not immediate but spread across decades. The involvement of the Zimbabwe Investment and Development Agency frame- work and public private partnership guidelines suggests an attempt to institutionalise account- ability and reduce risks associated with asset transfers of this magnitude.One of the most interesting dimensions of this development is its location in Victoria Falls, a globally recognised tourism hub. Victoria Falls already functions as a high value destination drawing international visitors, and the introduc- tion of a Special Economic Zone in Masuwe effectively expands the spatial and economic footprint of the region. By transforming state land into a structured tourism city, Zimbabwe is attempting to reposition Victoria Falls from a natural attraction into a fully integrated econom- ic zone. This move could significantly increase foreign direct investment inflows, tourism reve- nue diversification, and real estate development activity.However, the transaction also raises questions about long term sovereignty over strategic land assets. The 61 percent stake held by the private consortium means that operational control and profit dominance are largely in private hands for the duration of the agreement. While this may accelerate development, it also introduces dependency risks where key national tourism assets are influenced by private corporate strat- egies. The balance between attracting invest- ment and retaining strategic control becomes central to evaluating the sustainability of such deals.The inclusion of multiple companies within the consortium including JR Goddard Private Limit- ed, Sesani Private Limited, Stewart Scott Zim- babwe Private Limited, and GGF Africa Private Limited indicates a diversified private sector participation model. This structure may help distribute financial risk and technical expertise across different entities. It also suggests that the project is not dependent on a single investor, which can improve resilience in execution. Nonetheless, it also complicates accountability structures, particularly in monitoring perfor- mance across different contractors and stake- holders.Another critical dimension is the socio-econom- ic impact on surrounding communities. The development of water pipelines extending beyond the 1200-hectare site into neighboring areas signals potential regional benefits. Improved infrastructure may enhance liveli- hoods, support small business growth, and improve access to essential services. However, such benefits are contingent on effective imple- mentation and equitable distribution of resourc- es. Large scale developments often carry the risk of uneven benefit distribution where gains are concentrated among investors and elite consumers of high-end tourism products.The Masuwe project also reflects Zimbabwe’s broader economic strategy under its national development frameworks which prioritise infra- structure expansion, tourism growth, and investment attraction. In this context, the project can be seen as a flagship example of how policy translates into large scale development execu- tion. It aligns with the idea of leveraging strate- gic geographic locations to create economic zones capable of attracting international capital.Despite its promise, the project will need careful oversight to ensure that projected benefits are realised. Infrastructure delivery delays, cost overruns, governance inefficiencies, and market demand fluctuations in tourism could all affect outcomes. Additionally, the long-time horizon means that political and economic stability will play a significant role in determining success. Investors and the state alike are effectively entering a long-term partnership where trust and institutional consistency become as import- ant as financial inputs.In conclusion, the ceding of a majority stake in the Masuwe Special Economic Zone to JR God- dard Consortium is a landmark development in Zimbabwe’s investment and infrastructure strat- egy. It reflects a pragmatic approach to mobilis- ing private capital for large scale tourism infra- structure while also raising important questions about state control, equity distribution, and long-term economic sovereignty. The project sits at the intersection of opportunity and risk, offering the potential to transform Victoria Falls into a fully integrated tourism city while simulta- neously testing the limits of public private part- nership models in emerging economies.Zimbabwe Cedes Major StakeVictoria Falls Tourism ProjectT*From Page 16 -tures. Mining alone, which accounts for a significant share of diesel consumption through haul trucks, generators, drill rigs, and process- ing equipment, would see margin improvements that compress the cost per ounce or tonne of output and improve the economics of low- er-grade ore bodies that are currently marginal at existing diesel prices. Agriculture would ben- efit through reduced irrigation, tractor, and transport costs, improving the profitability of commercial farming and reducing the delivered cost of food to consumers. Manufacturing firms would see operating margin improvements that make Zimbabwe-produced goods more com- petitive against cheaper imports in the domestic market and against regional exporters in cross-border markets.At Zimbabwe's corporate income tax rate of 25%, the USD805 million in industrial fuel sav- ings generates approximately USD201 million in additional annual corporate tax revenue as higher corporate profitability flows through to tax assessments. The consumption multiplier from lower industrial input costs generates additional employment, higher wage bills, and therefore additional PAYE income tax, conservatively esti- mated at USD30 million. The reduced cost of goods transported by diesel-powered logistics leads to lower consumer food and manufac- tured goods prices, which releases household purchasing power that circulates back through the economy and generates approximately USD30 million in additional VAT receipts. In aggregate, the fiscal recovery from the econom- ic stimulus generated by cheaper diesel amounts to approximately USD261 million per year. Set against the gross fiscal outlay of USD805 million and the blend tax revenue retained of USD642.75 million, the net fiscal position of the cross-subsidy scheme is a cost of approximately USD162.25 million per year to the government, compared with the status quo in which it collects USD686.5 million in fuel taxes but suppresses the productive economy's competitiveness in exchange. The net econom- ic benefit of the scheme, measured as the stim- ulus to GDP through lower industrial input costs, improved export competitiveness, and stronger corporate investment capacity, is estimated at USD1.1 billion in additional annual economic output through a 1.4 times fiscal multiplier on the released corporate savings. Against a current GDP of approximately USD22 to 25 billion, this represents a 4 to 5% growth divi- dend that the current fuel tax architecture is effectively preventing from materialising. The policy case for the cross-subsidy is therefore not primarily a social argument about fuel affordability but an economic argument about where Zimbabwe's tax structure should sit rela- tive to the activities that generate the tax base on which the government ultimately depends.

CZM

*To Page 20The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 19marketsarani is emerging from its final launch this week, occupying the one layer of Zimbabwe's financial services market that is both genuinely open and genuinely valu- able, which is the connectivity and compliance infrastructure that every financial institution in the country requires to operate efficiently.FBC Holdings formed Xarani in 2021 as a fully-fledged financial technology company whose services are open to local and regional banks, fintech startups, vendors and regulators. The commercial logic of this positioning is that platform infrastructure extracts value from the transaction volumes generated across the entire system rather than competing for market share at the product layer where EcoCash has already foreclosed competition.Whether that logic translates into a commercial- ly independent platform business or remains an internal group capability is the defining question for FBC Holdings' competitive positioning over the next three years, and the answer turns on three decisions the group has not yet visibly made.The Finserve ParallelEquity Group's Finserve in Kenya is the most analytically useful regional model for under- standing what Xarani is attempting and the con- ditions required to achieve it. In August 2018, Equity Group spun off its fintech arm into Finserve Africa Limited as a fully owned subsidi- ary with its own board and management.FBC made the same structural move with Xarani three years later, which places Xarani at approximately the point in its maturation trajec- tory that Finserve occupied in 2021. Equity Group CEO James Mwangi defined the intent of the separation in terms that FBC Holdings has replicated almost verbatim.Equity Group itself would become one of Finserve's clients, and the subsidiary would focus on delivering solutions for the broader economy. The instruction to competitors was to plug into the platform or fall behind it.Finserve built 64 fintech, regtech and insurtech APIs through its Jenga platform, reached 4 million people daily through those APIs, and was working with 136 developers and SMEs by the time of its commercial launch as an indepen- dent entity. That depth arose from seven years of building inside Equity Group before the exter- nal platform push began.Xarani is now in year four of a comparable build cycle. The near-term priority, which is execution before end of 2026, is expanding the developer and institutional partner base beyond the current ZAMFI, Steward Bank and NMB rela- tionships to a point where the platform carries transaction volume sufficient to make it the low- est-friction option for third-party developers.Below that threshold Xarani functions as an internal group capability. Above it, Xarani func- tions as infrastructure.The critical constraint differentiating Xarani's operating context from Finserve's is market size. Equity Group entered its fintech build phase with over 14 million custom- ers across six countries, which is a transaction base large enough to make the Jenga APIs commercially attractive to external developers from day one of the external push.FBC Bank operates a customer base orders of magnitude smaller inside a single-country econo- my of 16 million people. This arises from FBC's structural position as a mid-tier institution rather than a dominant market player, and it compresses Xarani's organic adoption path in a way that accelerates the timeline within which governance and credi- bility changes must be made to bring competing banks onto the platform.What Xarani Becomes at Full BuildThree product layers define Xarani's architec- ture at maturity, each of which carries a distinct commercial logic and a distinct data accumula- tion dynamic. The first is digital identity and onboarding infrastructure, which is the layer where Xarani's AI-powered KYC systems have cut onboarding costs by 70 percent for partici- pating institutions.This cost reduction transforms customer acqui- sition economics for every financial services provider in Zimbabwe currently absorbing the full burden of manual onboarding.The data advantage this layer generates com- pounds with every new institution added to the platform, because the onboarding behavioural data from multiple institutions processed through a single infrastructure is analytically richer than the same volume processed for one institution alone.That data advantage concentrates inside Xarani and becomes the foundation of the credit intelli- gence the group can deploy across MicroPlan, OutRisk and FBC Bank within 24 months of reaching scale adoption.The second layer is payroll and civil service lending infrastructure, which is the Deduct-At-Source platform connecting microfi- nance institutions to the Salaries Services Bureau for online loan bookings and salary deductions.Civil servant payroll lending in Zimbabwe is structurally large, operationally expensive to administer manually, and exposed to payment delay risk that erodes margins across every institution in the segment.An institution embedded in the deduction infra- structure before mid-2026 holds a first-mover position in the most stable segment of Zimba- bwe's consumer lending market, which arises from the automatic deduction mechanism removing the primary default risk variable from the credit equation.That position becomes progressively harder to displace as institutions build credit scoring models on the deduction history data Xarani generates, because the data asset is propri- etary to the platform and cannot be replicated by a competitor entering the segment later.The third layer is interoperability, which is the connecting tissue that transforms Xarani from a commercial product into a component of nation- al financial infrastructure. Xarani has developed interoperable platforms and forged partnerships with telecommunications companies, banks including Steward Bank and NMB, and govern- ment-backed digital ID systems.Full interoperability with ZimSwitch extends that reach to the national payments switch and changes the regulatory relationship, the pricing power, and the competitive moat simultaneous- ly.The RTGS system collapse in August 2025 drove institutional demand for alternative settle- ment and connectivity pathways that are inde- pendent of the national settlement layer, and Xarani's interoperability positioning is the direct commercial response to that demand.Xarani and the Platform BetWhat FBC Holdings Is Building, and Whether It Can WorkX

*To Page 21The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 20 Every institution that connects to Xarani's platform before the next infrastructure disruption event acquires a continuity capability its uncon- nected competitors do not hold.The Central HazardThe structural hazard that determines whether Xarani reaches platform scale is the credibility problem inherent in bank-owned financial infra- structure, which is a problem that concentrates specifically in Zimbabwe's small, relation- ship-driven banking sector.A competing bank that integrates Xarani's KYC or payroll deduction platform hands FBC Hold- ings visibility into its customer acquisition volumes, onboarding rates, and lending pipe- line.The perception that FBC can use that data com- mercially is sufficient to keep Tier 1 banking competitors off the platform regardless of what the operational reality is, and this arises from the absence of a visible and verifiable gover- nance firewall between Xarani and FBC Bank. The addressable market among competing banking institutions stays closed until that firewall is constructed and publicly demonstra- ble.Finserve resolved a comparable version of this problem by appointing an independent board majority and management team drawn from outside Equity Group's own talent pipeline, creating a governance separation the market could verify through observable personnel and structural decisions.Xarani's current leadership team has been drawn almost entirely from FBC's own talent pipeline. Restructuring the board composition and publishing a data governance protocol with verifiable operational separation from FBC Bank are the two changes that unlock the banking sector client base, and both are executable within the current financial year without requir- ing external capital.The regulatory dimension of this hazard carries equal weight. The RBZ intervened decisively in EcoCash's operations between 2020 and 2021 and restructured the mobile money market through directive rather than market competi- tion.A PaaS provider whose revenue depends on being the connectivity layer between financial institutions is the primary target of any regulato- ry mandate routing institutional connectivity through a state-owned or nationally neutral infrastructure layer.The transition of Xarani's former CTO to the RBZ directorship overseeing ICT and fintech supervision is a relationship asset for navigating that risk, and this arises from the personal understanding of Xarani's architecture that the individual carries into the regulatory role. FBC Holdings needs to manage that relationship as a strategic engagement channel rather than a passive benefit.The Domestic Competitive LandscapeEcoCash accounts for more than 70 percent of all national payment transactions and holds over 86 percent of Zimbabwe's mobile money market.That concentration makes direct competition in the payment wallet layer commercially irrational for any new entrant, and Xarani's platform posi- tioning is the correct structural response.Infrastructure providers extract value from the volume generated by dominant players rather than competing for share against them, which is the commercial logic that makes Xarani a poten- tial beneficiary of EcoCash's dominance rather than a casualty of it.The near-term commercial opportunity, which is actionable within the next 12 months, is to become the connectivity and compliance layer that EcoCash, InnBucks, Paynow and the bank- ing sector use to interact with each other and with government systems.Zimbabwe's fintech ecosystem includes 82 companies among them ZimSwitch, HiMoney, MyCash and Sasai, alongside InnBucks Micro- bank, Paynow and Mukuru. None of these enti- ties is building the same PaaS architecture Xarani is pursuing.ZimSwitch is national infrastructure and func- tions as a partner channel. InnBucks, Paynow and Mukuru are consumer and merchant-fac- ing, and their overlap with Xarani's infrastruc- ture layer is functionally absent.The genuinely dangerous competitor is not domestic. Finserve's Jenga Payment Gateway allows cash-out by merchants to any bank in the world and to all mobile wallets across seven countries, and Finserve has stated the ambition to expand the platform southward.A Jenga integration into ZimSwitch would repli- cate Xarani's interoperability proposition with seven countries of transaction volume behind it. That threat materialises within two to three years if Xarani fails to build platform depth suffi- cient to make the cost of switching prohibitive for the institutions already embedded in its infra- structure.The Group Opportunity MapThe most immediately actionable competitive advantage from Xarani's build sits inside FBCH's own group, and it operates through three distinct transmission paths affecting MicroPlan, OutRisk and FBC Bank in sequence.MicroPlan's native integration with the Deduct-At-Source platform eliminates the manual submission and reconciliation burden that currently erodes margins on civil servant lending. This arises from the gap between the SSB processing timeline and MicroPlan's loan book management cycle, which creates a pay- ment delay exposure that automated deduction removes entirely.The Capitec model in South Africa demon- strates the outcome of this integration at scale, which is a payroll-backed lending book that performs at industrially low default rates because the deduction mechanism removes the primary credit risk variable from the portfolio.MicroPlan's integration with Xarani's deduction platform, executed before mid-2026, compress- es cost-per-loan within the quarter and separates default rates in the deduction-linked port- folio from the manually administered book within two reporting periods.OutRisk's addressable market expands in direct proportion to Xarani's onboarding volume, which arises from the structural opportunity to attach insurance products at the point of digital identity creation rather than through a separate distribution channel.Zimbabwe's insurance penetration sits at 3.6 percent of GDP. The barrier to expanding that penetration is distribution friction and acquisition cost. A client onboarded through Xarani's AI-KYC infrastructure receives an OutRisk prod- uct attachment at the moment of account creation, before leaving the digital onboarding flow, which is the bundled acquisition architec- ture that Safaricom deployed to scale M-Shwari and M-Tiba in Kenya.Every new institution adopting Xarani's KYC platform extends OutRisk's distribution reach without OutRisk incurring additional acquisition expenditure, and this compounds across the 12 to 18 month period required to bring three to five new institutional clients onto the platform.FBC Bank's competitive position transforms through data accumulation rather than product feature differentiation. A bank processing its own customer onboarding and transaction data operates with the same information as every competitor in the market.A bank whose subsidiary processes onboarding and transaction data for compet- ing institutions through a shared infrastructure oper- ates with a credit intelligence advantage that compounds continuously, which arises from the behavioural rich- ness of cross-institutional data being structurally supe- rior to single-institution data for credit scoring purposes.That advantage concentrates into underwriting improve- ment within 24 months of scale adoption and gener- ates a risk-adjusted lending margin advantage that FBC Bank captures without requir- ing market share acquisition from competitors.The Hazards AheadThree structural risks define Xarani's forward trajectory beyond the governance prob- lem, and each carries a different time horizon for materialisation. The first is the currency mismatch in capital expenditure, which is immediate and ongoing.Cloud infrastructure, international licensing and senior technology talent all carry USD cost bases. Xarani's domestic revenue is primarily ZiG-denominated. The forex conversion friction that constrains every bank's ability to fund long-duration USD-cost assets applies with equal force to a fintech infrastructure business, and this arises from Zimbabwe's dual-currency architecture rather than from any decision Xarani has made.FBC Holdings must capitalise Xarani in USD to sustain the infrastructure build at the pace required to close the gap with East African com- petitors before they reach ZimSwitch.The second risk is talent attrition, which is a near-term event horizon of 12 months at current compensation structures. The team that built Xarani's KYC infrastructure and agile delivery capability is globally portable at compensation levels that FBC Holdings' domestic pay bands do not match.*From Page 19

ZThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 21*From Page 20 Staff departure at the senior technical layer transfers institutional knowledge to competitors or to the regulator, as the former CTO's RBZ appointment already demonstrates. FBC Hold- ings must restructure Xarani's compensation architecture to include USD-denominated reten- tion components before the next round of regional fintech hiring activity draws from the same talent pool.The third risk is platform reliability, which is an event-driven exposure rather than a structural one but carries the highest single-event conse- quence. A PaaS provider whose platform degrades during a ZimSwitch or RTGS disrup- tion event destroys the trust of every institutional client simultaneously, and trust is the primary commercial asset of an infrastructure business.Xarani requires investment in redundancy, failover architecture and business continuity capability independent of the national settlement layer. This expenditure produces no immediate revenue and is therefore the first item cut in capital allocation decisions under budget pressure, which is precisely the condi- tion that produces the catastrophic reliability event.FBC Holdings' commitment to fund that redun- dancy before the next national infrastructure disruption is the single most important near-term capital decision for Xarani's commer- cial durability.The Forward AssessmentXarani is the most structurally interesting new entity in Zimbabwe's financial services sector because it occupies a competitive position that is both open and defensible, which is rare in a market where EcoCash has foreclosed the most obvious growth layer.The platform bet is intellectually coherent, the Finserve trajectory demonstrates the commer- cial destination at maturity, and the internal group synergies with MicroPlan, OutRisk and FBC Bank are real, underexploited and action- able within the current operating cycle.The version of Xarani that reaches platform scale in the Zimbabwean market solves three problems in sequence: it demonstrates opera- tional independence from FBC Bank through governance restructuring before the end of the current financial year, it builds USD-capitalised redundancy into its infrastructure before the next national system disruption, and it adds three to five banking sector clients to its platform before Finserve's southward expansion reaches ZimSwitch. Each of those outcomes is within FBC Holdings' power to deliver, and the deci- sion to deliver them is a capital allocation and governance decision rather than a technology problem.

Oil pares gains after US says two vessels crossed Strait of HormuzOil prices pared earlier gains on Monday after the U.S. military said two U.S. Navy guided-mis- sile destroyers had entered the Gulf to break an Iranian blockade and that two U.S. ships had transited the Strait of Hormuz.Iran earlier said it had prevented a U.S. warship from entering the Gulf.Brent crude futures LCOc1 were up $2.05, or 1.9%, at $110.22 a barrel by 1307 GMT, having hit a session high of $114.30. U.S. West Texas Intermediate CLc1 was up 47 cents, or 0.5%, at $102.41 a barrel, after rising to as high as $107.46 earlier on Monday. – nytimesEni selling its stake in Nigeria’s Renaissance JVEni is in the process of selling its 5% interest in the Renaissance joint venture in Nigeria, the Italian energy group said, adding the name of the prospective buyer and the value of the deal were confidential.In written answers to questions posed by share- holders ahead of its annual shareholder meet- ing on May 6, Eni said the prospective buyer would be subject to a due diligence process which would include also an assessment of potential reputational risks.Nigerian and foreign-owned energy companies have filed bids for Eni’s stake in the joint venture – formerly Shell Petroleum Development Com- pany JV – with Sterling Oil Exploration and Energy Production Company (SEEPCO) seen as a frontrunner, some media outlets reported earlier this year. - BloombergUganda March coffee exports up slightly from a year earlierUganda’s coffee exports in March rose 2.9% from a year earlier on the back of a good crop, the ministry of agriculture, animal industry and fisheries said in a report.The commodity is one of the East African coun- try’s top foreign exchange earners.Uganda is Africa’s largest exporter of coffee followed by Ethiopia.Uganda shipped 671,152 60-kg bags of the beans in March, up 2.9% from the same month last year, according to the report released late on Monday.“Coffee export volumes during the month were higher than March of last year on account of increased coffee production,” the report said, adding, however, that in terms of value, March’s earnings were lower by 13.6% from a year earli- er on account of lower global prices. - reutersEuropean shares dip as fresh US-Iran clash- es rattle risk sentimentEuropean shares nudged lower ‌on Tuesday, with investors on edge after the U.S. and Iran launched fresh attacks in Gulf waters, while global oil prices remained elevated.The pan-European STOXX 600 (.STOXX), opens new tab was down 0.1% at 604.68 points, as ⁠of 0704 GMT, after posting its biggest drop in a month on Monday. Major regional bourses were also trading lower, with London's FTSE 100 (.FTSE), opens new tab down 1%. The escalation in the Middle East conflict followed U.S. President Donald Trump's attempt to get stranded vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Gulf to wider mar- kets and typically ‌carries ⁠oil and gas supply equal to about 20% of global demand every day. - cnbcZambia says US health deal must be uncou- pled from minerals accessZambia’s government said on Monday that it opposed a U.S. attempt to tie health funding to access to critical minerals, giving details for the first time about why negotiations with Washing- ton over two proposed agreements have stalled.Zambia’s Foreign Minister Mulambo Haimbe said the United States had offered support of up to $2 billion over the next five years in a proposed health agreement, but that some of the terms regarding data sharing would violate Zambians’ right to privacy.Separately, he said Zambia had objections to the content of a proposed critical minerals agreement. - wsjMalawi fuel crisis deepensMalawi's fuel crisis amid uncertainty in the oil market shows no signs of abating. Even as the government reassures citizens that the country is not running out of fuel, most filling stations are dry, and the few with fuel are experiencing long queues.In the capital Lilongwe, businessperson Antho- ny Jamali told DW: \"At times, we have to trek in order to reach to our destinations. We have stopped some of our businesses because we feel like it's becoming expensive.\"Another man, Isaac Banda, seemed disheart- ened by the struggle to get fuel: \"Everything has risen in price, depending on the food and some of the groceries. It's become very difficult to travel from one place to another now because of the fuel crisis.\" - DWSouth African rand weakens as firmer dollar, oil jump weigh on sentimentThe South African rand weakened on Monday, pressured by a firmer U.S. dollar and a jump in oil prices, as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran weighed on global market sentiment.At 1334 GMT, the rand traded at 16.6925 against the dollar, down 0.5% from its previous close.The safe-haven U.S. dollar edged higher against a basket of currencies, while oil jumped over 3% to more than $110 a barrel.- MT NewswiresChina grants Africa’s largest economies tariff-free accessChina's new tariff policy officially kicked off ON 1 May granting Africa's 20 largest economies—in- cluding South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, and Kenya—tariff-free access to its market for the next two years. This development comes as the United States pursues new import taxes under President Donald Trump's protectionist agenda. Joining us to discuss the key aspects of the China-Afri- ca trade deal is Azar Jammine, Chief Econo- mist, Econometrix. - Retail Insight NetworkQ1'26 earnings drive momentum in Ghana equitiesAs investors digest the first quarter results of listed companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange, analysts at Laurus Africa say the results from banking and telecoms sectors show strong topline, expanding margins, and a clear easing of the post-DDEP credit hangover. - reu- tersAfrica start-up funding up 27% y/y to $600mnStartup funding in Africa recorded a 27 per cent year on year growth to 600 million dollars in the first quarter of 2026. But, despite this growth, deals declined by 34 per cent, a greater rate to 92 deals excluding exits. - GuruFocus.UAE says it is discussing currency swap line with USThe United Arab Emirates is discussing a currency swap line with the United States, its trade minister said on Monday.“We have this discussion and conversation with many, it’s part of an elite group that the U.S. is having this swap policy with. They are only having it with five countries,” Thani Al Zeyoudi said at a conference in Abu Dhabi.“Being part of that group means that transac- tions… trade, investments between both nations reach a level where that swap is highly needed … so it is an elite matter, (it) is not about bailing out,” he told the “Make It In The Emir- ates” event.- TheStreetUganda’s forex reserves jump nearly 70% due to foreign investmentsUganda’s foreign exchange reserves rose 69.7% in the 12 months to January, supported in part by strong foreign direct investment inflows into the oil sector, the central bank said in a report.The East African nation’s foreign reserves rose to $5.6 billion as at end January, up from $3.3 billion at the end of the same month last year, Bank of Uganda said in a report seen by Reu- ters on Monday.Uganda expects to commence commercial crude production this year and ahead of that, oil firms France’s Total and China’s CNOOC, who operate the oil fields, have been undertaking investments in key infrastructure such as pipe- lines and drilling wells. investing.comWorld Cup prize pool nears $900 million as FIFA boosts payoutsFIFA has increased payments to teams compet- ing in the 2026 World Cup, raising the total distribution to $871 million, making it the most lucrative edition on record.But the increased financial distributions, announced last Wednesday at the 36th FIFA Council meeting in Vancouver, Canada, come as the governing body faces criticism over ticket pricing and its commercial partnerships.Under the new financial distribution structure, participating associations at the 2026 World Cup — set to be held across the U.S., Mexico, and Canada from 11 June — will each receive an additional $2 million, across - cnbcafricaGoogle cloud growth tops Microsoft and Amazon as all three beat estimates on AI demandAll three top cloud infrastructure providers surpassed analyst estimates in earnings reports late Wednesday, but Google was the standout, generating its fastest growth rate on record. - ApnewsTLcom secures $70mn pan-African tech fundTLcom has secured $70 million in funding, the first tranche of its $150-million Africa-focused tech fund. The venture capital firm says it plans to expand to Egypt as it focuses on tech-en- abled African start-ups. - Bbc‘Bubble effect’: Weight loss drug fuelled growth is putting the pharma sector at riskSurging demand for weight loss and diabetes drugs leaves the pharmaceutical sector at risk from a “bubble effect” as profitability soars, new research suggests.Demand for the likes of Wegovy and Zepbound has driven research and development returns to their highest level in years, but a report pub- lished by Deloitte on Monday suggests this is masking pressure facing the rest of the sector. Pharmaceutical R&D returns for the world’s top 20 pharma companies have improved for a third consecutive year to 7%, thanks almost entirely to a handful of high-forecast assets such as glucagon-like peptide receptor agonists, or GLP-1s. - ReutersBusiness Around The World The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 22

130 Nigerians seek repatriation from South Africa after protestsAt least 130 Nigerian citizens in South Africa have asked their government to fly them home after a protests there targeting foreigners, Nige- ria’s Foreign Minister, Bianca Odumegwu-Ojuk- wu, said.There were the first to apply to a new scheme to repatriate citizens launched by Nigeria’s gov- ernment, Odumegwu-Ojukwu said on Sunday, amid fears that confrontations in South Africa could escalate.Protesters held rallies in Pretoria and Johannes- burg last week, demanding tougher action against illegal immigration, saying undocument- ed foreign nationals were putting pressure on jobs, security and public services. - Bbc.US calls Taiwan ‘trusted and capable part- ner’, praises its ties with EswatiniTaiwan is a “trusted and capable” partner of the United States and Taipei’s global relationships, including with Eswatini, provide significant ben- efits, the U.S. State Department said of Presi- dent Lai Ching-te’s trip to the southern African kingdom.Lai arrived in the former Swaziland on Saturday on a surprise visit after his government blamed Chinese pressure for nixing an earlier trip planned for last month by getting three Indian Ocean states to deny overflight permission for his aircraft.China views democratically governed Taiwan as part of its territory with no right to state-to-state ties, a position Taiwan’s government strongly disputes, and Beijing has demanded countries stop any engagements with the island. - Abc- news.Landmark UN resolution is a small but cru- cial step toward answering slavery’s lasting questionsIn a historic vote on March 25th – the Interna- tional Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade – the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the transatlantic slave trade the “gravest crime against humanity”.Ghana’s President John Mahama spearheaded the landmark resolution, supported by the African Union and the Caribbean Community.The resolution was adopted with 123 votes in favour – representing about 75% of the world population. Among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and Russia voted in favour; the UK and France were among the 52 countries to abstain; and the United States was one of the three countries that voted against it, with Argentina and Israel the other two. - TheGuardian.Trump said his blockade would cause Iran’s oil industry to ‘explode’ this week.Locked in a standoff with Iran that will break only when economic pain is no longer tolerable, President Donald Trump may have to maintain his naval blockade against Iran for weeks — forcing serious economic consequences on the world.Trump said Wednesday that he will keep the U.S. blockade against Iran in place until it agrees to a nuclear deal. Tehran, meanwhile, refuses to reopen the Strait of Hormuz until the U.S. calls off its Navy. - Npr.Iran's navy warns seafarers amid US effort to 'guide' stranded shipsIran said on Monday that ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz must coordinate with Irani- an authorities, after the United States announced an effort to open the strait.\"Ships, their owners and shipping companies know well that to ensure their security and safety they need to coordinate with relevant bodies in the Islamic Republic of Iran,\" foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said at a briefing in Tehran.The United States on Monday kicked off an effort to “guide” stranded ships from the Iran-gripped Strait of Hormuz, as it tries to counter economic disruptions that outlasted the peak of fighting with no peace deal in sight.A day after US President Donald Trump announced what he called “Project Freedom,” the Joint Maritime Information Center said Monday that the US had set up an “enhanced security area” south of typical shipping routes and urged mariners to coordinate closely with Omani authorities “due to anticipated high traffic volume.” - Aljazeera.Nigerians seek return from South Africa amid xenophobia concernsNigerians in South Africa are increasingly seek- ing to return home amid renewed concerns over xenophobic tensions, with officials in Abuja con- firming that many of those requesting evacua- tion lack valid residency documents.Nigerian foreign ministry spokesperson Kimiebi Ebienfa explained that the voluntary repatriation effort largely involves individuals whose legal status in South Africa has lapsed.“Those that have indicated interest for a volun- tary return to Nigeria are some persons that don't have… the legal requirement to live in South Africa. Maybe those that their visas have expired, or their documentation is not regular,” he said.“Instead of remaining there to be caught up with law enforcement… they are pleading to just leave the country and our missions are taking that up with them.” - BBC.Ugandan civil society denounces ‘foreign agents’ billCivil society groups in Uganda have strongly criticised a proposed “Protection of Sovereignty Bill,” warning it could stifle dissent and harm the economy, as debate intensifies ahead of its presentation in parliament.At a press conference, former cabinet minister Miria Matembe condemned the speed at which the controversial legislation is being pushed forward.“I have never seen such a controversial, widely controversial, rejected bill being rushed to be debated within two days… And you bring a bill that has been controversial and widely reject- ed.” - Reuters.Mali junta chief to take over killed defence minister's roleTMali's junta leader, Assimi Goita, will assume the additional role of defence minister, accord- ing to a decree announced on Monday, after the death of the previous minister in large-scale attacks.Mali is facing a security crisis following an assault on junta strongholds led by Tuareg sep- aratists and al-Qaeda-linked jihadists more than a week ago, during which Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed by a car bomb at his residence.The separatists and jihadists were able to cap- ture the key northern town of Kidal in their assault on multiple junta locations, in the largest attack in the west African country in nearly 15 years.The fighting resulted in the death of at least 23 people, with the United Nations children's agency UNICEF reporting that civilians and chil- dren were among the dead and injured. - AIM.Ex-French president Sarkozy attends final hearings in Libyan financing trialFormer French president Nicolas Sarkozy returned to the Paris Court of Appeal for the final hearings in the high‑profile case over alleged Libyan financing of his 2007 presidential campaign, again rejecting accusations that he sought funds from Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.Sarkozy, 71, previously told the court there was “not a single cent of Libyan money” in his cam- paign, reiterating a position he has maintained since the case first emerged.He became the first former president in modern French history to spend time in jail over the affair, serving 20 days of a five‑year sentence before being released pending appeal. - Zambi- anobserver.Drones target Khartoum airport, Sudan alleges Ethiopian involvementA drone launched by Sudan 's paramilitary forces targeted the airport in the capital of Khar- toum on Monday but was shot down before it could hit the target, airport officials said. Sudan accused Ethiopia of being involved in the assault.It was the latest attack in the deadly war in Sudan, now in its fourth year, which has pushed the country to the brink. The attack came just days after the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces killed at least five people in a drone attack that hit a civilian vehicle on the outskirts of Khartoum on Saturday - Polity. Thousands march in DR Congo capital in support of US sanctions against KabilaThousands of pro-government supporters took to the streets of the Congolese capital, Kinsha- sa, on Monday in support of United States sanc- tions against Joseph Kabila.Washington blacklisted the former president last week, accusing him of supporting the Rwan- da-backed M23 rebels and its political-military arm, the Congo River Alliance (AFC), involved in the conflict in the east of the country.The Treasury Department claimed that, among other things, Kabila has provided them with financial and technological support with the intent to destabilise the Kinshasa government. Violent conflict in the region has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians and a mass displacement crisis. - Cnn Former DR Congo President Joseph Kabila hit with US sanctionsThe former president of the Democratic Repub- lic of Congo, Joseph Kabila, has been hit with sanctions by the United States on Thursday.Washington accused him of supporting the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels and its political-mil- itary arm, the Congo River Alliance (AFC). - apnewsNigerian, Beninese militias kill dozens of Fulani herders in border raidA state-backed Nigerian militia, operating along- side the military, killed scores of ethnic Fulani herders in a raid, local sources have told AFP.The herders were killed in an operation that also involved vigilantes from Benin, just across the border from Niger state, after the herders were accused of being informants for the jihadist group Ansaru, the sources said. - PoliticoRussia offers Ukraine May 8-9 WWII anniver- sary ceasefirePresident Putin has unilaterally declared a two-day truce amid commemorations of the end of World War II in Moscow. Ukraine's President Zelenskyy proposed his own truce starting a couple of days earlier.President Vladimir Putin on Monday declared a two-day ceasefire in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, to come into effect on May 8 and May 9, marking the anniversary of Nazi Germany's capitulation and the end of World War II in Europe in 1945. Russia's Defense Ministry announced the unilateral offer, and also said it counted on the Ukrainian side to follow suit. - VoxPolitics Around The World The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 23

The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 24WeeklyCommodity PulseAluminium rebounded 2.9% week-on-week, recouping the prior week's losses entirely, as direct Iranian strikes on UAE and Bahrain smelting facilities triggered acute supply-shock pricing. Gulf producers are responsible for approximately 9% of global primary aluminium supply and nearly 25% of non-Chinese supply.Emirates Global Aluminium warned that full capacity restoration at its flagship plant could take over a year, while Bahrain's ALBA operations were suspended entirely. The resulting natural gas cost surge also lifted global smelting economics. Firm Chinese manufacturing activity data provided additional support on the demand side, reinforcing the bullish price trajectory for the metal.Nickel consolidated near two-year highs, ending broadly flat after the prior week's 5.9% surge. Prices touched an intra-week peak of $19,437/t on Wednesday 29 April before easing as risk sentiment softened on fresh Hormuz escalation. The market is absorbing its recent gains in an orderly fashion.Indonesia's RKAB quota discipline and Hormuz-linked sulphur shortages maintained tight High-Pressure Acid Leach (HPAL) processing conditions, supporting the cost floor. The International Nickel Study Group's revised 2026 market balance — shifting from a projected surplus to a small deficit — continues to anchor medium-term bullish sentiment and supports prices at current elevated levels.Platinum eased 1.4% over the week as energy-driven inflation fears reinforced expectations of higher-for-longer interest rates globally, reducing the appeal of non-yielding precious metals. UK gilt yields reaching near 18-year highs during the period reflected the broader hawkish repricing and added additional headwinds to the metal.The stalled US–Iran negotiations and the persistent Hormuz closure continued to suppress risk appetite in precious metals markets. Autocatalyst demand from recovering auto production and the metal's growing role in hydrogen fuel cell technology continue to underpin structural demand and limit the extent of further downside from current levels.Gold swung sharply through the week, hitting a low of $4,557/oz on Wednesday as President Trump's rejection of Iran's ceasefire proposal drove a repricing of Federal Reserve rate-cut expectations. Rising energy prices amplified inflation concerns, reducing the appeal of the non-yielding metal.A recovery followed as record Q1 2026 World Gold Council demand data, up 74% in value to $193 billion, reasserted structural support. Renewed US–Iran clashes in the Strait of Hormuz on 4 May rekindled safe-haven flows, lifting gold back above $4,716/oz by the close of the period. Central bank accumulation at near-record annual levels continues to anchor the market on any significant dip.Copper fell 2.5% week-on-week, sliding to three-week lows near $5.85/lb (~$12,870/t) as renewed US–Iran clashes in the Strait of Hormuz stoked demand-destruction fears across the industrial metals complex. A hawkish shift in Federal Reserve rate-cut expectations added to the headwinds by strengthening the US dollar.Fibonacci resistance at $13,445/t held firm throughout the period, capping any recovery attempts. London Metal Exchange inventories at approximately 180,000 tonnes, approaching levels historically associated with price appreciation, provided a structural floor. Datacenter construction signings by major technology companies continued to support the longer-term electrification demand outlook.Brent surged a further 6.3%, reaching a 4-year high of $114.64/b on Thursday 30 April, its ninth consecutive session of gains, as the Strait of Hormuz remained effectively closed. The International Energy Agency confirmed this as the largest supply shock on record, with up to 13 million barrels per day of supply disrupted.US forces repelled Iranian drone and missile attacks on 4 May while escorting US-flagged vessels through the strait, while the UAE reported intercepting Iranian missiles and a fire at its Fujairah oil terminal. The UAE's exit from OPEC, announced during the week, added further uncertainty. Washington's threat of sanctions on Chinese refiners transiting through Hormuz broadened the geopolitical risk premium and kept the market on edge heading into the following week.

MarketswatchZiG Maintains Stability he Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG) opened the week of 21–27 April in a familiar pattern, official rate stability coexisting with a significantly elevated parallel market premium, as the public debate triggered by RBZ Governor John Mushayavanhu's 18 April undervaluation remarks continued to generate commentary across regional financial media.On the official interbank market, the ZiG traded at approximately 25.22 per US dollar on 24 April, marginally weaker than the previous week's 25.18 but well within the tight corridor the Reserve Bank has maintained since October 2024. The year-on-year depreciation of 5.92% remains modest by Zimbabwe's historical standards and is consistent with the RBZ's stated goal of a gradual, managed glide path rather than the abrupt devaluations that have characterised prior Zimbabwean currency regimes.The ongoing debate sparked by Governor Mushayavanhu's claim that the ZiG's true value should be closer to ZiG15 per dollar, based on full reserve buyback capacity, has found limited traction in market pricing but substantial traction in public discourse. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), in commentary cited this week, reiterated its December 2026 assessment that more than 90% of Zimbabwe's transactions continue to be conducted in US dollars, and that many businesses regard the ZiG's current stability as artificial and inherently unsustainable. That assessment stands in pointed contrast to the RBZ's more optimistic framing.Regional MarketsRand Slips The South African rand has given back a portion of the previous week's gains, sliding from approximately R16.34 to R16.60 per dollar by Sunday 27 April, as a combination of stalled Iran ceasefire talks, a resurgent dollar, and rising domestic rate hike expectations weighed on the currency. The rand touched a two-week low of R16.60 on 27 April as markets reacted to the lack of meaningful progress in US–Iran peace negotiations, with Iran yet to signal a willingness to resume talks following the expiration of the initial two-week ceasefire framework.The domestic policy picture shifted notably this week with the release of South Africa's March 2026 CPI data by Statistics SA on Wednesday 22 April. Headline inflation edged up to 3.1% year-on-year from 3.0% in February, a modest increase, but one occurring at the lower end of the SARB's new 3% target range. The monthly increase of 0.6% was above the 0.4% February reading, with housing and utilities (5.1%) and the early passthrough of Middle East conflict costs into transport categories beginning to show. SARB Governor Lesetja Kganyago used the occasion to deliver one of the most explicitly hawkish statements of 2026, warning that the bank would not allow oil-driven inflation to become embedded and restating its commitment to the 3% target. Markets are now pricing in a meaningful probability of at least one 25 basis-point rate hike at the May 28 meeting, with some forecasters pencilling in two hikes before year-end.Kwacha’s New Recovery Highs in SightThe Zambian Kwacha has extended its appreciation this week, strengthening to 18.93 per US dollar on 27 April from 19.13 at the start of the period. The move brings the kwacha to its firmest level since February 2026, when the currency touched 18.58, its strongest since July 2023, in what was a period of peak confidence in Zambia's external position. The kwacha's 12-month gain of 32.75% remains among the most compelling recovery stories on the continent.The drivers of this week's appreciation are consistent with those that have underpinned the broader recovery trend. Copper prices have held firm above US$13,000 per tonne on sustained demand from China's infrastructure rollout and the accelerating global energy transition. The Bank of Zambia's foreign exchange reserves have been bolstered by mining royalty inflows and export surrender requirements. The IMF-backed programme, now in its third year of implementation, continues to deliver macroeconomic discipline that has translated into tangible investor confidence improvements.The kwacha's firmness this week is also partly attributable to the broader softening of the US dollar against emerging market currencies that accompanied the fading of the most acute phase of oil price volatility. As the Iran ceasefire, however fragile, reduces the extreme tail risk that had driven safe-haven dollar demand in March, commodity-linked currencies like the kwacha are natural beneficiaries. Pula Strengthens to 13.49The Botswana Pula delivered a strong performance this week, strengthening from approximately 13.86 per dollar at the start of the period to 13.49 on 24 April, a weekly gain of nearly 2.75%. The move was driven by the broader global environment of a softer dollar and the carryover effects of the rand's own recovery dynamics. The USD/BWP cross dropped to 13.4174 on 10 April in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, and the current rate of 13.49 represents a sustained hold near those post-ceasefire highs rather than a further extension.The pula's month-on-month gain of 1.41% and year-on-year gain of 2.00% tell a story of quiet, managed appreciation within the crawling peg framework. The Bank of Botswana's exchange rate mechanism, which incorporates a basket weighted toward the rand and a selection of major trading partner currencies, provides a degree of structural insulation from sharp movements while allowing trend alignment with the fundamental direction of South Africa's and Botswana's external positions.Naira’s Parallel Gap NarrowsThe Nigerian Naira has delivered its best week of the past month on the official market, with the CBN rate strengthening to ₦1,358.44 per dollar on 27 April, a level not seen since mid-March. The improvement represents a 1.63% appreciation against the dollar since the start of April, reversing the modest weakening seen through the middle of the month. On the parallel market, the rate has also firmed to ₦1,390–1,400, with the official-parallel spread settling at approximately 2–3%, a remarkably contained differential by Nigeria's historical standards.The naira's strengthening this week reflects improved FX supply conditions. Nigeria's gross foreign exchange reserves remain robust at approximately US$49.40 billion, providing the CBN with continued capacity for market intervention when needed. Bonny Light crude production has been consistent, and the Dangote refinery's growing contribution to domestic petroleum product supply continues to reduce the import bill.Shilling Edges to 129.15 The Kenyan Shilling has barely moved this week, opening and closing at approximately 129.15 per US dollar, a remarkable example of stability in a regional context characterised by broader volatility. The 52-week range of 128.9 to 130.38 represents one of the tightest bands of any major Sub-Saharan African currency, and the shilling's performance in April, modestly stronger by 0.58% against the dollar across the full month, reflects the combination of sound monetary management, adequate reserve buffers, and a favourable macro outlook.The CBK's decision on 8 April to hold the Central Bank Rate at 8.75%, pausing the historic 10-cut easing cycle, was the key policy event of recent weeks, and markets have continued to digest its implications favourably. By signalling concern about oil price passthrough while maintaining a broadly accommodative stance, the CBK has demonstrated the kind of calibrated policy management that underpins investor confidence in the shilling. Private sector credit growth remains above 8%, commercial bank lending rates have declined to 14.7%.The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 25TUndervaluation Debate Puts Reserve Bank in the Spotlight

*From Page 4 ZSE & VFEX WEEKLY COMMENTARYhe ZSE halted its bear run and partially recouped prior week's losses in the last week of April as investors seek to hedge against inflationary pressures amid geo-political tensions in the Middle-East which have resulted in a ripple effect on April inflation numbers in Zimbabwe. The ZSE All Share Index strengthened by 0.84% week-on-week to Thursday to close at 365.17 points, driven by sustained growth in medium caps which outweighed sell-offs in market heavies. Year-to-date, the ZSE All Share Index is up 31.4% (34.7% in US$ terms), which compares to a 27.7% nominal growth (26.8% in US$ terms) registered in same period in 2025, and a 117.6% nominal growth (14.4% in US$ terms) achieved in 2024. The ZSE mainstream index gained 1.8% (1.8% in US$ terms) in the month of April, buttressing a nominal 0.9% (0.1% in US$ terms) growth registered in February.The US$ denominated bourse, VFEX, further widened the magnitude of losses this week amid uncertainties as USD inflation surged in April according to latest official data. The mainstream VFEX All Share Index took a dive by -1.11% against prior week to close at 228.92 points, driven by 4 laggards which outweighed 7 risers. The market dipped by -8.4% in April, countering an 11.5% growth achieved in March. The All-share index has climbed 29.5% year-to-date, compared to a staggering 70% growth achieved in 2025, and a mild growth of 4.1% registered in 2024. An aggregate of US$2,632,909 exchanged hands this week, up from US$83,979,733 traded in the prior week.On currency markets, the ZiG sustained stability throughout 2025, depreciating by a mild -0.7% against the USD on interbank while maintaining exchange premium at 38%. The stability has continued into 2026 as the government maintains a contractionary monetary and fiscal policy stance. However, as the local currency appreciates against the USD on interbank, the parallel market remains stable, marginally depreciating and widening the exchange premium. This has the effect of fuelling speculative trading over time. The ZiG depreciated by -0.32% against the USD on the interbank market this week to close at ZWG25.34 per each US$.TThe AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026 26ZSE ASI VFEX ASI ZWG INTERBANK RATE 23/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/0423/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/0423/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/04362.13 231.49 25.26357.42 231.21 25.22362.47 228.60 25.19359.61 230.22 25.29362.84 224.15 25.30365.17 228.92 25.340.84% -1.11% -0.32%ZSE TOP 10 INDEX MEDIUM CAP INDEX SMALL CAP INDEX 100.11100.11100.11100.11100.11100.110.00%363.21 382.65356.79 385.27362.30 388.57358.59 389.33361.27 395.17363.18 399.4723/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/04-0.01% 23/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/044.40% 23/0424/0427/0428/0429/0430/04

TOP 5 WEEKLY RISERSTOP 5 WEEKLY FALLERS FINANCIAL MARKETS AT A GLANCE 2025AFDISARISTONBATCFIDELTADAIRIBORDHIPPOMEIKLESOKSEEDCOSTAR AFRICATSLTanganda 13804.584619974.826192680.35297.972994931511.3694376.37863.4082600237.562513803.8731180006192664.85221.44395031211.3694365.04863.4006600206.5857Latest PriceZiG CentsPrevious WeekZiG CentsConsumerStaplesRTG 18.009 18.009Latest PriceZWL CentsConsumer Previous WeekZWL CentsCAFCAG/BELTINGSMASIMBANAMPAKUNIFREIGHTZECO1300.0511.6667310.0625851800.00181300.0511261.014484.99132250.0018Latest PriceZiG CentsIndustrialsSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsARTZDRPROPLASTICSTURNALLWilldaleRioZim6.8054148.09529.023.6794756.80541489.02475Latest PriceZiG CentsMaterialsSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsTN CYBERTECHZIMPAPERS10.05337.29.9867.2Latest PriceZiG CentsICTSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsMASHHOLDFMP125.0481112.25119.95112Latest PriceZiG CentsReal EstateSectorPrevious WeekZiG CentsARISTONMASIMBATANGANDAG/BELTINGSDAIRIBORD4.58310.06237.5611.67297.971563823935.3%22.0%18.8%16.7%14.9%COUNTER PRICE CENTS CHANGE % CHANGE UNIFREIGHTCBZSTAR AFRICAZSE LTDDELTA180.001516.433.41101.972680.35 (45) (71) (0) (0) (4)-20.0%-4.5%-2.6%-0.2%-0.2% COUNTER PRICE CENTS CHANGE ANGE Interbank Market Rate 25.34-0.32% ZSE Top 10 Index 363.18-0.01% ZSE All Share Index 365.170.84% NGSE All Share Index 242,277.88.72%11,130.960.13%BSE All Share Index LuSE All Share Index 26,716.950.28%VFEX All Share Index 228.92-1.11% JSE All Share Index 115,180.5-1.09%CBZFBCHFIDELITYFMLNMBZZBFHZHLZSE Holdings1516.4399057.828952051880.0417101.97241430.0599057.8528952051875106.125Latest PriceZiG CentsFinancialSectorPrevious WeekZiG Cents357.42399.47ZSE Medium Cap IndexZSE All Share indexMedium Cap indexWOW 4.4% MoM 15% YTD 43.6%357.42275.65ZSE Consumer Staples IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Consumers Staples indexWOW 1% MoM 7.5% YTD 18%357.42173.01ZSE Materials IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Materials IndexWOW 0.4% MoM 2.8% YTD 8.1%115180.5357.42JSE All Share Index JSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW -1.1% MoM 1.3% YTD -0.6%242277.8357.42NGSE All Share Index NGSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW 20.7% MoM 8.4% YTD 55.7%26716.95357.42LUSE All Share IndexLUSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW 0.3% MoM -1.8% YTD 3.1%0.4%5.4%Interbank MarketInterbank MoM Mvt.ZSE All Share index357.42410.61ZSE ICT IndexZSE All Share indexZSE ICT IndexWOW 0% MoM -8.3% YTD 52.7%357.42874.07ZSE Consumer Discretionary IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Consumer Discretionary indexWOW 0% MoM 32.8% YTD 16.4%357.42363.18ZSE Top 10 IndexZSE All Share indexZSE Top10 indexWOW -0.01% MoM 3% YTD 28.9%11130.96357.42BSE All Share IndexBSE All Share IndexZSE All Share indexWOW 0.1% MoM 0.1% YTD 0.9%357.42666.9ZSE Real Estate IndexZSE All Share index ZSE Real Estate IndexWOW 5.4% MoM -0.5% YTD 8.3%357.42173.72ZSE Industrials Index (New)ZSE All Share indexZSE Industrials Index (new)WOW 5.7% MoM 16.3% YTD 26.5%357.42299.69ZSE Financials SectorZSE All Share indexZSE Financials indexWOW -0.9% MoM 0.1% YTD -1.1%357.42228.92VFEX All Share IndexZSE All Share indexVFEX All Share IndexWOW -1.1% MoM -3.9% YTD 29.5%

Regional Economic Watchforeign nationals were putting pressure on jobs, security and public services. However, aside from in the western region of Soubre and the central region of Yamoussoukro where rains were above average, farm- ers said growing conditions were poor for the developing pods that will be harvested from July to August.Campaigners for migrant rights say foreigners have long been scape- goated in South Africa for its economic woes. South Africa last month promised to crack down on anyone carrying out xenophobic attacks after Ghana and other African countries reported that their nationals had faced violence and discrimination.More protests were planned on May 4 and May 8 and Nigeria would be watching developments closely, the government said. It had already summoned South Africa’s High Commissioner in Abuja over the situa- tion, and its diplomatic missions in South Africa are working with local authorities to reduce risks to Nigerians, the minister said. UgandaUganda’s foreign exchange reserves rose 69.7% in the 12 months to January, supported in part by strong foreign direct investment inflows into the oil sector, the central bank said in a report. The East African nation’s foreign reserves rose to $5.6 billion as at end January, up from $3.3 billion at the end of the same month last year, Bank of Uganda said in a report seen by Reuters on Monday.Uganda expects to commence commercial crude production this year and ahead of that, oil firms France’s Total and China’s CNOOC, who operate the oil fields, have been undertaking investments in key infra- structure such as pipelines and drilling wells. The central bank said in the report that Uganda’s public debt had surged by 21.2% to 130.2 trillion Ugandan shillings ($34.77 billion) at end January compared with the same period last year.South AfricaA gauge of South African manufacturing sentiment improved in April as output and new sales orders rebounded after a weak first quarter, a purchasing managers’ index (PMI) survey showed on Monday. The seasonally adjusted PMI sponsored by South African bank Absa rose to 52.6 in April from 49.0 in March, returning to growth for the first time since September 2025.A reading above 50 signifies an expansion in busi- ness activity.Business activity rose to 52.8 from 46.1, returning to expansionary terri- tory, while new sales orders jumped to 52.9 from 44.5. However, input costs were pushed higher by a weaker rand currency and higher interna- tional oil prices.Expected business conditions improved slightly but remained below 50, pointing to subdued confidence.MalawiMalawi’s central bank left its main lending rate unchanged at 24%, saying the decision should help inflation fall further and restore economic stability. The donor-dependent Southern African nation has been mired in an economic crisis, struggling to control inflation which has been above 20% in annual terms for more than three years.But inflation has eased for five consecutive months now and stood at 23.8% year on year in March. It projected inflation would average 22% in 2026, down from 28.4% last year. Economic output is expected to expand 3.8% this year, up from 2.7% in 2025, supported by favourable performance in the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors.ZambiaZambia’s government said on Monday that it opposed a U.S. attempt to tie health funding to access to critical minerals, giving details for the first time about why negotiations with Washington over two proposed agree- ments have stalled.Zambia’s Foreign Minister Mulambo Haimbe said the United States had offered support of up to $2 billion over the next five years in a proposed health agreement, but that some of the terms regarding data sharing would violate Zambians’ right to privacy.Separately, he said Zambia had objections to the content of a proposed critical minerals agreement. Regarding the critical minerals agreement, he said Zambia was reluctant to accept the terms due to an insistence on preferential treatment for U.S. companies.The U.S. State Department has said that it does not disclose details of bilateral negotiations. Health advocates had warned that the proposed health deal linked the money to mining access and brought data-sharing risks, but Zambia’s government previously said only that parts of it were not aligned with the country’s interests.UgandaUganda’s coffee exports in March rose 2.9% from a year earlier on the back of a good crop, the ministry of agriculture, animal industry and fish- eries said in a report. The commodity is one of the East African country’s top foreign exchange earners. Uganda is Africa’s largest exporter of coffee followed by Ethiopia.Uganda shipped 671,152 60-kg bags of the beans in March, up 2.9% from the same month last year, according to the report released late on Monday. In the 12 months to March, Uganda earned $2.4 billion from coffee exports, up from $1.8 billion in the previous period, the ministry said.Senegal Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye said the ruling party is on a path that could lead to its downfall but that the party’s leader, Prime Min- ister Ousmane Sonko, will remain in his post if he keeps “doing his job properly”Faye’s comments, aired on state television late Saturday, come amid persistent speculation that the two men’s political alliance is on the rocks and as the West African country faces growing economic challenges linked to debt and the fallout from the Iran war.Sonko was a popular opposition figure under the previous administra- tion. He was barred from running in the 2024 presidential election due to a legal conviction and chose little-known Faye, a long-time aide and member of the Pastef party, as his replacement candidate.Faye then appointed Sonko as prime minister. Since then, signs of dissen- sion have begun to appear between the two men. In March, Sonko said he was willing to take his party out of the government and return to opposi- tion if Faye broke with Pastef’s vision.NigeriaAt least 130 Nigerian citizens in South Africa have asked their government to fly them home after a protests there targeting foreigners, Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, said. There were the first to apply to a new scheme to repatriate citizens launched by Nigeria’s govern- ment, Odumegwu-Ojukwu said on Sunday, amid fears that confronta- tions in South Africa could escalate.Protesters held rallies in Pretoria and Johannesburg last week, demand- ing tougher action against illegal immigration, saying undocumented 28 The AXiS CCXIV Monday 04 May 2026