The Big Loop starts with foresight to provide a common
lens for agencies to look ahead
a. Strategy Group’s Centre for Strategic Futures leads a Whole-of-Govt scenario
planning exercise which seeks to
i. Identify longer-term driving forces in our operating context
ii. Surface critical challenges and opportunities for Singapore over the next 20 years
iii. Develop a common understanding of and vocabulary for conversations around
our future
b. This then facilitates the development of strategies that can position the Singapore
Government to meet emerging challenges and opportunities
9
OFFICIAL (CLOSED) \ NON-SENSITIVE
With foresight, Strategy Group charts the medium-term
policy agenda…
1 – Strengthen resilience Policy Agenda 8 – Develop horizontal
[meta-shift] support structures
2 – Secure our place 7 – Build a future-ready
in the world & sustainable Singapore
3 – Seize new opportunities 6 – Build a more resilient
to transform our economy & united society
4 – Strengthen nexus of 5 – Build a fair, just & caring society
socio-economic policies
10
OFFICIAL (CLOSED) \ NON-SENSITIVE
…where resilience is a cross-cutting priority
a. COVID-19 and its aftershocks demonstrated importance of factoring resilience into
policies and plans in multiple domains (e.g. public health)
b. Strategy Group works with our agencies to ensure that the Public Service is
i. Prepared for potential shocks and shifts; and
ii. Has the ability to withstand impact, bounce back, and evolve new responses
c. Three key considerations:
i. Mitigating Over-Dependencies and diversifying (e.g. in terms of strategies)
ii. Planning for Adaptability to maximise maneuver space during shocks
iii. Building Buffers / Reserves during peacetime, for activation in crises
11
OFFICIAL (CLOSED) \ NON-SENSITIVE
Multiple Small Loop processes support the Big Loop on an
ongoing basis, keeping policy agenda current and relevant
Sense-making and Scanning Policy-making
• Regular horizon scanning by the • Commissioning of workgroups to
larger foresight and strategic look at specific issues of strategic
planning community interest
• Nearer-term data insights (i.e., • Sector- and agency-level strategic
through sentiment polls, admin planning processes
data)
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OFFICIAL (CLOSED) \ NON-SENSITIVE
(๒๗)
เอกสารประกอบการประชมุ ทวภิ าคี
Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS)
The State of Southeast Asia:
2022
1
NON-SENSITIVE
About the Survey
• To present a snapshot of
the views and perspectives
of opinion-makers, policy-
makers and thought-
leaders in the region on
regional affairs and geo-
political developments
• Total of 1,677 respondents
across ten ASEAN
countries
NON-SENSITIVE
What are your top 3 concerns about ASEAN?
● Top concern – ASEAN is slow and ineffective
(70.1%): top choice in 7 countries
● 2nd concern – ASEAN risks becoming an arena
of major power competition (61.5%); top
choice in Laos, Vietnam
● 3rd concern – ASEAN’s inability to overcome
current pandemic challenges (49.0%)
● Significant jump in concern about ASEAN’s
relevance (32.2%): esp. Cambodia (43.2%),
Myanmar (41.4%), Vietnam (37.5%) and
Thailand (36.8%).
4
NON-SENSITIVE
Do you approve of ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar
crisis?
Equal split in regional views:
● Most disapproving: Myanmar (78.8%), Thailand (39.3%), Singapore (37.0%)
● Most approving: Brunei (58.5%), Indonesia (44.3%)
5
NON-SENSITIVE
Why do you approve of ASEAN’s response?
● Top reason: ASEAN has taken active
steps to mediate in the crisis
(42.5%)
● 2nd place: ASEAN is doing the best it
can within its institutional limits
(30.1%): Top choice for Brunei
(51.6%) and Singapore (45.4%)
● 3rd place: ASEAN is already going
above and beyond without violating
the principle of non-interference
(19.3%)
● 4th place: Major external powers are
following ASEAN’s lead on
Myanmar and boosting ASEAN
centrality (8.2%)
6
NON-SENSITIVE
Why do you disapprove of ASEAN’s response?
● Top choice: ASEAN moving too slowly in
response to escalating political and
humanitarian crisis (45.5%): Top reason
for 7 countries
● 2nd place: ASEAN not utilising harder
methods (26.4%)
→ Myanmar respondents: Split between
ASEAN not utilising harder methods
(39.9%) and ASEAN’s lack of speed
(33.3%)
● 3rd place: ASEAN is not engaging with all
the relevant key stakeholders in Myanmar
and at the international level (18.5%)
● 4th place: ASEAN is breaking its own
principle of non-interference (9.6%)
7
NON-SENSITIVE
To move the issue forward, ASEAN should:
● 37.8% want ASEAN to engage in
independent trust-building dialogue.
● 2nd choice: ASEAN to mount a coordinated
and unified response with international
partners (24.4%)
● 3rd choice: ASEAN should employ harder
methods of suspension to curtail the State
Administration Council (19.6%)
→ Myanmar strongest proponent of harder
suspension methods (43.4%) and expelling
Myanmar from ASEAN (21.4%)
→Laos strongest proponent that ASEAN
should not interfere with Myanmar’s
domestic policies (22.7%).
8
NON-SENSITIVE
Major Powers’ Regional Influence
and Leadership
9
NON-SENSITIVE
Which country/regional organisation is the most
influential economic power in Southeast Asia?
● China retains the title of most influential
economic power in the region (76.7%) –
consistent trend since 2019
● Followed by US (9.8%) and ASEAN
(7.6%)
● Highest recognition levels of China’s
economic influence: Brunei (84.9%),
Cambodia (84.0%), Laos (86.4%),
Myanmar (83.4%), and Singapore
(81.1%).
10
NON-SENSITIVE
What is your view of this economic power’s influence on
your country?
● Majority (64.4%) remain worried
about China’s growing regional
economic influence
● Regional anxiety towards China
decreased slightly this year, but
increases recorded in Laos
(65.8%), Myanmar (87.3%) and
Singapore (73.9%)
11
NON-SENSITIVE
Which country/regional organisation has the most
political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia?
● China remains the most
influential political-strategic
power (54.4%), followed by US
(29.7%) and ASEAN (11.2%)
● Strongest views from
Cambodia (75.3%), Laos
(75.0%), and Myanmar
(70.9%)
12
NON-SENSITIVE
What is your view of this power’s political and
strategic influence on your country?
● Region remains worried about
China’s growing strategic clout
(76.4%), albeit a decrease from last
year’s 86.5%
● Greatest acceptance of China’s
influence from Cambodia (54.1%)
● Increased apprehension towards
China’s rise: Laos (78.8%), Myanmar
(93.5%) and Singapore (90.7%)
13
NON-SENSITIVE
Who do you have the strongest confidence in to provide
leadership in championing the global free trade agenda?
2022
2021
● Confidence in US expanded from 19.7% last year to 30.1% this year
● China second place with 24.6%, up from 13.2% last year
● ASEAN ranked third at 15.5% dropping from 21.5% last year
● The EU, last year’s frontrunner, placed fourth (14.1%) and Japan placed fifth (9.0%)
14
NON-SENSITIVE
Who do you have the strongest confidence in to provide
leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold
international law?
2022
2021
● Top 3: US (36.6%), ASEAN (16.8%) and the EU (16.6%)
● US: top choice for Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam
● ASEAN: top choice for Brunei, Indonesia and Laos
● China: Cambodia’s top choice
15
NON-SENSITIVE
The strengthening of the Quad and the prospects of tangible
cooperation in areas like vaccine security and climate
change is positive and reassuring for Southeast Asia.
● 58.5% of respondents agreed
that the strengthening of the
Quad would be constructive for
the region
● Especially Philippines (81.6%),
Laos (75.0%), Vietnam (65.9%),
Indonesia (64.9%), Singapore
(63.5%), and Myanmar (61.4%)
● 13.1% disagreed with the
question, especially Cambodia
(40.7%)
16
NON-SENSITIVE
How will AUKUS affect regional security?
● 36.4% feel that AUKUS will help
balance China’s growing military
power
→ Especially so for Myanmar (63.7%)
and the Philippines (60.0%)
● One-third feel that it will escalate
regional arms race (22.5%) or
undermine the nuclear weapons
non-proliferation regime (12.3%).
● Approximately a fifth (18.0%) feel that
the AUKUS arrangement will
weaken ASEAN centrality.
→ Top choice for Laos (36.4%)
17
NON-SENSITIVE
ASEAN in the Middle
18
NON-SENSITIVE
ASEAN is caught in the crossfire as Beijing and
Washington compete for influence and leadership in
Southeast Asia. How should ASEAN best respond?
● ASEAN continues to favour proactive
approach of enhancing its resilience
and unity to fend off pressure from
two major powers (46.1%)
● Outstrips preference for the traditional
position of not choosing sides
(26.6%)
● Option to seek out “third parties” to
broaden its strategic space and
options increased to 16.2%
19
NON-SENSITIVE
If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the two
strategic rivals, which should it choose?
The US (57.0%) continues to enjoy popular support vs. China (43.0%)
● Greatest support for US: Myanmar (92.0%), the Philippines (83.5%) and Singapore (77.9%)
● Greatest support for China: Cambodia (81.5%), Laos (81.8%) and Brunei (64.2%)
20
NON-SENSITIVE
What could potentially worsen your positive impression
of China?
● 50.7% concerned about China’s
growing economic dominance and
political influence in their country
● China’s strong-arm tactics in the
South China Sea and the Mekong
are a close second (46.2%)
→ top concern for all SCS claimants
● 3rd concern: China’s use of
economic tools and tourism to
punish my country’s foreign policy
choices (38.8%).
21
NON-SENSITIVE
What can China do to improve relations with your country?
● 77.3% feel that China should respect their country’s sovereignty and not constrain
their country’s foreign policy choices
→ Top choice for Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore and
Thailand.
● 64.6% believe China should resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully
in accordance with international law.
→ Top choice for Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam
22
NON-SENSITIVE
The level of US engagement with Southeast Asia under
the Biden Administration has…
● 45.8% of respondents believe that US
engagement under Biden has “increased” or
“increased significantly”
→ Optimism felt by Brunei (52.9%), Laos
(43.2%), Myanmar (56.5%), Singapore
(60.8%), Thailand (53.8%), and Vietnam
(52.8%)
● A third (32.5%) view the level of US
engagement as unchanged
→ Top choice for Indonesia (40.5%),
Malaysia (40.7%), and the Philippines
(37.0%)
23
NON-SENSITIVE
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