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Margaret E. Kemeny on disease course, a model that has been useful for examining these processes for several reasons. First, there are a large number of infected individuals who can be identified early in the disease process at the asymptomatic stage, so one can chart the course of disease from the symptom-free period forward. With many other diseases, such as cancer and heart disease, researchers are typically less able to identify participants at the asymptomatic stage and instead must wait until the disease is manifest. Second, because the population with HIV is more youthful than is the case with many other chronic diseases, many of the difficulties inherent in examining psychosocial predictors of disease in older populations can be avoided. In particular, with HIV, problems of comorbidity are few, at least in the early stages of infection, and so the difficulty of unraveling the influence of one chronic problem on another often does not emerge until quite late in the disease process. Third, there are known cofactors that can be reliably measured and controlled in statistical analyses to rule out potential confounding factors in the study of psychosocial influences on the course of disease. In the case of HIV infection, for example, controlling for age, alcohol consumption, drug use, sleep, and medication use, as well as other potential confounding variables, lends a precision to the analytic phase that cannot be obtained with diseases for which the cofactors remain largely elusive. Fourth, being able to follow a disease over a long period of time, from the asymptomatic period through death, enables one to evaluate several established routes that may mediate between a psychosocial variable of interest as a predictor of disease course (Taylor, Repetti, & Seeman, 1997). As just noted, these include changes in affective states, such as depression or anxiety; changes in social support; differential practice of health habits or treatment-seeking behaviors and their potential role in the onset o1" exacerbation of symptoms; and differential exposure to stressors, which may challenge the immune system and produce a more rapid course of illness. Fifth, unlike many other chronic diseases, HIV infection has meaningful ordinal scales of disease progression. These include the number of CD4 T lymphocytes and viral load. The opportunity to look at these biological markers of disease progress is a significant advantage to health psychologists attempting to plot dose-response relationships or to study the psychosocial predictor-disease course relationship over different stages in the course of disease. A sixth advantage of HIV as a disease model is that there are meaningful clinical markers identified with HIV infection: in particular, symptom appearance, the diagnosis of AIDS, and ultimately death itself. Seventh, to the extent that we understand the psychosocial factors that may be related to disease course, there is a potential to develop interventions based on such data. Keeping people healthy as long as possible is an important goal for AIDS researchers; by understanding the role of psychosocial factors in disease course, one may intervene with the hope of slowing disease progression (for an extended discussion of this issue, see Cole & Kemeny, 1997, in press; Kemeny, 1994). Finally, HIV as a disease model has the capacity to silence, or at least subdue, critics of this line of work on several fronts. Immunologists, for example, are not necessarily impressed when a psychosocial factor is seen to produce changes in immunological parameters, such as natural killer cell activity or T cell cytotoxicity. A glass of wine or a brisk walk can produce similar immunological changes. However, when they can see an effect on disease course, they are more impressed. The reverse is often true of health psychologists, who are not particularly surprised to see a relationship between a psychosocial predictor and a health outcome, such as death, but are quite impressed by changes in immunological parameters that provide clues to the pathways by which such relationships may be understood. HIV is now more limited in its usefulness as a disease model for such purposes because of recent developments in its management. The discovery of protease inhibitors and their widespread use by people infected with HIV leads at least to disjunctions in the course of illness and often to the elimination of the downward course of disease in people who adhere to treatment. The work reported in this article was developed in advance of these exciting developments and, as such, is unaffected by them. Psychosocial Predictors and Course of Illness in Men With HIV Infection An analysis of the course of disease among people infected with HIV is a valuable context for examining the benefits of psychosocial resources, such as positive illusions, because it provides an opportunity to examine criticisms of the theory's framework. Some have suggested that positive illusions may be beneficial as long as they remain unchallenged, but in circumstances when disconfirmation of overly optimistic beliefs is likely, those beliefs may lead to January 2000 • American Psychologist 101

Geoffrey M. Reed Photo by Cecilia Jacobson maladjustment, specifically, psychological distress and other adverse consequences. Advancing or terminal disease constitutes a severe challenge to the unrealistic optimism and exaggerated sense of personal control that might otherwise buffer an individual from the adverse consequences of advancing disease. Moreover, alternative theories have maintained that such beliefs as positive illusions may not be adaptive at the final stages of life. Specifically, in her theory of adjustment to terminal illness, Kfibler-Ross (1969) characterized acceptance as the final stage in adjustment to death, which often immediately precedes it. She suggested that the acceptance stage is characterized by a tired and peaceful although not necessarily pleasant psychological state and by resignation to the prospect of death. In 1987, she explicitly extended these ideas to people with AIDS, arguing that acceptance is psychologically adaptive, permitting people to come to terms with the inevitable, to make final preparations for their departure, and to use the time to say their good-byes to family and friends. Although there has been little empirical support for Ktibler-Ross's position (Silver & Wortman, 1980), her work has had great influence on public thinking and especially on clinical practice, and so the merit of her position warrants attention. The positive illusions framework makes quite different predictions, arguing that mildly but unrealistically positive beliefs may be more adaptive than realistic beliefs, even in the case of advancing disease. Moreover, such beliefs are quite common. In a study of adjustment to HIV, Taylor et al. (1992) found that HIV-seropositive gay men who were unrealistically optimistic about the future course of their infection were better adjusted and coped more actively with their situation than those who were less optimistic. Moreover, these unrealistically optimistic beliefs did not compromise their health behaviors or riskrelated sexual behavior. The frequent but by no means ubiquitous evidence of these beliefs at the final stage of life provides an opportunity to compare and evaluate these quite different accounts of what may constitute psychological adjustment when facing the prospect of death. Moreover, as noted earlier, they provide an opportunity to extend and test the relevance of the positive illusions framework to physical health as well. Realistic Expectations and the Course of AIDS In a first study that tested these competing frameworks (Reed et al., 1994), we recruited 78 gay men who had been diagnosed with AIDS. These men were all participants in the Multicenter AIDS Cohort Study (MACS), a multisite collaborative longitudinal investigation of the natural history of HIV infection and AIDS. Because the data were collected in the late 1980s, the life expectancy for these men was not long, and consequently our sample was small. The men we recruited were mostly White, had an average age of 38 years, and were well-educated; at the time of the study, they had been diagnosed with AIDS for about one year. At the close of the study, two thirds of the men had died. As part of Kemeny et al.'s (1994) psychosocial substudy with the MACS, these men completed an extensive questionnaire assessing their self-reported health status, psychological adjustment, psychological responses to HIV (items based on Folkman & Lazarus's, 1980, Ways of Coping measure), and a number of standardized scales, such as the Life Orientation Test (LOT; Scheier & Carver, 1985), a measure of dispositional optimism, the Index of Well-Being (Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976), the Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Of particular interest were the results of a factor analysis of coping responses to "the effects of AIDS on your health and the life-threatening nature of the illness." One of the identified coping factors assessed realistic acceptance of one's own death. Specifically, the items on this factor, which we called Realistic Acceptance, were "I tried to accept what might happen," "I prepare myself for the worst," "I go over in my mind what I will say or do about this problem," and the reverse-coded item "I refuse to believe that this problem has happened." Those who score high on this factor are essentially acknowledging the likelihood of their risk for death, whereas those who score low on it are not engaged psychologically or behaviorally with the final stage of life. Comparing individuals who scored hig_h on this factor with those who scored low on it enabled us to compare Kubler-Ross' predictions regarding adjustment to the prospect of death with our own. Participants were divided into high and low Realistic Acceptance on the basis of a median split, and a survival analysis was conducted. Realistic acceptance of one's own death did indeed predict longevity. The men who scored high on Realistic Acceptance typically died nine months earlier than those 102 January 2000 ° American Psychologist

Julienne E. Bower who scored low. The analysis was repeated, controlling for a wide variety of potential predictors of death, including age, level of education, time since diagnosis, self-reported health status, number of AIDS-related symptoms, level of CD4 T helper cells, psychological distress, depression, fatigue, presence or absence of suicidal ideation, initial diagnosing condition, neuropsychological impairment, and the use of zidovudine (AZT), which, at the time, was the only treatment available to these men. The relation between Realistic Acceptance and length of survival remained significant when these variables were statistically controlled. Through a second set of analyses we examined whether any of the known pathways relating psychosocial resources to disease course could account for the relationship between realistic acceptance and more rapid course of death. Specifically, a first plausible hypothesis is that people who are accepting of their own death may engage in poorer health behaviors that contribute to diminished survival time. However, analyses in which we controlled for health habits rendered this route implausible as a mediator. A second possibility is that people who are not accepting of their death have high levels of social support, which prolongs life. This hypothesis, too, was not supported. A third possibility is that realistic acceptance may lead people to ignore relevant symptoms, to fail to seek prompt medical attention, or to comply poorly with medical treatment. However, analyses suggested that men high in realistic acceptance were as careful as the men low in realistic acceptance to take care of their health and were somewhat more rather than less likely to be taking AZT. A fourth possibility is that realistic acceptance might work its effect on survival time by altering mood or emotional states. That is, those accepting their death may greet that realization with depression, whereas those who maintain unrealistic optimism may be happier. However, analyses that controlled for psychological distress--including the emotions of hopelessness, anger, anxiety, guilt, and depression-- suggest this route is not accounting for the longer time to death either. The results of this study suggest, then, that the customary explanations for the effects of psychosocial factors on the course of illness cannot address this pattern of results. Instead, cognitive beliefs reflecting the realistic acceptance of the likelihood of death are associated with a faster course of disease, and unrealistically optimistic beliefs are associated prospectively with somewhat greater longevity. Further, there is no evidence that unrealistic optimism simply prolonged the final stages just before death. All of the men were weakening and had somewhat restricted their activities, but there was no evidence that the unrealistically optimistic men remained in the last phase of life longer than those with a rapid course of death. The study also suggests that a previously unexplored variable in the relation of psychosocial predictors, namely positive versus negative expectations about one's illness, is related to disease course. Because this concept is grounded in an established model of psychological adjustment to illness, it provides a strong theoretical position from which to design subsequent investigations. HIV Infection, Bereavement, Negative Expectations, and Symptom Onset To pursue these issues further, we (Reed, Kemeny, Taylor, & Visscher~ 1999) conducted a prospective six-year longitudinal investigation of the psychosocial predictors of disease progression, also with the MACS, that enrolled men infected with HIV who were asymptomatic. The study had several purposes. The first was to see if a relationship between realistic acceptance and HIV progression could be observed at other points in the disease process, and especially whether expectations constitute a psychosocial predictor of more rapid disease course in those who have not experienced symptoms previously. A second purpose was to explore these relations in the context of bereavement. As noted earlier, intensely stressful events such as illness are often associated with correlated stressors, which may themselves exacerbate the course of disease. One of the most common correlated stressors among men with HIV infection is bereavement, and so examining these issues in the context of bereavement permits an examination of another pathway by which psychosocial resources and illness progression may be related. Previous work has suggested that AIDS-related bereavement may be associated with disease progression in HIV-infected individuals (Kemeny et al., 1995; Kemeny & Dean, 1995). At the very least, these findings suggest the importance of controlling for bereavement when examining the relation of realistic acceptance to health outcomes in the context of HIV, because reactions to bereavement may exacerbate the course of disease or psychological states related to lhe course of disease, such as depression. A more intriguing possibility, suggested by Kemeny's research on bereavement and immune changes in men with January 2000 • American Psychologist 103

Tara L. Gruenewald HIV infection (Kemeny et al., 1994), is that the experience of losing close friends or a partner to AIDS might potentiate the effects of negative expectations. That is, the participants in this study were infected with HIV, but they were asymptomatic, and consequently their negative expectations, although present, may not have loomed very large in their lives. However, among those who had been bereaved and who had direct, firsthand experience with a close friend or partner who had died of AIDS, negative expectations may have taken on a strength, clarity, and specificity that had psychological significance and ultimately significance for health outcomes as well. For this study (Reed et al., 1999), we expanded our assessment of negative expectations based on a factor analysis of scales measuring psychological responses to the risk of HIV progression. From this analysis, we derived a general measure of expectations, including the original four realistic acceptance items, as well as conceptually related items that included the perceived risk that one's disease would progress, perceived control over the risk of disease progression (reverse scored), confidence that the disease would progress, and AIDS-specific optimism (reverse scored). A person with a high score on the negative HIVspecific expectancies factor, then, perceives himself to be at high risk for disease progression, believes that he has little control over that risk, experiences a low level of confidence regarding the risk of disease progression, reports that he accepts and prepares for the possibility of deteriorating health, and has a low level of optimism regarding the future course of his illness. We expected that high scores on this measure would predict a more rapid onset of HIV-related symptoms among these previously asymptomatic men over the three-year time period, either alone or in conjunction with bereavement. To obtain the sample, we screened members of the MACS to include men who knew they were HIV seropositive, had CD4 T lymphocyte data over a two-and-a-half- to three-and-a-half-year follow-up period, and were asymptomatic initially with respect to HIV symptoms. Seventytwo men met these criteria. Thirty-seven of the 72 participants were bereaved, having experienced the death of a close friend or primary partner within the 12 months prior to the psychosocial assessment. The psychosocial assessment consisted of the same questionnaires as described in the first study, which included the HIV-related expectancies measures. In addition, we had data from the Profile of Mood States (POMS; which assesses current mood state) and the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; as a measure of depression). Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to identify predictors of symptom appearance during the follow-up period. About halt" the sample showed illness progression through the appearance of one or more criterial symptoms associated with advancing disease, including persistent diarrhea, unintentional weight loss, persistent fevers, and persistent night sweats. Among bereaved participants, high scores on the negative HIV-specific expectancies measure were associated with a greater likelihood of symptom development during the follow-up period. Specifically, about two thirds of the men in this group developed symptoms, compared with between 40% and 50% in all other conditions. This relation is not changed when immune parameters, AZT, substance abuse, depression, or high-risk sexual behavior is entered into the equation. In this study, then, we found that negative HIV-specific expectancies were a significant predictor of the onset of prognostically relevant symptoms for AIDS among previously asymptomatic HIV-seropositive gay men, but primarily among those who had also been bereaved. This pattern of findings supports the hypothesis that the experience of AIDS-related bereavement can potentiate the effects of negative expectations, leading to adverse health effects. As in the previous study, there was little evidence that the pattern was mediated by the traditional routes that have been studied by health psychologists seeking to understand the effects of psychosocial variables on disease progression. Controlling for health habits does not diminish the effect, nor is the pattern affectively mediated: Controls for mood and for depression yielded no evidence that these relations were mediated by affective changes. The study, then, suggests that negative as opposed to positive expectations are associated not only with a more rapid progression toward death among those diagnosed with AIDS but with a more rapid onset of symptoms in those who had previously been asymptomatic. Our findings thus far reveal the importance of psychosocial resources that guard against the development of negative expectations. They suggest that a realistic appraisal of one's situation--namely, the potential for deteriorating health--contributes to a more rapid course of the very condition that is most feared. However, these studies 104 January 2000 • American Psychologist

have not provided an indication of what psychological states may be most protective of health. We now turn to this issue. Discovery of Meaning and Illness Progression In a 1983 article on cognitive adaptation, Taylor (1983) suggested that positive illusions may be adaptive in the face of life-threatening illnesses, in part because they help people find meaning in the experience (cf. Frankl, 1963; Yalom, 1980). The possibility that stressful life events may provoke positive psychological changes, including finding meaning from the experience, has gained increasing recognition in the literature on recovery from trauma (e.g., Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Ickovics & Park, 1998; JanoffBulman & McPherson Frantz, 1997; Schaefer & Moos, 1992; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995; Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998). Although there is substantial evidence that the ability to find meaning in a traumatic or stressful event, including a serious illness, is often psychologically adaptive (Mendola, Tennen, Affleck, McCann, & Fitzgerald, 1990; Schwartzberg, 1993; Thompson, 1991), there has previously been little effort to relate the discovery of meaning to disease states. In essence, then, we turned the question that guided the previous investigations on its head: Negative expectations may exacerbate disease course; can positive mental states slow it down? There is some evidence that finding meaning is related to disease course. Affleck and his associates (Affleck, Tennen, Croog, & Levine, 1987) found that men who had sustained a heart attack and who perceived that they had obtained some benefits from that heart attack, including a change in their philosophy of life or values, were less likely to have a subsequent attack. They also exhibited less cardiac morbidity over an eight-year follow-up period. Because of the nature of the study design, however, it was not possible to look at the intervening physiology or the specific mechanisms by which these protective effects took place. Cognitive processing of the implications of a trauma may also have positive effects on adjustment. Horowitz (1986), for example, argued that traumatic events often provide new information about oneself or the world that may disturb one's existing schemas and that such experiences must be worked through until the schemas evolve to match the reality of the events. Janoff-Bulman (1992) and Silver, Boon, and Stones (1983) have described the effects that traumatic experiences can have on basic assumptions about the self and the world, which may lead to extensive cognitive processing and mental rumination in an effort to make sense of the experiences. Notably, their findings emphasize the potentially deleterious effects that ruminative thought can have in the absence of finding meaning in the event. Among other implications, these divergent pattems of empirical findings suggest the importance of distinguishing between finding meaning, which appears to be beneficial to adjustment, and cognitive processing more generally, which may be either beneficial or deleterious for adjustment. For this study, we (Bower, Kemeny, Taylor, & Fahey, 1998) identified 40 HIV-seropositive men who had recently experienced the loss of a close friend or a partner to AIDS. We explored bereavement, because it is a traumatic event that is known to have adverse effects on the immune system, both in healthy populations and among those with HIV (Kemeny et al., 1994, 1995). Moreover, in the study just described, we had found that bereavement potentiated the adverse effects of negative expectations on health, and as such bereaved HIV-seropositive men appear to represent a high-risk group for whom finding meaning may be an especially valuable process. That is, if an HIV-infected bereaved man can find meaning in the bereavement experience, it could potentially prevent negative expectations from developing or from taking hold and consequently be protective against deteriorating health. The data came from an intensive interview study of these bereaved men that dealt with their bereavement experience and the effects it had had on them (Bower et al., 1998). The interviews were transcribed and coded for evidence of cognitive processing and meaning. Cognitive processing was operationally defined as verbal statements reflecting deliberative, effortful, or long-lasting thinking about the death. For example, evidence of cognitive processing included such statements as "I think, in a spiritual way, I tried to understand it" and "I'm muddling through nay own feelings of what could have been, what was, and what is, and I'm thinking of my future." A simple statement like "I think about him once in a while" would not be coded as an example of cognitive processing, whereas the statement "I've thought a lot about what his death might mean for me" would be. Meaning was defined as a major shift in values, priorities, or perspective in response to the loss. Statements reflecting meaning indicated such changes as a greater appreciation for the loved one, an enhanced sense of living in the present, a perception of life as fragile and precious, or a commitment to enjoying life. Specific examples are "What his death did was snap a certain value into my behavior, which is, 'Listen, you don't know how long you've gol. You've just lost another one. Spend more time with the people who mean something to you'" and "I would say that his death lit up my faith." A participant was classified as low in cognitive processing if he had no or one cognitive processing statement and as high if he had two or more. Participants were classified as no on discovering meaning if they had no meaning slatements and as yes if they did. The reliability of these classifications was acceptable for both cognitive processing (K = .67, p < .01) and discovery of meaning (K = .60, p < .01 ). To assess the effects of cognitive processing and finding meaning on course of illness, we related the cognitive processing and meaning measures prospectively to levels of CD4 T lymphocyte cells over a two- to threeyear follow-up period and to AIDS-related mortality over a four- to nine-year follow-up period. In addition, as in the previous studies, we examined whether mood, depression, health behaviors, and other potentially confounding psychosocial factors might explain the relations between cogJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 105

nitive processing, finding meaning, and progression of disease. Sixty-five percent of the participants had engaged in active, deliberative, or long-lasting thinking about the death of the person for whom they were grieving and were classified as high in cognitive processing. A smaller number, 40%, had made shifts in their values, priorities, and perspectives in response to the loss. All but two of those who had found meaning in the experience were high in cognitive processing, but only some of those who had engaged in cognitive processing had found meaning, yielding three comparison groups. Only the men who found meaning in the experience maintained their CD4 T helper cells over the follow-up period. Those who did not engage in cognitive processing or who engaged in cognitive processing but failed to find meaning showed a decline in CD4 T helper cells over the follow-up period. Cognitive processing in the wake of a traumatic event, then, is not sufficient to produce beneficial health effects, consistent with work by Janoff-Bulman, Silver, and others. Instead, benefits were confined to those who found meaning in the experience. Moreover, these effects remain significant when a variety of other variables are controlled for, including predictors of HIV progression (e.g., number of HIV-related symptoms and initial CD4 T helper cell levels), health habits (e.g., sleep, sexual practices, cigarette smoking, and alcohol consumption), and affective states (e.g., depression and loneliness). In all cases, the relationship between finding meaning and CD4 T helper cell decline remained significant. Cognitive processing and finding meaning were also not related to optimism or to negative affectivity. This pattern suggests that the relationship of finding meaning to the maintenance of CD4 T helper cells among the HIV-seropositive men is not emotionally mediated. We also examined whether the discovery of meaning was associated with a lower rate of AIDS-related mortality. The association was significant. Only 3 of the 16 men who had found meaning in the bereavement experience died during the follow-up period, whereas half of those who had not found meaning died. In summary, then, those men who had been able to find meaning in the bereavement experience involving a partner or friend appeared to be biologically protected. They showed a lower level of CD4 T helper cell decline, and they were less likely to die during the follow-up period. These findings suggest that to the roster of psychosocial states believed to be health protective should be added the ability to construe meaning from adverse circumstances: to be able to take an experience that, although tragic and upsetting, can nonetheless lead an individual to find personal lessons in the experience that will help that individual live the remainder of his or her life with an enhanced sense of purpose and an appreciation for the value of life. Positive Psychology and Health Observers of the human condition have long maintained that positive states of mind can lead not only to a more meaningful life but to a healthier one. Until the past decade, however, these thoughtful observations were largely intractable to scientific efforts. With the development of rigorous methodological standards, including longitudinal research, appropriate measurement, and proper controls for biological and psychosocial confounds, it is now possible to test these ideas empirically. Most of the research that has related psychosocial factors to changes in disease states has focused on negative psychological states, including depression, stress, grief, and loneliness. Yet, philosophers and, increasingly, scientists as well have noted that exposure to trauma and other stressful life events does not inevitably lead to depression and despair. Such experiences can also act as catalysts for reevaluating one's goals and priorities and for reestablishing a sense of self (Frankl, 1963; O'Leary & Ickovics, 1995; Schaefer & Moos, 1992). Increasing evidence indicates that the array of positive outcomes that may result from stressful events includes finding meaning in life, developing better coping skills, enhancing one's social resources, establishing important personal priorities, and recognizing the value of social relationships (Leedham et al., 1995; Petrie et al., in press; Rose et al., 1995; Shifren, 1996). To date, our work represents one of few efforts to document the beneficial effects of such experiences on physical health outcomes, although many researchers have noted the value of such experiences for restoring or maintaining mental health in the face of trauma. What determines whether one has the ability to respond to stressful or traumatic events not with despair, depression, and purposelessness but with resilience and a renewed sense of purpose? As yet, the answers to such questions are not fully known (Ryff & Singer, 1998). Our work on cognitive adaptation to life-threatening events and on positive illusions (Taylor, 1983; Taylor & Brown, 1988), however, suggests that normal human perceptions, marked by a positive sense of self, a sense of personal control, and an optimistic, even unrealistically optimistic, view of the future, may represent reserve resources that not only help people manage the ebb and flow of everyday life but that assume special significance in helping people cope with intensely stressful and life-threatening events. Consistent with this perspective, in several studies researchers have found a relationship between dispositional optimism and reports of positive changes, benefits, or "growth" following stressful events (Curbow, Somerfield, Baker, Wingard, & Legro, 1993; Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996; Tennen, Affleck, Urrows, Higgins~ & Mendola, 1992). In the case of lifethreatening illness, these resources may act as buffers against the reality of advancing disease and death to the point that people face such experiences not only with psychological benefits but also with more resilient physical resources as well. As the investigations described in this article indicate, realistic expectations about one's disease and its downward course appear to be associated with a more rapid course of disease, helping to bring about the reality those expectations embody. The ability to remain optimistic, even unrealistically optimistic, in the face of deterioration (Reed et al., 1994, 1999; Taylor et al., 1992) 106 January 2000 • American Psychologist

and the ability to find meaning in adverse experiences appear to be physiologically protective (Bower et al., 1998). Important questions remain about exactly how such effects are mediated. As yet, a viable neuroimmunological model of how positive psychosocial states exert these physically protective effects has not been tested, although the literature offers some hints as points of departure (e.g., Eppel, McEwen, & Ickovics, 1998; Futterman et al., 1994). In addition, the psychosocial routes are not entirely understood. In our investigations, we attempted to evaluate the most probable routes by which psychological states may exert their effects on course of illness. These include the practice of health habits that may enhance health, such as exercise, or that may reduce it, such as smoking and alcohol consumption, or the appropriate use of health care services. The ability to develop or enlist available social support has been shown to protect health in other contexts (e.g., House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Sarason, Sarason, & Gurung, 1997; Seeman, 1996), and we have evaluated it in preliminary fashion as a mode by which the healthprotective effects of these cognitive changes, namely negative expectations and finding meaning, may have occurred. Finally, it is possible that positive psychosocial states are associated with affective states that, in turn, lead to a physiological state conducive to maintaining health. Indeed, much of the work in which psychosocial states and their relation to health outcomes have been examined has focused on affective states, such as depression, hostility, or anxiety (e.g., Frasure-Smith et al., 1995; Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987; Herbert & Cohen, 1993; Miller, Mischel, O'Leary, & Mills, 1996). The implicit rationale for such a model is that depression, hostility, anxiety, and other emotional states are known to have physiological concomitants that provide hints about the pathways by which psychosocial states may affect bodily functioning and, in turn, the progress of disease. None of our investigations provide support for any of these hypothesized routes (cf. Cole, Kemeny, Taylor, Visscher, & Fahey, 1995; Segerstrom et al., 1998). To be sure, the psychosocial states we have studied are affectively valenced, and so affective processes may still be implicated in these effects. For example, finding meaning may induce a state of peacefulness or calm that may produce effects on the autonomic nervous system, leading to the beneficial effects on immunity that we have found. Similarly, negative expectations may not result in full-blown depression but might produce a sense of discouragement that has physiological concomitants. However, given the consistency of the pattern and the failure to find evidence for affective mediation, the most likely explanation is that cognitive variables in their own fight have health-related significance, at least in the progression of HIV. These variables include realistic acceptance in the first study, an expanded measure of negative expectations in the second study, and a conceptually related variable, finding meaning, in the third investigation. That is, cognition appears to represent an alternative route to the biology of disease progression by as-yet largely uncharted pathways (see Kemeny & Gruenewald, in press, for a discussion of this issue). A remaining issue concerns the relation of positive and negative psychological states to each other. In the past, researchers have focused heavily on negative psychological states that compromise both mental and physical functioning. An emphasis on positive psychological states, as protective of mental and physical health, is a more recent focus, especially the relation of positive psychological states to illness outcomes. One question that arises is whether these states are polar opposites of each other or whether they represent qualitatively different responses. From an empirical standpoint, positive and negative psychological states, whether affective or cognitive, are typically negatively correlated but not at levels so high as to suggest redundancy. The neural circuitries of positive and negative affective and cognitive responses overlap but also diverge somewhat (see Panksepp, 1998, for a review). As the neural pathways by which both positive and negative psychological states interact with and exert effects on biological processes are increasingly uncovered, our understanding of the relationship between positive and negative psychological states will be improved. Conclusions The psychologically and physiologically protective functions of positive beliefs are only beginning to be understood. Rigorous research investigations from a variety of laboratories have now provided evidence, however, that such resources as meaning, a belief in personal control, and optimism not only help people adapt to stressful events more successfully but actually protect health. Although as yet we do not fully understand the biopsychosocial pathways by which such protective effects occur, the evidence is strong enough to justify considering these resources important weapons in the arsenal of prevention. REFERENCES Affleck, G., & Tennen, H. (1996). Construing benefits from adversity: Adaptational significance and dispositional underpinnings. Journal oj Personality. 64, 899-922. Affleck, G., Tennen, H., Croog, S., & Levine, S. (1987). Causal attribution, perceived benefits, and morbidity after a heart attack: An eightyear study. 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Emotional States and Physical Health Peter Salovey Alexander J. Rothman Jerusha B. Detweiler and Wayne T. Steward Yale University Universit)' of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus Yale Universi~ Positive emotional states may promote healthy perceptions, beliefs, and physical well-being itself To explore potential mechanisms linking pleasant feelings and good health, the authors consider several lines of research, including (a) direct effects of positive affect on physiology, especially the immune system, (b) the information value of emotional experiences, ( c ) the psychological resources engendered by positive feeling states, (d) the ways in which mood can motivate health-relevant behaviors, and (e) the elicitation of social support. As anticipated by the Greek physician Hippocrates, positive emotions and healthy outcomes may be linked through multiple pathways. T hat the arousal of emotion might have consequences for physical health is not a new idea. Hippocrates, the father of clinical medicine, posited four bodily fluids (humors) that when out of balance led to various physical maladies. The humoral imbalances thought to cause illness, also, in his view, produced characteristic and chronic emotional states--black bile led to sorrow, phlegm to sleepiness, blood to sanguine feelings, and yellow bile to anger. Thus, Hippocrates linked emotion and disease by virtue of their common antecedents. Although Hippocrates no doubt had the details wrong, he provided prescient guidance regarding possible connections between emotion and health. Psychotherapists and practicing physicians similarly have recognized the comorbidity of psychological and physical disorders. Rates of mood and anxiety disorders are considerably higher among medical inpatients compared with the general population (Katon & Sullivan, 1990). Depressed individuals report somatic ailments in greater numbers than do nondepressed individuals (Katon, 1984) and appraise their health status less positively (Maddox, 1962; Tessler & Mechanic, 1978). When health plans offer psychological services through which individuals presumably can have their psychological distresses attended to, use of medical services for relief of physical symptoms is reduced (Cummings & Follette, 1976; Follette & Cummings, 1967; Jones & Vischi, 1979). Although the comorbidity of depressed mood and increased reports of physical complaints is well documented, our understanding of the specific mechanisms that link emotional states and physical health is less certain. The premise that the onset of a physical illness that interferes with pleasurable daily activities or causes considerable pain could result in depressed mood is noncontroversial (Keefe, Wilkins, Cook, Crisson, & Muhlbaier, 1986; Rodin & Voshart, 1986; Turk, Rudy, & Stieg, 1987). Somewhat more controversial is the premise that both on-going and acute emotional experiences can produce changes in physical health (Cohen & Rodriguez, 1995; Herbert & Cohen, 1993). This article examines the influence of emotional states on physical health and considers a range of physiological, cognitive, social, and behavioral factors that may serve to link emotional experience and health. First, we examine the direct effects of positive and negative emotional experiences on physiology, especially of the immune system, and their implications for health outcomes. Next, we turn to the informational value of emotional experiences and examine its influence on people's perceptions of and decisions regarding their physical health. Third, we describe the evidence that positive emotional experiences provide people with psychological resources that enable them more effectively to prevent or deal with health problems. Fourth, we explore whether people use healthy and unhealthy behaviors as mood regulatory strategies. Finally, we consider the role of emotion in the complex relation between social support and health. In keeping with the theme of this special issue of the American Psychologist, we place special emphasis on positive feelings and good health. However, because the research literature has so often focused on the opposite, we review how negative emotions might be associated with sickness too, especially when this work provides clues about how emotional resilience might have more salubrious consequences. Direct Effect of Emotional States on Immunity and Illness The physiological consequences associated with emotional experiences provide one mechanism by which emotional states may influence physical health. Although health psyPeter Salovey, Jerusha B. Detweiler, and Wayne T. Steward, Department of Psychology, Yale University; Alexander J. Rothman, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus. Preparation of this article was facilitated by the following grants: American Cancer Society Grant RPG-93-028-05-PBP, National Cancer Society Grant RO1-CA 68427, and National Institute of Mental Health Grant PO1-MH/DA 56826. We thank Shelley Taylor and Brian Bedell for their comments on earlier versions of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter Salovey, Department of Psychology, Yale University, P.O. Box 208205, New Haven, CT 06520-8205. Electronic mail may be sent to peter.salovey @yale.edu. 110 January 2000 ° American Psychologist Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X100/$5.00 Vol. 55, No. I, 110-121 DOI: 10A037//0003-O66X.55.1.110

Peter Salovey Photo by Michael Marsland chologists have often proposed that negative emotional experiences cause one to be more vulnerable to illness (e.g., Friedman & Booth-Kewley, 1987), it has been only in the past 15 years or so that investigators have been able to test these predictions directly. In general, negative emotional states are thought to be associated with unhealthy patterns of physiological functioning, whereas positive emotional states are thought to be associated with healthier patterns of responding in both cardiovascular activity and the immune system, although the data concerning negative states are more plentiful (e.g., Booth-Kewley & Friedman, 1987; Herbert & Cohen, 1993). We will focus primarily on the immune system here, as the cardiovascular consequences of emotional arousal (especially anger) have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Friedman, 1992; Kamarck & Jennings, 1991; Smith, 1992). Reported positive and negative affect has been shown to be associated with the release of secretory immunoglobulin A (S-IgA), the antibody considered the first line of defense against the common cold, so that positive moods would appear to enhance immune system responding, but it is compromised by negative moods (Stone, Cox, Valdimarsdottir, Jandorf, & Neale, 1987; Stone et al., 1994; Stone, Reed, & Neale, 1987). Moreover, the increased frequency of desirable (but not undesirable) events predicts higher levels of immune response on subsequent days, even after controlling for the frequency of desirable events on the same day as the immune response was assessed (Stone et al., 1994). Several studies have also revealed a lagged relation between the low frequency of desirable events and the onset of respiratory illness (Evans & Edgerton, 1991; Stone, Reed, & Neale, 1987). In their most recent experiments, Stone and his collaborators have found that undesirable events lower S-IgA levels by increasing negative mood, but desirable events increase S-IgA levels by decreasing negative mood rather than by affecting positive mood (Stone, Marco, Cruise, Cox, & Neale, 1996). Green and Salovey, however, have argued that one should not expect differentiation of positive and negative moods as mediators when both mood measures are included in the same statistical model, because the two are negatively correlated, once nonrandom error is taken into account (Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Green, Salovey, & Truax, 1999). Cohen and his colleagues have provided strong evidence that negative mood states increase people's susceptibility to illness (Cohen et al., 1995). In a laboratory paradigm in which people are exposed systematically to a respiratory virus, individuals who experienced greater negative mood at the time of the investigation developed a more severe illness in response to the virus than those whose moods were more positive (Cohen et al., 1995). The current challenge is to demonstrate that these links between negative mood and illness are mediated by changes in immune parameters. Laboratory studies that manipulate people's moods experimentally provide some converging evidence regarding the causal influence of affective states on immune system functioning. Labott and her colleagues asked healthy college women to view two videotapes, one that was funny and one that was sad (Labott, Ahleman, Wolever, & Martin, 1990). S-IgA level increased after watching the humorous video, suggesting enhanced immune system activity; but it dropped after viewing the sad video, indicating suppressed immune system activity. These differences, however, were obtained only if participants had been instructed to express their mood overtly (we will return to this point shortly). Dillon, Minchoff, and Baker (1985-1986) have similarly demonstrated, among both men and women, that viewing a humorous video resulted in greater S-IgA compared with that obtained after viewing a neutral video. However, several investigators have found that induced pleasant and unpleasant mood states have similar effects on immune functioning. Knapp et al. (1992) found that induced pleasant and unpleasant affective states were each associated with decreased lymphocyte proliferation to two common mitogens. When a group of actors was asked to experience pleasant and unpleasant moods of varying levels of arousal on different days, all moods affected natural killer cell activity and the ratio of suppressor to cytotoxic T cells similarly, regardless of their valence or level of arousal (Futterman, Kemeny, Shapiro, & Fahey, 1994). However, the proliferative response to the mitogen phytohemagglutinin was sensitive to the valence of the induced mood; it increased after positive moods and decreased after negative moods (but see Futterman, Kemeny, Shapiro, Polonsky, & Fahey, 1992). We should note that some of the tests of the effects of emotional experiences on immune system function are methodologically compromised. One of the important tenets of psychoneuroimmunology is that immuno-suppression or immuno-enhancement should be assessed through January 2000 • American Psychologist 111

Alexander J. Rothman Photo by Tom Foley multiple assays because the various measures of immune system functioning are not always closely related to each other(Taylor, 1999). However, the studies cited above in which positive affect appears to be associated with better immune functioning usually are based on a single measure, secretory IgA. Furthermore, the Labott et al. (1990) and Dillon et al. (1985-1986) experiments relied on methods of data collecting (timed salivary flow) and laboratory antibody analysis (radial diffusion) now considered flawed. The work by Stone and his colleagues (1994, 1996) generally is based on better methods (e.g., saliva collected directly from the parotid allowing for better control over salivary flow). Although the expression of emotions can have immediate effects on some aspects of the immune system, it is not clear how long such effects last and whether differences in chronic mood actually lead to clinically significant differences in disease resistance. There is some evidence that the chronic use of coping styles that promote either positive or negative moods is associated with a range of health outcomes. For example, baseline levels of S-IgA are positively correlated with the reported frequency with which people use humor as a coping mechanism (Dillon et al., 1985-1986). Similarly, the more older women cry as a coping mechanism, the greater the number of health problems they report (Labott & Martin, 1990). The immunological consequences associated with negative mood states may also serve to explain the finding that people who are dealing with severe stressors for longer than a month are substar~tially more susceptible to experimentally induced colds (Cohen et al., 1998). The observed relation between physical health and dispositional styles such as optimism (Peterson, Vaillant, & Seligman, 1988; Scheier & Carver, 1992; Scheier et al., 1989), hostility (Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996), and hardiness (Kobasa, 1979; Kobasa, Maddi, & Kahn, 1982) may be due in part to the chronic mood states engendered by the personality style and their resultant impact on physiological functioning (e.g., Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998). Given that negative emotional states are associated with lowered immune activity and increased susceptibility to disease, one might conclude that people would benefit from minimizing or suppressing any negative feelings they might have. In fact, women who were instructed to suppress their emotional reactions to a sad film evidenced minimal change in their S-IgA levels (Labott et al., 1990). Although there may be some immediate immunological benefits to be obtained from suppressing one's negative feelings, the suppression or inhibition of negative emotional states can result in adverse physiological and health outcomes that may outweigh any short-term gains (Gross, 1998). Actively suppressing one's negative (or positive) emotional experience heightens the sympathetic activation of the cardiovascular system (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Emotional suppression has been hypothesized to be related to the development of coronary heart disease (Pennebaker, 1992) as well as the progression of cancer (Gross, 1989; Jensen, 1987; Temoshok, 1987), although such relationships have been difficult to demonstrate empirically (e.g., Joffres, Reed, & Nomura, 1985; Keene, 1980; Suls, Wan, & Costa, 1995). In addition to the potential adverse health consequences associated with emotional inhibition, Pennebaker and his colleagues (reviewed in Pennebaker, 1989; Pennebaker & Traue, 1993) have demonstrated that interventions that help people process and confront traumatic life events produce significant improvements in health functioning, including fewer self-reported health problems (e.g., Greenberg & Stone, 1992; Greenberg, Wortman, & Stone, 1996; Pennebaker, Barger, & Tiebout, 1989), lower use of health services (e.g., Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988), and enhanced immune system activity (e.g., Esterling, Kiecolt-Glaser, Bodnar, & Glaser, 1994; Pennebaker et al., 1988; Petrie, Booth, Pennebaker, Davison, & Thomas, 1995). These benefits have been obtained despite the fact that people experience considerable negative affect during the time they are writing or talking about the trauma. In fact, Kelley, Lumley, and Leisen (1997) found that patients with rheumatoid arthritis who talked about the stressful events in their lives not only reported better physical functioning three months after disclosure, but the magnitude of improvement was positively related to the degree to which the disclosure process had induced a negative mood. However, the paradigm developed by Pennebaker and others does not merely involve the expression or release of pent-up negative emotions. The effectiveness of the writing or verbalization task is believed to be based on its ability to help people work through the traumatic event. Although data regarding specific mediational mechanisms are limited, there is some evidence that people report greater health changes if during the writing task they used more 112 January 2000 • American Psychologist

Jerusha B. Detweiler Photo by Michael MarsLand positive emotion words and over time engaged in more causal and insightful thinking (Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997). To the extent that disclosure helps people to repair their traumatic experiences, it may share important features with the mood regulatory strategies that people use on an on-going basis (Gross, 1998; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). People who report that they are generally able to regain and maintain positive emotional states are less likely to get sick or to use medical services when faced with a stressful life experience (Goldman, Kraemer, & Salovey, 1996; see also Catanzaro & Greenwood, 1994). There would appear to be direct, physiological benefits derived from experiencing and expressing positive emotional states. However, the health consequences of negative emotional states depend upon people's ability to work through and manage them. To the extent that people--because of dispositional or situational constraints--are unable to repair their negative moods, the persistent expression of negative affect may have adverse health consequences. Informational Value of Emotional States People's behavioral practices are a primary determinant of their physical health, and change in human behavior is likely the most efficient way to reduce disease morbidity and premature mortality (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1991). A premise of nearly all theories of health behavior (e.g., Becker et al., 1977; Janz & Becker, 1984) is that people decide to adopt or maintain a particular pattern of behavior based on an analysis of the relevant costs and benefits associated with each behavioral option (for a review see Salovey, Rothman, & Rodin, 1998). Given that people rely on their emotional states as a source of information about how they are doing and that their emotions can alter the ease with which information comes to mind (Schwarz & Clore, 1996), people's assessment of their health status as well as different patterns of behavior may vary depending on their moods. Because these beliefs guide behavioral decisions, the influence of emotion on judgment offers a path by which emotional experiences can affect physical health. Does a person's mood influence the recognition or interpretation of physical symptoms? Are people more likely to interpret a physiological response as a health concern if they are in a negative mood? To answer this question, people's mood states have been manipulated systematically in the laboratory and the effects on symptom reports examined. Across studies, people made to feel sad report more physical symptoms than those made to feel happy (Croyle & Uretsky, 1987; Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989), and those placed in a sad mood also attribute greater discomfort to their symptoms (Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). Studies that have examined whether naturally occurring variations in mood lead to symptom reporting provide a more complex set of results. Some investigators have found that the chronic tendency to experience a particular mood state (e.g., negative affectivity; Watson & Pennebaker, 1989) but not situational variations in mood predicts symptom reporting independent of illness severity (e.g., Cohen et al., 1995; Watson, 2000). However, others have found measures of state negative affect to be better predictors of symptom reports than measures of trait affect (e.g., E. A. Leventhal, Hansell, Diefenbach, Leventhal, & Glass, 1996). Some investigators even observe that symptom reporting is independent of prior reports of negative affect (Diefenbach, Leventhal, Leventhal, & Patrick-Miller, 1996). Significant differences in the methodology and measures used across these studies render any interpretation of the conflicting pattern of results difficult. However, the consistent effect of induced mood on symptom reporting does suggest that there are conditions under which mood can systematically alter symptom reports. The presence of physical symptoms is but one factor motivating individuals to attend to their health or to seek treatment. Perceptions of personal vulnerability are an important antecedent to the adoption of appropriate behavioral practices (Weinstein, 1993). Mood can influence people's perceptions of risk for an unwanted health problem, so that people in a happy mood believe themselves to be less vulnerable than do those in a sad mood (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Mayer & Volanth, 1985; Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989). Treatment decisions are also affected by people's beliefs about their capacity to engage successfully in salubrious behaviors (i.e., self-efficacy) and their expectations that such behaviors will alleviate illness or maintain health (i.e., response efficacy; Bandura, 1977, 1997; for a review see Salovey et al., 1998). Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) demonstrated that mood states can influence people's beliefs regarding their ability to carry out health-promoting behaviors. As cornJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 113

Wayne T. Steward Photo by Michael Marsland pared with sad individuals, those who were happy perceived themselves as better able to engage in health-promoting behaviors and had greater confidence that these behaviors would relieve their illness. Individuals who are ill and are experiencing sad moods may thus be caught in a bind, On the one hand, they appear to experience their symptoms as more frequent, intense, and discomforting. On the other hand, they believe that there is little they can actually do to make themselves feel better. Such malaise may make the sad individual especially unlikely to adhere to treatment recommendations. Like Darwin (1872), many scholars have recognized that emotional states offer people information about their environments. Positive emotional states signal that one's environment is safe, whereas negative emotional states indicate that there are aspects of one's environment that must be addressed and corrected (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). The informational value of emotional states may have implications for the decision to seek care for a health problem. Delays in care seeking are a function of a number of psychological factors that guide how people interpret and evaluate physical symptoms (Andersen, Cacioppo, & Roberts, 1996; Dracup et al., 1995; Safer, Tharps, Jackson, & Leventhal, 1979). However, the relation between emotional states and care seeking has focused primarily on the impact of stressful life events (e.g,, Cameron, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1993, 1995). To the extent that positive emotional states are taken to indicate the absence of problems that need to be addressed, when people are feeling happy they may be less likely to recognize signs of physical distress and consequently may be less likely to seek medical care. On the other hand, negative emotional states may engender greater vigilance or concern among people who are experiencing physical distress, which may in turn facilitate contact with a medical professional. However, investigators have yet to test directly the effect of pleasant and unpleasant moods on care seeking. The observation that people in pleasant emotional states typically rely on less effortful, heuristic-based cognitive processing strategies (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991) and are motivated to act in ways that enable them to sustain that emotion state (Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995) provides a framework that is consistent with the predicted effect of positive mood on care-seeking. Yet, there appear to be situations in which feeling positive about either oneself or one's future provides people with the psychic resources enabling them to process more thoroughly threatening information (Aspinwall, 1998; Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998). Whether the greater willingness to consider information about a potential health concern translates into a similar willingness to recognize a sign of current physical distress is an empirical question that needs to be addressed. Of course, the benefits associated with faster decisions to seek care are contingent on the accuracy with which people distinguish between symptoms that are and are not disease related. It is possible that negative emotional experiences may heighten feelings of concern to such an extent that people become significantly more likely to seek help in situations in which medical care is, in fact, not needed (Stretton & Salovey, 1998). Negative emotional experiences may not always facilitate care-seeking. When ambiguous physical symptoms and stressful life events co-occur, the symptoms may be considered part of one's emotional reaction to the life stressor and are less likely to prompt a decision to seek medical attention (Cameron et al., 1995). Any difficulty people have identifying the source of their physical distress may be exacerbated by the fact that negative emotional states shift people's attention toward themselves and away from their external environment. Evidence that sadness increases attentional focus on to the self has been obtained in both correlational studies (reviewed by Ingrain, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Salovey & Rodin, 1985) and experiments (Salovey, 1992; Sedikides, 1992; Wood, Saltzberg, & Goldsamt, 1990). Because focusing attention on the body increases perceptions of symptoms and sensations (Pennebaker, 1982; Pennebaker & Lightner, 1980), people may become highly sensitive to the contingent relation between negative emotional events and physical symptoms and consequently develop explanatory theories that serve to integrate these psychological events. In line with H. Leventhal's common-sense model of illness (H. Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 1984), the specific content of the theories people develop should determine whether physical symptoms are likely to be (mis)attributed to stressful life events. Emotional States and Psychological Resilience Appropriate health practices are often difficult to carry out and psychologically taxing. In order to adopt precautions, 114 January 2000 • American Psychologist

people must first recognize the possibility that they are at risk for an unwanted health problem. Yet, people actively strive to maintain their optimistic sense of their personal risk (e.g., Weinstein & Klein, 1995) and resist acknowledging that they have health concerns (e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992). People who use illness screening or detection practices must be willing to run the risk of learning that they have a health problem. Noncompliance with screening guidelines often reflects an unwillingness to face this risk (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Positive emotional states can facilitate healthy behavioral practices by providing the resilience that people may need to confront the possibility that they might have or develop a serious health problem. In line with this perspective, Fredrickson (1998) has argued that the primary function of positive emotional experience is that it facilitates the availability of personal resources that afford innovation and creativity in thought and action (see also Isen, 1987). Positive emotional states may offer people the opportunity to consider and plan for future outcomes, whereas negative emotional states orient people to respond to proximal, immediate events (Frijda, 1986). Although there are no data that directly confirm the predicted link between positive emotional experiences and the increased availability of psychological resources, there are empirical findings that are consistent with this perspective. For example, humor has been shown to help people cope more effectively with life stressors. Expression of humor appears to moderate associations between negative life events and mood disorders (Martin & Lefcourt, 1983; Nezu, Nezu, & Blisset, 1988) and increases people's tolerance for higher levels of physical discomfort (e.g., Cogan, Cogan, Waltz, & McCue, 1987). Also, positive experiences engendered, for example, by recalling one's past acts of kindness, allow individuals to accept healthrisk information less defensively, even when it is quite self-relevant (M. B. Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; see also Trope & Pomerantz, 1998). The health benefits associated with both domain-specific optimism (e.g., Taylor et al., 1992; see also Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000, this issue) and dispositional optimism (e.g., Peterson, 1988; Scheier & Carver, 1985, 1992; see also Peterson, 2000, this issue) may reflect, in part, the psychological resources afforded by the belief that one will experience good instead of bad outcomes. Optimists who are coping with a health problem or are undergoing a medical procedure may be better able to focus on and plan for future outcomes. For example, Scheier et al. (1989) reported that in a sample of men who underwent coronary artery bypass surgery, those who were dispositionally optimistic were more likely to cope by focusing on postoperative goals. Five years after surgery, optimists reported healthier habits, such as regular use of vitamins, eating lunches with less fatty foods, and enrollment in a cardiac rehabilitation program (study by Scheier, Matthews, Owens, Magovern, & Carver as cited in Scheier & Carver, 1992). A positive state of mind may enable people to consider personally unfavorable information. People who hold optimistic beliefs about their health spend more time reading information about health risks than about more favorable health concerns and, subsequently, have better memory for that information (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996). Moreover, the relation between optimism and informationseeking is even stronger when the information is personally relevant and, thus, presumably more threatening. The tendency to be hopeful when considering future life events may also enable people to become more informed about potential health outcomes (Snyder, 1994; Snyder, Irving, & Anderson, 1991). For example, in an investigation of hope and college women's cancer-related health practices, hopelul women were better informed of the negative health effects of behaviors such as smoking (Irving, Snyder, & Crowson, 1998). Individuals high in hope also reported they would be more willing to visit health professionals and to perform detection behaviors (such as skin cancer exams and breas! examinations; Irving et al., 1998). Consistent with the premise that positive emotional states facilitate healthy behavioral practices, positive affectivity mediated the relation between hope and intended cancer-related behaviors. Although the tendency to experience positive emotions may be a function of stable individual differences in dispositions such as optimism or hope, it can also be manipulated by activities or interventions that elicit positive affect. People coping with a serious illness spontaneously ,engage in downward social comparison (i.e., compare themselves to someone who is worse off than they are; e.g., Wood, 1989; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). Because downward social comparison generally engenders feelings of positive affect (Taylor & Lobel, 1989), it may be that people engage in this pattern of comparisons to regulale their mood, and the positive affect associated with downward social comparison provides them with the psychological resources they need to cope effectively with their heallh problems. This analysis suggests that downward social comparison may not only provide short-term benefits (i.e., mood regulation) but also indirectly facilitate long-term coping. Before closing our discussion on the relationship between positive affect, psychological resources, and health, we would like to highlight the health-care worker's role as one who can inspire hope in others. Freud (1953) described that patients' expectancies, "colored by hope and faith," are "an effective force.., in all our attempts at treatment and cure" Ip. 289). The link between such hopeful expectations and health outcomes becomes both clear and convincing through the investigation of the placebo, a pharmacologically inert substance given to patients in place of an active medication. Approximately 35% of patients report symptom relief in response to a placebo (estimate based on a review of the literature by Hafen, Karren, Frandsen, & Smith, 1996). Frank (1974) concluded that by raising the patient's level of hope, the health care professional's positive expectations (even when administering a placebo therapy) can have a concrete impact on the health of the patient. The positive mood experience that comes from a renewal of hope, particularly among those who are strugJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 115

gling with illness, reaps health benefits that cannot be underemphasized. Changes in Mood and Health-Relevant Behaviors Individuals may use behaviors relevant to their health as mood regulation strategies. For example, people might choose to eat, use tobacco, or exercise in response to an upsetting event. There is considerable evidence, for example, that people use and abuse alcohol because of their expectations about how it will influence their emotional state (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995; Gustafson, 1991; Wills & Shiffman, 1985). Cooper et al. (1995) have argued that people consume alcohol to satisfy two distinct functions that are closely tied to their emotional states: People drink because they believe it will help them to escape or regulate negative feelings, or they drink because they believe it will heighten or stimulate positive feelings (see Sayette, 1993; Stritzke, Lang, & Patrick, 1996). Negative emotional experiences are an important antecedent to tobacco use (Brandon, 1994). Rates of smoking are considerably higher among people who have been diagnosed as clinically depressed (e.g., Glassman et al., 1990). Studies that have manipulated people's affective experiences experimentally have provided evidence that is consistent with the epidemiological data; compared with people in either a control or a positive mood condition, people placed in a negative mood report greater cravings for cigarettes and subsequently smoke more (e.g., Brandon, Wetter, & Baker, 1996; Payne, Schare, Levis, & Colletti, 1991). Finally, people report that the desire to repair or to improve their mood is a primary reason that they smoke, and the situations most likely to trigger a relapse during a quit attempt are those that involve an unpleasant emotional experience (e.g., Brandon, Tiffany, Obremski, & Baker, 1990; Shiffman, 1982). Although people are attracted to many health-relevant behaviors because of a desire to avoid or blunt a negative emotional experience, some behaviors are attractive because of their ability actually to induce positive feelings. Kelly and Kalichman (1998) have reported that the pleasure associated with unprotected sex predicted the continued practice of unprotected anal intercourse, even after controlling for people's attitudes and intentions regarding safer sex. Another form of physical activity, exercise, increases positive feelings and reduces negative feelings (e.g., Byrne & Byrne, 1993; Steptoe & Cox, 1988), although people's affective state before exercise may attenuate the actual change in emotional experience (e.g., Gauvin, Rejeski, & Norris, 1996; Rejeski, Gauvin, Hobson, & Norris, 1995). The emotional benefits obtained from regular exercise may be of such value that interference with habitual patterns of exercise behavior can precipitate mood disturbances (e.g., Mondin et al., 1996). People's behavior may be motivated by the desire to improve their mood, but the processes by which the behavior alters mood is unclear. Specifically, research is needed to tease apart the relative influences of physiological changes associated with the behavior and cognitive expectancies regarding the influence of the behavior on emotional experience. In addition, investigators may need to attend to a broader array of emotional states when assessing the degree to which a behavior successfully made people feel better. For example, a diary study of self-defined chocolate addicts and nonaddicts found that the so-called addicts tended to eat more chocolate when they were in depressed moods (Macdiarmid & Hetherington, 1995). However, bad moods were not ameliorated by eating chocolate; the chocolate addicts experienced increased levels of guilt. Feelings of guilt or shame may reflect regret over having relied on unhealthy behavioral practices to repair a mood state. If behaviors such as eating or drinking do not actually improve mood, why are they motivated by upsetting situations? Baumeister (1991) argued that a number of behaviors, including drinking and binge eating, provide a person with an opportunity to escape from one's self. While engaging in the behavior, people's attention is directed upon the act itself with little attention allocated to the problems that motivated the action or its consequences. In line with this perspective, Baumeister presented evidence suggesting that during an escape from the self, a person also experiences a blunting of emotion, including any unpleasant emotions that elicited the need for escape (see also Leith & Baumeister, 1996). Mood and the Elicitation of Social Support The impact of interpersonal relationships on people's emotional states and the recursive effect that these states have on the availability of interpersonal contact offers a final path through which emotional states can affect health. The influence of social support on health is well-established (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996). Social support is related to lower mortality (Berkman, 1985), greater resistance to communicable diseases (Cohen, 1988), lower prevalence and incidence of coronary heart disease (Seeman & Syme, 1987), and faster recovery from hearl disease and heart surgery (Ruberman, Weinblatt, Goldberg, & Chaudhary, 1984). In general, individuals who have minimal psychosocial resources appear to be more prone to illness and mood disturbances when faced with increased stress levels than individuals with considerable social support (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988). There are two ways in which social support can affect health (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996). The buffering hypothesis argues that people benefit from social support only when they experience a stressful life event, whereas the direct effect hypothesis argues that social relationships promote health and well-being regardless of the individual's stress level. Both buffering and direct effects are possible, depending on the nature of the stressor. In either case, the relation between social support and health may be mediated, in part, by changes in people's emotional experience. Social support may thus lead the individual to experience a lesser degree of stress in the face of a challenging situation. 116 January 2000 • American Psychologist

Social relationships may also allow individuals to feel secure with the knowledge that help will be provided when and if necessary. This feeling of security may increase their resilience to physical illness (Cohen & Syme, 1985). Finally, social support may keep people from feeling lonely, a condition that is associated with somatic complaints, depression, and general feelings of distress (Peplau, 1985). Medical students who described themselves as lonely have lower natural killer cell activity than less lonely students, and respond with a weaker immune response to a hepatitis B vaccine than those with a larger social support network (Glaser et al., 1992; Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1992). There is likely to be a reciprocal relation between emotional experience and social support: Not only does the provision of social support influence one's emotional state, but a person's emotional state also influences the likelihood that social support is provided, We would expect that people would be more likely to provide on-going assistance to others who maintain a more positive outlook on life. Several cross-sectional studies have observed a positive relation between mood and the perceived number of friends and family members who could be counted on and the actual number of people who had provided help over the course of a year (Eckenrode, Kruger, Cerkovnik, 1986, cited in Cohen, 1988; see also Cohen et al., 1982). Signs of emotional distress signal one's need to potential providers of social support. However, the prolonged expression of negative emotion deters people from helping out (Pennebaker, 1993; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1996). Although direct empirical support for the claim that positive mood mediates the relation between social support and health is not available, we are confident that positive mood is a critical component of social interactions. We agree with Cohen and Syme's (1985) suggestion that social support, through the stability, predictability, and control that it provides, leads people to feel positively about themselves and their environment. These feelings, in turn, motivate people to want to take care of themselves, interact more positively with others, and demonstrate resilience in times of stress. The combination of these factors facilitates continued physical and psychological health and further strengthens the individual's social network. Individuals who are happy find it easier to develop a rich network of social support as compared with those who are more dour. We are likely attracted to people who are pleasant, thus providing them with the health benefits of social support. Conclusion In this special issue of the American Psychologist, we celebrate the accomplishments of the field of psychology as we enter the year 2000 by focusing on positive aspects of human behavior. As we recognize the value of focusing on optimal experiences and the good life more generally, we still need to recognize that our understanding of how positive mental states affect physical health has been informed not only by studying the positive, but by focusing on the negative as well. For instance, Harvard's famed physiologist, Walter Cannon (1957), spent several decades documenting what he called voodoo death, stories in various cultures about people who because of some major troubling emotional experience (often extreme fright) suddenly died. Cannon even traced a reasonable pathophysiology that still sensibly provides an explanation for how a person literally could be scared to death. 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Wisdom A Metaheuristic (Pragmatic) to Orchestrate Mind and Virtue Toward Excellence Paul B. Baltes and Ursula M. Staudinger Max Planck Institute for Human Development The primary focus of this article is on the presentation of wisdom research conducted under the heading of the Berlin wisdom paradigm. Informed by a cultural-historical analysis, wisdom in this paradigm is defined as an expert knowledge system concerning the fundamental pragmatics of life. These include knowledge and judgment about the meaning and conduct of life and the orchestration of human development toward excellence while attending conjointly to personal and collective well-being. Measurement includes think-aloud protocols concerning various problems of life associated with life planning, life management, and life review. Responses are evaluated with reference to a family of 5 criteria: rich factual and procedural knowledge, lifespan contextualism, relativism of values and life priorities, and recognition and management of uncertainty. A series of studies is reported that aim to describe, explain, and optimize wisdom. The authors conclude with a new theoretical perspective that characterizes wisdom as a cognitive and motivational metaheuristic (pragmatic) that organizes and orchestrates knowledge toward human excellence in mind and virtue, both individually and collectively. W Visdom is generally considered the pinnacle of insight into the human condition and about the means and ends of a good life (P. Baltes, Smith, & Staudinger, 1992; Kekes, 1995; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b). In the positive-psychology spirit of this special issue of the American Psychologist, our interest in wisdom has been spurred by a motivation to identify and highlight the best of what society and humans can accomplish concerning their own development and that of others. As has been true several times throughout the millennia (P. Baltes, 1999; Kekes, 1995; Rice, 1958), the current scholarly discourse about the structure and function of wisdom evinces another period of rejuvenation. Occasionally, researchers argue that such historical periods of rejuvenation follow the principle of societal need for reflection about its own attainments, status, and future direction. The purpose of this article is twofold. First and most important, we present an overview of our work on the psychology of wisdom. Proceeding from a general theoretical framework, we have developed an empirical research paradigm to study wisdom (P. Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; P. Baltes & Smith, 1990; P. Baltes et al., 1992; P. Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Dixon & Baltes, 1986; Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b). Second, to embed our work in a larger context, we begin by summarizing briefly the work of other psychologists interested in the topic of wisdom (see also, Clayton & Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990; Pasupathi & Baltes, in press; Staudinger & Baltes, 1994; Sternberg, 1990, 1998; Taranto, 1989). Historically, it has been mainly the fields of philosophy and religious studies that have served as the central forum for discourse about the concept of wisdom (Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1993, 1999; Kekes, 1995; Oelmtiller, 1989; Robinson, 1990; Rudolph, 1987; Welsch, 1995). For the current historical moment, however, renewed interest in the topic of wisdom is evident in a wide spectrum of disciplines, ranging from the traditional mentors of wisdom, philosophy, and religious studies, to cultural anthropology, political science, education, and psychology (Agazzi, 1991; Arlin, 1993; Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1993, 1999; Cook, 1993; Lehrer, Lum, Slichta, & Smith, 1996; Maxwell, 1984; Nichols, 1996; Nozick, 1993; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b; Sternberg, 1990; Welsch, 1995). Because of the culturally rich meaning and heritage of wisdom, defining and operationalizing the concept of wisdom as a scientifically grounded psychological construct is Paul B. Baltes and Ursula M. Staudinger, Center for Lifespan Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany. Ursula M. Staudinger is now at the Department of Psychology, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany. We would like to acknowledge the many contributions of earlier colleagues in the Wisdom Project at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. Earlier collaborators included, foremost, Freya DittmannKohli, Roger Dixon, and Jacqui Smith. We also thank Monisha Pasupathi for her valuable comments. We thank especially Irmgard Pahl, who, as editorial assistant, has participated with the utmost competence, care, and curiosity in examining cultural-historical and philosophical works regarding their treatment of wisdom. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul B. Bakes, Lifespan Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, Germany. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected] or to [email protected]. 122 January 2000 • American Psychologist Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00l$5.00 Vol. 55, No. 1, 122-136 DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.122

Paul B. Baltes not easy. Wisdom may be beyond what psychological methods and concepts can achieve. The first president of the American Psychological Association, G. Stanley Hall (1922), was one of the first psychologists to tackle this task, originally in an anonymous article published in 1921 in the Atlantic Monthly. Subsequently, it was primarily the lifespan model of Erikson (1959; Clayton & Birren, 1980; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998) and the emergence of lifespan psychology (P. Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999) that kept wisdom in the domain of psychological analysis. It was not until the 1980s that a more diverse group of psychological scholars and researchers began to engage themselves with the topic of wisdom, although most work was theoretical rather than empirical. A book edited by Sternberg (1990) was a signal of this growing interest in wisdom, as are entries on wisdom in a variety of behavioral-science-oriented encyclopedias (e.g., P. Baltes & Staudinger, 1998; Pasupathi & Baltes, in press; Staudinger & Baltes, 1994). Implicit and Explicit Psychological Theories of Wisdom Not surprisingly, because of the multidisciplinary nature of the wisdom concept, including its integrative feature of linking mind to virtue, psychological research on wisdom is multifaceted. Aside from issues such as the nature of methodology applied and the content range that is assigned to the psychological sphere of wisdom (Birren & Fisher, 1990), two major branches can be distinguished: implicit theories and explicit theories of wisdom (Sternberg, 1990). Implicit Theories The first branch of this sphere, implicit theories of wisdom, consists of psychological research that is associated with folk-psychological or common-sense approaches, a line of work initiated by Clayton (Clayton & Birren, 1980), Holliday and Chandler (1986), Sternberg (1985, 1986), Orwoll and Perlmutter (1990), and Sowarka (1989). At stake here is the question of how the term wisdom is used in everyday language and how wise persons are characterized. In our assessment, results on implicit conceptions of wisdom and wise persons permit five conclusions about the concept of wisdom: (a) Wisdom is a concept that carries specific meaning that is widely shared and understood in its language-based representation. For example, wisdom is clearly distinct from other wisdom-related psychological concepts such as social intelligence, maturity, or creativity. (b) Wisdom is judged to be an exceptional level of human functioning. It is related to excellence and ideals of human development. (c) Wisdom identifies a state of mind and behavior that includes the coordinated and balanced interplay of intellectual, affective, and motivational aspects of human functioning. (d) Wisdom is viewed as associated with a high degree of personal and interpersonal competence, including the ability to listen, evaluate, and to give advice. (e) Wisdom involves good intentions. It is used for the well-being of oneself and others. In many ways, as is true for many achievements of human development (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1991), such implicit and folk-psychological characterizations of wisdom are mainly the product of cultural history and its impact on current society (see also, Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990). There is a saying that states, "Cultural memory is the mother of wisdom." Individuals partake in this culture-produced concept of wisdom. Consistent with this view, a more comprehensive characterization of wisdom can be deduced from culturalhistorical and philosophical analyses of the wisdom concept (Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1993, 1999; Kekes, 1995; Lehrer et al., 1996). To illustrate, P. Baltes (1993, 1999, see Appendix A) identified seven properties of wisdom that emerge when analyzing and synthesizing cultural-historical and philosophical work: (a) Wisdom represents a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice; (b) wisdom addresses important and difficult questions and strategies about the conduct and meaning of life; (c) wisdom includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and the uncertainties of the world; (d) wisdom constitutes knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, measure, and balance; (el) wisdom involves a perfect synergy of mind and character; that is, an orchestration of knowledge and virtues; (t) wisdom represents knowledge used for the good or well-being of oneself and that of others; and (g) wisdom, although difficult to achieve and to specify, is easily recognized when manifested. When comparing the results of modern-day research on subjective beliefs of wisdom (see above) with these more general perspectives on wisdom that can be deduced from philosophical and cultural-historical analyses, there is much overlap (P. Baltes, 1999). If anything, however, the philosophical-historical analysis of wisdom is more general, as it integrates the beliefs held by many individuals into a common set of properties about which there is much January 2000 • American Psychologist 123

Ursula M. Staudinger collective and scholarship-based intersubjectivity. The beliefs of single individuals, in other words, are usually less developed (comprehensive and organized) than those offered by philosophical and cultural-historical analyses. Explicit Theories Explicit psychological theories of wisdom go beyond the characterization of wisdom and a wise person in terms of language-based descriptions. They focus on behavioral manifestations or expressions of wisdom. In psychology, such explicit theories of wisdom refer to theoretical constructions of wisdom that lend themselves to empirical inquiry in terms of quantifiable operationalization as well as the identification of relevant antecedents, correlates, and consequences of wisdom and wisdom-related concepts. Implicit and explicit psychological theories of wisdom are intertwined of course. For example, the information provided by implicit theories of wisdom and the culturalhistorical work on wisdom offers a frame within which explicit psychological work can be evaluated. Specifically, one can ask whether explicit and behavior-oriented work on the psychology of wisdom sufficiently agrees with the language-based construction of wisdom as reflected in cultural history, philosophy, and folk psychology. Theoretical and empirical work on explicit psychological theories of wisdom can be roughly divided into three groups: (a) the conceptualization of wisdom as a personal characteristic or constellation of personality dispositions (e.g., Erikson, 1959; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998), (b) the conceptualization of wisdom in the neo-Piagetian tradition of postformal and dialectical thought (e.g., Alexander & Langer, 1990; Labouvie-Vief, 1990), and (c) the conceptualization of wisdom as an expert system dealing with the meaning and conduct of life (P. Baltes & Smith, 1990; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1994). This third category of explicit theories guides our own empirical work and serves as the basis for the psychological paradigm of wisdom presented in the following. For another well-elaborated psychological theory of wisdom (although largely theoretical rather than empirical), the reader can refer to a recent work by Sternberg (1998). Specifically, Sternberg conceptualized wisdom as the application of tacit knowledge toward the achievement of a common good through a balance among multiple personal (intra-, inter-, and extrapersonal) interests and environmental conditions. There is much similarity between our respective theories. The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm: Wisdom as Expertise in the Fundamental Pragmatics of Life To prevent a possible misunderstanding, we begin by making explicit that our own empirical approach is only one way to operationalize our general perspectives on wisdom (see Appendix A and Figure 1). We do not argue that this line of empirical operationalization covers the entire meaning space of wisdom. Wisdom as a theoretical and cultural construct is more than any given empirical method can achieve. Because of the emphasis of wisdom on excellence, we define wisdom as an expertise in the conduct and meaning of life. In this vein, wisdom is a key factor in the construction of a "good life" (M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; P. Baltes et al., 1992; Staudinger, 1999b). An important step toward the further explication of this definition of wisdom as expertise was a specification of the content that can properly be said to fall within the category of wisdom (cf. P. Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 1993). To this end, we introduced the concept of the fundamental pragmatics of life. With fundamental pragmatics, we mean knowledge and judgment about the essence of the human condition and the ways and means of planning, managing, and understanding a good life. Included in the fundamental pragmatics of life are, for example, knowledge about the conditions, variability, ontogenetic changes, and historicity of life development as well as knowledge of life's obligations and life goals; understanding of the socially and contextually intertwined nature of human life, including its finitude, cultural conditioning, and incompleteness; and knowledge about oneself and the limits of one's own knowledge and the translation of knowledge into overt behavior. Equally central to wisdom-related knowledge and judgment are the "spiritual" incomprehensibilities of life, such as the mind-body dynamics or the existence of a divine being. These examples illustrate that the territory of inquiry that we label as the fundamental pragmatics of life is very different from other domains that have been identified in research on expertise. For the most part, past research on expertise has concentrated on well-defined systems of factual and procedural knowledge such as physics or chess. 124 January 2000 • American Psychologist

Figure 1 A-Research Framework Describin.cl Antecedent Factors and Mediatin~ Processes for the Acquisition and Maintenance of Wisdom-Related-Knowledge and Skills Across the LiFe Span FACTORS e.g., Cognitive Mechanics Mental Health Cognitive Style Creativity Openness to Experience Ego Strength I EXPERTISE-SPECIFIC I ~- FACTORS ~- Experience in Life Matters Organized Tutelage Mentorship in Dealing with Life Problems Cognitive Heuristics Motivational Dispositions (e.g., Strive for Excellence, Generativity) e.g., FACILITATIVE [ EXPERIENTIAL CONTEXTS ORGANIZING PROCESSES: EXAMPLES e.g., Life Planning Life Management Life Review GENERAL FRAMEWORK Wisdom as Excellence in Mind and Virtue PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK Wisdom as Excellence in the Conduct and Meaning of Life BERLIN WISDOM PARADIGM Wisdom as Expert Knowledge and Judgment in the Fundamental Pragmatics of Life BASIC CRITERIA Factual Knowledge, Procedural Knowledge META CRITERIA Lifespan Contextualism, Value Relativism, Recognition/Management of Uncertainty Age Education Parenthood Providing Mentorship I[ Profession/Work Context Historical Period Note. The likelihood of attaining expert levels of performance in this prototypical domain of the cognitive pragmatics of the mind is assumed to depend on an effective coalition of life-contexl expertise-specific, and general person-related factors. Wisdom, contrariwise, is an area that in itself represents an open and ill-defined body of knowledge. Nonetheless, we assume that wisdom has a core and that wisdom-related manifestations, if and when they occur, can be evaluated in terms of indicators of quality and quantity. Our empirical research results support this assumption. Many people, after some training, are capable of reaching a high consensus in the evaluation of wisdom-related products of performances. A Family of Five_ Criteria for Assessing the Quality of Wisdom-Related Performance In our work, the quality of wisdom and the capacity for judgment in the fundamental pragmatics of life are defined through a set of five criteria listed in the bottom part of Appendix A. As described in more detail elsewhere (e.g., P. Baltes et al., 1984, 1992; Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990; Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a, 1996b), this set of criteria builds on the theoretical and empirical approaches mentioned above: that is, research on expertise, lifespan psychology of cognition and personality, the neo-Piagetian tradition of adult cognitive development, as well as cultural-historical analyses of wisdom. The two general, basic wisdom criteria (factual and procedural knowledge) are characteristic of all types of expertise and stem from the tradition of research in expertise. Applied to the present subject area, these criteria are (a) rich factual (declarative) knowledge about the fundamental pragmatics of life and (b) rich procedural knowledge about the fundamental pragmatics of life. The factual knowledge part concerns knowledge about such topics as human nature, life-long development, variations in developmental processes and outcomes, interpersonal relations, social norms, critical events in life and their possible constellations, as well as knowledge about the coordination of the well-being of oneself and that of others. Procedural knowledge about the fundamental pragmatics of life involves strategies and heuristics for dealing with the meaning and conduct of life--for example, heuristics for giving advice and for the structuring and weighing of life goals, ways to handle life conflicts and life decisions, and knowledge about alternative back-up strategies if development were not to proceed as expected. In addition to these two basic criteria, we have formulated three meta-criteria that in their separate and joint expression, we consider specific for wisdom. These criteria stem primarily (but not entirely) from the lifespan psychology of cognition and personality (e.g., Alexander & Langer, 1990; P. Baltes, 1987, 1997; P. Baltes et al., 1999). The first metacriterion, lifespan contextualism, is meant to identify knowledge that considers the many themes and January 2000 • American Psychologist 125

contexts of life (e.g., education, family, work, friends, leisure, the public good of society, etc.), their interrelations and cultural variations, and in addition, incorporates a lifetime temporal perspective (i.e., past, present, and future). Another feature of lifespan contextualism is the historical and social location of individual lifespan development as well as the idiographic or nonnormative events that operate in human development (Bandura, 1982). The second wisdom-specific metacriterion, relativism of values and life priorities, deals with the acknowledgment of and tolerance for value differences and the relativity of the values held by individuals and society. Wisdom, of course, is not meant to imply full-blown relativity of values and value-related priorities. On the contrary, it includes an explicit concern with the topic of virtue and the common good. However, aside from the recognition of certain universal values (Kekes, 1995), value-relative knowledge, judgment, and advice are part of the essence of wisdom. The third meta-criterion, the recognition of and management of uncertainty, is based on the ideas (e.g., Baron, 1988; Dawes, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Simon, 1983; Stich, 1990) that (a) the validity of human information processing itself is essentially limited (constrained), (b) individuals have access only to select parts of reality, and (c) the future cannot be fully known in advance. Wisdom-related knowledge and judgment are expected to offer ways and means to deal with such uncertainty about human insight and the conditions of the world, both individually and collectively. For space limitations, we are not able to explicate how our family of wisdom criteria relates to work conducted by others who are also engaged in the study of wisdom or related topics. Aside from Sternberg's (1998) important recent effort mentioned earlier, with its focus on tacit knowledge dealing with a balanced integration of intra-, inter-, and extrapersonal interests, we note especially works by Arlin (1993) on the ability of mature thinkers to identify problems, by D6rner (1983) on complex problem solving, by Kitchener and Brenner (1990) on the concept of tolerance for ambiguity, by Eriksonian researchers on generativity and other gains of adulthood (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998), by researchers interested in the self-based regulation of cognition and emotion during adulthood (Blanchard-Fields & Hess, 1996; Carstensen, 1995; Labouvie-Vief, 1995), and conceptual and empirical work by Riegel (1973) and Basseches (1984) on dialectical thinking as a postformal mode of adult reasoning. Such lines of inquiry are very relevant, and we have benefited from their consideration. In the contex~ of our own approach, however, perhaps with the exception of Sternberg (1998), these various approaches each represent only one important component or facet of the wisdom-related domain of expertise that we attempt to articulate and study. The Empirical Assessment of Wisdom-Related Performance The five qualitative criteria for the evaluation of wisdomrelated knowledge and judgment are suited for application to a wide array of person-specific as well as social manifestations of wisdom. This topical array ranges from state constitutions or works in the religious sphere on spirituality, to personal documents such as biographies and autobiographies, to the way people assess and respond to tasks of life planning, life management, and life review, whether it be their own or that of another. Wisdom is located in many sources and to achieve its highest level of manifestation, it is likely that these sources need to be interrelated and used as an ensemble. In our work, we primarily have focused on, to date, searching for manifestations of wisdom in individual minds by asking people to respond to various problems of life (for a more detailed description, see, e.g., Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a). Specifically, and as illustrated in Appendix B, study participants are confronted under standardized conditions with difficult life problems of fictitious people, such as the following example: "Someone receives a telephone call from a good friend who says that he or she cannot go on like this and has decided to commit suicide. What might one/the person take into consideration and do in such a situation?" Another example is as follows: "In reflecting over their lives, people sometimes realize that they have not achieved what they had once planned to achieve. What should they do and consider?" The participants are then asked to reflect out loud on the presented dilemma. The responses are recorded on tape and transcribed. Before the tasks are administered, participants are given practice in thinking aloud (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) and thinking about a hypothetical person. Appendix B contains an excerpt from a high- and low-rated response to the question of what to consider and do in the case of a 15-year-old girl who wants to get married right away. For the purpose of obtaining quantified scores, a select panel of judges, who are extensively trained and calibrated in applying the criteria, evaluates the protocols of the respondents in light of the five wisdom-related criteria using a 7-point scale. The training proceeds on the basis of a manual. The reliability of this rating method is very satisfactory. In the empirical research conducted so far, the intercorrelation between the five criteria has always been high, approaching values between .50 and .77; test-retest correlations over 12 months range in adults between .65 and .94; and the multidimensional measurement space that is based on multiple tasks of wisdom conforms to the five-criterion framework outlined (P. Baltes & Staudinger, 1993: Staudinger, Raykov, B6hmig-Krumhaar, & Baltes, 1999). In general, we speak of a "wise" protocol only if it has received a high rating in all five areas (e.g., a rating greater than 5 for each criterion on the 7-point scale). As is the case in research on other expert systems, it is an open question to what degree the development of wisdom reflects the accumulation of quantity or also the acquisition of new qualities. Our general approach, which is consistent with many cultural-historical views of wisdom (P. Baltes, 1999), is to view wisdom as more or less (quantitative) a 126 January 2000 • American Psychologist

phenomenon without excluding the possibility that its final achievement is a qualitatively new step. Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences of Wisdom Treating wisdom as an expert system associated with the fundamental pragmatics of life suggests a number of conditions under which wisdom is likely to develop (Bloom, 1985; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). Foremost are four theoretical perspectives. First, like any expertise, the acquisition and refinement of wisdom involves an extended and intense process of learning, practice, as well as the motivation to strive toward excellence. Second, wisdom is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Therefore, a variety of micro- and macrofactors and processes need to collaborate to generate wisdom. Third, because of the integrative aspects of wisdom in linking knowledge with virtue, it is likely that the antecedents of wisdom are grounded in the orchestration of several characteristics: cognitive, motivational, social, interpersonal, and spiritual. Fourth, as with any other high-level expertise, guidance by mentors or other wisdom-enhancing "voices" of society as well as the experience and mastery of critical life experiences are likely necessary. Figure 1 summarizes some of our analytic efforts at translating these general theoretical perspectives into a testable framework. The framework describes a series of ontogenetic conditions and processes that, as distant and proximal factors, need to work together "synergetically" so that something like wisdom can develop. Specifically, we distinguish three categories of conditions that are relevant to the development of wisdom: (a) general personal characteristics, (b) characteristics and experiential contexts that are specific to the acquisition of expertise in the area of the fundamental pragmatics of life, and (c) macrostructural contexts that are linked to certain constellations of wisdomrelated experience. Moving toward wisdom requires some orchestrated coalition of these factors. It is likely, however, that there is not a single pathway; rather, we proceed in our work with the idea of multiple but constrained pathways to wisdom. Because of the visibility of Erikson's (1959) theory of wisdom (e.g., Clayton & Bitten, 1980; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998), we add some observations to prevent possible misunderstandings and to differentiate our own conception from his. In our view, the Eriksonian approach to wisdom, with its lifespan-, self-, and motivation-based conception of wisdom, provides one important set of constellations that we consider critical for the understanding of wisdom. However, our conception of wisdom differs in significant ways. First, Erikson's theory does not explicate many of the other expertise-related factors and processes that, in addition to personality-related factors, are at the foundation of the acquisition and refinement of wisdom. Second, our conception of wisdom entails more than the mind and personality of individuals. In our conception, wisdom is fundamentally a cultural and collective product in which individuals participate. Individuals are only some of the carriers and outcomes of wisdom. Third, the substantive content of Erikson's wisdom theory, with its primary emphasis on self-referenced integrity and generativity, represents but a subset of the territory that we propose to demarcate as wisdom. Other subsets involve, for instance, the heuristics of knowledge organization and decision making that are associated with wisdom-related behavior. At the center of the ontogenetic schema (cf. Figure 1), we highlight some of the processes that we consider as the perpetual and organizing regulators of the development of wisdom. Finally, on the right-hand side of Figure 1, there is a schematic presentation of the inferential processes that we engaged in as we translated the general culturally and philosophically legitimated conception of wisdom into our specific psychological operationalization. In the lower part of the right column, assumptions about the sequential course of development of the five criteria for wisdom are suggested. In line with the model for the development of expertise suggested by Anderson (1987), for example, we propose that in the course of development of expertise, a shift of emphasis takes place from declarative (factual) to procedural knowledge. From this foundation, we expect the body of ~isdom-constitutive knowledge to emerge that is captured with the three metacriteria: lifespan contextualism, relativism in values and life priorities, and recognition and management of uncertainty. We have and are considering adding to this family of five criteria another feature of wisdom. We now think that it may be important to make more explicit the motivational-emotional orientation associated with the use of wisdom, that is, that wisdom is (a) intended for the wellbeing of oneself and others and (b) involves an effective coordination of mind and virtue. So far, we had included this motivational-emotional aspect of wisdom as a correlate of practically all criteria. Such an approach, however, may not be explicit enough and, therefore, could falsely generate the impression that our model does not consider motivational-emotional dimensions and the notion that wisdom deals with the personal and common good or well-being. Nothing could be further from our intentions. Empirical Findings: Berlin Wisdom Paradigm In the following, we summarize some of the main findings obtained when translating our paradigm into empirical research. Studies in which we confronted individuals with the kind of life problems described in Appendix B are most prominent. More recently, we have added to this approach an additional methodological and conceptual frame. In this new facet of research, we focused on a theory of successful lifespan development that defines the three processes of selection, optimization, and compensation as the key elements leading to developmental advances (M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; P. Baltes, 1997; Freund & Baltes, in press; Marsiske, Lang, Baltes, & Baltes, 1995). We considered knowledge about these processes as part of the domain of wisdom (P. Baltes et al., 1992). In this work, we used proverbs to examine whether individuals had knowlJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 127

I Figlure 2 Adult Developmental Age Gradients for Prototypical Measures of the Cognitive Mechanics (Working Memory; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997) and the Cognitive Pragmatics (Wisdom; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996bJ 3 3. Cognitive Mechanics Cognitive Pragmaties I Example: Wisdom I 2 ~o.." • Example:Working Memory• 2 ~ *g •.* *'•o • • I l ~**e &•~_~ 1- . _~_, |e ••,1•%•1~ ~. I ? ... -: ,. . I o • • o. -2 -2- -3 -3 3b ' s'o ' 7'o ' 9'o ' ' 30 ' ' 50 ' ' 70 ' ' 90 Age Age edge that is consistent with this theory of successful development. Empirical Findings 1: The Role of Chronological Age Originally, because of our interest in the search for positive aspects of human aging, our research included a focus on age-comparative analyses of wisdom-related performance (Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger, 1999a). As for the role of age, Figure 2 presents a summary of four studies with adults. In total, the findings are based on 533 people who ranged in age from 20 to 89 years and represented diverse educational and socioeconomic backgrounds. Ignoring the possibility of cohort effects, the major finding was that for the age range from about 25 to 75 years of age, the age gradient is zero. The data also tentatively suggested that there may be a limit to the level of wisdomrelated performance in old age, beginning on average around 75 years of age. This finding is understandable in light of studies on the fluid mechanics of cognitive aging. Beyond the age of around 75, one observes a more broadly based decline in cognitive status (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1997; Schaie, 1996) that is likely to impose increasing "mechanical" limits on level of functioning in response to the kind of wisdom tasks that are used. Recent research with adolescents (Pasupathi, Staudinger, & Baltes, 1999) has suggested that the major period of acquisition of wisdom-related knowledge and judgment before early adulthood is the age range from about 15 to 25 years. On the one hand, this finding of no age gradient across most of adulthood may disappoint those who expect, in line with subjective theories of lifespan development, a higher level of functioning in wisdom tasks as people move through midlife into old age. Indeed, if one examines the relative proportion of people in the top 20% performance category by age across multiple studies, there is some evidence that if age and facilitative experiential contexts collaborate, more older than younger participants are in the top 20% (P. Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker, & Smith, 1995; Staudinger, 1999b). This has led us to predict that the "world record" in wisdom may be held by someone in his or her 60s. On the other hand, however, the finding of no major age differences during middle adulthood offers support for two of our key assumptions. First, when contrasting findings on the cognitive pragmatics (for which wisdom is a prototype) to research on the fluid mechanics, results indicate that wisdom-related knowledge and judgment are facets of human development that do not show signs of deterioration beginning in earlier stages of adulthood. Second, as we suggested in our developmental causal model of wisdom (Figure 1), having lived longer in itself is not sufficient for acquiring more knowledge and judgment capacity in the wisdom domain. Other factors need to enter into a coalition that, as an ensemble, is generative of wisdom. Empirical Findings 2: The Role of Professional Experience (Clinical Psychology) Another research project involved persons for whom we judged to have experienced a constellation of life processes that were conducive to wisdom. In two studies, clinical psychologists were taken as an example of professional specialization for which both training and practice consist of intensified contact and engagement with questions of 128 January 2000 • American Psychologist

life planning, life management, and life review (Smith, Staudinger, & Baltes, 1994; Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes, 1992). The clinical psychologists were compared with young and old adults of similar educational level and age whose professional training, however, had no particular emphasis in the domain of the fundamental pragmatics of life. As predicted, clinical psychologists showed higher levels of wisdom-related performance than controls. This was also true for the top range of performances. As we also predicted, however, their performances did not approach expert levels, as judged by our theory-based measurement. On the 7-point scale we developed and applied, the group of clinical psychologists received an average score of 3.8 for the two studies, only slightly above the scale's mean value. In interpreting this result, one must consider the possibility that it is people with a particular personality constellation and motivational structure who become clinical psychologists. To estimate the contribution of such selection-into-clinical-psychology-profession effects, we examined measures of intelligence and personality. Communality analyses that are based on hierarchical models of regression, which have wisdom-related performance as a dependent variable, allowed us to quantify the joint and separate effects of professional specialization versus intellectual and personality dispositions (Staudinger, Maciel, Smith, & Baltes, 1998). Professional specialization turned out to be important; in fact, it was the largest unique predictor, accounting for 15% of the variance in wisdomrelated performance. Empirical Findings 3: Wisdom-Related Performance Requires the Interplay ot Intelligence, Cognitive Style, and l~ersanality A major theoretical aspect of our approach (see also Sternberg, 1998) is that wisdom requires and reflects integration and balancing of several spheres of human functioning. On the level of personal characteristics, this includes the orchestration of cognitive and behavioral style and personality attributes. To examine this question, we conducted one study (Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997) in which a large number of relevant measures were considered as predictors of wisdom performance. Specifically, a total of 33 psychometric indicators (that were based on 14 tests) marked the sectors of psychometric intelligence (4 indicators), personality-intelligence interface such as cognitive style and creativity (17 indicators), and personality dispositions (12 indicators). Of these 33 indicators, 10 turned out to be significant predictors of wisdom and were considered in the analyses reported below. Our general expectation was that none of these measures by themselves would be powerful predictors of wisdom. Moreover, we expected that to achieve a salient prediction, a large number of predictors would be necessary. Finally, we predicted, to test the uniqueness of the wisdom construct, that a significant amount of remaining variance in wisdom-related performance would be predictable only by consideration of parallel tests of wisdom rather than other predictors. The results of hierarchical regression models with follow-up communality analyses supported each of these predictions. In total, 40% of the variance in wisdom-related performance could be predicted by considering the 10 significant predictors. First, none of the indicators taken alone, however, accounted for more than 18% of the variance in wisdom-related ratings. Second, the results showed that even after all (33) of the predictors were brought into the prediction equation, the parallel tests of wisdom-related performance added a relatively large amount of additional variance (19%). This finding indicates that even within a differentiated and rather comprehensive psychometric sphere, our wisdom-related measures possessed a high degree of unique variance. Wisdom is more than the ensemble of 33 indicators used to mark the predictor domains of intelligence, personality-intelligence interface, and personality. What was the specific configuration of predictors of wisdom-related performance? First, there was a significant overlap between all three predictor domains pointing to the coordinative nature of wisdom. Specifically, the predictors from all domains shared 9% of the predictive variance. Second, the unique prediction of intelligence and personality was relatively small (2% each). Most important, the intelligence-personality interface indicators (e.g., cognitive style, creativity) contributed the largest unique share (15%). Within the framework of the interface instruments applied in this study, it was cognitive style (e.g., Steruberg's, 1996, measure of thinking styles) and creativity that particularly showed a positive connection to wisdom-related performance. Among Sternberg's thinking styles, the judicial style (which implies the evaluation and comparison of issues at stake) and the progressive style (which implies moving beyond existing rules and being tolerant of ambiguous situations) were the most salient predictors. Figure 3 summarizes the main findings from all studies where we examined predictive correlates of wisdom as measured in the Berlin wisdom paradigm. These results indicate that wisdom-related knowledge and judgment are not simply another variant of intelligence or personality. Rather, wisdom implies a coordinating configuration of multiple attributes, including knowledge associated with specific life experiences. The outcome is the orchestration of mind and virtue toward excellence. In this vein, the findings are also in accordance with the results of research on implicit theories of wisdom mentioned above. Empirical Findings 4: The Study of Persons Nominated as Wise It might be supposed that the superior performance of clinical psychologists is less a manifestation of their greater wisdom than of the fact that psychologists fare better than nonpsychologists in a "wisdom theory" developed by members of their own profession. To examine this argument of professional self-enhancing bias, we compared clinical psychologists with other people who were not psychologists but who had been nominated as wise by a January 2000 • American Psychologist 129

F!gure 3 The Pattern of Predictive Correlates of Wisdom-Related Performance in Adults Intelligence (4 Scales) e.g., Fluid Intelligence Crystallized Intelligence Personality-Intelligence Interface (17 Scales) e.g., Creativity Cognitive Style Social Intelligence Personality Traits (12 Scales) e.g.. Openness to Experience Personal Growth PsychologicalMindedness 35% (15%)~ Age (Adulthood) I Life Experience 1 Ggneral Life Experience Specific Professional Experience Note. The pattern oF predictive correlates of wisdom-related performance in adults illustrates the notion that wisdom is the result of a coalition of multiple sources and attributes orchestrated toward the integration of mind and virtue. Values in parentheses indicate unique predictive contributions that are based on communality analysis (joint representation of data from P. Baltes et al., 1995; Staudinger et al., 1997; Staudinger, Maciel, et al., 1998). panel of nonpsychologists, independently of our definition of wisdom (P. Baltes et al., 1995). The wisdom nominees were figures of public distinction who survived an intensive Delphi-like nomination process by a rater panel. Initially, 156 persons were considered. In the end, 21 were chosen as fulfilling the stated criteria. None of the 21 wisdom nominees was a psychologist. Although the range of ages for those nominated as wise was relatively broad (41-79 years), the majority were older adults (M = 64 years). The wisdom-related performance of nominees was compared with clinical psychologists of the same age range and, in addition, with both young (25-35 years) and old control adults (60-80 years) who were advanced college graduates but worked outside the field of the professional human services. The participants from all four groups responded to two wisdom-related tasks each. The first task posed a problem of life planning (cf. Smith et al., 1994) and the second was a problem of existential life management involving the potential suicide of a friend (Maercker, B6hmig-Krumhaar, & Staudinger, 1998). Overall, wisdom nominees performed at least as well as clinical psychologists and this applied to the top range of performances as well. In fact, for the task most closely tapping into the core of wisdom, that is a task of existential life management, wisdom nominees evinced the highest level of performance, and this included quite a few in the age range from 50 to 70 years. Thus, the conception of wisdom advanced by us is not one where nonpsychologists would not be able to perform well. Empirical Findings 5: The Interactive-Minds (Social-Collaborative) Aspect of Wisdom One of our central theoretical postures is that wisdom is a collectively anchored product and that individuals by themselves are only "weak" carriers of wisdom (P. Baltes & Smith, 1990, Staudinger, 1996). To examine the role of collaborative or interactive-minds conditions, we conducted a study in which groups of people performed on wisdom tasks under varying conditions of social support and collaboration. Specifically, we compared people who responded to wisdom tasks alone with (a) those who discussed the problem with a significant other before responding individually, (b) those who engaged in a virtual-internal dialogue about the wisdom problem with a person of their choice, or (c) a group who just had some free time to think about the problem by themselves before responding (Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a). The outcome was fully supportive of the view that social collaboration, whether internal or external, facilitates 130 January 2000 • American Psychologist

wisdom-related performance if, afterwards, persons had the time to reflect about the discourse. This included the condition where the discourse involved an inner voice, that is, private conversations with a person considered by the person to be a model of human functioning. The increase in performance was close to one standard deviation. In line with our interactive-minds and collective approach to wisdom was the finding that combining individual thinkingtime with an interactive-minds condition was of much importance. From a lifespan point of view, the finding that, when compared to young adults, older adults benefited more from the actual dialogue condition was especially significant. This is one of the very few findings in research on adult development and aging where older adults profited more from a given intervention than young adults. We interpret this as evidence that with age, when it comes to topics such as wisdom, people acquire a knowledge base that is conducive to input from interpersonal consultation or dialogue. Empirical Findings 6: Wisdom in Proverbs Most recently, we extended our inquiry concerning wisdom to the study of proverbs and their relevance in accessing wisdom-related knowledge (P. Baltes & Freund, 1999). This research follows the notion of folk psychology (Haselager, 1997; Mieder, 1993) that much of a culture's historically acquired knowledge is stored in proverbs and that accessing this body of knowledge is a major facilitator in achieving and interpreting a good life. In this instance, we focused on the use of proverbs that reflect the three strategies of life management that Margret Baltes, Paul Baltes, and their colleagues have identified as the foundation to successful life development: selection, optimization, and compensation (M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; P. Baltes, 1997: Freund & Baltes, in press; Marsiske et al., 1995). Selection involves goals, optimization concerns the means to reach goals, and compensation denotes means that are invoked when established means fail to reach a given goal. Examples of such proverbs are as follows: "Jack of all trades, master of none" (selection), "practice makes perfect" (optimization), and "when there is no wind, grab the oars" (compensation). To test the availability of such proverb-related knowledge, we presented adults who varied in age from early to late adulthood with life problems that require the use of a particular strategy of problem solving (P. Baltes & Freund, 1999). We asked adults to choose between two proverbs for each problem situation, one that denoted one of the three key processes (selection, optimization, compensation) and another that described an alternative proverbial strategy (e.g., "everything comes to he who waits"). The outcome was clear and consistent with our expectation that people have access to proverb-based strategies of practical wisdom. Study participants chose the target proverbs of selection, optimization, and compensation more often than the control proverbs. In addition, although older adults typically are much slower in reaction-time tasks, in this instance older adults performed as fast as young adults. We interpret this finding as evidence that with age, people gain wisdom-related knowledge that is captured in proverbs and can be activated when coping with difficult problems of life. In the future, we intend to extend this line of inquiry in several ways. First, we have plans to examine the degree to which expertise in the use of proverbs correlates with alternative indicators of wisdom such as being nominated as wise, being an effective counselor, or demonstrating high levels of performance in think-aloud wisdom tasks. Furthermore, we plan to conduct experiments in which proverbs are studied that reflect more directly the three metacriteria that we have identified as essential to wisdom: lifespan contextualism, relativism of values and life priorities, and recognition-management of uncertainty. Peng and Nisbett (1999), for example, compared Chinese and American students in relevant work. They studied individual preferences for proverbs that varied in the degree to which they expressed maxim-like prescriptions or reflection-based uncertainty and oppositional information. Chinese students, compared with American students, preferred proverbs that, in line with our conception of wisdom, were more oppositional and contradictory in context. Wisdom as a Cognitive and . . Motivational-Emotional Heurishc (Pragmatic) to Orchestrate Mind and Virtue In this section, we describe one new line of work that we are initiating to explore another facet of the general conception of wisdom. With this work, we intend to examine more fully to what degree and how wisdom-related knowledge and judgment can serve the function of planning and optimizing human development. For this purpose, we consider the use of methods associated with the study of cognitive heuristics and pragmatic schemata of reasoning. In general terms, a heuristic can be defined as a highly automatized and organized strategy for directing search processes or for organizing and using information in a certain class of situations (Baron, 1988; Dawes, 1988; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Haselager, 1997; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nozick, 1993; Simon, 1983). In the context of the tasks of everyday life, a functionally similar concept is that of a pragmatic in the sense of a pragmatic reasoning schema (Holyoak & Spellman, 1993; Smith, 1996). Considering this general approach to the study of behavior, one of us (P. Baltes, 1999) has advanced the idea that one feature of the concept of wisdom is its role as such a heuristic or pragmatic. The direction of the collaborative organization generated by the concept of wisdom would be human excellence in the conduct of life. Specifically, the special focus of this wisdom heuristic would be the activation, organization, and collaborative enlisting of knowledge that directs one's attention to the integration and optimization of mind and virtue. January 2000 • American Psychologist 131

What are the definitional elements of this wisdom heuristic? A first set of implications follows from the meaning space of wisdom described above. For example, we suggest that invoking the concept of wisdom coordinates knowledge and judgments about the fundamental pragmatics of life around such properties as (a) strategies and goals involving the conduct and meaning of life; (b) limits of knowledge and uncertainties of the world; (c) excellence of judgment and advice; (d) knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, and balance; (e) search for a perfect synergy of mind and character; and (f) balancing the good or well-being of oneself and that of others. There are additional features of the wisdom heuristic (P. Bakes, 1999). One is the role of wisdom in what is called the "binding" problem associated with the issue of integration versus fragmentation of bodies of knowledge. As Stich (1990), for instance, has argued, one of the major deficits of knowledge systems can be their fragmentation or lack of goal- or outcome-oriented binding and collaboration. To counteract such fragmentation of bodies of knowledge, the wisdom heuristic would function as an organizing selector and activator of otherwise more independent bodies of knowledge about the means and ends of a good life. Other characteristics of the wisdom heuristic are its generality, flexibility, and efficiency in application. Similar to a general purpose heuristic and what Hatano (1988) identified as an adaptive-flexible expertise-related heuristic (compared with routine heuristics), we suggest that the wisdom heuristic has wide applicability. Most issues of the meaning and conduct of life are approachable by this heuristic. Moreover, we submit that the heuristic is highly efficient, considering the complexity of information associated with the domain of the fundamental pragmatics of life. In this vein, and using Gigerenzer's and his colleagues' terminology (Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999), we would classify the wisdom heuristic as a "fast and frugal" heuristic, as one where within the frame of bounded rationality, highly complex sets of information about the meaning and conduct of life are reduced quickly to their essentials without people being lost in the neverending process of information search that were to occur if wisdom were treated as a case of unbounded rationality. Finally, we suggest that wisdom is a metaheuristic, that is, a heuristic that organizes, at a high level of aggregation, the pool (ensemble) of bodies of knowledge and commensurate, more specific heuristics that are available to individuals in planning, managing, and evaluating issues surrounding the fundamental pragmatics of life. Such an approach to the psychology of wisdom is consistent with work by philosophers, who, in their search for an interdisciplinarily guided view of the nature of human rationality, have begun to attend to work on heuristics and pragmatic schemata in cognitive psychology; foremost to mention are philosophical pragmatists (Bratman, 1987; Fletcher, 1995; Rorty, 1998; Stich, 1990). As a cognitive and motivational metaheuristic, then, wisdom is the embodiment of the best "subjective beliefs and laws of life" that a culture and individuals have to offer. Without wisdom as a metaheuristic, individuals' knowledge and judgment about the conduct and meaning ot life would be manifested at a lower level of quality, with a greater degree of fragmentation and without the proactive directionality toward optimization that the concept of wisdom prefigures. Moreover, if the wisdom heuristic was acquired systematically and repeatedly over time, the expectation would be that developing individuals would be able to reach more advanced levels of wisdom-related knowledge and judgment than is true to date. It might also be useful to consider the wisdom heuristic in efforts at improving training in clinical, educational, and applied psychology (P. Baltes, 1999; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996a). Summary In sum, then, we suggest that adding the concept of wisdom to psychological inquiry is a worthwhile challenge. As a concept and as a heuristic, it highlights the jewels and peaks of cultural evolution and human ontogenesis. In its application to human development, wisdom makes explicit the goal of orchestrating mind and virtue toward human excellence and the common good. There are many open questions, of course. Of much interest is the link of wisdom as a knowledge-based expertise in the fundamental pragmatics of life to actual behavior involving oneself and others. Currently, aside from our work on wisdom nominees and the correlative patterns observed when linking wisdom-related performance to facets of intelligence and personality, there is no relevant empirical evidence to make explicit the link between knowledge and behavior. For example, to what degree do people who excel in our wisdom tasks also demonstrate superior outcomes in their own life management? Is the kind of wisdom-related knowledge and judgment studied by us effective as a life-guiding and life-advancing method? Furthermore, to what degree are people who display wisdom-like knowledge sought out as advisors? What is the behavior they display? These are important questions for future research (e.g., the concept of successful aging in M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996, or the concept of art of living in Staudinger, 1999b). In the ancient history of the concept of wisdom, the sage was often invoked as the only carrier of wisdom, and there were few (Assmann, 1994; P. Baltes, 1999; Hadot, 1995; Oelmtiller, 1989). At the same time, it was suggested that sages represent guideposts of excellence for the vast majority of people who themselves would never reach the pinnacle of wisdom. On the one hand, we share in this ancient (e.g., Spinoza) view that wisdom, like "all excellent things, is as difficult as it is rare" (Hadot, 1995, p. 261). On the other hand, when thinking of and about wisdom, individuals are offered a sense of directionality and positive agency. By reference to wisdom, we can participate, for a fleeting moment at least, in the personal utopia of an otherwise unreachable level of excellence. Elevating the notion of wisdom to an overall life orientation, however, goes beyond the fleeting moment of the present. Making the ensemble of attributes associated with wisdom as explicit as possible, translating it into a more regularly available heuristic (pragmatic), and thereby 132 January 2000 • American Psychologist

incorporating it into the construction and optimization of human development, individually and collectively, may be a critical step for reaching increasingly higher levels of functioning as the lifespan unfolds. In our view, then, the perennial power of wisdom is its role as a reminder, a source, and a benchmark in the quest for excellence (P. Baltes, 1999). As a Chinese wisdom proverb says, "Even a very long journey begins with a single step." We add, "And this step is more effective the more it is a step in the right direction." In fact, if the directional movement is correct, such as is true for the direction and destination of wisdom, we can even afford slow progress. To illustrate, we recall a quotation from an ancient Roman (Marc Aurel): "It's better to limp slowly along the right path than walk stridently in the wrong direction." 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Appendix B Berlin Wisdom Parad!gm: I_llustration of a Wisdom-Related Task With Examples of Extreme Responses (Abbreviated) A 15-year-old girl wants to get married right away. What should one/she consider and do? Low Wisdom-Related Score A 15-year-old girl wants to get married? No, no way, marrying at age 15 would be utterly wrong. One has to tell the girl that marriage is not possible. (After further probing) It would be irresponsible to support such an idea. No, this is just a crazy idea. High Wisdom-Related Score Well, on the surface, this seems like an easy problem. On average, marriage for 15-yearold girls is not a good thing. But there are situations where the average case does not fit. Perhaps in this instance, special life circumstances are involved, such that the girl has a terminal illness. Or the girl has just lost her parents. And also, this girl may live in another culture or historical period. Perhaps she was raised with a value system different from ours. In addition, one has to think about adequate ways of talking with the girl and to consider her emotional state. 136 January 2000 • American Psychologis

States of Excellence David Lubinski and Camilla Persson Benbow Vanderbilt University Research from the individual-differences tradition pertinent to the optimal development of exceptional talent is reviewed, using the theory of work adjustment (TWA) to organize findings. The authors show how TWA concepts and psychometric methods, when used together, can .facilitate positive development among talented youth by aligning learning opportunities with salient aspects of each student's individuality. Longitudinal research and more general theoretical models of (adult) academic and intellectual development support this approach. This analysis also uncovers common threads running through several positive psychological concepts (e.g., effectance motivation, flow, and peak experiences). The authors conclude by underscoring some important ideals from counseling psychology for fostering intellectual development and psychological well-being. These include conducting a multifaceted assessment, focusing on strength, helping people make choices, and providing a developmental context for bridging educational and industrial psychology to facilitate positive psychological growth throughout the life span. S ince the beginning of recorded history, the extraordinary gifts that some individuals possess and the ways these gifts are nurtured have fascinated people. This may be particularly true for those intellectual attributes that manifest precocity in rate of development and terminal level of performance. How does such precocity emerge? Are there ways to cultivate its manifestation? Are there barriers in place that attenuate its development into exceptional adult attainment? These are among the most critical questions being addressed by investigators interested in talent development. Although there are many ways to approach these issues from various disciplinary perspectives, in this article we show how traditional individual-differences measures, used within the theory of work adjustment (TWA; Dawis & Lofquist, 1984) framework, can facilitate optimal development of talent. We also synthesize basic but widely scattered findings in the psychological literature to reveal the many converging lines of evidence that support this practice. Detailing exact interventions or procedures for adjusting educational curricula (Benbow & Lubinski, 1996; Benbow & Stanley, 1996; Lubinski & Benbow, 1995; Winner, 1996) is, however, beyond our scope here. Rather, we limit ourselves to demonstrating how findings in positive psychology provide foundational support for tailoring a school's curriculum to match individual differences among talented students. We begin with a review of early approaches to talent development within the individualdifferences tradition: this sets the stage for using ability and preference assessments to design optimal learning environments for intellectually talented youth. Early Work Around the time the science of applied psychology began, scholars were intrigued by the possibility that in-depth studies of exceptionally able students might help answer the questions posed above. Even staunch empirical outlets like the Journal of Applied Psychology devoted space to some case history reports (e.g., Coy, 1918; Garrison, Burke, & Hollingworth, 1917, 1922; Hollingworth, 1927). These students were seen as so fascinating and their intellectual development as so remarkable (and of eventual value to society) that they were worth idiographic (N = 1) profiling. What these case histories revealed, among other things, was that the terms intellectually gifted or highly talented are imprecise. The breadth of diversity found within this special population was profound across both intellectual and nonintellectual attributes. The students were anything but a categorical type. Hence, no single environmental manipulation would address the needs of all talented youth. There was no "silver bullet." Upon reflection, this finding was unsurprising. One third of the total range on any given normally distributed dimension is found within the top one percent (a common arbitrary criterion for classifying an individual as "gifted"). Scores marking the top one percent on general intelligence, as measured by conventional psychometric (IQ) assessments, begin at an IQ of approximately 137. Yet, IQs can extend beyond 200. Individual differences within the upper segment of this over 70 point IQ range lead to huge differences in the educational environments required for ensuring optimal development. Although Leta Hollingworth's (1942) volume Children Above 180 IQ helped solidify this conclusion, there were other voices. Many early pioneers of applied psycholThis article was supported by an anonymous funding agency and the Kennedy Center at the College of Education and Human Development, Vanderbilt University. We are grateful to John B. Carroll, Rene V. Dawis, Linda Dunn, Robert Hogan, Arthur R. Jensen, Paul E. Meehl, Martha J. Morelock, Frank k. Schmidt, Lynne Schoenauer, Daniel L. Shea, Julian C. Stanley, Auke Tellegen, and Rose Mary Webb for providing us with feedback oft an earlier version of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either David Lubinski or Camilla Persson Benbow, Department of Psychology and Human Development. Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37203. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected] or to camilla.benbow @vanderbilt.edu. January 2000 ° American Psychologist Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00 Vol. 55, No. 1, 137-150 DOI: 10,1037/10003-066X.55.|.137 137

David Lubinski ogy stressed the heterogeneity in gifted populations; they pointed out the concomitant necessity of and benefits for structuring these students' educational curriculums at a level and pace commensurate with their rate of learning. Thus. by the 1950s, when the Bingham Lecture Series entitled "The Discovery and Development of Exceptional Abilities and Capacities" began (all of the lectures in this series were published in the American Psychologist), almost every contribution to the series underscored the empirical evidence for this perspective (e.g., Ghiselli, 1963; Paterson, 1957; Stalnaker, 1962; Terman, 1954; Wolfle, 1960). Moreover, most contributors promoted educational acceleration to respond to the unique educational needs of these gifted children. It is important to point out before leaving this topic, however, that educational acceleration is a misnomer, as students are not hurried along but rather placed in existing curricula roughly at the point where they are naturally functioning. Thus, we prefer the term appropriate developmental placement because it is a more accurate descriptor of the process. Regardless, the academic, emotional, and social advantages of "educational acceleration" for the highly talented have been confirmed in every decade since the 1920s (Benbow & Stanley, 1996; Pressey, 1946a; Seashore, 1922; Terman, 1925, 1959). Over most of the 20th century, however, assessing intellectual precocity largely pertained to using general intellectual abilities for forecasting general academic achievement and placement. Although this was an important first step, which has been validated over long time frames (Cronbach, 1996; Holahan & Sears, 1995), it is not useful for tailoring educational interventions toward specific needs. Recent advances stemming from more refined individual-differences measures appear to offer much more. Modern Empirical Advances During the past two decades, some consensus has emerged regarding the nature and structural organization of cognitive abilities (Carroll, 1993; Gustafsson & Undheim, 1996), interests (Day & Rounds, 1998; Holland, 1996), and personality (Goldberg, 1993; McCrae & Costa, 1997) in adult populations. More recently, verisimilitude for these models has generalized to intellectually gifted young adolescents. It seems that the intellectually precocious are precocious in many ways. For them, results of conventional psychometric assessments of cognitive abilities, interests, and personality appear to be similar to those of adults (Achter, Lubinski, & Benbow, 1996; Achter, Lubinski, Benbow, & EftekhariSanjani, 1999; Benbow, 1992; Benbow & Lubinski, 1997; Lubinski, Benbow, & Ryan, 1995; Lubinski, Schmidt, & Benbow, 1996; Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt, Lubinski, & Benbow, 1998). Because of this, psychometric assessments initially designed for adults can facilitate positive development among gifted youth. Abilities Most importantly, the hierarchical organization of cognitive abilities--a general factor supported by a number of group factors (e.g., mathematical, spatial, verbal)--reveals the same structure among intellectually talented young adolescents as it does in random samples of adult populations. The intellectually talented tend to develop the eventual adult structure at an early age (hence, the label precocious). Moreover, although we have known for decades that individual differences within the top one percent of general intelligence have important educational implications, we now know that the same is true for some specific abilities (Benbow, 1992). Mathematical, spatial, and verbal reasoning abilities have differential and incremental validity for predicting relevant educational-vocational criteria beyond general intelligence (Achter et al., 1999; Humphreys, Lubinski, & Yao, 1993). Stanley (1996; Keating & Stanley, 1972) was among the first to extend the early efforts of Hollingworth and Terman, who focused on intensity appraisals of general intelligence (IQ), to appraising specific abilities (group factors). Through his Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth (SMPY), beginning in 1971, Stanley documented the importance of more refined intellectual assessments. SMPY used the College Board Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) to examine the intensity of precocity among 12- year-olds who were "bumping their heads" on the ceilings of age-calibrated tests routinely administered to them in their schools. Prior to the 1970s, having 12- or 13-year-olds take the SAT for educational planning was essentially unheard of, but today, largely in response to Stanley's groundbreaking work, approximately 200,000 seventh and eighth graders take the SAT annually and have their abilities profiled. Organizers of talent searches seek out seventh and eighth graders scoring in the top two to five percent on age-calibrated standardized tests to take the SAT (or other college entrance exams; Benbow & Stanley, 1996). Inter138 January 2000 * American Psychologist

Camilla Persson Benbow Photo by Peyton Hoge Photos estingly, these students generate SAT score distributions indistinguishable from random samples of high school seniors (Benbow, 1988). Similarly, the SAT is differentially valid for these students, just as it is for college-bound high school students. Students whose talents are primarily in mathematical relative to verbal reasoning tend to gravitate toward quantitatively demanding areas, whereas students primarily talented in verbal relative to mathematical reasoning tend to seek out disciplines more in line with their intellectual strength. Of course, there are exceptions. When gifted students are placed in environments corresponding to their abilities (e.g., summer residential programs conducted by talent-search organizers), amazing achievement can emerge. For over 25 years it has been shown that highly able students routinely assimilate a full year of a rigorous high school course (e.g., chemistry, Latin, mathematics) in three weeks. These accomplishments have been replicated widely and are well documented (Benbow & Lubinski, 1996; Benbow & Stanley, 1996). Such programs receive positive subjective reports from participants (Benbow, Lubinski, & Suchy, 1996) and demonstrate positive long-term benefits (e.g., Swiatek & Benbow, 1991a, 1991b). We believe, however, that even better outcomes can be achieved if preferences are also considered when matching students to educational environments. Preferences Recent empirical findings allow us to refine appropriate developmental placement beyond multiple abilities. That is, just as work over the 1970s and 1980s documented the utility of assessing specific abilities among the gifted (for educational planning), research during the 1990s demonstrated the same potential for certain nonintellectual attributes. Educational and vocational interests seem to be sufficiently differentiated (Achter et al., 1996), longitudinally stable (Lubinski et al., 1995, 1996), and construct valid (Achter et al., 1999; Schmidt et al., 1998) to be useful for this special population by the time its members reach the age of 12 years. We can forecast not only what gifted youth are likely to be best at but also what they are most likely to enjoy. Because exceptional achievement is more likely to emerge when individuals follow their "passion," this advance has important implications for nurturing positive development. Holland's (1996; Day & Rounds, 1998) robust hexagonal model for describing the structure of adult vocational interests can be applied to intellectually gifted adolescents (Lubinski et al., 1995; Schmidt et al., 1998). The acronym RIASEC in Holland's model is the dominant outline of vocational interests today. RIASEC stands for realistic (works with things and gadgets, works outdoors), investigative (academically orientated, interested in scientific pursuits), artistic (prefers unstructured environments and opportunities for self-expression), social (enjoys people contact and working with and doing things for people), enterprising (is persuasive or a corporate climber, takes on leadership roles), and conventional (conforms to office practices, prefers structure and knowledge of what is expected). These dimensions are multifaceted and, for many purposes, important to decompose (Schmidt et al., 1998). However, as a general outline, RIASEC works well for adults and intellectually talented adolescents in locating environments where passions are likely to be reinforced and actualized. Although cognitive abilities are more multidimensional than general intelligence supported by quantitative, spatial, and verbal abilities, and although interests extend beyond the six RIASEC dimensions discussed here, these personal attributes are among the most significant personal determinants of educational and vocational choice (Dawis, 1992; Lubinski, 1996). Collectively, they provide a way to think about the multifaceted nature of cognitive and motivational issues found in highly able adolescents. For this special population, we suggest that educational counseling begin with assessment of at least these individual differences. Some may argue that to do so at an early age pigeonholes students, but that is not necessarily so. Rather, these dimensions are tools for evaluating choices and opportunities for personal development that are present at an earlier age. Although interest profiles can and do change among the gifted from early adolescence to adulthood, there is enough stability and validity to consider them flexible guideposts. In the contexts of other attendant life pressures, some of which may conflict (e.g., peers, parents, teachers) with one's self-concept (see below), this information may be clarifying. Because intellectually talented adolescents appear to think seriously and meaningfully about educational and career choices at an earlier than typical age (Achter et al., 1996), these assessments provide a conceptual framework for evaluating their experiences across contrasting learning and work settings. Next, we provide a synthetic model for combining ability and interJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 139

est information in a cohesive and theoretically meaningful way. TWA TWA was designed for adult populations and the world of work. TWA is useful for organizing psychometric findings on ability and interest dimensions to facilitate optimal development (see Figure 1). To the left of the conventional TWA model in Figure 1 (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984), we have two well-supported models of cognitive abilities and interests. On the top left side is a familiar arrangement of the major dimensions of cognitive abilities: numericalquantitative, spatial-mechanical, verbal-linguistic, and their communality, general intelligence (using radex scaling; Lubinski & Dawis, 1992; R. E. Snow & Lohman, 1989). On the bottom left side of Figure 1 is Holland's (1996) RIASEC model. Because the same variables determine educational and vocational adjustment and, as we saw above, because intellectually talented young adolescents are developmentally mature, we combined information from both sources to view the gifted more multidimensionally. Specifically, we have aligned cognitive abilities and interests with TWA and extended this amalgamation to the educational planning for precocious youth (Achter et al., 1996; Benbow & Lubinski, 1997). Next, we describe how TWA works. According to TWA (Dawis & Lofquist, 1984; Lofquist & Dawis, 1991), educational and vocational adjustment involves two major dimensions of correspondence: satisfactoriness (competence) and satisfaction (fulfillment). The former is determined by the correspondence between abilities and the ability requirements of the environment. The latter is determined by correspondence between personal needs and rewards provided by the environment. To the extent that satisfactoriness and satisfaction co-occur, the person and environment are said to be in harmony. Both are motivated to continue to interact with one another, because it is to their mutual advantage, and tenure (a longitudinally stable person-environment relationship) occurs. Take, for example, the situation of students who are heavily recruited (by environments) and the educational institutions that are highly sought after (by students). Both work hard to "'find" each other (Zuckerman, 1977), and both work hard to "keep" each other. One important feature of TWA is that it places equal emphasis on assessing the person and assessing the enviFigure | The Theory of Work Adjustment (TWA) CombinedWith the Radex Scaling of Cognitive Abilities (Upper Left) and the RIASEC Hexagon of Interests (Lower Left) for Conceptualizing Personal Attributes Relevant to Learning and Work Spatial - Mechanica I Numerical - Quantitative Abilities iL Verbal - inguistic I Interests Realistic~.~ Investigative I Co°.°tio°a,( Theory of Work Adjustment Correspondence) ( Abilities )~ ~(~ LR Ability "1 equirementsJ nvironmen ~ C Interests) , ~ ~C ReinfOrcer System ) (Correspondence) r'~ Csatisfactoriness) / Note. The dotted line running down the individual and environment sectors of TWA illustrates that TWA places equal emphasis on assessing the personal attributes (abilities and interests) and assessing the environment (abilities requirements and reward structure). RIASEC is an acronym for realistic, investigative, artistic, social, enterprising, and conventional; vocational interests covary to the extent to which they share proximity. For cognitive abilities, V = verbal-linguistic, N = numerical-quantitative, and S = spatiaJ-mechanical content; subscripts with these letters represent lhe level of complexity, with larger subscripts reflecting greater compJexity, g = general intelligence. Cognitive abilities covary to the extent that they share content and complexity. 140 January 2000 ° American Psychologist

ronment. Ideal environments are those that match the personal attributes of individuals. Optimal development occurs when people's needs are met and their abilities are appropriately challenged. Students who are primarily strong in verbal reasoning versus quantitative or spatial reasoning tend to gravitate toward domains (e.g., disciplines, occupations) that require appreciable levels of their most salient talent. For example, fields like engineering tend to attract people with primary strengths in spatial visualization and quantitative reasoning abilities, whereas the humanities tend to attract people with primary strengths in verbal abilities (Achter et al., 1999; Humphreys et al., 1993). Sometimes, however, interests can motivate educational and vocational choices that do not draw on strengths. It is not unusual for people to strongly desire to do things that they cannot do (e.g., singing when they lack a fine voice); simultaneously, most people are competent at many things that they would prefer not to do. Yet, for most well-adjusted students and employees, their ability and preference constellation aligns with the ability requirements and rewards of their learning or work purview. TWA is also helpful in illuminating other psychological concepts useful in analyzing how people approach contrasting learning and work environments (Dawis, 1996a) such as self-concept, self-efficacy, internal locus of control, and self-esteem. All of these concepts involve perceptions of self. To a large extent, what we mean by a self-concept reflects our perceptions of our abilities and skills and our beliefs about our needs and values. Selfconcept is dependent on behaviors we value (competencies) and people or things we care about (personal needs). Behaviors, people, and things we are indifferent to are irrelevant to our self-concept. Beliefs about the extent to which our abilities are effective (i.e., self-efficacy beliefs) in meeting our needs are critical to our self-concept. This, in turn, involves the perception of the locus of control for reinforcement (i.e., events that meet needs). An internal locus of control develops to the extent that individuals perceive themselves as instrumentally effective in getting their needs met. One's personal evaluation of how these aspects of self interconnect, or the evaluation of self, engenders feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with oneself, which constitute one's level of self-esteem. Providing intellectually talented students with valid psychometric information about their abilities and interests imparts critical information on how one's self-concept is being defined. Making developmentally appropriate learning opportunities available for the gifted, opportunities that are congruent with valid information and responsive to the students' differential learning rates, is likely to lead to feelings of satisfaction with self and the development of an internal locus of control. Hence, TWA provides students with tools for not only a better understanding of themselves (and their contrasting reactions to different environments) but also a framework for taking charge of their personal development. Empowerment in the area of personal development has long been one of the major goals of educational and vocational counseling from the individual differences tradition (Dawis, 1992, 1996b; Lubinski, 1996; Tyler, 1992). Assessing the salient personal attributes of clients, focusing on strengths (while acknowledging relative weaknesses), and using these aspects of self to solidify life values (Tyler, 1992; Williamson, 1965) are the conceptual antecedents from which TWA evolved. Knowledge about enduring psychological characteristics is critical in evaluating contrasting environments for development and making decisions about which opportunities are likely to be most personally meaningful. When these ideas are combined with developmental work on niche building (Bouchard, 1997; Scarr, 1992, 1996)--how people seek out and strive to create learning, social, and work environments corresponding to their personal attributes (Bouchard, 1997)--we begin to gain a purchase on how precocious cognitive development unfolds. Perhaps we also come to understand how it should be nurtured. Intellectual Development: TWA Informed by PPIK Theory Ackerrnan (1996; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) has proposed an intriguing model of adult intellectual development that is relevant to our discussion. It orchestrates abilitiesas-process with personality and interest dimensions to conceptualize the acquisition of cognitive content (i.e., knowledge) throughout the life span. Here, content denotes the pedagogical aspects of learning (i.e., knowledge), whereas process is more restricted to the psychological power of intellect (i.e., general intelligence, or possibly working memory capacity; Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). Ackerman's (1996) theory is called PPIK, because it integrates intelligence-as-process, personality, interests, and intelligence-as-knowledge. Interests and personality attributes serve to channel the development of knowledge structures down differential paths (e.g., C. P. Snow's, 1967, two cultures, "humanists" vs. "scientists"), whereas intelligence-as-process determines the complexity of knowledge assimilated (i.e., one's general potential for intellectual sophistication). Teaming interests and personality dimensions with intelligence-as-process has empirically confirmed differential predictions regarding the developmental trajectory of crystallized abilities (i.e., specific knowledge structures). Moreover, this model is also insightful for understanding why individuals with similar cognitive profiles can and frequently do vary widely in the particulars of their knowledge base. They do so because they differ on noncognitive personal attributes relevant to the development of specific skills and knowledge; they also have different opportunities. To support these ideas, Ackerman (1996; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) has compiled ability-interest, abilitypersonality, and interest-personality correlates from the psychological literature on adult populations. Through narrative review, meta-analytic inquiry, and investigations of self-reported strengths, four (across-attribute) ability-interJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 141

est-personality trait complexes were identified: social, clerical/conventional, science/math, and intellectual/cultural.t The science/math and intellectual/cultural trait complexes provide empirical support for C. P. Snow's (1967) two cultures: Intellectual/cultural, for example, consists of light correlations between measures of verbal ability and aesthetic and investigative interests, whereas science/math consists of light correlations between math and spatial abilities and realistic, investigative, and social (reversed) interests. This patterning has recently been replicated in intellectually gifted young adolescents (Schmidt et al., 1998). These trait complexes, although comprising modest positive and negative correlations (.25-.30), nevertheless generate ostensibly different subpopulation "types" when identification is restricted to one specific ability (mathematical, spatial, or verbal reasoning) and selection is stringent (see below). According to PPIK theory, for most students, throughout the preadult years, general intelligence tends to override other predictors of academic performance because academic criteria are relatively uniform from kindergarten through 12th grade (i.e., all students are exposed to essentially the same educational curriculum). However, as people mature, they are allowed to make more choices and move more freely into and out of various environmental niches as a function of their own choices. In contrast to adolescence, adulthood brings more freedom of choice, and people begin to specialize. According to a number of developmental theorists (Bouchard, 1997; Reiss, Neiderhiser, Hetherington, & Plomin, 2000; Rowe, 1994; Scarr, 1992, 1996), choices are made to conform to one's relatively enduring personal attributes. As people select niches tailored to their enduring psychological characteristics, the particular competencies and knowledge structures acquired become more dependent on the level and patterning of cognitive abilities, interests, and personality. Moreover, with adulthood people not only become freer to make choices about their development, but the intensity of their development also comes more under their control. How people develop becomes less dependent on a standard curriculum and more a function of the types of environmental niches chosen to migrate from, enter into, and operate within. This is precisely why PPIK theory holds appeal for intellectually talented youth: With relatively little effort, they are able to master the typical educational curriculum quickly, relative to their chronologically age-matched peers. This opens up an array of possibilities for further development. Yet, precisely how the gifted choose to develop (when developmentally appropriate learning opportunities are freely provided) is not (and should not be) random: It is psychologically systematic. The development of gifted students tends to be driven by the same underlying individual differences found in adults and is predictable with conventional psychometric tools. Making explicit the attributes that structure these students' development is likely to help them make better choices and reduce the number of false starts. Further, PPIK theory shows how TWA works within a developmental context to explain the emergence of eminence. Because eminent individuals tend to find their career paths early and must spend huge amounts of time mastering their domain (Roe, 1952; Walberg, 1969; Zuckerman, 1977), using TWA to help talented youth make wise decisions becomes good practice. To be sure, not all talented youth become eminent--and many should probably not be encouraged to do so--but those who do tend to begin the talent development process early. To more fully appreciate creative, high-achieving individuals, however, we need at least one other class of variables: Conative determinants are critical for understanding truly exceptional accomplishments. Magnitude of Development Both TWA and PPIK theory stress conative factors for conceptualizing individual differences in development. These determinants are related to individual differences in drive and energy--not the substance of behavior per se but rather its intensity and temporal dynamics. Familiar labels include capacity for work, industriousness, perseverance, and zeal. Across almost all disciplines and occupations, conative attributes are among the most conspicuous factors that distinguish truly exceptional performers from their professional peers. Even in less glamorous arenas, this class of variables is important in understanding performance more generally (e.g., under- and overachievement in routine educational settings). Clearly, there are individual differences in the amount of energy that people can or are willing to invest in their development. To assess these differences, Ackerman has discussed and developed a measure for a construct he calls typical intellectual engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992). In a similar vein, TWA has offered four aspects of personality style (Dawis & Lofquist, 1976) to characterize the temporal characteristics of behavior: celerity, endurance, pace, and rhythm. In both PPIK theory and TWA frameworks, concentrated effort, time on task, and energy invested play a large role in the development of expertise and knowledge structures. In the psychological literature, consideration of conative variables goes back to at least Webb's (1915) formulation of will, but Galton (1869) also discussed zeal and the capacity for work as critical components for truly exceptional performance. Essentially all modern psychologists studying the topic of talent development have noted the intense devotion to practice, study, and work that exceptional performers manifest (Ericsson, 1996; Eysenck, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Jackson & Rushton, 1985; Simonton, 1988, 1994). Yet, the magnitude of individual differences manifested on these volitional attributes is frequently underappreciated. J Trait complexes are akin to R. E. Snow's (1991; R. E. Snow, Corno, & Jackson, 1996) aptitude complexes for examining different treatment modalities in educational settings and Dawis and Lofquist's (1984) taxons of ability and preference constellations used to conceptualize the person component of the interaction between individuals and environments. All of these ideas highlight the importance of combining affective and cognitive variables for both basic and applied research as well as practice. 142 January 2000 • American Psychologist

Figure 2 Two Questions About Work Taken From the Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth's 20-Year Follow-Up Questionnaire A• 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% g. 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1972 - 1974 Talent Search Participants 1976 - 1979 Talent Search Participants < 40 40-49 50-59 60-69 >_ 70 < 40 40--49 50-59 60-69 Hours Hours >_ 70 m II < 40 40 50 60 70 > 70 < 40 40-49 50-59 60--69 _> 70 Hours Hours Note. Participants were identified at age 13 as having quantitative reasoning abilities within the top one percent of their age group. At age 33, they were asked (A) how many hours per week they typically worked, by gender (excluding homemakers), and IB) how many hours per week they were willing to work, given their job of first choice, by gender. Please note that the 1972-1974 participants were given six temporal options, whereas the 1976-1979 participants were provided with five choices. To highlight this point, we present Figure 2, which contains data from over 1,700 participants from SMPY's 20-year follow-up (Lubinski & Benbow, 1994). All participants were assessed with the SAT before they were 13 years old, during the 1970s; they scored in the top one percent in quantitative reasoning ability for their age group (many had even more exceptional SAT-Verbal scores). At age 33, the participants were asked how much they would be willing to work in their "ideal job" and how much they actually do work. These data reveal huge individual differences. For better or worse, these individual differences will surely engender different performance and work-related outcomes. The Emergence of Eminence When dealing with exceptionality, one is sometimes moved to consider different kinds of intelligence or different models, because the kinds of problems encountered when moving across contrasting disciplines (e.g., art, chemistry, and literature) are so different. Extraordinary accomplishments within these spheres serve only to underscore their uniqueness. They appear qualitatively different. Given this, might it make sense to think of Picasso, Curie, and Shakespeare as having different kinds of minds (Gardner, 1993)? What about Gandhi or Freud, with the unique problems they addressed and the way they approached life more generally? Perhaps different types of intelligence are necessary to conceptualize their spectacular achievements. There is probably some truth to this, especially given what we know about the cerebral organization and cognitive functioning of gifted individuals with different strengths and relative weaknesses (Dark & Benbow, 1991; Nyborg, 1994; O'Boyle, Benbow, & Alexander, 1995). Yet, it would still be good to see how far the psychology of individual differences can take us (Messick, 1992). It is quite possible that when exceptional performances undergo critical analysis, what is uncovered is not unique qualities but rather more of certain qualities (e.g., affective, cognitive, conative) that lead to qualitative differences in knowledge content and, perhaps, different types of eminence. Consider the following illustration. If we assume true correlations between quantitative, spatial, and verbal reaJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist 143

soning abilities are all around .75, this leaves much room for profile variability. Indeed, appreciable variability is expected, particularly when selection is stringent and exclusively restricted to one ability dimension. For example, someone four standard deviations above the norm on verbal reasoning abilities, or who is the top 1 in 30,000, would clearly be in possession of the specific cognitive ability for greatness in law, literature, or philosophy, among other verbal-linguistic disciplines. Yet, this individual might not be distinct from many colleagues at major universities on other specific abilities. The mean expectation for this person's quantitative and spatial reasoning abilities (with RVQ = Rvs = .75, and with V four standard deviations above the norm) is three standard deviations above the norm (i.e., .75 X 4 -- 3), or the top 1 or 2 in 1,000. Now, to be sure, being among the top 1 or 2 in a group of 1,000 is impressive, but it is not nearly as impressive as being the top 1 in 30,000 and really is not so awfully rare at major universities. This amount of intellectual diversity is the expectation for anyone so verbally exceptional. It also would be the amount of diversity anticipated (under the same assumptions) for someone as exceptional in quantitative or spatial reasoning. Three groups of individuals, selected for their exceptionality in quantitative, spatial, or verbal reasoning appear quite distinct from one another-- and in some important respects they are. However, their distinctiveness may overshadow their common generic stock. Is it possible that creators of exceptional intellectual products are not nearly so enigmatic as typically supposed? Can measures associated with major dimensions of cognitive abilities capture their distinctiveness quantitatively? Might they also explain how quantitative differences in individual-differences profiles develop into qualitative differences in knowledge structures? Plausibility for this idea is intensified when it is recalled that specific abilities "pull" with them unique clusters of noncognitive personal attributes (Ackerman, 1996; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Ackerman & Rolfhus, 1999), sometimes in diametrically opposed ways. Recall Ackerman's (1996) cultural/intellectual and science/math trait complexes, which have recently been replicated in gifted adolescents. In Schmidt et al.'s (1998) study of gifted adolescents, spatial abilities covaried approximately .25 with realistic interests (working with things) and -.25 with social interests (working with people). If spatially talented students are selected, using a cutting score of merely two standard deviations above the mean, the following would be anticipated: The resulting sample will average half a standard deviation above the mean in interests in working with things (2 X .25 = .50) and half a standard deviation below the mean in interests in working with people (2 × -.25 = -.50). Collectively, these two patterns would cover a full standard deviation difference in interests for people versus things (see the RIASEC component in Figure 1). These differences would be conspicuous enough to motivate categorical considerations. They would certainly generate stereotypic impressions of "different types" if compared with members of highly talented groups selected on verbal or quantitative abilities, which covary more deeply with other interests. Now consider the result if the cutting score had been 4 rather than 2 standard deviations above the norm. Selecting two groups at the extremes on any pair of the major markers of general intelligence (math/verbal, math/space, verbal/space) eventuates in multiple group differences on other major individual-differences dimensions. Moreover, such group differences are often sufficiently pronounced to stimulate reasonable observers to consider discontinuities. Yet, as we have seen, these constellations could stem from continuous gradations within an underlying multivariate space of systematic sources of individual differences with no discrete boundaries. It could turn out that exceptional achievements are "simply" outcomes of optimal blends of extraordinary levels of normative attribules (affective, cognitive, and conative) that found their way to developmentally supportive environments. These considerations prompt two questions: What is a supportive environment, and how do supportive environments operate to sustain positive psychological growth over extended time frames? Corresp.ondent Learning Environments Foster Psychological Well-Being; Discorrespondent Learning Environments Foster Psychological Pain For environments to support the amount of psychological growth needed for the emergence of eminence, positive psychological experiences are required to nurture the development of expertise, skill, and knowledge structures through a fairly immediate mechanism. Several investigators have estimated that this development takes approximately 10 years of concentrated effort. For example, a decade of up to 70-hour work weeks is required before someone with the proper configuration of attributes (Eysenck, 1995; Jensen, 1996) develops the crystallized skills needed for moving the boundaries of a discipline forward (Ericsson, 1996; Gardner, 1993; Simonton, 1988, 1994; Zuckerman, 1977). How might these sustaining mechanisms operate? Consider the following: To the extent that students are placed in correspondent learning and work environments, they are more likely to experience a greater density of reinforcing events and, simultaneously, are less likely to experience punishing events, including boredom. These environments encourage maximal positive development. More specifically, they enhance the likelihood of experiencing psychological well-being (the affective concomitant of reinforcing operations) and attenuate the chances of experiencing psychological pain (the affective concomitant of punishing operations). What events constitute punishment versus reinforcement depends on the individual. Just as learning environments may be considered highly challenging or boring depending on the student, the same environment may be seen as exciting or aversive from a motivational--reinforcement or punishment--point of view. This is why it is important to assess individual differences in abilities and interests initially. To the extent that satisfaction and satisfactoriness are not achieved, two forms of psychological 144 January 2000 • American Psychologist

distress ensue: one associated with problems (when performance is unsatisfactory), the other associated with pain (when needs are not met). Therefore, psychological problems are characteristic of a lack of correspondence between the individual's abilities and the ability requirements of the environment, a mismatch causing problems for the individual and the environment. Psychological pain, on the other hand, results from a lack of correspondence between the individual's needs and the rewards mediated by the environment. Figure 3 depicts a well-replicated two-dimensional framework for studying affect defined by positive and negative emotionality, two relatively independent dimensions (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Positive and negative emotionality are stable individual-differences dimensions associated with positive and negative affect, but nevertheless they can manifest wide state variations (Zevon & Tellegen, 1982). Fluctuations in affect systematically covary with reintbrcing and punishing stimuli. These two dimensions are helpful for understanding changes in affect associated with reinforcement (well-being) and punishment (pain). One goal of educational and vocational counseling from a TWA framework is to maximize the former and minimize the latter. Psychologically, there are at least two components to pain and two components to well-being (see Figure 3). Psychological pain follows two kinds of punishing condiFigure 3 Consensual Mood Structure High Positive Affect joy ÷ Pleasure. ~ ., 3 .-I~ - Reinforcement ," ° i Z ," Disengagement" Strong Engagement ,• Z "" .~ ,,4 ~,, ~.~ ~-. • . + Punishment ~.n~e~j, I'D ". ~=1" "Pain Depression Low Positive Affect Note. Adapted from Watson and Tellegen's (1985) outline of the structure of affect, with the additions of two contingencies of punishment (+ for positive punishment and - for negative punishment) and reinforcement (+ for positive reinforcement and - for negative reinforcement). These punishment and reinforcement contingencies illustrate how exogenous events serve to moderate affect. Specifically, this figure is adapted from "Toward o Consensual Structure of Mood," by D. Watson and A. Tellegen, Psychological Bulletin, 85, p. 221. Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. tions, namely, positive and negative punishment, which are the presentation of aversive stimuli (anxiety) and the removal of appetitive stimuli (depression), respectively. Psychological well-being, on the other hand, follows two kinds of reinforcing conditions, namely, positive and negative reinforcement, that is, the presentation of appetitive stimuli (joy) or the removal of aversive stimuli (relief). TWA can help in identifying environments that are ideally tailored toward augmenting one's overall psychological well-being while simultaneously attenuating the likelihood of experiencing pain. More specifically, one's affect fluctuates as a function of the density of punishing and reinforcing events experienced. Correspondent learning environments tend to minimize the former and maximize the latter. Placing students in learning environments congenial with their abilities and interests has multiple direct advantages. For example, the curriculum moves at a pace commensurate with learning rates, so more learning occurs and motivation builds. Also, the topics of most interest are introduced at developmentally appropriate times, so more enjoyment is experienced, which augments motivation. Moreover, such environments also foster advantageous indirect benefits, by placing talented students who enjoy academic challenges in social milieus where they feel free to express their genuine love of learning and receive peer support rather than ridicule for doing so (Benbow & Stanley, 1996). In sum, satisfaction and satisfactoriness operate to maximize positive and negative reinforcement and minimize positive and negative punishment (see Figure 3). Herein is the mechanism that sustains commitment to developing skills over extended time frames. This applies not only to the development of eminence but also to less noteworthy accomplishments like securing an advanced degree. Support for these ideas is found in the subjective reports of intellectually talented students who have had an appropriate developmental placement experience (Benbow et al., 1996; Benbow & Stanley, 1996). 2 The reports tend to be overwhelmingly positive. In addition, our experience over the past l0 years with summer residential programs for the gifted has revealed that 40% of the participants return the following summer for further educational experiences tailored toward their capabilities and interests. We 2 For evaluating meaningful outcomes for gifted youth, some remarks about realistic criteria are in order. The study of extraordinary intellectual abilities invariably turns to genius, an infinitely small subset of the intellectually talented population (e.g., Einstein, Picasso, and Eliot). They represent approximately one in a million people. Even so, some have considered the forecasting of genius to be a critical goal of talent development procedures. However, this criterion is unrealistic. The base rate tbr genius is simply too miniscule (and the chance factors too harsh) to make doing so justifiable. What is more, all of the necessary endogenous and exogenous factors conducive for this degree of development have to co-occur in the proper zeitgeist; the culture has to be receptive to the products generated. To be sure, spurred on by optimism spawned by the early testing movement, Terman (1925; Terman & Oden, 1959) probably fostered this criterion himself by unfortunately calling his longitudinal study Genetic Stud)" of Genius. We now know that there is much more to genius than simply ability. Models are available for better understanding how genius does indeed come about, however; interestingly, there is a consensus about certain attributes (Eysenck, 1995; Gardner, 1993; Jensen, 1996; Simontom 1988, 1994; Zuckerman, 1977). January 2000 • American Psychologist 145

do, however, observe a robust gender difference that is nationally characteristic of summer residential programs for the gifted. Although both boys and girls evaluate these opportunities positively, gifts tend to report more positive effects. Our interpretation of this finding is that peer pressure on gifted gifts is harsher in contrast to the pressure experienced by gifted boys. Hence, when talented girls are placed in an environment where the pressure not to achieve is essentially absent, they not only enjoy the reinforcing experience but also are especially relieved by the absence of punishment. Indeed, they often report finally being able to "be themselves." Conceptualizing States of Excellence In Nicholas Hobbs's (1958, p. 595) list of criteria for becoming "the compleat counselor," he lists first "become a good general psychologist" and remarks, "I have been impressed over and over again by the frequency with which pure science psychology provides new directions for various kinds of applied endeavors." In this spirit, we attempt to tie the thread running through TWA's correspondence dimensions, satisfaction and satisfactoriness, to other concepts in psychological literature. Satisfaction, Satisfactoriness, and Other Psychological Concepts We suspect that satisfaction and satisfactoriness cut across multiple aspects of life; if we are correct their implications could be very broad. Lofquist and Dawis (1991) supported this idea by linking these two outcomes to Freud's pleasure principle (people seek to avoid pain and achieve gratification, or TWA's satisfaction) and reality principle (i.e., the demands and requirements of the external world, or TWA' s satisfactoriness). Tellegen (1981) has spelled out a distinction between two similar mental sets: experiential (or respondent) and instrumental (or operant). As one might infer from Tellegen's distinction, which builds on a Skinnerian framework, Premack's principle runs through these concepts (and is also embedded in TWA): To predict which environments an individual is likely to enter, work in, and thrive in, you must not only know what they can do (their abilities, or capabilities), you must also know what they want (their interests, needs, or motives). These distinctions all contrast a positive experience, highly reinforcing in and of itself (unconditionally, often outside of any pragmatic utility), with one of more striving, planning, decision making, and active pursuit. Other distinctions loosely coupled with the foregoing include Bakan's (1966) communion and agency, Fromm's (1979) receptive and active modes, Koch's (1956) intrinsic and extrinsic modes, Maslow's (1968) B-Cognition (for being) and D-Cognition (for doing), and Parsons and Bales's (1955) expressiveness and instrumentality. Can these sets of contrasting concepts help in better understanding the reports of world-class performers about their subjective experiences during or after a brilliant accomplishment? How about other subjective "highs" that co-occur with less spectacular achievements but nevertheless require vigorous concentrated efforts to develop? The familiar illustration that comes to mind (found in some introductory psychology texts) is the side-byside photographs used to exemplify self-actualization. One is of a young boy, proudly holding his pet rabbit and the blue ribbon they just earned at the fair. The photograph next to this is typically that of a Nobel laureate and the trophy for this achievement. The adjacent photographs poignantly illustrate how similar affective states can co-occur with highly disparate accomplishments. Yet, these achievements are developmentally appropriate and tailored to the abilities and interests of the participants; they also undoubtedly share similar affective qualities. Can the model we have been developing shed light on such phenomena? We think so. Effectance Motivation White (1959) has argued that prolonged bouts of problemsolving behavior directed toward a distant goal serve to generate acquired motives: I shall argue that it is necessary to make competence a motivational concept; there is a competence motivation as well as competence in its more familiar sense of achieved capacity. Moreover, when this behavior gives satisfaction it involves the transaction of person and environment (the effect each has on the other). (p. 318) White (1959) refers to the development of the type of motivation (motivation that develops from having an instrumental effect on the environment) called effectance. Importantly, effectance is self-generated endogenously rather than being exogenously administered. It appears to be an emergent person-environment phenomenon: It is constantly circling from stimulus to perception to action to effect to stimulus to perception, and so on around; or, more properly, these processes are all in continuous action and continuous change. Dealing with the environment means carrying on a continuing transaction which gradually changes one's relation to the environment. Because there is no consummatory climax, satisfaction has to be seen as lying in a considerable series of transactions, in a trend of behavior rather than a goal that is achieved. It is difficult to make the word "satisfaction" have this connotation, and we should do well to replace it by "feeling of efficacy" when attempting to indicate the subjective and affective side of effectance. (pp. 321-322) Hence, genuine feelings of self-efficacy are the result of many behavior-dependent products or, more specifically, products dependent on competent (effective) behavior. This supports Allport's (1946) insight: positive developmenl unfolds not only because of what individuals do but also because of the effects their behaviors have on the environment. We hypothesize that teaming dominant abilities with regnant interests and concentrating development toward a correspondent goal enhances the development of effectance motivation. Csikszentmihalyi (1993) has noted interconnections between his concept of flow and many other concepts, including Maslow's (1968) peak experiences. Could it be that underpinning much of what is meant by experiencing flow or having a peak experience is the subjective experi146 January 2000 ° American Psychologist

ence of effectance motivation--more specifically, an experiential state engendered when complex performances emerge in highly correspondent environments, performances that require an extraordinary commitment of concentrated effort to develop and for which these extraordinary efforts contribute to the development of sustaining opponent processes (Landy, 1978; Solomon, 1980)? This seems to follow from White's (1959) position on the development of effectance motivation, something not unlike a "mechanism becomes drive" phenomenon, which engages concurrently with or after a seemingly effortless but impressive performance. Educational Implications If the above analysis has merit, it suggests that educators should concentrate on developing students' satisfactory behaviors, which are structured around students' most salient attributes, and finding environmental niches within which they are likely to be genuinely reinforced (for developing their capabilities) rather than focusing on feelings (and reinforcing indiscriminately). Flow experiences would then engender cascades of indirect effects, not only for the gifted but for all students, because if this analysis is correct, it would be impossible to feel depressed or have low self-esteem while experiencing flow. Maybe educators who shifted away from the development of skills to the development of "positive feelings" did students a disservice. At least White (1959) appeared to believe that in their most genuine form, feelings of self-efficacy co-occur with or result from the development and execution of complex skills. Perhaps educators should concentrate on recognizing and reinforcing successive approximations toward instrumentally effective skills. That is, they should focus on developing the capacities to do the same thing a little better every day, or continuous improvement, which the Japanese call kaizen (Secretan, 1997, p. 49). With respect to developing true excellence, there probably will never be any quick fixes. Excellence takes time. Perhaps it would be good for educators and policy makers to acknowledge this more frequently, as others already have. For example, when it was pointed out to Ignatz Jan Paderewski (the great Polish pianist) that he was a genius, his response was "Yes, and before that I was a drudge." Educators probably should focus not on the aforementioned unconditional feeling states but rather on their conditional instrumental counterparts whose development naturally engenders them. Being interested in developing effective behaviors and reinforcing their occurrence is likely to foster positive psychological development. Being unwilling to differentiate between effective and ineffective performances and unwilling to differentially reinforce them is likely to foster something else. Broader Issues in Counseling and Educating the Gifted Factors other than empirical evidence often contribute to whether sound research findings are implemented in practice. In this regard, Hobbs's (1958) "The Compleat Counselor" is particularly worth reading. Not infrequently, attendant social issues determine how educational and psychological services are reacted to and distributed (Coleman, 1990-1991; Cronbach, 1975b; Humphreys, 1991). Hobbs (1958) recommended that we attend to issues such as the cultural climate and the tenor of the time. Appreciation of these determinants is not only likely to enhance our effectiveness as practitioners, but doing so may even attenuate the intensity of Cronbach's (1975a) pessimistic appraisal of empirical generalizations in the social sciences (i.e., their "short half-life"). Actually, the psychology of individual differences has amassed an impressive array of empirical generalizations (Lubinski, 1996, 2000), for which highly efficacious interventions that meet the special needs of intellectually talented students are but one example. In many respects, society has had a volatile relationship with the gifted throughout most of this century (Benbow & Stanley, 1996). One likely reason for this is that educational systems are confronted with an array of overwhelming negative psychological exigencies. In the context of a society replete with drug running, teen pregnancy, and gross underachievement among various demographic groupings, the gifted do not surface as a priority. Relatively speaking, the gifted appeared to be doing just fine. However, they could have been doing much better (Benbow & Stanley, 1996), and society likely would have profited from it. During the 1950s, a lot was known about the special needs of gifted students (Witty, 1951), and distinguished educators and psychologists laced their professional writings with this information. They noted not only the direct effects of tailoring educational curriculum to individual differences in learning rates (Hollingworth, 1926, 1942) but also the positive indirect effects for society (Paterson, 1957; Pressey, 1946a, 1946b; Terman, 1954). In discussing the conspicuous neglect of gifted students and how it was in society's best interest to correct for this, Hobbs (1958) suggested that counseling psychologists should take a leadership role: The compleat counselor will also be asked to help in the development of new generations of people trained to levels commensurate with their abilities. We have been prodigal of talent in America, being content to let lie fallow or refuse to cultivate much of our human potential. But things were changing even before the launching of the satellites [Sputnik], and gifted children, after years of neglect in education, are all the rage. One cannot but welcome this change in attitude. Though we suddenly see in teachers' magazines and popular periodicals altruistically toned articles stating the case for the gifted child, we should recognize that this sudden interest in intelligence springs from concern with prospects for national survival. I would hope that our compleat counselor would be one of the most effective people in identifying talented youngsters and in helping to plan educational programs to ensure their fullest development. (p. 598) These remarks point to some corollary social benefits of investing in gifted students while highlighting society's self-interest in responding favorably to their precocity; it is also the thoughtful thing to do for the individual gifted January 2000 • American Psychologist 147

child. This midcentury recognition of gifted students was stimulated by Witty's (1951) The Gifted Child, within which Hobbs (1951) made a forceful case for their underappreciation as a human capital resource: Citizens and experts alike have not generally become aware of the community's significance, for good or ill, in the life of the gifted child. Perhaps the most promising contribution that this volume can make is to bring the potentialities and the particular needs of the gifted child into prominence. (pp. 164-165) Witty's (1951) volume was indeed successful in this regard (see Terman, 1954, p. 227) and became a landmark in the gifted literature. Writings such as these and others were synthesized and enlarged in Williamson's (1965) Vocational Counseling. This volume provided a solid foundation (empirical, philosophical, and theoretical) for facilitating talent development for all students. It provided the connecting fiber binding applied individual-differences research in educational and industrial psychology, conjoined their powerful person-environment models, and traced their conceptual antecedents to Paterson, Schneidler, and Williamson's (1938) Student Guidance Techniques and Viteles's (1932) Industrial Psychology. Williamson (1965) is an excellent exemplar of positive psychology. He was especially insightful in his description of how to counsel and design learning environments for future intellectual leaders, particularly through the way he drew on philosophical concepts from the Greeks (e.g., eudaimonia, doing excellence). Yet, looking back, it appears that the compelling exigencies of the 1960s and 1970s shifted focus. Neither Hobbs's (1958) recommendations nor Williamson's (1965) systematic compilation of prior decades of applied individual-differences research were widely assimilated by the next generation of scholars. Although important, the work of Hobbs and Williamson was not seen as a priority. Ironically, this turned attention away from those most equipped to solve the most challenging problems encountered in a highly technical, multicultural, ever-changing society. Nevertheless, research on talent development within this tradition--namely, the individual-differences tradition--has continued (Dawis, 1992; Lubinski, 1996): abilities, interests, and personality are assessed to build models for facilitating positive development (Benbow & Stanley, 1996; Dawis, 1996b; Scarr, 1996). Today, we know much more about the dimensionality of relevant individual differences dimensions germane to the development of exceptional achievements, as well as how to utilize this information in practice (Benbow, 1991; Benbow & Lubinski, 1996, 1997; Benbow & Stanley, 1996; Lubinski & Benbow, 1995; Winner, 1996). This special issue marks a good time to take stock in what we now know about this special population and the magnitude of psychological diversity within it. In all likelihood, this population contains the most promising human capital for solving the social exigencies facing us. Moreover, the TWA framework provides a cogent model for conceptualizing how all applied psychological specialties, when seen in their most ideal form, might be construed: as sequential complements of one another covering the full range of life span development (through lifelong learning). Namely, when contiguously aligned, the applied psychological precincts appear to form a developmental continuum: educational --~ counseling --~ industrial. Child and adult clinical psychology also form a developmental continuum but focus on maladaptive behavior within or in transitioning between stages. 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