Michal Smetana Institute of Political Studies Charles ...

Michal Smetana
Institute of Political Studies
Charles University in Prague

U.S. nuclear posture 2001-2013:
general trends

 highly asymmetric dynamics in the rhetoric
and practice -> allowing dramatic changes
on the level of discourse and general
declaratory statements, but retaining
relatively much slower / evolutionary
dynamics in the operational policy

 discursive shift (based partly on different
preferences among some short- to long-term
goals) x patterns of continuity in many
significant practical aspects

 in both cases strong link-up to the nuclear
policies of 1990’s (or even Cold War period)

1990's SAC / STRATCOM nuclear force planning
principles & priorities

Phoenix Study, STRATCOM's briefing on the impact of the Washington
Summit Agreement , Sun City, Sun City Extended, STRATCOM's white
paper & Warfighter Assessment of post-START II arms control
(1991-1996)

 Triad of strategic nuclear forces;
 "Twin Triad" with SSBNs and ICBMs carrying day-to-day deterrence

burden and strategic bombers providing back-up;
 Two-ocean SSBN force with full target coverage in both oceans, large

operating areas, and maximum upload capability;
 MIRV on SSBNs;
 Warheads at a level consisting with warfighting needs;
 Flexibility in nuclear forces;
 Robust and highly flexible nuclear war planning system;
 Survivable nuclear forces and C2 connectivity;
 Continue modernization of remaining forces;
 Secure hedge and upload capacity;
 Arms control must ensure stability with Russia;1

1 KRISTENSEN, Hans M. (2001) The Matrix of Deterrence: U.S. Strategic Command Force Structure Studies.



Offensive leg

 retaining the concept of nuclear (strategic)
triad of ICBMs / SLBMs / bombers - crucial
importance of flexibility of strategic forces

 gradual quantitative reductions x qualitative
improvements, modernization, R&D programs
for follow-on’s within each leg

 ICBM "de-MIRVing"

 alert posture: high for "Twin-Triad" (ICBMs +
SLBMs), low for bombers

 steady, gradual quantitative reductions in
operationally deployed force – 1700-2200
(NPR 2001 / SORT), 1550 (NPR 2010 / New
START) (=> consequently also in the non-
deployed hedge force)

Offensive leg II.

 discursive rejection of "Cold War"
thinking in all NPRs

x
 "MAD based" force planning vis-à-vis

Russia (=> implicit secondary capability
to deter any other state actor), alert
postures primarily driven by Cold War
counterforce doctrines

Defense / nuclear infrastructure

 in both NPRs expressed urgent need for
comprehensive revitalization

 conceptual significance in relation to long-term
goals: deterrence, dissuasion, prerequisite for
further reductions (+ NPR 2010: importance
for nuclear weapon-free world)

 accentuation within the general concept ->
way to justify large investments, in case of
Obama also to gain support from the
Republican opposition

 nuclear testing moratorium since 1992, actual
production of new nuclear weapons halted =>
main mission: maintenance of safe & reliable
nuclear arsenal - Stockpile Stewardship, Life
Extension Program (LEP)

New nuclear weapons / capabilities

 conceptual differences:

Bush:
 explicit requirement to posses the capability to produce new warheads and to resume

underground nuclear testing if needed/required
 Advanced Concepts Initiatives, RNEP, Reliable Replacement Warhead... -> R&D programs

with the aim to develop new (primarily counter-proliferation) capabilities for U.S. nuclear
arsenal - precision guidance, low-yield, earth penetration, improved reliability, tailored effects ;
(programs later terminated, funding cut by the U.S. Congress)

x
Obama:
 complete omission or even discursive renouncement in NPR

BUT
 disputed by senior U.S. officials
 significant modifications under LEP; e.g.: B61 LEP -> B61-12 (~ $10bn LEP + ~ $1bn adding

controllable tail fins) – increased accuracy => enhanced capability to destroy targets

Summary & implications

 discursive differences –> Bush: focus on credibility
=> deterrence, dissuasion; Obama: focus on signals
to external actors => non-proliferation impact

 firmly established trends in operational policy (many
of them originating in 1990's) that the administrations
are ultimately unable/unwilling to significantly alter:
main force structure, arms control principles, alert
postures, delivery systems/stockpile modernization,
infrastructure...(but also limited ballistic missile
defense, development of conventional strategic
weapons...)

 => despite radical rhetoric and many dramatic
proposals, significant changes in this area can not be
expected; more likely slow, gradual evolution