zirat23 ebook

A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N






Annual Report

Proprietary Information






New data in red font


Author


Peter Rudling
ANT International, Tollered, Sweden


















































© November 2018
Advanced Nuclear Technology International
Spinnerivägen 1, Mellersta Fabriken plan 4,
448 50 Tollered, Sweden

[email protected]
www.antinternational.com

A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N






















Disclaimer


The information presented in this report has been compiled and analysed by Advanced Nuclear Technology
International Europe AB (ANT International®) and its subcontractors. ANT International has exercised due
diligence in this work, but does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of the information.
ANT International does not assume any responsibility for any consequences as a result of the use of the
information for any party, except a warranty for reasonable technical skill, which is limited to the amount paid
for this report.













Quality-checked and authorized by:







Mr Peter Rudling, President of ANT International






























Copyright © Advanced Nuclear Technology International Europe AB, ANT International, 2018.
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Contents

Appendix A - Proprietary information A-1
A.1 Failure causes – PWRs A-1
A.2 Failure causes – BWRs A-5
A.3 High burnup fuel performance summary A-10
A.3.1 High burnups achieved in utility power plants A-10
A.3.2 Utility issues and information A-16
A.3.3 Utility Reported Information A-16

Appendix B - References B-1
Nomenclature
Unit conversion


































































Copyright © Advanced Nuclear Technology International Europe AB, ANT International, 2018.
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Appendix A - Proprietary information

This section provides proprietary utility data that have been approved by the respective organisation for
publication within the ZIRconium Alloy Technology (ZIRAT) program.

A.1 Failure causes – PWRs


Table A- 1: Summary of previous PWR failures/issues. New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1, 2 Batches of 15x15 Mk-B HTP C20 – 3 failed rods in 3 assemblies due to grid-fretting on core edge. EOC BU =
Cy 20 1 Remaining Batch of 15x15 Mk-B 46.305 MWd/kgU.
Cy 21 (Current) Estimating several failures, probably due to grid-rod fretting.
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2, Transitioning to CE 16x16 NGF from CE 16x16 C19 – 11 failures in 6 assemblies, Grid-rod fretting, core edge, bundle edge.
Cy 19 standard. ZIRLO and Optimized ZIRLO cladding
Borssele, Cycle 40, 2013 1 failure caused by baffle jetting/ rod to grid About 1.5 grams wash-out failure caused by baffle jetting/ rod to grid fretting. Cycle
fretting at several spacers. burnup increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core average fuel assembly
burnup during cycle – 1.5 MWd/kgU vs 3.9 MWd/kg Core average
Braidwood & Byron Westinghouse OFA Fuel 5 Cycles w/ Defects 2001 > Present
11 total assemblies failed – PCI primary cause related to pellet missing surfaces.
Brokdorf, Cy 24, 2011-2012 Several leakers and a lot of FA with damaged Core contains mainly AREVA HTP design with M5 cladding. Visual inspection showed
spacer grids. spacer grids damaged due to handling problems and grid-to-grid fretting.
Brokdorf Several leakers and a lot of FA with damaged AREVA HTP steel guiding tube & WSE 16×16: Uran and Uran-Gd FA; visual
spacer grids inspection, spacer grids damaged due to handling problems and grid-to-grid fretting
Callaway, Cy 16, 2007 Vantage-5 (OFA). I failure estimated.
Calvert Cliffs 1, 2002-2003 6 failed rods due to grid-rod fretting. All failures in both units were due to grid-rod fretting as has been the case in several
Calvert Cliffs 2, 2002-2003 7 failed rods due to grid-rod fretting. previous cycles. See ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR for more details [Adamson et al., 2004].
Calvert Cliffs 1, Cy17, 2006 CRUD-induced corrosion failures of first-burned assemblies.
Calvert Cliffs 2, Cy16 Sipping Results:
- Eight third burn fuel failures/one suspect. Subsequent can sipping
confirmed suspect as failed.
- Two second burn Turbo failures/one suspect – Batch 2T fuel. One failure
and the suspect were in reinsert fuel for U2C17.
Catabwa 2, Cy 13, 2005 Grid-rod fretting. FANP Mk-BW.
No details reported.
Commanche Peak 1, 2006 17x17 OFA 1 fuel design, IFMs 2 (U1-2005, IMS Results: M66, N17, N46, N12, and N24 were identified as failed fuel assemblies.
Cy 11 U2-2006). The four “N” assemblies were scheduled for reload. Ultrasonic Testing (UT) identified
one failed fuel rod in each assembly.
ZIRLO cladding, GT, and Instrument Tube (IT).
DFBN, Alternative P-Grid installed in 2002. Pre-
Cy 12 Oxidized cladding (U1-2005, U2-2006). In-Mast Sipping (IMS) indicated one failed assembly N75 with a BU of 45 000 MWD/MTU
scheduled for discharge. UT indicated one failed rod. Video exams showed bulging,
bowing, and possible cracks between grids 3 and 4. Due to potential fuel rod degradation,
rod was not removed from assembly.
Comanche Peak 1, Cy12, 2007 Vantage-5 (OFA). 1 OFA failure.
Commanche Peak 2, Cy 9 2 assemblies identified by sipping (KK28 and KK32). Both assemblies were high BU
and scheduled for discharge. Two pieces of debris were observed and removed from
the top of the lower core plate following the 2RF09 core offload.
Comanche Peak 2, Cy 10, 2007 Vantage-5 (OFA). 3 OFA failures.
Comanche Peak 2, Cy 12, Vantage-5 (OFA), ZIRLO cladding First cycle fuel failed – 1 rod failed, 4000 MWD/MTU over batch average (Cycle burnup
2009-2011 Primary hydriding - no clear primary defect increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core average fuel assembly burnup
location during cycle)
Severely degraded rod but no washout - hot cell under consideration


Optimized Fuel Assembly
1
2
Intermediate Flow Mixing grids.






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Table A- 1: Summary of previous PWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
Crystal River 3, Cy 13, Nine failures: 6 grid-rod fretting Three axial power shape, Axial Power Shaping Rods (APSR), assemblies failed
2003 suspected 3 PCI suspected. (duty related failures suspected). See ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR for more details [Adamson et al., 2004].
Crystal River 3, Cy 15, AREVA Two Mark B-10 failures identified by in-mast sipping: 2 failed peripheral assemblies
2005 Mk B-HTP Indications of FA to baffle wear/interactions:
 Some fuel rod/baffle indications – no failures.
 Mostly grid/baffle wear.
 No failures in peripheral HTP assemblies.
Diablo Canyon 2, Cy 14, Westinghouse VANTAGE 5 fuel. In Cycle 14, 1X burned FA NN66 had one severely hydrided rod which separated during FA
2007 inspections (unknown cause), Secondary hydriding location between grid 6 and IFM C.
ZIRLO cladding.
IFMs.
Removable Top Nozzles (RTNs).
DFBN.
Alternate Protective grid with extended
BEPs.
Diablo Canyon 2, Cy 16, 3rd burn assembly located on core 1 failed rod:
2009-2011 periphery; Vantage-5 (OFA) design,  Debris induced failure, no degradation, no plans for further exams
ZIRLO; debris failure  Z16 assembly had burnup increase of 8500 MWD/MTU during cycle
Grafenrheinfeld, Cy 30, No leaker, but two FA with damaged Visual inspection, spacer grids damaged during handling.
2011-2012 spacer grids
Grafenrheinfeld, Cy 31, No defect rods 2 FA with damaged spacer. 4 FA with Steel guide-tube have holding springs damaged. Inspection in
2012-2013 hot-cells will be carried out
Indian Point – Unit 2, Cy 17 W, Full core of Upgrade 15x15 with I- Cy 17- 4 failed bundles:
spring grid design.
 One 3rd-burn was almost certainly due to grid-rod fretting and was not UT examined.
 UT testing found 1 failed rod in each of two twice-burned assemblies. Of the twice-
burned assemblies, one was peripheral and one inboard. Entergy concluded the 2nd-
burned peripheral assembly was grid-rod fretting, consistent with similar failed
peripheral rod data seen to date. The 2nd-burn peripheral failure was not disassembled
for single rod inspection. The cause of the failure in the other twice-burned assembly is
under evaluation.
 One third-burned assembly with a possible 7 failures. The 3rd-burned assembly was
on core periphery, and grid-rod fretting is the most likely cause.
Indian Point – Unit 3, Cy 14 W, Full core of Upgrade 15x15 with the Cy14- 1 failed rod, unknown cause. In 2nd cycle. End Of Cycle (EOC) BU = 42 GWD/MTU
exception of centre assembly, 15x15 V5H
Millstone 2, Cy 18 AREVA- 14x14: HTP spacers, fuel guard, 2 thrice-burned assemblies identified as failed in cycle 18 - UT identified 1 failed rod in each
optimized zircaloy-4, enriched axial assembly
blankets, gadolinia.
Millstone 3, 2007 Westinghouse - 17x17* RFA2: IFMs, P- Cycle 12 Started May 2007.
Cy 12 grid, ZIRLO, enriched annular axial Fuel defect occurred < 30 days into cycle.
blankets, ZrB2 Integral Fuel Burnable
Absorber (IFBA), oxide coating. Currently predicting 2-3 failures in low power assemblies, Probable cause: debris.
McGuire 1, Cy 16, 2005 Grid-rod fretting. FANP Mk-BW.
No details reported.
Nogent 2 Plant, Cy 11 39 leaking fuel rods, A gradual increase of noble gas activity had been noted in the second part of the cycle. The plant
(Nov. 2002)-EDF plant 37 in the 22 thrice burned was shut down 5 months before the scheduled outage. No fuel washout. See ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR for
FAs - grid to rod fretting more details [Strasser et al., 2003].
at bottom grid. M5 fuel cladding, Zry-4 AFA-3GL skeleton.
2 in the once burned FA
– a welding upper end plug
defect and debris fretting.
Cattenom 3 3 , 14 ft. core, 28 fuel assemblies failed by AFA 2G.
1300 MWe EdF, Cy 8, grid-rod fretting at CRUD 8. Numerous cases of both transversal breaks, and axial crack formation resulting in significant fuel
2001-EDF plant
Grid-rod fretting failures washout.
occurred at the lowest grid Failure cause related to not sufficient spacer grid spring force due to the high cross flows at the
in 28 fuel assemblies. bottom of the FA in 1300 MWe core (span 1 location). The cross-flow rates are more than 30 %
higher than that in a 900 MWe plant. The location of the highest cross-flows in a 1300 Me plant
corresponds to core locations of fuel assemblies showing grid-rod fretting failures.
Cattenom 4, 2002, 14 ft. Seven fuel assemblies failed. Uranium contamination was observed.
Core – EDF plant



See section 9.2.2.1 in ZIRAT7/IZNA2 AR for more details [Strasser et al, 2002].
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Table A- 1: Summary of previous PWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
EdF data reported in The main failure causes in the A significant number of fuel failures were related to the M5 fuel cladding in 1300 MWe and 1450 MWe units. The
2009 [Thibault et al., EdF plants are: M5 FR failures were due to fabrication defects either related to the end plug girth or fill hole weld or defects in
2009] GTRF wear, the fuel clad itself at grid levels (related to the pulling of the rods into the assembly structure). To resolve these
Clad manufacturing defects and, manufacturing issues, AREVA has modified the welding techniques as well as the rod pulling procedure.
It was observed that there were no GTRF failures in 2008 (in previous years there have always been some
Excessive fuel assembly bowing GTRF failures). The reasons for the great improvement is thought to be due to that both AREVA and
(resulting in assemblies grids Westinghouse have introduction reinforced FAs design (AFA3GLr – AREVA and RFA2- Westinghouse).
hanging-up during loading and
unloading and IRI) Since the introduction of the AREVA AFA3G design in 1999, a decrease of the average core bow in EdF NPPs
has been observed, especially on the 900 MW units, but not as fast as expected. The maximum values of
bowing remain relatively high on the 1300 MW units, typically between 15 and 19 mm for a “S shape” bow. The
Westinghouse RFA fuel design behaves in the same way with similar bowing range while HTP assembly
deformations are twice less.
Incomplete Rod Insertions (IRIs) due to bowing have been significantly reduced since the AFA3G FA’s design
has been loaded in EdF NPPs and despite the increasing of the average discharge burn-up of the FAs. In 2008,
no anomaly of RCCA drop time was observed in EdF NPPs during the BOC tests. Concerning the EOC tests, no
anomaly was observed in the 12 feet units whereas four RCCAs dropped without recoil in the 14 feet units.
Three of them was AFA3G FAs (two “2nd cycle” FAs and one “4th cycle” FA) and one was the older design
(AFA2G). The number of FAs damaged during handling operations has decreased in 2008 but remains
significant. The damages concern only AFA 2G or 3G design and mainly the 14 feet units. It occurs during the
unloading operations. The damages generally occur during a “three-sided box” extraction and result from grids’
hanging due to bowing and to a reduced gap between FAs following unexpected grid growth due to re-
crystallized Zircaloy-4.
North Anna 1, Cy 20, AREVA - 17x17* Advanced Currently estimate 3 failed
2007 Mark-BW: MSMGs, coarse mesh low-power rods, possibly debris, a manufacturing defect,
trapper bottom nozzle, M5 or old nemesis GTRF.
cladding, BPRAs.
North Anna 1-2, 2007- Fuel Rod Bow Fuel Rod Bow
2009 First observed in Unit 2 outage, Spring 2007
- Higher rod bow than normal on 4 discharge assemblies
Unit 1 outage, Fall 2007
- 26 assemblies observed with significant rod bow
- All were 2nd burn assemblies
- 7 of 26 assemblies with bow at or near contact, or outside assembly envelope (core redesign)
Inspections March 2008
- Water channel (interior rod gaps)
- All gaps within expected dataset
Unit 1 outage, Spring 2009
- 9 assemblies observed with significant bow,
- 4 of 9 assemblies with bow at or near contact. 3 were discharge assemblies. 1 was 2 nd burn reuse
assembly. It was replaced in Cycle 21 loading pattern
- Much of the bow observed involved the corner rod.
Assembly Growth
- Assembly length measurements taken during Unit 2 outage, Spring 2007
 Higher growth than originally expected, but below UTL
- More length measurements taken during Fall 2008 Unit 2 outage (same assemblies measured in Spring
2007).
 All lengths under the Upper Tolerance Limit
- Some assembly distortion seen during Unit 1 refuelling 20, but not severe. One assembly difficult to
load.
Oconee 2, Cy 21, 2005 PCI failures suspected. FANP Mk-B11.
Oconee 3, Cy 22, 2006 AREVA In the Spring 2006 outage, three leaking FAs were removed from O3C22. The cause was GTRF. Cycle 23
15 X 15 started up clean.
Mk-B11A (M5 fuel rod cladding).
Palo Verde 2, Cy 9, Eleven failed one-cycle Zry-4 Primary defect in span 8-9, secondary hydrides in span 2-4.
20004 (OPTIN cladding) rods. AOA was experienced early in cycle 9. A mid-cycle shutdown produced a reversed AOA situation, i.e., the
CRUD/corrosion related failures. previously low relative power in the upper core now had a significantly higher than predicted power resulting in
fuel failures 3 months after the, Mid Cycle Outage, (MCO). All but one was a high-duty peripheral rod, and
significant tenacious CRUD deposits were observed in grid spans 7 – 9 on all rods.






See section 9.2.1.1 in ZIRAT6/IZNA1 AR for more details [Adamson et al, 2001].
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Table A- 1: Summary of previous PWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
Palo Verde 2, Cy 9, 2000 5 Eleven failed one-cycle Zry-4 Primary defect in span 8-9, secondary hydrides in span 2-4.
(OPTIN cladding) rods. AOA was experienced early in cycle 9. A mid-cycle shutdown produced a reversed AOA situation, i.e., the
CRUD/corrosion related failures. previously low relative power in the upper core now had a significantly higher than predicted power resulting
in fuel failures 3 months after the, Mid Cycle Outage, (MCO). All but one was a high-duty peripheral rod, and
significant tenacious CRUD deposits were observed in grid spans 7 – 9 on all rods.
Palisades, Cy 19 AREVA HTP Combustion Failures in Cy19: 3 First Cycle due to uncertain causes; 1 Third Cycle due to grid fretting on core edge:
Engineering First indications of failure detected prior to exceeding 70% power during initial start-up. Multiple start-up
(CE) 15x15 during the cycle lead to severe hydriding and pellet washout. Initial inspections could not find a primary
failure location. Welds appeared sound.
Ringhals 2 AFA-3GAA (M5) with One failed rod (F15) due to debris fretting 15 56 mm from BEO (Grid 1).
Cy 29, 2005 Trapper debris filter. The rod failed at a BU of 3-4 MWd/kgU.
CRUD BU = 10.6 MWd/kgU; Failure seen in Oct 2004, high activity release.
Open hole at 2664 mm and blister at 3327 mm from BEP.
Fuel washout seen.
Robinson Nuclear Plant -2, AREVA
Cy 25 (Current) 15x15 HTP/IFM Estimate 1-2 failures
Seabrook, Cy 5, 1997 Five one-cycle ZIRLO rods failed. Longer cycle in transition to 24-month cycle.
CRUD/corrosion related failures.
Possibly CRUD-induced overheating resulting in substantial nucleate boiling.
Sequoyah 1, Cy 14, 2007 One failed FA. In-mast identified a once burned. Vacuum sipping confirmed. 4-face visual inspection identified grid
Std. Mark.BW. damage and rod gap closure in five FAs.
Feb 2007 – Pool side exam on AG10 FA. Fuel rod A1 leaker. Cause most likely due to excessive fuel
distortion (distorted fuel resulted in torn grid during handling which likely fretted A1 rod in AG10).
Sequoyah 2, Cy 14 AREVA Std. Mark.BW with M5 fuel No failures but significant problems encountered during core reload (cycle 15) due to FA bow.
claddings and GTs.
San Onofre Nuclear Gene- 15 rods failed by GTRF. All were 2nd cycle ZIRLO fuel. No secondary failures or degradation observed.
rating Station Unit 2, Cy 16 GTRF occurs on core periphery low power assemblies
(2010-04-08 to 2012-01-09)
San Onofre Nuclear Gene- 5 rods failed by GTRF. All were 2nd cycle ZIRLO fuel. No secondary failures or degradation observed.
rating Station Unit 3, Cy 16 GTRF occurs on core periphery low power assemblies
(2011-02-15 to 2012-01-31)
Takahama-1, Cy 25 Two failed FA were identified to be failed by sipping and the failed rods were subsequently identified
by UT.
TMI-1, Cy 10, 1995 6 Nine high peaking fuel rods, All failed and degraded pins reportedly had Distinctive CRUD Pattern (DCP) 7 .
Zry-4 Cladding, failed after High peaking factors, thermal-hydraulic conditions. Calculations indicated that no boiling should have
122 days of operation. occurred on the pins with DCP, although the pins with DCP were calculated to have a slightly higher
CRUD/corrosion related failures. temperature.
Water chemistry (low pH at BOC, pH < 6.9, max LiOH 2.2 ppm).
Some, AOA effect was found reaching a maximum in the Middle of Cycle (MOC) 10.
The source of the CRUD could not be determined. The CRUD sampling showed that the nickel-to
iron ratio was in the range 1.25 to 16.7, which was reportedly somewhat lower than in previous
investigations.
TMI AREVA Mark-B HTP Fuel 2 Cycles w/ Defects 2001 > Present
4 total assemblies – 3 GTRF, 1 PCI
Vogtle 2, Cy 13 , 2008 Indications of 1-3 failed rods.
Waterford 3, Cy 15 Transition core of CE 16x16 NGF Cy 15 - 3+, grid-fretting on core edge, mostly under top grid, no degradation
Cy16 (Current) and CE 16x16 Standard w/Inconel 5-10 failures estimated.
Top Grid. Transition to ZIRLO with
C15 and Optimized ZIRLO with
NGF.
Watts Bar Unit 1, Cy 6, TVA, First burned Robust Fuel Assembly The debris fretting failure occurred in FA H03 in rod J8 at grid no. 1, even though this fuel design was
2005 (RFA2). equipped both with Debris Filter Bottom Nozzle (DFBN) and P-Grid.
Watts Bar Unit 1, Cy 7, 2007 1 failed rod. 4-face visual inspections identified debris in a first burned FA. In-mast identified a twice burned leaker.
Severe degradation resulting in some fuel washout.
ANT International, 2018


5 See section 9.2.1.1 in ZIRAT6/IZNA1 AR for more details [Adamson et al, 2001].
6 For more details, see section 5.6.2 in ZIRAT6/IZNA1 STR, [Wikmark & Cox, 2001], and ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR [Adamson et al., 2004].
7
This acronym implies that the fuel inspection revealed CRUD deposits on the fuel rod and that the deposits were uneven in the rod
circumference.





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A.2 Failure causes – BWRs


Table A-2: Summary of previous BWR failures/issues. New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
Brunswick Unit 1 Loaded Atrium-10 with modified Six failures occurred in C15, 4 removed in MOC (April 2005), 2 removed during EOC (Mar 2006):
Cy15 FUELGUARD debris filter  Three 1st cycle GE14 debris failures
starting with C17 (2008)  Three 2nd cycle GE14 debris failures
GE14
Brunswick-1, Atrium-10 One failed rod:
Cy 16 GE14  One 2nd cycle GE14 that operated 22 months, inspection planned for summer 2008.
 No significant fuel degradation/wash out.
Brunswick 2, 2 debris fretting failures GNF, P7 8
2001-2002, at the 4 th spacer occurred Both rods failed in 1st cycle.
C15A in two fuel rods.
The first rod failed very early in it’s cycle, and operated unsuppressed at ~10 kW/ft for ~1.5 months before PST and
power suppression were performed. The failed fuel rod operated for an additional ~7 months at ~7 kW/ft.
The second fuel rod failed 8-10 months into the cycle. Due to the short time remaining in the cycle, power suppression was
not applied and the failed rod continued to operate at ~10-11 kW/ft for two additional months up to the scheduled outage.
No degradation occurred 9
Brunswick-2, GE14 Five failures occurred in C17, 4 removed at MOC (May 2006), 1 removed during EOC (Mar 2007):
Cy 17
 One 1st cycle GE14 debris failures.
 Three 2nd cycle GE14 debris failures, (1 indeterminate debris most likely root cause).
One 2 nd cycle GE14 not yet inspected.
Brunswick Unit 2 Atrium-10 Channel Bow experienced in C18
Cy18 Loaded GE14 with Defender  Center cell declared inoperable
debris filter in C18 (2007).  Measurements planned for Aug 2009
Browns Ferry 1, Unknown, GE-14 Control Cell 30-39, Suspected PCI failure, Third burned GE-14, 50.5 GWd/MTU
Cy10, 2012-2014
Browns Ferry 2, 63 Fuel Assemblies failed Affected fuel was GE13B/P6 claddings that failed in their second cycle with BUs of 29-30 MWd/kgU.
Cy 12, 2001-2003 10 due to CRUD corrosion. Bundles that failed tended to be leading for the reload batch, indicating some impact of duty on tendency for failures.

Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) started in BOC Cy 11 and NMCA at CRUD 11 was implemented (3/01), Depleted
Zinc Oxide (DZO) started in 1997 at 3 to 5 ppb.
Maximum oxide thickness both in lower and upper part of the failed rods. Maximum CRUD deposition towards the
bottom of the rods.
BF-2 changed out their condenser tubes to Ti-tubes 8-10 years ago. For more details see section 9 in
ZIRAT7/IZNA2 AR [Strasser et al., 2002].
Browns Ferry 3, 3 Fuel Assemblies failed DZO started in 1995 at 3 to 5 ppb, NMCA at CRUD 9 was implemented and HWC started in BOC Cy 10, DZO went to
Cy 11, due to CRUD corrosion. 5 to 10 ppb after the HWC was started.
2002-2004 11 Affected fuel was GE13B/P6 claddings that failed in their third cycle with BUs of 43-47 MWd/kgU. Rod oxide thickness
peaked at lower and upper part of the rods but maximum oxide thickness was found in upper part of the failed rods.
Browns Ferry 3, One ATRIUM10 first burned Failure cause not determined. No abnormalities observed during visual, no indication of what caused failure from
Cy 12, 2004-2006 FA failed. visual exam. Failed rod not yet determined.
Two GE14 second burned FA These failures are thought to be duty related. Primary failure location not determined. The failures of these two
failed. assemblies were next to a CB and failed during a sequence exchange. One failed rod had a circumferential crack and
the other failed rod had blisters. Primary failure location not determined.
Browns Ferry 3, Atrium-10 U3C12 inspection of an Atrium-10 first burn failure, 21 GWD/MT, (FCA199). Failed rod was K5 and it was caused by
Cy12 debris. Debris fretting mark was found under spacer 8. Debris was not found. The rod did not degrade.
KernkraftWerk SVEA 96/L Cy 20: 1 rod failed in 1 FA, ATRIUM 10B; LTP (Fe-Liner), 45 MWd/KgU; no fuel washout.
Brunsbüttel (KKB)
Cy 20




GNF cladding with sponge Zr liner alloyed with 1000 wtppm Fe.
8
9
No fuel washout occurred; no severe secondary degradation crack formation.
10
See ZIRAT7/IZNA2 AR [Strasser et al., 2002], ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR [Strasser et al., 2003] and ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR
[Adamson et al., 2004] for more details.
See ZIRAT8/IZNA3 [Strasser et al., 2003] and ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR [Adamson et al., 2004] for more details.
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Table A-2: Summary of previous BWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
Cofrentes, Debris fretting failure SVEA 96
Cy 15, 2005 at spacer 6 elevation 27.4 MWd/kgU
(SVEA 96)
Debris fretting failure (GE12) Circumferential crack at the 1-2 spacer elevation – Fuel washout noted.
GE12
26.2 MWd/kgU
Axial crack at the 1-2 spacer elevation –Fuel washout noted.
Cooper, Cy 23 GE14 Cy 23 - 1 failed rod, twice burnt, 34.901 GWD/MTU ave. bundle BU. Debris, GE14, barrier. No degradation
Dresden & Quad ATRIUM-9 Fuel and GE14 Fuel 4 Cycles w/ Defect 2001 > Present.
Cities 1 ATRIUM-9 assembly – Debris (Dresden 3 in 2003).
4 ATRIUM-9 assemblies – PCI (Quad 1 & Quad 2 in 2003).
1 GE14 assembly – Debris (Quad 2 in 2005).
Fitzpatrick, 2004 PCI related failures in Two duty related failures occurred in non-barrier GE12 (non-barrier) assemblies late in their second cycle at a
two (2) non-barrier fuel BU of about 45 MWd/kgU.
See ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR for more details [Adamson et al., 2004].
Fitzpatrick, Currently full core of GE14. Currently one estimated failure, suppressed with two blades. Does not appear to be duty related.
Cy 18 (Current) Loading GNF2 this Fall.
Forsmark 1, Atrium10B (Fe-liner) One failed rod (c4), debris fretting at spacer 4 elevation.
Cy 24, 2004 BU = 20.6 MWd/kgU, failure seen late Oct 2004, unloaded during short outage May 10, 2005.
Primary failure not found in pool examination.
Apparent secondary failures (but no degradation) observed.
Sent to hot cell (Studsvik).
Small debris fretting hole at Spacer # 4.
Forsmark 1, Atrium10B (Fe-liner) One failed rod (a10), debris fretting at spacer 7 elevation, BU = 20.6 MWd/kgU
Cy 25, 2005 Blisters at 604 and 632 mm from BEP
This 2-cycle leaker in F1 unloaded in extra outage May 2005 to ensure that no fuel washout would occur that
would increase the plant activity level since they were going to replace the turbine.
Forsmark 3, Atrium10B (Fe-liner) One failed rod (a6), debris fretting at 2295 mm elevation, BU = 31.9 MWd/kgU.
Cy 20, 2005 Blisters at 307, 420 and 700 mm from BEP
Grand Gulf, Failure cause not known. GE11, P7B clad, no details reported.
Cy 13, 2005 ATRIUM10 nonliner, transversal break.
Grand Gulf, One failed rod, ATRIUM 10 (non-liner fuel with Fuel Guard).
Cy 15, 2006 Failure cause is not known Forced mid-cycle outage to remove the degrading rod.
Long axial cracks formed leading to fuel washout
Grand Gulf, Cy 15 Full Core ATRIUM10 with Cy 15: Degraded 3 rd cycle ATRIUM10 failure which resulted mid-cycle outage. Likely due to PCI (Missing Pellet
FuelGuard. Surface (MPS) area) during cycle start-up.
Will load GE14 with Defender and
Zry-4 channels this Fall.
Cycle-16 started use of
Zry-4 channels.
Hatch 1, Cy 21, PCI related failures in Five duty related fuel rods failed at 19 months into a 22 month cycle in one cycle GE14 barrier fuel with an
2003 five (5) liner (barrier) estimated BU of 26 MWd/kgU.
fuel rods See ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR for more details [Adamson et al., 2004].
KKI (Isar) 1, Cy 19, Debris fretting failure SVEA 96 Optima 2/LK3L (liner)
2005 at spacer 6 elevation. 2.9 MWd/kgU
Cracks between spacer 1, 2, 4 and 5 – Fuel washout noted.

KernkraftWerk SVEA 96/L Cy 21: 4 rods failed in 4 FA, SVEA 96 (LK2+):
Krümmel (KKK) ATRIUM 10 XP  Rod 1: 3.500 mm (fretting hole at spacer 6), BU – 6 MWd/kgU; transversal break at 890 mm above the
Cy 21 A, B BEP; fuel washout about 10g.
 Rod 2: 3.500 mm (fretting hole at spacer 6), BU – 8 MWd/kgU; only secondary hydride bulges.
 Rod 3: 2.950 mm (fretting hole in spacer 5), BU – 8 MWd/kgU; only secondary hydride bulges.
 Rod 4: 2.950 mm (fretting mark at spacer 5-probably fretting defect), BU – 45 MWd/kgU; only
secondary hydride bulges.









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Table A-2: Summary of previous BWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary Comment
failure
Kuosheng 2, Cy 15, 2004 12 2 rods in ATRIUM-9B On April 16, 2003, approximately 106 days after the unit start-up, a spike increase of coolant activity was observed
fuel bundles, KAG115 following the control rod sequence change on April 13, 2003. Two additional activity spikes were noted on
and KBH069, failures September 12 and October 26, 2003 after a control rod sequence change.
were duty related Both KAG115 and KBH069 were located in B1 control cells and both failed rods were in the same F2 location in
(Missing Pellet each assembly. The estimated bundle burnup of KAG115 and KBH069 is 28.87 GWd/MTU and 28.64 GWd/MTU
Surfaces). respectively.
MPS is believed to be the failure cause.
Kuosheng 2, Cy 18, 2005 ATRIUM-10. 1 failed rod, the failed fuel was twice burnt, located at the core centre.
 The failure was initially detected less than one week right after startup of cycle18.
Mid-cycle outage was planned one month after Power Suppression Testing (PST).
 Initial poolside examination also indicated that secondary hydrides existed in the failed rod.
The primary defect was not found.
 The failed rod will be also sent to INER for examination.
LaSalle 1, Cy 10, 4 failed fuel rods in four First failure occurred upon setting full power rod pattern at BOC10 in February 2002.
2002 different FAs. 1 first cycle ATRIUM10 bundle (liner fuel) failed, Rod H10, 1 cycle fuel, of bundle 30A042. Failure Mode - This rod
had a clear debris fretting mark near Spacer #5. This FA was equipped with Fuel Guard (debris filter).
Three (3) second cycle ATRIUM9 bundles (liner fuel) failed, 2 due to PCI most likely; the failure mode of the third
rod was not yet assessed.
Rod D1 of bundle 19A077. The Ramp Terminal Level, (RTL) was 8.5 kW/ft (about 25 kW/m). The failure mode is
believed to be PCI, since the rod failed a couple of hours after a control rod pull. Circumferential crack and two
axial cracks below the first spacer.
Rod A4 of bundle 19A201 where the failure mode is believed to be PCI. A very short, tight axial crack was
observed at the 74” elevation indicative of PCI failure. A circumferential crack was found at the bottom part of the
rod that broke during handling.
Rod F3 of bundle 19A113. Failure Mode - Indeterminate. Possible debris fretting or clad defect. Visual inspections
of other rods in the bundle showed surface markings, but none were through-wall defects. No evidence of PCI - low
powered rod. This rod showed a 6-inch long axial crack, 11 inches from BEP.
Sr-91 and -92 data in late February 2002 indicate fuel washout.
More details see Section 9, ZIRAT7/IZNA2 AR [Strasser et al., 2002].
LaSalle 2, Cy 9 PCI related failures in A total of 5 ATRIUM 9B (Fe doped liner) rods failed most likely due to PCI. Four were in the first cycle and one was
2003 13 five (5) liner (barrier) in its second cycle of operation.
fuel rods. 29C170 failed assembly - it did not degrade even though it operated in failed condition for 23 months– 14 months
unsuppressed.
28A034 failed assembly - Significant axial crack of approximately 36” length and considerable fuel washout.
29C220 failed assembly - Significant axial crack.
29C232 failed assembly –only two short axial crack (no degradation).
29A032 failed assembly - two short axial crack (fission plume above one crack indicating some limited fuel
washout).
Failure occurred in LaSalle 2 in first week or so of startup for Cycle 9 in December 2000. Not clearly recognized
until January 2nd. Small leaker, 10 to 20 Ci/sec of Xe-133. No noticeable increase in Sum of the Six.
PST did not identify the failure (-s) and consequently no suppression was implemented. Ran fairly steady to fall of
2001. Second PST in late Jan 2002 identified leaker area - no Cs data and had to insert 2 rods to cover both
possible cells. Good suppression until restart from 3 week April outage. Significant increase in offgas following Unit
restart in April. Changed rod pattern around suppressed area. Possible degradation of initial leaker and some effect
of changing power shape in leaker. Maintaining 2-rod suppression on known leaker. Refuel outage in early 2003.
LaSalle AREVA ATRIUM-9 & -10 4 Cycles w/ Defects 2001 > Present
Fuel 14 total assemblies – 9 PCI (ATRIUM-9), 3 Debris (ATRIUM-10), 2 from L1C12 await inspection (GE14 - suspect
Debris)













12
See ZIRAT14/IZNA9 AR for more information [Adamson et al., 2009].
See ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR for more details [Strasser et al., 2003].
13





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Table A-2: Summary of previous BWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
LaSalle Unit 1 and 2 Unit 1 and Unit 2 are mixed cored with Channel Distortion Issues
GNF GE14 fuel and AREVA ATRIUM-  A total of 294 bundles (115 GE-14 bundles and 179 ATRIUM-10 bundles) were re
10 fuel
channeled during L2R12 to mitigate the potential for channel distortion in Cycle 13.
One cycle on each Unit of ATRIUM-10  Using guidance in GEH Safety Communication 08-05, Revision 1 to monitor cell
ALC friction.
One cycle on each Unit of ATRIUM-10 Recent Fuel Failure History
HALC
 Unit 1 Cycle 12 - discharged February 2008
All ATRIUM fuel has the FUELGUARD - 2 Assemblies (Debris)
LTP debris protection  Unit 2 Cycle 12 - discharged January 2009
Unit 2 has 8 LTA ATRIUM 10XM - 1 Assembly – Inspection scheduled for July 2009.
HALC
Unit 2 also has AREVA Zry-4-BWR
channels
 Expected to have reduced
hydrogen pick up and
irradiation growth Expected to
have reduced shadow
corrosion related channel bow
Nine Mile Point 1, Failed rod (due to debris) was 5/12/2006: FRI spiked; Xe138/133 ratio decreased by factor of 100. PST completed 6/4/2006;
Cy 17 operating in 3rd cycle. Cladding type: rod inserted. August 2006 rapid increases in FRI and Sum of Six. 9/1/2006 inserted 2 nd
GNF’s “P7”. suppression rod. No indications of further degradation in the 10 months to the March 2007
Refuelling Outage (RFO). One leaker found by sipping.
Olkiluoto 1, 6 (Fuel Assemblies) Locations of primary failures not known yet, nor the final failure cause, BUs: 34-38 MWd/kgU.
Cy 37, 2015-2016 ATRIUM 10XM Axial splits on two FAs (secondary failures), Fuel washout detected. Hot cell examinations are
planned
Olkiluoto 1, Debris 1 failed rod at 6.5 MWd/kgU
Cy 39, 2017-2018
Olkiluoto 2, Debris fretting failure SVEA 96 Optima
Cy 24, 2005 at spacer 6 elevation. 27.8 MWd/kgU
Transversal break at 900 mm (35”) elevation – Fuel washout noted.
Olkiluoto 2, Cy 26 GE14 Cy 26- 1 rod/SVEA96 Optima (LK3/L) failed at Spacer 6; Probable fretting from a foreign object;
Two secondary defects above bottom plate: 800 mm a hydride bulge with visual cracks, 600
mm a hydride bulge fractured and twisted; uranium fallen out from the rod visually estimated to
be less than one gram.
Olkiluoto 2, Cy 31, 2011-2012 1 rod suspected Not fully inspected yet; debris most likely Optima2 / LK3 with a burnup of 27.3 MWd/kgU.
Hydride bulbs & cracks visible at three elevations. No fuel washout. PIE not done or planned.
Olkiluoto 2, Cy 32, 2011-2012 1 rod failed , Optima 2 / LK3 27.5 MWd/KgU; failure cause not identified; A hydribe bulb and cracks at two locations . No fuel
washout. PIE not planned.
Olkiluoto 2, Cy 35, 2015 GNF2 fuel rod bowing – no failed rods During the most recent outage of OL2 (17.5.2015 - 4.6.2015), it was noticed that two GNF2
LUAs had fuel rod bow between spacers 1 and 2. The rod-to-rod gap was not entirely closed
but very close to being so. The two LUAs were on their fourth cycle with BUs 48.7 MWd/kgU.
The root cause of this event is not currently known. For the time being, all four GNF2 LUAs
have been removed from OL2 core as a precaution, [Michelsson, 2015].
Olkiluoto 2, Cy 37, 2017-2018 Failure cause uknown, 2 leaking assemblies. It is still uncertain how many rods have failed, most likely two rods.
Burnups 11.1 MWd/kgU and 25.8 MWd/kgU
Oskarshamn 1 Debris fretting failure SVEA-96S/ Low Corrosion (LK3)- no liner, old design of debris filter
Cy 29, 2005 at spacer 7 elevation.
31 MWd/kgU
Hydride bulges in span 1 and 2 – No significant fuel washout.
Oskarshamn 3 Debris fretting failure SVEA Optima 2/LK3L (liner), triplewave debris filter
Cy 21, 2005 at spacer 8 elevation. 21.9 MWd/kgU
Transversal break at 1100 mm (43”) elevation – Fuel washout noted.
Oskarshamn 3, SVEA-96 Optima design and SVEA-96 Two mid cycle outages to remove 7 failed rods, as follows:
Cy 22 Optima 2 1) S96 O.2, 22 MWd/kgU, prim. defect at 8 th spacer
Transversal break betw. spacer 2 and 3
2) S96 O., 37 MWd/kgU, prim. defect at 7 th spacer
No severe degradation
3) S96 O., 33 MWd/kgU, prim. defect at 7 th spacer
Circumferential and axial cracks betw. spacer 2 and 3
4) S96 O.2, 27 MWd/kgU, prim. defect at 5 th spacer
Axial crack, 100 mm long, betw. spacer 1 and 2
5) S96 O., 37 MWd/kgU, prim. defect at 8 th spacer
Transversal break at spacer 4
6) S96 O.2, 24 MWd/kgU, prim. defect at 6 th spacer
Axial crack, 40 mm long, betw. spacer 1 and 2
7) S96 O.2, 15 MWd/kgU, not inspected yet






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Table A-2: Summary of previous BWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary failure Comment
Oskarshamn 3, SVEA-96 Optima2 In Oskarshamn 3, there may be several cycles during a calendar year due to midcycle outages to
Cy 27-28 remove failed fuel. During Cy 27 a midcycle outage started 2008-02-14 to remove three failures
and to increase core reactivity by adding another 26 fresh fuel assemblies to be able to extend the
planned outage in 2008 with 2 months of operation.
Oskarshamn 3, SVEA-96 Optima2 Two assemblies failed believed to be due to debris fretting
Cy 35, 2011-2012
Oskarshamn 3, GE14 Two identified leakers. Not yet inspected. Probably abrasion damage from debris. Burnup: 18.4
Cy 41, 2015-2016 and 5.63 MWd/kgU
Oskarshamn 3, One leaker; Probably abrasion damage Optima3; Burnup: 6 MWd/kgU
Cy 42, 2015-2016 from debris.
Oskarshamn 3, Debris (preliminary) 3 leakers ,Two SVEA96 Optima3 and one GE14
Cy c42/c43, 2016-2017
Pilgrim, Cy 16 Full core GE14. Cy 16: 2 3rd cycle failures– possibly PCI related.
Loading GNF2 this Spring.
Perry Cy 9, The cell with the failure(s) contains 2 GE14/GE12 with P7 cladding and lower tie plate debris filters.
2002 GE14 first cycle bundles and 2 GE12 One Defect was detected and suppressed on February 23rd, 2002 and the second failure was
second cycle bundles. Suspect the defect suppressed July 4, 2002.
is in the lower right hand corner of the cell
(2 nd cycle GE12 bundle). Primary failure No degradation occurred.
cause is unknown.
Peach Bottom Unit 2 and 3 Units 2 and 3 operate with GNF GE-14 Recent Fuel Failure History
fuel
 Previous 3 Cycles on Unit 2, P3C15 (currently operating P3C17)
Unit 3 has 4 GNF-2 LUA assemblies in - All failures were either determined to be
their 2nd cycle of operation debris, or highly suspect for debris fret
Unit 2 has 2 reloads of Defender LTP, - Most recent exam was December 2008
and Unit 3 has 1 reload  Debris Fret
Channel Distortion – D-Lattice
 On January 21, 2009, during the Unit 3
soft shutdown for a maintenance outage,
2 control rods failed to settle into the "00"
position after being fully inserted
2 other control rods with no-settle conditions were also identified
Quad Cities 1, PCI related failures in ATRIUM9B (Fe-doped liner)
Cy 17, 2003 14 two (2) liner (barrier) As was the case in LaSalle 2 (see below), both failed assemblies were in Control Cell Core (CCC)
fuel rods. locations in their first cycle and the failures occurred after control rod pulls.
Fuel failure in rod C9 in bundle Q7D210 in cycle 17 that occurred in December 2001 following
return from down power, one day after a full control rod pull. Failure was the first cycle ATRIUM9
(liner) bundle. One day following a control rod deep shallow exchange in cycle 17A, failure
indications were noted in QC 1 cycle 17 A. Failure occurring in conjunction with control rod pull
indicates PCI failures.
Also rod E3 in FA Q7D189 failed.
Some limited cracking was observed (no degradation).
The two cells were suppressed with good results.
Quad Cities Unit 1 and 2 Unit 1 and Unit 2 are mixed cored with Channel distortion issue
GNF GE14 fuel and Westinghouse  24 Optima2 fuel assemblies were re-channeled during the Q1R20 refuel outage due to
SVEA-96 Optima2 fuel channel distortion concerns.
Lead plant in Exelon for OPTIMA2 fuel
River Bend, 7 rods failed due to CRUD related Water chemistry apparently within specification.
(Cy 11), 2003 15 , 16 corrosion. Cy 11 - No NMCA but HWC and Zn-injection, also high Cu coolant content was observed.
First cycle fuel with BU ranging from 14.6-19.0 MWd/kgU.
Siemens ATRIUM-10 Low-Temperature Process (LTP).
All failed rods were on periphery in FA on bladed surfaces (high power positions). Failures and
peak oxide thicknesses in span 2 (of peripheral rods) where max. CRUD deposition was noted.




See ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR for more details [Strasser et al., 2003].
14
See ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR for more details [Strasser et al., 2003].
15
16
See ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR [Strasser et al., 2003] and ZIRAT9/IZNA4 AR for more details [Adamson et al., 2004].






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Table A-2: Summary of previous BWR failures/issues (cont’d). New data in red font.

Nuclear unit Type of primary Comment
failure
River Bend, ATRIUM 10 (non-liner First failure (PCI) occurred 108 days into cycle, 2nd cycle bundle, Little/no secondary damage.
Cy-13 fuel with Fuel Guard) Second failure (debris or fabrication) occurred 320 days into cycle, 1st cycle bundle, Some fuel washout. Major damage below
the 2nd spacer.
Third failure (Debris or PCI) occurred 383 days into cycle, 2nd cycle bundle, 24” long secondary damage crack.
Vermont Yankee, Five rods failed due to No details if fuel washout occurred or not, see ZIRAT7/IZNA2 AR [Strasser et al., 2002], ZIRAT8/IZNA3 AR [Strasser et al.,
2001 CRUD induced 2003] and ZIRAT9/IZNA4 [Adamson et al., 2004], for more details.
corrosion.
Clinton, Limerick GNF GE14 Fuel 7 Cycles with Defects 2001 to Present
& Peach Bottom 7 total assemblies – Debris (zero defects @ Clinton)
Several BWRs Excessive fuel channel [Cantonwine et al., 2010] reported on the measured settle times at Monticello and Peach Bottom 3 and compared to the data
bowing collected at LaSalle 1. To quantify control rod interference, the amount of interference was calculated in two ways:
 A Channel Interference Metric (CIM) is defined as the total deflection of both channels toward the blade minus the
available gap and
 the Half-Gap Channel Interference Metric (HGCIM) is defined as the total deflection of an individual channel side
minus the available half gap.
[Cantonwine et al., 2010] concluded that the new data fits well into the previously developed correlation (reported in
ZIRAT14/IZNA9 AR [Adamson et al., 2009]), which showed that an interference (the sum of all 4 blade wings) of <0.5 mm (20
mils) correlated to normal or near normal settling times, 0.5 to 1.0 mm (20 to 40 mils) correlated to slow or no-settle conditions
and >1.0 mm would indicate a no-settle condition. The results of half gap interference (the sum of half gap interference of
each channel side that faces the blade) showed that >5 mm (200 mil) half gap interference is necessary before a slow or no-
settle condition occurs.
Cofrentes have experience of >7 mm measured bow in one channel without friction problems in the cell [Sedano & Mata,
2011]. However friction problems can be expected for bows >5 to 6 mm based on the experience in other reactors. If the
maximum fuel channel bow exceeds 4 mm there is a risk that the CR does not settle.
ANT International, 2018


A.3 High burnup fuel performance summary


A.3.1 High burnups achieved in utility power plants


The burnup levels achieved in power plants in 2018 are summarized in Table A-3 for PWRs/VVERs and Table
A-4 for BWRs based on publications during the past years and data provided by ZIRAT Members in response
to our questionnaire on this topic. While the data are not complete, they represent a fair picture of the trends in
the utilities of various countries that responded to the ANT International questionnaire or have published their
data.


Table A-3: Highest burnup achievements in PWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report. New data
in red font.

GWD/MT
Batch ave. Peak assembly Rod
USA (62 GWD/MT peak rod NRC limit)
ANO 1 & 2 (#1, AREVA MKB, HTP, #2 W/CE) 47.7 55.8
Braidwood 2 (Byron similar) 51.3 (55.2subb) 55.2 57.6
Byron 1 53.4 (54.0subb) 54.6 56.9
Callaway, 54.6 Zry-4
Vantage-5 (OFA) ZIRLO 48.9 ZIRLO 52.9 ZIRLO
Calvert Cliffs 2, M5 clad, Zry-4 GT) 5.0 62.5 70.0
Catawba, McGuire, all ZIRLO 57
Comanche Peak 1 & 2, OFA/WABA/IFBA, ZIRLO 54 peak, 48 ave.
Diablo Canyon 1 & 2, Vantage-5 (OFA) ZIRLO 54.0 56.0 62.0
Indian Point 2 & 3 53.0 60.0 62.0





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Table A-3: Highest burnup achievements in PWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report. (cont’d)
New data in red font.


GWD/MT
Batch ave. Peak assembly Rod
USA (62 GWD/MT peak rod NRC limit)
Millstone 3
3LTAs 48-52
1LTA >70
North Anna
3LTAs, M5 clad 52.0
1LTA, M5 clad 67.6
1LTA, ZIRLO clad 72
Oconee, M5 clad, GTs 51.0 68.0 72
Palisades AREVA CE-HTP 50.0 52.0
Prairie Island 1 & 2, V+ Optimized ZIRLO 55.45 55.45 60.12
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, CE16 fuel with ZIRLO cladding 50.3 50.6 54.6
Sequoyah 1 & 2 (M5) 48.5 - 52.3 50.9 - 54.1 53.5 - 59.2
TMI 1 54.3 55.7 60
Waterford W-CE 51.0 53.0
Watts Bar (ZIRLO) 49.4 55.1 60.1
Wolf Creek, RFA2, ZIRLO 50.0 55.0 60
Other US PWRs Mk-BW, M5 clad 50.0 67.6 72
W, RFA-2, ZIRLO clad 49.6 51.2
Alliance LUA 48.9
Belgium
Doel 1, 2, 3, 4 52.5
Tihange 1 50.7
Tihange 2 47.5
Tihange 3 54.4
Czech Republic
Dukovanyl-1, VVER440, Gd-1 / E110 50.4 52.8 56.1
Dukovanyl-2, VVER440, Gd-1 / E110 51.9 53.2 58.0
Dukovanyl-3, VVER440, Gd-2+ / E110 50.6 51.4 56.1
Dukovanyl-4, VVER440, Gd-1 / E110 51.5 54.0 57.3
Temelin 1, VVER1000, TVSA-T / E110M 49.7 51.6 57.7
Temelin 2, VVER1000, TVSA-T / E110M 45.9 51.8 54.8
Finland
Lovisa 1, VVER 440 43.3 (Zry-4) 48.3 (Zry-4)
Lovisa 2, VVER 440 46.5 (E110) 51.9 (E110)
LTA
E110 40.0 45.9 56.2
Zry-4 55.3 62.2
France (52 GWD/MT peak assy. regulatory limit)
EdF plants, M5 47.0 51 UO2
42 MOX





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Table A-3: Highest burnup achievements in PWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report (cont’d).
New data in red font.


GWD/MT
Batch ave. Peak assembly Rod
France (52 GWD/MT peak assy. regulatory limit)
LTAs in France and other countries with M5 clad 68 UO2 80 UO2
60 MOX
Germany*
Biblis A & B 35 - 38 (56 planned) 41 - 47 48 - 50
Emsland 52 (62 planned) 62.0 68
Grohnde, M5, AREVA HTP 55
Isar 1 54 ~60
Isar 2, AREVA M5; polygonale GT 54 56 64
50 MWd/kgU; steel GT – Assembly burnup reached – 44 MWd/kg
Brokdorf, AREVA HTP steel guiding tube & WSE 16x16: Uran and Uran-Gd FA 48 54.1 58
LUAs with polygonal GT 38
LUAs with steel GT 31
Grafenrheinfeld HTP, mainly AREVA HTP design with M5 cladding 53 61.3 67.3
UO2 53.0 61.8 65.2
MOX 54.3 63.6
Phillipsburg, 2,
HTP M5, SS Guide Tubes 30.2
HTP, M5, PCAm- Guide Tubes, MOX 58.9 59.4
HTP M5, PCAm Guide Tubes, UO2 54.8
AFA-3G, M5, Zry-4 Guide Tubes, UO2 48.3
Focus, Duplex, Zry-4 Guide Tubes, UO2 52.2
Unterweser, M5 clad, HTP spacer 56.1 62.2 67
GKN2, AREVA, HTP, M5 54.8 59.1
Fragema, FGA, M5 53.2 53.5
FANP, HTP, Duplex D4 54.8 55.8
Japan
Takahama 1, Step 1 fuel <43 48.0 62 (limit)
Step 2 LTA: ZIRLO MDA, NDA clad 55.0
4 LTAs (Ohi4) NDA clad 52.0 60
LT rods (McGuire+R2), NDA clad 84, 91 (pellet)
Ohi 4 <50 55.0 71 (limit)
Mihama 3 <49 55.0 71 (limit)
(Vandellos), MDA and ZIRLO clad >55 75
Step 3, Future planning >60
Genkai 1 & 2, MDA, ZIRLO 52.9 54.2
Genkai 3 & 4, Zry-4 46.7 47.0
Sendai 1 & 2, MDA, ZIRLO 48.7 51.6
Netherlands
Borssele, AREVA HTP & FOCUS 53.5 56.5 64.7
HTP-M5 53.5





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Table A-3: Highest burnup achievements in PWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report (cont’d).
New data in red font.


GWD/MT
Batch ave. Peak assembly Rod
Netherlands
HTP-M5: UO2(113);MOX(8) 55.0
HTP-M5 UO2(101)/MOX(20) 55.0
Russia
VVER-440s 45.3 56.0 58 - 60
(45 - 49 ave.) 66 - 68 pellet
VVER-1000s 55.5 (40 - 49 ave.)
Kalininskaya 1 LTA 62.0 71
Spain
Almaraz 1 46.2 52.4 56.0
Almaraz 2 46.8 54.8 58.7
Trillo 50.2 57.4 61.7
Slovenia
Krsko, 16x16 VANTAGE+ (65) 42.3 52.9 58.3
16x16 modified VANTAGE+ (56)
Sweden
Ringhals 2, AFA-3G, M5 49.1 52.6 57.5
LTA Fragema AFA-3G 62.0 68.0
Ringhals 3, Fragema AFA-3G, M5 40.5 54 - 57
LTA, Siemens HTP 54.0 57.2
Ringhals 4, Fragema AGORA 5A, M5 54.2 55.0 59.0
LTA, Fragema AFA-2G 50.3
Switzerland
Gösgen, AREVA 15X15-20, Duplex (DX) 68 68 73
LTA, DX HPA4 71.5 74.0
LTA, DX Zr2.5Nb 106.0
Beznau1, AREVA, FOCUS, DX D4 59.6 <60.0 <65.0
Beznau2, AREVA, FOCUS, DX D4 59.2 <60.0 <65.0
UK
Sizewell 44.3 46.5 50.0
Ukraine
Eleven VVER-1000 49-50
(42-43 ave.)
* Some plants have steel guide tubes to remedy fuel assembly bowing.
ANT International, 2018


















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Table A-4: Highest burnup achievements in BWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report. New data
in red font.

GWD/MT

Batch ave. Peak assembly Rod
USA
Browns Ferry 1
GE14 28.2 31.8 39.1
Browns Ferry 2
AREVA A10 41.7 46.2 51.3
GE14 48.6 48.9 55.1
Browns Ferry 3, AREVA A10 47.0 51.8 59.1
AREVA 10 44.0 46.2 51.5
GE14 45.5 49.3 55.5
Cooper, GE14 52.0 54.0
Fitzpatrick, GNF2/GE14 50 51
Grand Gulf, GNF2 49.4 53.6 58.6
73 (pellet)
Monticello, GE14, P9 44.5 49.0 57.68

Pilgrim GNF2 46.0 56 (pellet)
River Bend, GNF2/GE14 47 52 57
68 (pellet)
Vermont Yankee GNF2/GE14 45.0 47
Other US BWRs, GE14 47.5 52.1 GE-11
ATRIUM-10 43.1 53.0 GE-13
Finland
OL1, GE14, P8 45 49.8 59
ATRIUM 10XM 48.5 49.9 69.1
ATRIUM11/LTP2 50.9
OL2, SVEA 96 Optima2, LK3 47.6 49.5 64.5
SVEA-96 Optima3 / LK3 48.9
GNF2/P9, LUA 53.7
Germany
KK Gundremmingen, UO2 49.0 67-75 73-82
KK Gundremmingen, MOX nearly 50 ave. 58 ave. 68 pellet
KK Isar 1 54 60 60, LK3
Philipsburg 1
Atrium 10B 53.0 57.6
Atrium 10XP 47.7
SVEA 96 Optima 2 59.3 61.0
Others 49-52 51-54 58-61
Japan
Fukushima Daini #1
LTA 9x9 Step III, Zry-2 liner clad 55.0
LTA 9x9 Step III, HiFi clad 53.0 72 equiv. HiFi
coupons







A-14(A-29)

A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Table A-4: Highest burnup achievements in BWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report (cont’d).
New data in red font.

GWD/MT

Batch Ave. Peak Assembly Peak Rod
Spain
Cofrentes, SVEA 96, OP2 45.7 47.2 64.0
GE14 43.0 46.4 63.1
ATRIUM 43.9 45.6 62.0
GNF2 20.6 23.6 36.0
Sweden
Ringhals 1, Atrium 10B 50.0
Forsmark 1, GE-12 41.0 44.7
Atrium 10B 42.9 41.7
Forsmark 2, SVEA 96S 41.8 45.3
2 LTAs, SVEA 96S 39.7
2 LTAs, GE-14 41.3
6 LTAs, Optima 2 40.7
Forsmark 3, SVEA 100 42.4 43.8
2 LTAs, SVEA 100 41.3
4 LTAs, GE-14 38.9
8 LTAs, ATRIUM 10B 39.1
Oskarshamn 1, SVEA-96 Optima2 44 46 64
ZIRLO fuel channels 46
GE14 45 46 63
Oskarshamn 2
SVEA-96 Optima2 45
ZIRLO fuel channels 43
Oskarshamn 3
GE14 47.5
Japan
Fukushima Daini #1
LTA 9x9 Step III, Zry-2 liner clad 55.0
LTA 9x9 Step III, HiFi clad 53.0 72 equiv. HiFi
coupons
Spain
Cofrentes, SVEA 96, OP2 45.7 47.2 64.0
GE14 43.0 46.4 63.1
ATRIUM 43.9 45.6 62.0
GNF2 20.6 23.6 36.0
Sweden
SVEA-96 Optima2 45 47 64
SVEA-96, Optima3 46 48 66
ATRIUM 10XM 44
ZIRLO fuel channels 48
Switzerland
Mühleberg, Zry-2, GNF cladding - P7 53.6 54.6 69.1(GE14)/63.6(GNF2)
KKL, 2 LTAs,SVEA96, LK3 clad 51.5 54.8 62.9





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A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Table A-4: Highest burnup achievements in BWRs. Data in black are from previous ZIRAT Annual Report (cont’d).
New data in red font.

GWD/MT

Batch Ave. Peak Assembly Peak Rod
Switzerland
ATRIUM 11 45
KKM, GNF2/P8 61.8 61.8 78.6
4 bundles LTA, GNF2, P8 61.8
4 bundles GNF2 with Defender debris filter 36.7
ANT International, 2018


A.3.2 Utility issues and information

TVO’s current concern related to fuel is the relatively high frequency of failed fuel of late. Previous cycle TVO
had leakers in both OL1 and OL2 and currently TVO has an indication of leaking fuel in OL1 [Metsälä, 2018].

A.3.3 Utility Reported Information


A.3.3.1 PWRs/VVERs


A.3.3.1.1 Beznau (PWR)

Table A-5: Data of the last completed cycle [Hellwig, 2018].


Beznau 1 Beznau 2
Start of last cycle 2014-04-14 2017-09-28
Cycle No 43 43

End of last cycle 2015-03-13 2018-06-26
Batch design burnup for reload batch 58.00 58.00
Fuel Type FOCUS DXD4 FOCUS DXD4
Enrichment 4.55% equiv. 4.55% equiv.
BA-design no no
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load
Cycle length, EFPD 316 269
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? no no
Maximum applied LiOH 5 ppm, accord. to spec. 5 ppm, accord. to spec.
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) ca. 1170 ca. 1170
pH during Cycle 7.2 7.2
What is the highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel 59.6 batch 59.2 batch
design type? What cladding type?
<60 FA aver <60 FA aver
<65 rod aver. <65 rod aver.
BE-type FOCUS BE-type FOCUS
cladding DXD4 cladding DXD4
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) was irradiated and what is the maximum assembly burnup obtained none 4 LUAs (AGORA 4H, i.e.
[MWd/kgU] HTP), (3rd Irradiation Cycle)
Have you examined any fuel with >60 GWD/MT burnup in the last year? no no
Number of primary failed rods and fuel type 0 0





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Table A-5: Data of the last completed cycle [Hellwig, 2018] (cont’d).

Beznau 1 Beznau 2
Elevation of primary failures and failure cause, fuel desing, cladding type, burnup n.a. n.a.
Degradation of failed fuel, type of degradation and elevation, fuel washout, fuel type? Have hot cell examinations n.a. n.a.
been performed or are such examinations planned?
Cycle burnup increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core average fuel assembly burnup during cycle n.a. n.a.
ANT International, 2018

Table A-6: Data of current cycle [Hellwig, 2018].

Beznau 1 Beznau 2
Start of current cycle 2018-03-20 2018-07-10
Cycle 44 44
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted 58.00 58.00
Fuel Type FOCUS DXD4 FOCUS DXD4
Enrichment 4.55% equiv. 4.55% equiv.
BA-design no no
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load
Cycle length, EFPD to be determined to be determined


Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? no no
Maximum applied LiOH 5 ppm, accord. to spec. 5 ppm, accord. to spec.

Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) ca. 1170 ca. 1170
pH during Cycle 7.2 7.2
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak assembly? peak rod? and 59.6 batch 59.2 batch
for what fuel design type? What cladding type?
<60 FA aver <60 FA aver
<65 rod aver. <65 rod aver.
BE-type FOCUS BE-type FOCUS
cladding DXD4 cladding DXD4
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the maximum assembly burnup planned at none 4 LUAs (AGORA 4H, i.e.
EOC [MWd/kgU] HTP), (4th Irradiation Cycle)
What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle no no
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what? 0 0
Fuel washout? no no
Any special events no no
ANT International, 2018

A.3.3.1.2 CEZ (VVER)

Table A-7: Data of the last completed cycle [Miloslav, 2018].


Dukovany 1 Dukovany 2 Dukovany 2 Dukovany 3 Dukovany 3 Dukovany 4 Dukovany 4
Start of last cycle 2016-02-11 2015-04-29 2017-03-14 2015-03-18 2016-09-24 2014-12-29 2016-05-07
Cycle No 31 30 31 29 30 28 29
End of last cycle 2017-01-21 2016-09-17 2018-03-10 2016-04-23 2017-07-15 2016-02-06 2017-05-13
Batch design burnup 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU
for reload batch
(planned burnup for
inserted batch)





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Table A-7: Data of the last completed cycle [Miloslav, 2018] (cont’d).

Dukovany 1 Dukovany 2 Dukovany 2 Dukovany 3 Dukovany 3 Dukovany 4 Dukovany 4
Fuel Type (fresh fuel Gd-2M+ Gd-2M Gd-2M+ Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M
loaded into given cycle)
(TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL)
Fresh fuel loaded into 48 + 12 fresh FA, 72 + 6 fresh 66 + 12 fresh FA, 60 + 12 fresh FA, 48 + 6 fresh FA, 78 + 6 fresh 72 + 12 fresh
given cycle, Enrichment FA, FA, FA,
4.38% working 4.38% working 4.38% working FA, 4.38% working 4.38% working 4.38% working 4.38%
FA, FA, FA, FA, FA, working FA,
4.38% regulation 4.25% 4.38% regulation FA 4.25% regulation 4.25% regulation 4.25% 4.25%
FA regulation FA FA FA regulation FA regulation FA
BA-design GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3
Operating mode: base base load base load base load base load base load base load base load
load or load following
Cycle length, EFPD 339 (1444 MW) 353 (1444 342 (1444 MW) 298 (1444 MW) 290 (1444 MW) 391 (1444 361 (1444
MW) MW) MW)
Were Zn-injection Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No,
(concentration used?),
HWC, NMCA applied? HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No,
NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No
Maximum applied KOH 19mg/l 19mg/l 19mg/l 17.9mg/l 16.2mg/l 17.2mg/l 18mg/l
Maximum applied Boric 14 g/kg 13.7 g/kg 14.0 g/kg 13.0 g/kg 13.9 g/kg 13.6 g/kg 13 g/kg
Acid (ppm) (outage) (outage) (outage) (outage) (outage) (outage) (outage)
pH during Cycle 7.3±0.1 7.5±0.1 7.3±0.1 7.3±0.1 7.4±0.1 7.4±0.1 7.1±0.1
What is the highest 50.1 51.9 50.9 49.5 49.8 51.5 51.0
burnup you have
achieved for a batch 52.8 53.2 52.7 51.4 51.3 54.0 53.7
average? peak
assembly? peak rod? 56.1 GWd/tU 55.8 GWd/tU 56.0 GWd/tU 54.7 GWd/tU 53.8 GWd/tU 57.3 GWd/tU 57.0 GWd/tU
and for what fuel design
type? What cladding Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2+ Gd-2M
type?
E110 E110 E110 E110 E110 E110 E110
What type of LUAs (Lead No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs
assemblies) was
irradiated and what is the
maximum assembly
burnup obtained
[ MWd/kgU]
Have you examined any
fuel with >60 GWD/MT No No No No No No No
burnup in the last year?
Number of primary failed
rods and fuel type 0 FA, 0 FR 0 FA, 0 FR 0 FA, 0 FR 0 FA, 0 FR 0 FA, 0 FR 0 FA, 0 FR 0 FA, 0 FR
Elevation of primary
failures and failure cause, N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
fuel desing, cladding
type, burnup
Degradation of failed fuel,
type of degradation and N/A, no hot N/A, no hot N/A, no hot
elevation, fuel washout, N/A, no hot cell cell N/A, no hot cell N/A, no hot cell N/A, no hot cell cell cell
fuel type? Have hot cell examination examination planned examination examination
examinations been planned examination planned planned examination examination
planned
planned
planned
performed or are such
examinations planned?
Cycle burnup increase of
the failed fuel assembly
related to the core N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
average fuel assembly
burnup during cycle
© ANT International, 2018










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A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Table A-8: Data of current cycle [Miloslav, 2018].

Dukovany 1 Dukovany 2 Dukovany 3 Dukovany 4

Start of current cycle 2017-05-22 in outage 2017-10-23 2017-09-06
Cycle 32 32 31 30
Batch design burnup for reload batch (planned burnup for inserted batch) 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU
Gd-2M+ Gd-2M+ Gd-2M+ Gd-2M
Fuel Type (fresh fuel loaded into given cycle) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL)
72 + 6 fresh FA, 72 + 6 fresh FA, 78 + 6 fresh FA, 66 + 6 fresh FA,
Fresh fuel loaded into given cycle, Enrichment 4.38% working FA, 4.38% working FA, 4.38% working FA, 4.38% working FA,
4.38% regulation FA 4.38% regulation FA 4.38% regulation FA 4.25% regulation FA
BA-design GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load base load base load
Cycle length, EFPD 353 (1444 MW) 351 (1444 MW) 375 (1444 MW) 348 (1444 MW)
Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No,
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No,
NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No
Maximum applied KOH 18mg/l 18mg/l 18mg/l 18mg/l
13 g/kg 13 g/kg 13 g/kg 13 g/kg
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm)
(outage) (outage) (outage) (outage)
pH during Cycle 7.1±0.1 7.1±0.1 7.1±0.1 7.1±0.1
50.5 49.9 49.8 50.9
52.9 53.3 51.6 53.7
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch
average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What 56.1 GWd/tU 55.8 GWd/tU 54.6 GWd/tU 57.4 GWd/tU
cladding type?
Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M Gd-2M
E110 E110 E110 E110
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs
maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC [MWd/kgU]
© ANT International, 2018


Table A-9: Data of the last completed cycle [Miloslav, 2018].

Temelin 1 Temelin 1 Temelin 2 Temelin 2
Start of last cycle 2015-08-27 2016-12-25 2015-07-28 2016-10-15
Cycle No 14 15 13 14
End of last cycle 2016-08-26 2017-12-08 2016-06-03 2017-05-19
Batch design burnup for reload batch (planned 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU
burnup for inserted batch)
TVSA-T TVSA-T TVSA-T TVSA-T
Fuel Type (fresh fuel loaded into given cycle)
(TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL) (TVEL)
43 fresh FA, 48 fresh FA, 42 fresh FA, 36 fresh FA,
Fresh fuel loaded into given cycle, Enrichment Ø 43 FA enr. = 4.30% Ø 48 FA enr. = 4.30% Ø 42 FA enr. = 4.14% Ø 36 FA enr. = 3.52%
(1x3.64%, 6x4.00%, (12x3.85%, 12x4.40%, (30x4.25%, 12x3.86%) (6x1.86%, 30x3.85%)
18x4.28%, 18x4.46%) 24x4.46%)
BA-design GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3 GD2O3
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load base load base load
Cycle length, EFPD 347 (3120 MW) 347 (3120 MW) 289 (3120 MW) 214 (3120 MW)
Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No, Zn - No,
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No, HWC - No,
NMCA applied?
NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No NMCA - No





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A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Table A-9: Data of the last completed cycle [Miloslav, 2018] (cont’d).

Temelin 1 Temelin 1 Temelin 2 Temelin 2
Maximum applied KOH all alkali = 0.4676 mmol/l all alkali = 0.5077 mmol/l all alkali = 0.6412 mmol/l all alkali = 0.5635 mmol/l

16.13 g/kg 16.60 g/kg 16.33 g/kg 18.18 g/kg
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm)
(outage) (outage) (outage) (outage)
pH during Cycle 7.2±0.1 7.15±0.1 7.15±0.1 7.1±0.1
44.6 49.7 43.7 45.9
50.8 51.6 47.5 51.8
What is the highest burnup you have
achieved for a batch average? peak 54.0 GWd/tU 57.7 GWd/tU 53.5 GWd/tU 54.8 GWd/tU
assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel
design type? What cladding type?
TVSA-T TVSAT TVSA-T TVSA-T
E110M E110M E110M E110M
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) was
irradiated and what is the maximum assembly No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs No LUAs
burnup obtained
[ MWd/kgU]
Have you examined any fuel with >60 No No No No
GWD/MT burnup in the last year?
Number of primary failed rods and fuel type 2 FA, # of FR not known 3 FA, # of FR not known 4 FA, # of FR not known 3 FA, # of FR not known
Elevation of primary failure not
Elevation of primary failure not Elevation of primary failure
Elevation of primary known, known, not known,
failure not known, failure cause not known, failure cause not known, failure cause not known,
Elevation of primary failures and failure failure cause not known, TVSA-T TVSA-T, TVSA-T
E110M,
TVSA-T
cause, fuel desing, cladding type, burnup E110M, E110M,
E110M, CR23 = 45.2 GWd/MtU, DL12 = 40.7 GWd/MtU, DS28 = 27.4 GWd/MtU,
CP07 = 45.9 GWd/MtU, CU01 = 33.2 GWd/MtU, DN02 = 44.2 GWd/MtU, DP01 = 39.6 GWd/MtU,
CP10 = 45.9 GWd/MtU DN04 = 41.6 GWd/MtU,
CU17 = 36.3 GWd/MtU DN01 = 47.8 GWd/MtU
DJ11 = 51.7 GWd/MtU
no severe
no severe degradation, no severe degradation, degradation,secondary no severe degradation,
type of degradation type of degradation
Degradation of failed fuel, type of degradation and elevation not known, type of degradation hydriding spotted at the top and elevation not known,
and elevation, fuel washout, fuel type? Have no fuel washout, and elevation not known, end of fuel column of no fuel washout,
hot cell examinations been performed or are fuel type TVSA-T no fuel washout, peripheral rod of DN04, fuel type TVSA-T
such examinations planned? fuel type TVSA-T no fuel washout,
further steps under further steps under evaluation fuel type TVSA-T further steps under
evaluation evaluation
further steps under evaluation
DL12 = 1.08
Cycle burnup increase of the failed fuel CR23 = 0.98 DS28 = 1.30
assembly related to the core average fuel CP07 = 1.06 CU01 = 1.26 DN02 = 1.09 DP01 = 1.22
CP10 = 1.05
DN04 = 1.12
assembly burnup during cycle CU17 = 1.27 DJ11 = 0.87 DN01 = 0.35
© ANT International, 2018

Table A-10: Data of current cycle [Miloslav, 2018].
Temelin 1 Temelin 2
Start of current cycle 2018-02-28 2017-07-28
Cycle 16 15

Batch design burnup for reload batch (planned burnup for inserted batch) 50 GWd/tU 50 GWd/tU

TVSA-T TVSA-T
Fuel Type (fresh fuel loaded into given cycle)
(TVEL) (TVEL)
54 fresh FA, 43 fresh FA,
Fresh fuel loaded into given cycle, Enrichment Ø 54 FA enr. = 4.05% Ø 43 FA enr. = 3.84%
(12x3.30%, 18x4.21%, (1x1.3%, 12x3.30%,
18x4.26%, 6x4.46%) 6x3.85%, 24x4.21%)
BA-design GD2O3 GD2O3





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A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Table A-10: Data of current cycle [Miloslav, 2018] (cont’d).

Temelin 1 Temelin 2
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load
Cycle length, EFPD 360 (3120MW) 307 (3120MW)
Zn - No, Zn - No,
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? HWC - No, HWC - No,
NMCA - No NMCA - No
Maximum applied KOH all alkali = 0.5852 mmol/l all alkali = 0.4928 mmol/l
16.27 g/kg 16.74 g/kg
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm)
(outage) (outage)
pH during Cycle 7.15±0.05 7.15±0.1
46.0 46.0
50.0 50.0
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? 54.0 GWd/tU 54.0 GWd/tU
peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What cladding type?
TVSA-T TVSA-T
E110M E110M
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the No LUAs No LUAs
maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC [MWd/kgU]
© ANT International, 2018


A.3.3.1.3 Gösgen – Däniken (PWR)


Table A-11: Data of the last completed cycle [Meyer, 2018].

Gösgen Gösgen
Start of last cycle 2016-06-26 2017-06-29
Cycle No 38 39
End of last cycle 2017-06-03 2018-06-03

Batch design burnup for reload batch 64 MWd/Kgu 64 MWd/Kgu
Fuel Type AREVA 15x15-20 AREVA 15x15-20
Enrichment 4.95% 4.95%
BA-design ------- -------
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load

Cycle length, EFPD 341 337
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? Zn: 5 pbb Zn: 5 pbb
Maximum applied LiOH max. 2.1 ppm max. 2.1 ppm
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) 1000 ppm at startup 1000 ppm at startup
pH during Cycle 7 ÷ 7.2 at 300 °Cel. 7 ÷ 7.2 at 300 °Cel.
batch average: 65.5 MWd/KgU batch average: 65.0 MWd/KgU
peak FA: 67 MWd/KgU peak FA: 65.2 MWd/KgU
What is the highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak peak rod: 73 MWd/KgU peak rod: 72 MWd/KgU
assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What cladding type?
AREVA 15x15-20 AREVA 15x15-20
Duplex Duplex
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) was irradiated and what is the maximum
assembly burnup obtained [MWd/kgU] - -
Have you examined any fuel with >60 GWD/MT burnup in the last year? Yes Yes





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Table A-11: Data of the last completed cycle [Meyer, 2018] (cont’d).

Gösgen Gösgen
Number of primary failed rods and fuel type None None
Elevation of primary failures and failure cause, fuel desing, cladding type, burnup None None
Degradation of failed fuel, type of degradation and elevation, fuel washout, fuel
type? Have hot cell examinations been performed or are such examinations None None
planned?
Cycle burnup increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core average fuel ------- -------
assembly burnup during cycle
Number of fuel failures, based upon what?
Fuel washout? None None
Any special events - -
© ANT International, 2018

Table A-12: Data of current cycle [Meyer, 2018].

Gösgen

Start of current cycle 2018-06-23
Cycle 40
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted 64 MWd/Kgu
Fuel Type AREVA 15x15-20
Enrichment 4.95%
BA-design -------
Operating mode: base load or load following base load
Cycle length, EFPD 341
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? Zn: 5 pbb
Maximum applied LiOH max. 2.1 ppm
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) 1000 ppm at startup
pH during Cycle 7 ÷ 7.2 at 300 °Cel.
batch average: 64 MWd/KgU
peak FA: 68.2 MWd/KgU
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch
average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What peak rod: 73.8 MWd/KgU
cladding type?
AREVA 15x15-20
Duplex
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the -
maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC [MWd/kgU]
What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle Measurements of: oxide thickness, FA-dimensions (length, bowing) and visual inspections
© ANT International, 2018

A.3.3.1.4 NEK (PWR)

Table A-13: Data of the last completed cycle [Bojan, 2018].


Krsko

Start of last cycle 2016-11-03
Cycle No 29
End of last cycle 2018-04-01
Region (NEK & Westinghouse NCD29) equals Batch
(Nominal Window cy29: 505 EFPD ; 20517 MWD/MTU)
Batch design burnup for reload batch
fresh fuel: 26609 MWD/MTU (16) and
24318 MWD/MTU (40)




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A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Table A-13: Data of the last completed cycle [Bojan, 2018] (cont’d).

Krsko

16x16 VANTAGE+ (65)
Fuel Type
16x16 modified VANTAGE+ (56)
4.4 (1) ; 4.8 (8) ; 4.4 (20); 4.8 (36)
Enrichment
fresh fuel: 4.45 (16); 4.85 (40)
BA-design IFBA ZrB2
Operating mode: base load or load following BASE LOAD
Cycle length, EFPD 505
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? NO
Maximum applied LiOH 3.5 ppm

Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) 2486 ppm (nominal Boron) ; HZP no Xe
1740 ppm (depleted Boron) ; HFP eq. Xe
pH during Cycle pH(Tavg): 6.9 - 7.2
(Nominal Window cy29: 505 EFPD ; 20517 MWD/MTU)
• 53307 MWD/MTU (Region 26A: 1FA)
What is the highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak • 53307 MWD/MTU : AC03 (FA)
assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What cladding type? • 58756 MWD/MTU : AC03 (rod)
• 16 VANTAGE+
• ZIRLO
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) was irradiated and what is the No LUA or LTA were used
maximum assembly burnup obtained [ MWd/kgU]
Have you examined any fuel with >60 GWD/MT burnup in the last year? NO
Number of primary failed rods and fuel type 0
Elevation of primary failures and failure cause, fuel desing, cladding type, N/A
burnup
Degradation of failed fuel, type of degradation and elevation, fuel
washout, fuel type? Have hot cell examinations been performed or are N/A
such examinations planned?
Cycle burnup increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core N/A
average fuel assembly burnup during cycle
© ANT International, 2018

Table A-14: Data of current cycle [Bojan, 2018].

Krsko
Start of current cycle 2018-05-01
Cycle 30
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted Region (NEK & Westinghouse NCD30) equals Batch
(Nominal Window cy30: 505 EFPD ; 20517 MWD/MTU)
fresh fuel: 26445 MWD/MTU (20) and
24241 MWD/MTU (36)
Fuel Type 16x16 VANTAGE+ (12)
16x16 modified VANTAGE+ (109)
Enrichment 4.8 (4) ; 4.8 (8) ; 4.45 (16); 4.85 (37)
fresh fuel: 4.4 (20); 4.95 (36)
BA-design IFBA ZrB2
Operating mode: base load or load following BASE LOAD
Cycle length, EFPD 505
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? NO
Maximum applied LiOH 3.5 ppm
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) 2496 ppm (nominal Boron) ; HZP no Xe
1735 ppm (depleted Boron) ; HFP eq. Xe
pH during Cycle pH(Tavg): 6.9 - 7.2







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Table A-14: Data of current cycle [Bojan, 2018] (cont’d).

Krsko
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch (Nominal Window cy30: 505 EFPD ; 20533 MWD/MTU)
average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What • 52933 MWD/MTU (Region 29B: 4FA)
cladding type? • 52952 MWD/MTU : AG21 (FA)
• 57665 MWD/MTU : AH39 (rod)
• 16 VANTAGE+
• ZIRLO
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the No LUA or LTA were used
maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC [MWd/kgU]
What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle IN MAST SIPPING
Visual UWTV Inspection
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what? No failures based on current radiochemical evaluation of the reactor coolant system specific
isotopic activity.
Fuel washout? NO
Any special events NO
© ANT International, 2018

A.3.3.1.5 Xcel Energy (PWR)


Table A-15: Data of the last completed cycle [Martin, 2018].

Prairie Island 1 Prairie Island 2
Start of current cycle 2014-11-10 2015-11-20
Cycle 29 29
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted enrichment gad exposure enrichment gad exposure
4.95 04 25,700 4.95 04 26,390
4.95 12 27,140 4.95 12 27,400
4.95 16 29,870 4.95 16 30,300
4.95 20 30,510 4.95 20 31,100
Fuel Type 422 Vantage + 422 Vantage +
Enrichment 4.95 4.95
BA-design Gadolinia Gadolinia
Operating mode: base load or load following Base Load Base Load
Cycle length, EFPD 654 671
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? N/A N/A
Maximum applied LiOH 5000 ppb 5000 ppb
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) 1379 ppm 1446
pH during Cycle 6.9 - 7.35 6.9 - 7.3
Batch Average 55.45 GWd/MTU Batch Average 55.45 GWd/MTU
Peak Assembly 55.45 GWd/MTU Peak Assembly 55.45 GWd/MTU
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch
average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What Peak Pin 60.120GWd/MTU Peak Pin 59.584 GWd/MTU
cladding type?
Fuel Type 422 V+ Fuel Type 422 V+
Cladding Type Optimized Zirlo Cladding Type Optimized Zirlo
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the N/A N/A
maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC [MWd/kgU]
What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle Healthy Fuel Inspection Healthy Fuel Inspection
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what? N/A N/A
Fuel washout? No No
Any special events None None
© ANT International, 2018






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Table A-16: Data of the current cycle [Martin, 2018].

Prairie Island 1 Prairie Island 2
Start of current cycle 2016-11-18 2017-11-20
Cycle 30 30
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be enrichment gad exposure enrichment gad* exposure
inserted
4.95 04 25,590 4.80 12@2;12@8 30,970
4.95 12 26,060 4.95 4@8 26,230
4.95 16 29,580 4.95 12@2; 4@8 27,500
4.95 20 29,970 4.95 12@2;12@8 30,610
Fuel Type 422 Vantage + 422 Vantage +
Enrichment 4.95 4.80; 4.95
BA-design Gadolinia (8 w/o) Gadolinia (2 and 8 w/o)
Operating mode: base load or load Base Load Base Load
following
Cycle length, EFPD 650 670
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?),
HWC, NMCA applied? No No
Maximum applied LiOH 5000 ppb 5000 ppb
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) 1422 1422
pH during Cycle 6.9 - 7.3 6.9 - 7.3
Batch Average 57.35 GWd/MTU Batch Average 52.98 GWd/MTU
What is the planned EOC highest burnup Peak Assembly 57.35 GWd/MTU Peak Assembly 52.98 GWd/MTU
you have achieved for a batch average? Peak Pin 60.40 GWd/MTU Peak Pin 57.67 GWd/MTU
peak assembly? peak rod? and for what
fuel design type? What cladding type? Fuel Type 422 V+ Fuel Type 422 V+
Cladding Type Optimized Zirlo Cladding Type Optimized Zirlo
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is
being irradiated and what is the maximum
assembly burnup planned at EOC N/A N/A
[MWd/kgU]
What type of inspections/examinations are Healthy Fuel Inspection Healthy Fuel Inspection
planned after this cycle
Number of estimated fuel failures, based
upon what? 0 0
Fuel washout? No No
Any special events None None
*X@Y where X is number of pins and Y is gad weight percent
© ANT International, 2018


A.3.3.2 BWRs


A.3.3.2.1 OKG

Table A-17: Data of the last completed cycle [Jarméus, 2018].


O 1 O 3
Start of last cycle 2016-05-11 2016-06-23
Cycle No c42 c42/c43
End of last cycle 2017-06-17 2017-08-18
Batch design burnup for reload batch 45 47.5
Fuel Type GE14 SVEA96 Optima3




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Table A-17: Data of the last completed cycle [Jarméus, 2018] (cont’d).

O 1 O 3

Enrichment 3.35 3.85
BA-design 8×3.0 % 12*5.5%
Operating mode: base load or load following Base Base load
Cycle length, EFPD 373 510
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? None None
Maximum applied LiOH BWR BWR
pH during Cycle BWR BWR
What is the highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak assembly? Batch 45; Assembly 46; Rod 63; all Bach 46 SVEA96 Optima3; Assembly 48
peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What cladding type? SVEA-96 Optima GE14; Rod 66 SVEA96 Optima3
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) was irradiated and what is the maximum None None
assembly burnup obtained [ MWd/kgU]
Have you examined any fuel with >60 GWD/MT burnup in the last year? No No
Number of primary failed rods and fuel type None 3; Two SVEA96 Optima3 and one GE14
Elevation of primary failures and failure cause, fuel desing, cladding type, burnup None Debris (preliminary)
Degradation of failed fuel, type of degradation and elevation, fuel washout, fuel type? None None
Have hot cell examinations been performed or are such examinations planned?
Cycle burnup increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core average fuel None None
assembly burnup during cycle
© ANT International, 2018

Table A-18: Data of the current cycle [Jarméus, 2018].

O 3

Start of current cycle 2017-10-15
Cycle c44/c45
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted 50
Fuel Type SVEA96 Optima3
Enrichment 3.91
BA-design 12*5.5%
Operating mode: base load or load following Base load
Cycle length, EFPD 375 planned
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? None
Maximum applied LiOH BWR
pH during Cycle BWR
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for Batch 44 SVEA96 Optima2; Assembly 49 GE14;
what fuel design type? What cladding type? Rod 66 GE14
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC None
[MWd/kgU]
What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle Channel bow measurements
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what? 1 deteced in online off-gas monitoring
Fuel washout? None
Any special events No
© ANT International, 2018














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A.3.3.2.2 TVO

Table A-19: Data of the last completed cycle [Metsälä, 2018].


OL 1 OL 2

Start of last cycle 2017-05-04 2017-07-14
Cycle No 39 37
End of last cycle 2018-05-13 2018-04-22
Batch design burnup for reload batch 50 MWd/kgU 50 MWd/kgU
Fuel Type ATRIUM 10XM; ATRIUM 11 Optima2; Optima3; GNF2
Enrichment 3.75 – 4.09 3.66 – 4.12
BA-design variable variable
Operating mode: base load or load following base l. base l.
Cycle length, EFPD 362 277
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? no no
Maximum applied LiOH n/a n/a
pH during Cycle n/a n/a
ATRIUM 10 XM SVEA-96 Optima2 / LK3:
What is the highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak batch ave: ~47.5 batch ave: ~46.0
assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design type? What cladding type? peak assembly: 49.9 peak assembly: 49.4
peak rod nodal: ~70.84 peak rod: ~64.0
GNF2 / P9:
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) was irradiated and what is the ATRIUM 11 / LTP2: Max assembly: 51.5
maximum assembly burnup obtained [MWd/kgU] Max assembly: 50.9 MWd/kgU SVEA-96 Optima 3 / LK3:
Max assembly: 48.9
Have you examined any fuel with >60 GWD/MT burnup in the last year? no no
2 leaking assemblies. It is still uncertain how
Number of primary failed rods and fuel type 1
many rods have failed, most likely two rods.
Elevation of primary failures and failure cause, fuel desing, cladding type, debris; 6.5 MWd/kgU Failure cause uknown; Burnups 11.1
burnup MWd/kgU and 25.8 MWd/kgU
Degradation of failed fuel, type of degradation and elevation, fuel washout, Fuel washout yes, no hot cell examinations no hot cell examinations performed or
fuel type? Have hot cell examinations been performed or are such performed or planned planned
examinations planned?
Cycle burnup increase of the failed fuel assembly related to the core n/a n/a
average fuel assembly burnup during cycle
© ANT International, 2018

Table A-20: Data of current cycle [Metsälä, 2018].

OL 1 OL 2

Start of current cycle 2018-06-23 2018-05-04
Cycle 40 38
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted 50 MWd/kgU 50 MWd/kgU
Fuel Type ATRIUM 10XM; ATRIUM 11 Optima2; Optima3
Enrichment 3.75 – 4.09 3.66 – 4.03
BA-design variable variable
Operating mode: base load or load following base load base load
Cycle length, EFPD 328 339
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? no no
Maximum applied LiOH n/a n/a
pH during Cycle n/a n/a







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Table A-20: Data of current cycle [Metsälä, 2018] ] (cont’d).

OL 1 OL 2

ATRIUM 10 XM SVEA-96 Optima2 / LK3:
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a
batch ave: ~47.5
batch average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for what fuel design batch ave: ~47.4 peak assembly: 49.9
batch max: 49.9
type? What cladding type?
peak rod nodal: ~69.8 peak rod: ~64.3
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what ATRIUM 11 / LTP2: SVEA-96 Optima3 / LK3:
is the maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC [MWd/kgU] Max assembly: 48.4 MWd/kgU Max assembly: 54.5
Visual inspection of FAs and FCs. Length measurements of Visual inspection of FAs and FCs.
What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle FC. Distance measurement between channel and handle. Length measurements of FCs and FRs.
Indication of fuel failure
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what? 0
Based on isotope measurements from reactor water
Fuel washout? no no
Any special events The indication of fuel failure mentioned above no
© ANT International, 2018

A.3.3.2.3 Xcel Energy


Table A-21: Data of the last completed cycle [Martin, 2018].

Monticello
Start of current cycle 2015-05-28
Cycle 28
enrichment gad exposure
3.74 16 19,490
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted 3.84 15 19,035
3.87 16 18,254
3.89 11 17,522
Fuel Type GE14
Enrichment 3.74; 3.84; 3.87; 3.89
BA-design Gadolinia
Operating mode: base load or load following Base Load
Cycle length, EFPD 656
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? Yes; HWC; OLNC
Maximum applied LiOH n/a
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) n/a
pH during Cycle 7
Batch Average 44.09 GWd/MTU

Peak Assembly 46.32 GWd/MTU
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak assembly? peak rod? and for
what fuel design type? What cladding type? Peak Pin 57.68 GWd/MTU
Fuel Type GE14
Cladding Type Zr-2
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the maximum assembly burnup planned at EOC N/A
[ MWd/kgU]

What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle n/a
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what? 0
Fuel washout? n/a
Any special events n/a
© ANT International, 2018




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Table A-22: Data of the current cycle [Martin, 2018].

Monticello
Start of current cycle 2017-05-13
Cycle 29
enrichment gad exposure
3.966 14 21,483
Batch design burnup for fresh fuel to be inserted
3.973 12 21,550
3.990 13 20,785
Fuel Type ATRIUM 10XM and GE14
Enrichment 3.966; 3.973; 3.990
BA-design Gadolinia
Operating mode: base load or load following Base Load
Cycle length, EFPD 678
Were Zn-injection (concentration used?), HWC, NMCA applied? Yes; HWC; OLNC

Maximum applied LiOH N/A
Maximum applied Boric Acid (ppm) N/A
pH during Cycle 7
Batch Average 44.56 GWd/MTU
Peak Assembly 50.93 GWd/MTU
What is the planned EOC highest burnup you have achieved for a batch average? peak assembly? peak Peak Pin 55.99 GWd/MTU
rod? and for what fuel design type? What cladding type?
Fuel Type GE14
Cladding Type Zr-2
What type of LUAs (Lead assemblies) is being irradiated and what is the maximum assembly burnup N/A
planned at EOC [ MWd/kgU]

What type of inspections/examinations are planned after this cycle Sipping is possible. Currently under consideration.

August 2018 chemistry results indicated small cladding defect.
Number of estimated fuel failures, based upon what?
Further monitoring did not indicate continued leakage.
Fuel washout? No
Any special events None
© ANT International, 2018
































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Appendix B - References

Adamson R. B., Cox B., Strasser A., Rudling P., ZIRAT6/IZNA1 Annual Report, ANT International,
Mölnlycke, Sweden, 2001.

Adamson R. et al., ZIRAT9/IZNA4 Annual Report, ANT International, Mölnlycke, Sweden, 2004.
Adamson R. et al., ZIRAT14/IZNA9 Annual Report, ANT International, Mölnlycke, Sweden, 2009.

Bojan K., Personal communication, 2018.

Cantonwine P. et al., Channel – Control Blade Interference in GE Boiling Water Reactor, D-Lattice Plants with
Zircaloy-2 Channels, Proceedings of 2010 LWR Fuel Performance, Paper 079, Orlando, Florida, USA,
September 26-29, 2010.
Hellwig C., Personal communication, 2018.

Jarméus N., Personal communication, 2018.

Martin S., Personal communication, 2018.
Metsälä M.., Personal communication, 2018.

Meyer L., Personal communication, 2018.

Michelsson L., Personal communication, 2015.
Miloslav Š., Personal communication, 2018.

Sedano P. J. G. and Mata P., Personal communication, 2011.

Strasser A. et al., ZIRAT7/IZNA2 Annual Report, ANT International, Mölnlycke, Sweden, 2002.
Strasser A. et al., ZIRAT8/IZNA3 Annual Report, ANT International, Mölnlycke, Sweden, 2003.

Thibault X., Meylogan T., Briard E., Chaigne G., EdF PWR Fuels - EdF Operating Experience, TopFuel
Conference, Paris, France, September 2009.

Wikmark G. and Cox B., Water Chemistry and CRUD Influence on Cladding Corrosion ZIRAT6/IZNA1
Special Topics Report, ANT International, Mölnlycke, Sweden, 2001.




































B-1(B-1)

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Nomenclature

AFA Advanced Fuel Assembly
ANT Advanced Nuclear Technology
AOA Axial Offset Anomaly
APSR Axial Power Shaping Rods
AREVA French Equipment Manufacturer
BEP Bottom End Plug
BOC Beginning of Cycle
BU Burnup
BW Basket-Weave
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CCC Control Cell Core
CE Combustion Engineering
CIM Channel Interference Metric
CLAB Central, large intermediate pool facilities that serve all the plants in Sweden
CPR Critical Power Ratio
CRUD Chalk River Unidentified Deposits
DFBN Debris Filter Bottom Nozzle
DX Duplex
DXELS Duplex Extra-Low Sn
EdF Electricité de France
EOC End of Cycle
FA Fuel Assembly
FANP Framatome ANP
FR Fuel Rod
GE General Electric
GNF Global Nuclear Fuel
GT Guide Tube
GTRF Grid-to-Rod Fretting
HGCIM Half-Gap Channel Interference Metric
HiFi High Fidelity
HPA High Performance Alloy
HTP High Thermal Performance
HWC Hydrogen Water Chemistry
IFBA Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber
IFM Intermediate Flow Mixing grid
IMS In-Mast Sipping
IRIS Incomplete Rod Insertions
IT Instrument Tube
KK KernKraftwerk
KKB KernkraftWerk Brunsbüttel
KKI KernkraftWerk Isar
KKK KernkraftWerk Krümmel
KKL KernKraftwerk Leibstadt
KKM KernKraftwerk Mühleberg
LK Låg Korrosion (Low Corrosion in Swedish)
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
LTA Lead Test Assembly
LTP Low-Temperature Process
LUA Lead Use Assembly
MCO Mid Cycle Outage
MDA Mitsubishi Developed Alloy
MOC Middle of Cycle
MOX Mixed Oxide
MPS Missing Pellet Surface
NDA New Developed Alloy
NGF Next Generation Fuel
NMC Noble Metal Chemistry
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission





Copyright © Advanced Nuclear Technology International Europe AB, ANT International, 2018.

A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



OFA Optimized Fuel Assembly
OL Olkiluoto
PCI Pellet Cladding Interaction
PCMI Pellet Cladding Mechanical Interaction
PIE Post Irradiation Examination
PST Power Suppression Testing
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
PWROG PWR Owners Group
QC Quality Control
RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly
RFA Robust Fuel Assembly
RIA Reactivity Initiated Accident
RTL Ramp Terminal Level
RTN Removable Top Nozzle
SSM Sandvik Special Metal
TMI Three Mile Island
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
TCD Thermal Conductivity Degradation
UT Ultrasonic Testing
VVER Voda Voda Energo Reactor (Russian type PWR)
W Westinghouse
WABA Wet Annular Burnable Absorber
WSE Westinghouse Sweden
ZIRAT ZIRconium Alloy Technology
ZIRLO ZIRconium Low Oxidation
Zry Zircaloy























































Copyright © Advanced Nuclear Technology International Europe AB, ANT International, 2018.

A N N U A L R E P O R T - P R O P R I E T A R Y I N F O R M A T I O N



Unit conversion


TEMPERATURE MASS
°C + 273.15 = K °C × 1.8 + 32 = °F kg lbs
T(K) T(°C) T(°F) 0.454 1

273 0 32 1 2.20
289 16 61
298 25 77 DISTANCE
373 100 212 x (µm) x (mils)
473 200 392 0.6 0.02

573 300 572 1 0.04
633 360 680 5 0.20
673 400 752 10 0.39
773 500 932 20 0.79

783 510 950 25 0.98
793 520 968 25.4 1.00
823 550 1022 100 3.94
833 560 1040
873 600 1112 PRESSURE

878 605 1121 bar MPa psi
893 620 1148 1 0.1 14
923 650 1202 10 1 142
973 700 1292 70 7 995
1023 750 1382 70.4 7.04 1000

1053 780 1436 100 10 1421
1073 800 1472 130 13 1847
1136 863 1585 155 15.5 2203
1143 870 1598 704 70.4 10000
1173 900 1652 1000 100 14211

1273 1000 1832
1343 1070 1958 STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR
1478 1204 2200 MPa√m ksi√inch
0.91 1

Radioactivity 1 1.10
1 Sv = 100 Rem
1 Ci = 3.7 × 10 Bq = 37 GBq
10
-1
1 Bq = 1 s










Copyright © Advanced Nuclear Technology International Europe AB, ANT International, 2018.