The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian ...

The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation: A Reexamination
Author(s): Josh Sanborn
Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer, 2000), pp. 267-289
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DISCUSSION

The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question
of the Russian Nation: A Reexamination

JoshSanborn

SirGeorgeBuchanan,GreatBritain'sambassadorto RussiaduringWorld
War I, published his widelyread memoirs in 1923. In those pages, he pro-
vided an influentialaccount of the response of the Russian people to Ger-
many'sdeclaration of war:

DuringthosewonderfulearlyAugustdaysRussiaseemed to have been
completelytransformedT.he GermanAmbassadorhad predictedthat
thedeclarationofwarwouldprovokea revolutionH. e had evendeclined
tolistento a friendwhohad advisedhim,on theeve ofhisdeparture,to
send hiscollectionofartto theHermitageforsafekeeping,as theHer-
mitagewould,he foretoldb, e one ofthefirstbuildingstobe sacked.Un-
fortunatelfyorhim,theonlyact ofmob violencethroughoutthewhole
RussianEmpirewasthewholesalelootingoftheGermanEmbassyon Au-
gust4. Insteadofprovokinga revolutiont, hewarforgeda newbond be-
tweenSovereignand people. The workmenproclaimeda trucetostrikes,
and thevariouspoliticalpartieslaid aside theirgrievances1.
Buchanan's assessment of Russia's response to the war was seconded
byhis compatriot Sir AlfredKnox, Britain'smilitaryattache in Russia:
Mobilisationwentsmoothlyand the numberof men called up in com-
parisonwiththe partialmobilisationof 1904 caused general astonish-
ment.The spiritof the people appeared excellent.All the wine shops
were closed and therewas no drunkenness-a strikingcontrastto the
sceneswitnessedin 1904.Wivesand motherswithchildrenaccompanied
thereservistfsrompointtopoint,deferringthehourofpartinga,nd one
sawcruelscenes,butthewomencriedsilentlyand therewereno hyster-
ics.The mengenerallywerequietand grave,butpartiescheeredone an-
otheras theymetinthestreetT. he warwasundoubtedlypopularwiththe
Earlierversionsofthisessaywerepresentedat the 1997 annual conventionoftheAmeri-
can AssociationfortheAdvancementof SlavicStudiesin Seattleand at the conference
entitled"Rossiiav pervoimirovoivoine"held in St.PetersburginJune 1998. I would like
to thankthe participantsand audience membersat thosepanels,in particularGeoffrey
Hoskingand BillRosenberg,whowerethedesignateddiscussantsf, ortheircomments.In
addition,I would like to thankSheila FitzpatrickR, on Suny,Michael Geyer,PeterHol-
quist,TroyDavis,and theanonymousreviewerfs orSlavicReviewfortheirinputand bib-
liographicaladvice.FinallyI, wouldliketoexpressmydeep gratitudetotheCenterforthe
Advancementand Studyof Peace and InternationalCooperation and theJohnD. and
CatherineT. MacArthurFoundationforthefundsnecessaryto conducttheresearchthat
led to thisarticle.
1. SirGeorge Buchanan,MyMissiontoRussiaand OtherDiplomatiMc emorie(sBoston,
1923), 1:213.
SlavicReview59, no. 2 (Summer2000)

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268 Slavic Review
middleclasses,and eventhestrikersw,hoRussiansbelievedhad been sub-
sidisedwithGermanmoney,at once on mobilisationreturnedtowork.2
Both of these men placed Russia's experience firmlywithinthe dom-

inant European paradigm of the Great War. The Russian throngs cheer-
ing their soldiers on to victoryfitquite nicely with the image of Europe
marching proudly,innocently,and unanimously to war in 1914. This pic-
ture of glorious enthusiasm made the ensuing horror and social collapse
all the more dramatic. World War I became Act V of the "long" European
nineteenth century,turningmoralityplay into tragedy.

Buchanan and Knox also provided the general outline of the western
account of "Russia's" response to the declaration of World War I.3 On the
one hand, we have Buchanan's description ofunity,the "bond between Sov-
ereign and people" that supposedly existed throughout the land in this
moment of crisis.On the other,we have Knox's slightlymore subtle analy-
sis, which contrasted the war's popularity in urban areas with the "quiet
and grave" response in rural ones.

This composite description of urban patriotic enthusiasm and rural
resignation has dominated nearly every account writtensince, as writ-
ers focusing on urban areas have sought to explain the end to the 1914
strikes,while those looking at the countrysidehave usually fallen back on
the assumption thatobtuse Russian peasants, locked in primitivelocalism,
had no conception of the nation as a whole and could not begin to com-
prehend theeventsthatweretakingthemfromtheirdirtyhuts.4Thus Rich-
ard Pipes claimed thatduring World War I the muzhik(peasant man) had
littlesense of "Russianness." He thought of himselfnot as a "Russkii,"but
as a "Viatskii"or "Tulskii"-that is, a native of Viatka or Tula province
and as long as the enemy did not threaten his home territoryh, e had no
quarrel withhim.5

In these accounts, Russia entered the war with a burst of patriotism
that masked the ultimatelyfatal flaws of class division in the cities and
brutishignorance in the countryside.When the war turned sour and the
patriotismdwindled, those flawsbecame apparent, leading to the collapse
of the old regime.

2. SirAlfredKnox,WiththeRussianArmy1,914-191 7 (London, 1921), 1:39.
3. These are nottheonlyforeignobserversourcesthathavebeen widelycitedin the
westernliteratureO. ther influentiawl orksinclude Maurice Paleologue,An Ambassador's
Memoirsv,ol.1 (London, 1923), and BernardPares,TheFalloftheRussianMonarchyA: Study
oftheEvidence(London, 1939).
4. See, forinstance,Leopold Haimson, "The Problemof Social Stabilityin Urban
Russia,1905-1917,"SlavicReview23,no.4 (December 1964): 619-42 and SlavicReview24,
no. 1 (March 1965): 1-22; W. Bruce Lincoln,PassagethrougAhrmageddonT:heRussiansin
WarandRevolution1,914-1918 (NewYork,1986), 41- 45; RichardPipes,TheRussianRevo-
lution(NewYork,1990), 203-10; Orlando Figes,A Peopl'es TragedyT:heRussianRevolution,
1891-1924 (London, 1996), 251-52; MartinGilbert,TheFirsWt orldWarA: CompletHeistory
(NewYork,1994), 31; AllanK. Wildman,TheEnd oftheRussianImperiaAl rmyT: heOldArmy
and theSoldiersR' evolt(March-Apri1l917) (Princeton,1980), 76-77.
5. Pipes,RussianRevolution2,03.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 269

This picturewasbolsteredbyinfluentiaalccountsbyRussianemigres.
Pipes,in thepassageprintedabove,wasquotingGeneralNikolaiGolovin,
who in turnwas citingGeneral IuriiDanilov. Both Danilov and Golovin
were reformisGt eneral Staffofficerswho were involvedin the military
preparationsforWorldWarI and survivedthewartowriteaccountsofwhy
thewarhad been lost.BothultimatelyturnedtotheexplanationthatRus-
sianpeasants,thebulkofthesoldiers,had been insufficientilmy buedwith
nationalconsciousnessand hence were not the citizen-soldiertshatar-
miesrequiredtowinmodernwars.Thiswasa soothingjustificationf,orit
shiftedblame awayfrommilitaryleadersand patrioticprogressivepoliti-
cians onto thelegacyofRussianbackwardnessand onto thoseconserva-
tivepoliticalfigureswhohad resistedthemodernizingnation-buildingef-
fortspearheadedbymilitaryreformerlsikeGolovinand Danilovpriorto
thewar.6

The mixtureofforeignobservationsand reformisjutstificationcsom-
bined to producea historiographicajul ggernautin westernscholarlycir-
clesthatbegansoon afterthewarand continuestohold swaytoday.There
are twobasic problemswiththestandardinterpretationT.he firstis em-
pirical:practitionerosfthedominantmodel havesimplynotbotheredto
researchtheactionsand thoughtsofreservistasnd theirfamiliesin 1914.
The factthathistorianshave not used one of theirstocks-in-tradies be-
fuddlingf, orthoughlibraryshelvesare notoverflowinwgithRussianWorld
WarI memoirs,letters,and diaries,manysuch sourceshave been pub-
lishedand are availablebothin Russiaand abroad.7Archivalsourcessuch
as police reports,manuscriptsof personalnarrativesa,nd lettersof nor-
mal soldiersand ruralfamiliesto stateinstitutionhsave also been almost
completelyignored.Asa result,certainmajorevents,suchas the1914draft
riotin Barnaul thatclaimed as manylivesas the 1863 draftriotin New
YorkCity,are virtuallyunknownto westernreaders,despitethefactthat
theBarnauluprisingwas mentionedin nearlyeveryRussianmilitaryac-
countofthewar.8

6. PavelMiliukovindictedRussianpeasantsfora lackofpatriotismin nearlythesame
wordsthatGolovinand Danilov did. See Paul MiliukovP, oliticaMl emoirs1,905-1917, ed.
ArthurP. Mendel,trans.Carl Goldberg(AnnArbor,1967), 300.

7. For an excellentbibliographyof such sources,along withRussian-languagesec-
ondary sources, see Pervaia mirovaiavoina: Ukazatel' literatury1914-1 993 (Moscow, 1994).
Additionalmentionshould be made of a handfulof primarysourceswrittenbysoldiers
thatarenotcoveredinthisbibliographyand arenotnormallycitedbyhistoriansI.. M. Gor-
dienko,Iz boevogporoshlogo1,914-1918gg. (Moscow,1957); V I. Gurko,WarandRevolution
inRussia,1914-1917 (NewYork,1919); A.A. IgnatyevA, SubalterninOldRussia,trans.Ivor
Montagu(London, 1944); VladimirS. LittauerR, ussianHussar:A StoryoftheImperiaCl av-
alry,1911-1920, reprinted. (Shippensburg,Penn., 1993); E. A. VertinskiiP,amiatnydeni:
Iz vospominangiivardeiskiksthrelko(vTallinn,1932); A.VavilovZ, apisksi oldataVavilova(Mos-
cow,1927); BoleslavVevern,6-ia batareia1, 914-1917 gg.Povesto vremenvielikagsoluzheniia
rodine(Paris,1938).

8. Lieutenant-GeneralNicholas N. Golovin(e), TheRussianArmyin theWorldWar
(NewHaven, 1931), 204; Golovin,VoennyuesiliiaRossiiv mirovovioine(Paris,1939), 2:121;
IuriiN. Danilov,Rossiiav mirovovioine,1914-1915 gg. (Berlin,1924), 111; SergeiDobro-
rolskiD, ie MobilmachundgerrussischeAnrmee1914 (Berlin,1922), 33.

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270 Slavic Review
The omissionofdraftriotsisminor,though,comparedtothemoreba-

sicconceptualproblemoftheliteratureon thesocialresponseto mobili-
zation.Historianshave soughtan answerto an impossiblequestion:how
did Russiarespondto thewar?Even in itslessegregious(and more per-
nicious) manifestations,cholarshave had fewqualms about seekingto
discoverwhat"peasants,""workers,o"r the"middleclasses"thoughtabout
thewar.In both guises,these questions,bypresupposingunitarysocial
groups,haverathernaturallylentthemselvesto monolithicanswers.

The Soviethistoriographoyn the1914mobilizationdepended on dif-
ferentsourcesand used a differenitnterpretivferameworkthanthewest-
ernhistoriographdyid,butin theend ittoo failedto providea convinc-
ing analysisof public activityand public attitudesupon the outbreakof
thewar.In contrastto westernscholars,manySoviethistoriansincluded
accountsofdraftriotsand popularunhappinesswiththewarin theirnar-
rativesb, ut theirfixationwithlabelingviolentoutburstsagainstthestate
as either"revolutionaryo"r "anarchic"blinded themto the quite novel
modes ofrhetoricand practiceused bythedemonstratorsb,othpatriotic
and unpatrioticw, ho surgedintothestreetsduringthemassiveupheaval
thatfollowedGermany'sdeclarationofwaron Russia.

The earliestSovietinterpretationof the mobilizationrelied on the
propositionthatVladimirLenin and theBolsheviksweretheonlyones to
trulyunderstandthenatureof thewarand theopportunityit presented
forliberation.Othersocialistpartieswerecondemnedfortheirblindpa-
triotismw, hileregularpeasantsand workerswerepitiedforthefactthat
theyhad been duped bytheirtsaristmastersI.n thefirstsystematiscchol-
arlyworkdevotedto thewar,forinstance,A. M. Zaionchkovskicilaimed
thatthepatrioticfrontpresentedbyall otheroppositionparties"allowed
thetsaristgovernmentomobilizepainlesslyand thentodrivemillionsof
nearlyunarmedmentoslaughteroverthecourseofthenextthreeyears."9

This positionwas temperedin theearly1960sbytheintroductionof
evidenceofunrestduringthewar.D. V.Verzhkhovskiaind V.F. Liakhov
citedthe draftriotsas evidencethatRussianworkershad been the only
ones in Europe to resisttheirgovernment'sattemptsto "hide the true
goals ofthewar"and had "activelydemonstratedagainstit."The Bolshe-
viks,theyclaimed,had been theonlypoliticalpartyto heed thevoice of
theworkingclass.10Meanwhile,A. M. Anfimovw, ritingabouttheresponse
to thewarin thecountrysidea,lso notedunrest,buthe arguedthatpeas-
antunhappinesscould onlytaketheformofan "anarchicand uncoordi-
natedstruggle."IIn themultivolumehistoryofthewarpublishedin 1975,
theseanalyseswerecombinedin theclaimthat,thoughtheRussianbour-
geoisiehad respondedtothewarwithenthusiasmb, othworkersand poor
peasantsprotestedthewarin "allthemajorcitiesofRussia"buthad failed

9. A. M. ZaionchkovskiiM, irovaiavoina1914-1918, 2d ed. (Moscow,1931 [1924]), 14.
10. D. V Verzhkhovskiaind V F. Liakhov,Pervaia mirovaiavoina, 1914-1918 gg.:
Voenno-istoricheosckhieirk(Moscow,1964), 39-40.
11. A. M. AnfimovR, ossiiskaida erevnivagodypervoimirovovioiny(1914-191 7g.) (Mos-
cow,1962), 347-48.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 271

to make an impact on policy because the outbursts were "anarchic at-
temptsof the populace" to stop the war.12Revolution awaited the organiz-
ing hand of the Bolsheviks.'3

Unfortunately,despite the upsurge in interestin World War I and the
reevaluation of Russia's past that has occurred since the fall of the Soviet
Union and the opening of Russian archives, post-1991 analyses of 1914
have been quite traditional,both in Russia and abroad. Thus one Russian
author, throwing off the yoke of Bolshevik interpretations of popular
mood, parroted Buchanan's "patriotic"position in a 1994 article:

WorldWarI ... whatdo weknowaboutit?Afewphrasesfromschoolprim-
ers,"annexationist,"imperialist,""crisisof elites,""revolutionarsyitua-
tion."The waris perceivedas a prologue to tworevolutions-February
and October-and, bycomparisonwiththem,theeventsare barelyim-
portantand evenlesssignificantB.utthatishowitisforus,theoffspring,
schooled not in the historyof the Fatherland,but in the historyof the
revolutionarymovement.For contemporariesitwas differenta,nd now
thatwe are openingtheyellowedarchivalfolders,we learnwithsurprise
thatamongthepeople [narod]itwascalleda Fatherlandwarand thatthe
patrioticspiritin Russiain thefirstwoyearswasunusuallyhigh.'4
HubertusJahn, in his fine 1996 studyof patriotic culture during the war,
also arrived at the conclusion that there was an "initial outburst of flag-
waving enthusiasm" that soon dissipated. Despite this outburst,Jahn ar-
gued, "Russia was not a nation during World War I" because Russians only
understood whom theywere fightingand not who theywere.'5
The problems thatplagued earlier accounts of the war have not gone
away. Scholars still relyon thin source bases when considering the 1914
mobilization and consider onlypartsofthe public's response withoutplac-
ing manifestationsofpatriotismand dissentwithina broader political con-
text.Given the richness of thatsource base and the scale of the events that
took place in 1914, it is impossible to describe and to analyze the World
War I mobilizations in a single article. Instead, itis mydesire in thisarticle
to provide a briefcatalog of the manyresponses to the outbreak of the war
and to argue that historians need to reconceptualize their notions of po-
litical communityand political action in late imperial Russia in order to
make sense of those responses.

The Mobilizationof 1914
The declaration of mobilization and war inJuly1914 brought about three
basic responses from the Russian populace. The firstwas by far the most

12. I. I. Rostunov,ed.,Istoriiapervomi irovovioiny1,914-1 918 (Moscow,1975), 1:228.
13. Some authors,howeverr, emainedunaffectedbythisattempttoportraythelabor-
ingmassesofRussiaas instinctiveloypposed toimperialiswt arsand continuedtoassertthe
standardpositionthattheoutbreakofwarhad intoxicatedall ofEurope and that"hurrah-
patriotism"reignedthroughoutRussia as surelyas it did in England. See, forinstance,
NikolaiIakovlev,1 avgusta1914,3d ed. (Moscow,1993 [1974]), 28-29.
14. Elena Seniavskaia,"Kornetbezhitna voinu,"Pogranichninko,. 3 (March1994): 61.
15. HubertusF.Jahn,PatrioticCulturein Russia duringWorldWarI (Ithaca, 1996),
171-73.

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272 Slavic Review
prevalent: a private response to the danger and disruption of the war.
Most men spent the one-day grace period before theywere due to appear
arranging forwaysto fulfilltheir obligations in their absence and spend-
ing time with theirfamilies. The most common sound in Russia was that
of men, women, and children weeping. The other common sound was
silence, not the "eternal silence" of the Russian countrysidethat Russian
urbanites,too deaf to rural noises to know the difference,generallyheard,
but a stunned silence.'6 Rural men themselves recalled the eeriness of
buzzing villages fallingsilent as families quietly grieved.'7

A typicalsituationwas described bya noncommissioned officerin his
unpublished memoirswrittenas he layin a militaryhospital in early1915.18
Ivan Kuchernigo lived in a village near the districtcenter of Aleshka and
received the news as most rural Russians did, at a village assembly:

On 17Julya, policemanwhohad neverbeen toourvillagebeforear-
rivedand wentdoor todoor callingeveryonetoa meeting,and so I went.

"What'sgoing on?" the peasantsasked each other,but no one re-
sponded because no one knewwhatwas going on, and how could we
have known... ?

Suddenly,thevillageelderappeared and made a signwithhishand
to be quiet. Everyonebecame silent,strainingtheirears and wantingto
hear exactlywhatour elderwouldsay...

"Here'swhat'safootboys!An enemyhas turnedup! He has attacked
our MotherRussia [MatushkuRossiiu],and our Father-Tsarneeds our
help,our enemyfornowis Germany."

"It'stheGermans!The Germans!"spreadthroughthecrowd...
"Quiet! Quiet!" boomed thevoice of the elder. "OK boys,in order
nottolose timemessingwithlistsw, hoeverfeelshealthyand able toserve
theFatherlandshould all showup at 9 o'clock on the 18thin theoffice
oftheDistrictMilitaryCommanderinAleshka,and I adviseyoutobring
withyoutwopairsofunderweara,nd they'lgl iveyoueverythineglsethere,
just do itquick."
Atthispoint,the crowddispersed to theirhuts,"forgettingabout theirfield
work." The heartbreaking familyscenes he described in his village were
played out all over Russia:
MyGod, howmanytearswerespilledwhenwe had to go. Myfive-year-
old daughtersatin myarmsand, pressingagainstme, said "Daddy,why
are yougoing?Whyare you leavingus?Who'sgoingto earn moneyand
getbreadforus?"Her littlearmsclasped me about theneckand tightly,
tightlyhuggedme. I heard thebeatingofherlittleheart,and heard her
lipsbeginto kissmyneck.I couldn'tanswerherquestions,and couldn't
hold back myown tears,and just answered"I'll be home soon, baby."
16. The quote thattheRussiancountrysidreespondedto thedeclarationofwarwith
"eternalsilence"comesfromKadetleader PavelMiliukov.MiliukovP, oliticaMl emoirs3,00.
17. 0. I. GorodovikovV, ospominani(iMa oscow,1957), 34.
18. "Zapisistarshegounter-ofitserkaom.253 pekhotnogoCherekopnogopolka Ivan
Vasil'evichKuchernigo,"GosudarstvennyairkhivRossiiskoiFederatsii(GARF), f. 6281,
op. 1,d. 178,11.1-3.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 273

Throughoutthevillagetheonlythingyoucould hearwereprayersa,nd
cursesthrownat theGermans.
KhristinaSemina, livingin an area of Transcaucasia populated mostly
byArmenians and Azeris,had similarrecollections ofthe general response
to the news thatwar had been declared:
AmongtheArmeniansthewhole familylived onlyon the labor of the
male.... Therefore,whenitwasdemanded thathusbands,fathersa,nd
brothersgo to theinductionpointand theysaid thatitwaswar-there
arosesuchcryingand wailingamongthewomenand childrenthatitim-
mediatelybecame horrible.The din ofthisweepingprevailedthrough-
out thecitybothnightand day.
The sorrowwas not, of course, limited to Armenians. Semina herselfwas
overcome bytearsand could not stop cryingas her husband both prepared
to leave and brought home tales of the "awfulscenes" thatwere occurring
at the induction point as familieswere splitapart.19The same sounds reso-
nated in Anna Akhmatova'sears. "Soldiers' wivesare sobbing forthe boys,"
she wrote on 20 July1914, "the weeping of widows is ringingthroughout
the countryside. "20
The second response has received farmore attention than it deserves
in proportion to its prevalence. This was vocal public support. It has re-
ceived undue attention because a disproportionate number of people
who got their remembrances of Russia's response to war published wit-
nessed thatresponse on Palace Square in St. Petersburg,the site of a truly
substantialpatrioticdemonstration of about a quarter of a million people,
moving and singing in unison in response to the tsar.Needless to say,the
scale of the event and the presence of the Petersburgelite made the dem-
onstrationatypical,but the obvious emotional power of the moment over-
whelmed almost everyone there and skewed theirvision of the declaration
of war.21
That said, there can be no doubt that a great many patriotic demon-
strationsoccurred throughout the country.Throughout the realm, pro-
vincial officialsarranged for patriotic demonstrations to be held as men
marched offto war, and these seem to have been fairlywell attended.
Again Kuchernigo best described the scene that occurred in many local
townswhere reservistscongregated:
Whatcrowdsofpeople! ItwashardtogetthroughthestreetsT. heywere
carryinpgortraitosftheemperordecoratedwithflagsT. he noisewassuch
thatitwashardtounderstandanythingS.ome sang "God Save theTsar,"
othersyelled "Long Live the Tsar and the People [narod],"and others

19. KhristinaD. Semina,Tragediiarusskoairmiipervoivelikovi oiny1914-1918 gg.:7a-
piskisestrymiloserdikiaavkazskogofron(NtaewMexico,1963), 1:11.

20. Anna Akhmatova,"liul' 1914,"in Primitetotdar . .: Stikhotvoren(iMiaoscow,
1995), 171.

21. In additionto Buchanan,see Paleologue,AnAmbassadorM'semoirs4,6-52; Pares,
Fall oftheRussianMonarchy1,87-89; M. V.Rodzianko,KrusheniiemperiiiGosudarstvennaia
Duma ifevral'skaia1917godarevoliutsii(aValleyCottage,N.Y, 1986), 100-107.

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274 Slavic Review
yelled"Downwiththe Germans,death,death to the Germans!""Long
livetheInvincibleRussianArmy!Hoorah! Hoorah! Hoorah!"22

MariiaBochkareva,livingin Siberiaat thetime,rememberedthedaysof
mobilizationas an "elevatingg, lorious,unforgettablme oment,"a feeling
thatmanyRussianswhojoined in thepatrioticdemonstrationms usthave
experiencedas well.23It was an intoxicatingexperienceto participatein
thelifeand activitiesofa largecommunitya,nd thatfeelingof transcen-
dence waseagerlysoughtaround theempire.

These demonstrationds id not,however,necessarilymean thatthere
was supportforthewaritself.MostRussiansharboredfewillusionsthat
theywouldgainanyparticularbenefitfroma militaryvictoryW. arhad al-
waysmeantsacrificeand loss,and therewasno reasonto believethatthis
one would turnout anydifferentlAy.s we willsee below,therewas a sig-
nificantoutpouringof distasteforthe waritselffromthe verybeginning
in theformofriots,butotherformsofresistancewerealso presentfrom
theoutset.In Riga,alongsidetheportraitosfthetsar,workersand reserv-
istsflewbannersproclaiming"downwiththewar!"24Less showyresistance
began in earnestas well.Atone districtofficeduringthefirswt eekofmo-
bilization,oftheapproximately2,000menwhohad initiallyshownup,over
200 promptlydisappeared.25

Evengiventhesecaveats,therecan be no doubtthattherewasa signifi-
cantminorityofthepopulationthatwasenthusiastiacboutthewarin 1914.
Partofthisenthusiasmwasexpressedbyyoungmenwhorushedtodistrict
militaryofficesto volunteerafterthewarbrokeout,despitethefactthat
volunteeringforservicewasan optionavailableonlytothosemenwhowere
neitherin activeforces,nor the reserves,nor thefirsttiermilitia.2T6his
wasan occurrencethatcompletelytookstateand militarymenbysurprise.
Indeed, as GeneralVladimirSukhomlinov,thewarministera,dmitteda
fewdaysaftermobilizationbegan,theyhad simplynotforeseenthepos-
sibilityofmen volunteeringduringwartime.2I7t was not until23Julythat
therulesgoverningtheinductionofvolunteerswereapprovedbythetsar
and not until28Julythattheyweredistributed.2B8ythattime,the con-
fusionsurroundingvolunteeringwas alreadyapparent.Angrytelegrams
decryingtheinactivitoyfdistricmt ilitarycommanders,patriotictelegrams

22. "Zapisistarshegounter-ofitserkaom.253 pekhotnogoCherekopnogopolkaIvan
Vasil'evichKuchernigo,"GARF,f.6281,op. 1,d. 178,1.4-4ob.

23. MariaBotchkareva[MariiaBochkareva],YashkaM: yLifeas Peasant,OfficearndEx-
ile,as setdownbyIsaac Don Levine (NewYork,1919), 64.

24. A. Pireiko,Vtylui nafrontiemperialistichesvkooini yV: ospominaniriiaadovogo(Lenin-
grad,1926), 9.

25. GARF,f.1745,op. 1,d. 58,11.370- 421 (dailyreportsofPlotskdistricmt ilitarycom-
mander,17Julythrough26July1914).

26. Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyvioenno-istoricheskiairkhiv(RGVIA), f. 2000, op. 3,
d. 2647,1.1 (letterfromNikolaiIanushkevichto chiefoftheMain Staff1, 8July1914).

27. RGVIA,f.400,op. 19,d. 86,1. 8 (Sukhomlinovreport,22July1914).
28. "Pravilao prieme v voennoe vremia okhotnikovna sluzhbu v sukhoputnye
voiska."Approvedbythetsar,signedbySukhomlinovi,bid.,1.10; distributedas "Prikazpo
voennomuvedomstvuno. 454,"28July1914,ibid.,11.34-35.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 275

offeringservices,and frustratednotes fromlocal officialsasking forguid-
ance flowed into central militaryoffices.29

The rules finallysent out initiallyforbade enlistingmen younger than
18 or older than 43 (rules thatwere soon bent or broken), and since all
men already obligated to serve were not allowed to volunteer, the pool of
possible volunteers was quite restricted.The majoritycame from men in
the second tier militia,men with student deferrals,or men of ethnicities
not yetdrafted.Unfortunately,no statisticsabout the number of men en-
rolled as volunteers appear to be available, but the "significantinflux"was
great enough to cause logistical difficultiesonly in the Caucasus, where
the Muslim population paid a tax in lieu of militaryservice.30Though the
volunteer rushwas thereforeprobably fairlysmall in numerical terms,and
we cannot assume in anycase thatall volunteerswere inspired by"hurrah-
patriotic"motives,it is clear that there were people scattered throughout
theempire who genuinelyresponded in a patrioticwayand thirstedto fight
in thewar,fromSiberian women like Mariia Bochkareva, to underageJew-
ish boys,to the sons of prominent politicians like Mikhail Rodzianko and
Aleksandr Krivoshein.31

The finalresponse to the declaration ofwar is one thathas had farless
coverage than it deserves. This was active public opposition. Throughout
Russia, the declaration of war sparked offdraftriots,some of them enor-
mous and serious. These riots,as I noted above, do not fitwell withthe ex-
isting historical paradigm of 1914. Compare Buchanan's claim that the
"onlyact of mob violence" throughout Russia was targeted at the German
Embassywiththe followingtelegram sent fromTomsk during the mobili-
zation period:

Reservistasre producingdisorderalmosteverywherien Tomskprovince:
in Novonikolaevsk[present-dayNovosibirsk]a mob ofreservistssacked
storesand began to sackthebazaar,thedisorderswerestoppedwiththe
assistanceof [armytroops]. .. The mobsthrewstonesatthem,one rifle-
man was wounded withbullets,as a resultofwhichthe troopsopened
fire... twowerekilled,twowereseriouslywounded.In lightofthesedis-
orders the horse requisitioncommitteestopped its work. Reservists
smashedliquorstoresin thevillagesofIudikh,Tiumentseva,nd Klochki
in Barnauldistrictr,eservistdsemanded provisionsfromcountyauthori-

29. See, forinstance,RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3, d. 2647,1.16 (telegramfrom"volunteers
under theleadershipofP. Shaposhnikov"to Sukhomlinov2, 3July1917); ibid.,1.30 (let-
terfromN. Bogomolovto the MobilizationDepartment,22July1914); ibid.,1. 15 (tele-
gramfromchairmanof the Kostromadraftboard to the war minister,22 July1914);
RGVIA,f.400,op. 19,d. 86,1.38 (telegramfromGeneralEbelov [Odessa] tochiefofMain
Staff2, 7July1914).

30. RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3, d. 1159,1.6 (letterfromPensionand ServiceDepartment
of theMain Staffto the MobilizationDepartmentof theGeneral Staff1, 5 August1914).

31. Botchkareva[Bochkareva],Yashka6,4; RGVIA,f.2003,op. 2,d. 28,1.53 (petition
to thetsarfrom11-year-oldVulfIankel'son ofRiga,n.d.); forRodzianko'srequestto en-
listhisson despitethefactthathe had failedhismedicalexam (and approvalofrequest),
see RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3,d. 2608,1.85 (reportfromSukhomlinovtothetsar,21July1914);
forKrivosheinchildren,see ibid.,1.88.

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276 Slavic Review
tiesin Iudikh,theydesertedin Tiumentsevand droveawaythe police
chiefin Iudikh.32

Aswecan see fromthisaccountand theaccountsbelow,Knox'sbeliefthat
"all thewineshopswereclosed and therewas no drunkenness"was sim-
plyfalse.Instead,extantsourcesshowthatone ofthemostpopularactiv-
itiesoftherioterswasto loot liquorstores.3M3 ilitaryofficialsd,esperately
wishingto preservetheirheadyvisionof popular supportforthewaras
hostilitiebs egan,quicklylatchedonto theliquorfactoras thesole reason
thatthe"disorders"occurred."Liquor,"one officiabl ravelydeclaredafter
the 1914 riotshad cooled, "wasthesourceofall misfortune."34

The rampagesforliquorwereunderstandable,perhapsevenpredict-
able.Inductionintotheactiveforceshad longbeen an occasionfordrunk-
ennesson thepartofyoungRussianmenand wasa culturalritualin many
places acrosstheempire.Some villagesevenupheld a traditionofpaying
forthevodka thatyoungconscriptsconsumed.35Needless to say,thisrit-
ual was frownedupon bymilitaryofficialseekinga quick and efficient
mobilization,and theysuccessfullyarguedthatliquorsales shouldbe cut
offduringthe mobilizationperiod. The obvioussolutionfromthe per-
spectiveofreservistws assimplytobreakopen theclosed stores,and in lo-
cationswherelocal officialns eglectedto heed thewarningsoftheMinis-
tryofInternalAffairasnd failedtoprovidepolice protectionforthestores,
itwas a solutionthatwas carriedout. In the cityofLugansk,riotsbegan
withan attackon liquorstores;thecrowdthenproceeded tolootfoodand
clothingstoresbeforebreakingwindowsin privateresidences"withshouts
of 'hurrah!'"36

But the closingof liquor storesand the effectsof drunkennessafter
the storeswerelooted cannotbe takenas the sole explanationforthese
widespreadriots.Aswe sawin thetelegramfromTomsk,farmorewasoc-
curringthansimpleraidsforvodka.Reservistws erealsoprotestingthelack
of provisions,the requisitioningof theirhorses,and the waritself.This
multiplicitoyffactorswas in evidencearound the empire.In Ekaterino-
slav,theriotwassparked,notbya runon theliquorstore,butbytheun-

32. Telegram fromTomsk provinceincluded in "O bezporiadkakhna sbornykh
punktakhvovremiamobilizatsii,r"eportfromdepartmentofpolice totheMVD Conscrip-
tionAdministration1,914, Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyisitoricheskiairkhiv,St. Petersburg
(RGIA), f.1292,op. 1,d. 1729,1.26.

33. Foran analysisoftheJulyriotsin thecontextofliquordisturbancess,ee William
ArthurMcKee, "TamingtheGreen Serpent:Alcoholism,Autocracya,nd RussianSociety,
1881-1914" (Ph.D. diss.,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley1, 997), esp. 525-32.

34. RGVIA,f. 2000, op. 3, d. 1196, 1.93 (telegramof the governor-generaolf the
Steppe districto Sukhomlinov,18August1914). Allliquorstoreswererequiredbylawto
remainclosed duringthemobilizationperiod,a law thatgenerallyappears to have been
enforced.See also Golovin,RussianArmy2,04,fora similarinterpretationoftheriots.

35. RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3, d. 18,1.6-6ob. (reportofcommanderofKazan' military
districto thewarminister8,January1910).

36. RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3, d. 1154,112. 42-43 (reportofthechiefoftheLuganskgar-
risonto thewarminister2,4July1914).

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 277

furlingofa patrioticflagand an attemptto starta prowardemonstration
bymembersoftheBlackHundreds,atwhichpointreservistssetupon the
man who had produced theflagwhileothersthrewbricksat policemen,
touchingoffa brawlthatended onlywhenpolicefiredintothecrowd,kill-
ingone and woundingseven.In theBelebeevskiidistrictofUfaprovince,
theriotsbeganwiththelootingofbreadstoresand finishedwithan attack
on liquorstores.In thecityofBirsk(again in Ufaprovince),liquorplayed
no partin theriot.Reservist"sdispersedthepolice and destroyedthein-
ductioncenter,thankstowhichthemedicalexaminationsand formation
ofunitsto send to thefronthad to stop."37

In mostplaces,riotersincludedan attackon liquorstoresin thecon-
textofotheractivitiesI.n Barnaul,riotersseized controlofthe cityfora
time,torchinghouses,stores,and a liquorwarehouse,promptinga full-
scale flightbylocal residents.More than one hundred men would die
in battlesbetweenreservistasnd police beforeorderwas restored.3T8he
battlein Barnaulwas thelargestofitskind,butthereweregunfightasnd
numerousepisodes of stone throwingthroughoutthe empire,activities
thatshould have givenpause to officialswho blamed everythingon the
booze. Manyoftheriotersweredeadlyserious,willingto die evenbefore
theliquorstartedflowingI.n all,people werewoundedand killedin draft
riotingintheprovincesofAstrakhan'V, itebskV, ologda,Viatka,Ekaterino-
slav,Novgorod,Penza, Perm',Podol'sk,Samara,Saratov,SimbirskT, am-
bov,Tobol'sk,Tomsk,Ufa,and the Region of the Don Host. These riots
left51 stateofficialws oundedand 9 dead,while136rioterswerewounded
and 216 killed.39

The onlysatisfactormy odel forexplainingmostoftheseriots,there-
fore,is to recognizethatthoughthewordmobis a singularnoun in Rus-
sian (tolpa)as wellas English,in facta riotis a setofactivitiesn,ota single
one. Once thebalance ofpoweris tippedand theforcesoftraditionaalu-
thorityare visiblyinferiori,topens a space forall kindsofactivitiesS.ome
menattackthepolice,othersstealbread,othersgetdrunk,and manytake
partin all oftheabove.

Usingthisframeworkw, e can usefullyindicatetheseveralfactorsbe-
hindthedraftriotsof1914.One, tobe sure,wasa desiretogetdrunk.An-
otherwas to demand sufficienptrovisionsforthemselvesand obtainthe
goods promisedto theirfamiliesY. etanotherreason,clearlyw, asto show
displeasurewiththewarand do everythinpgossibleto delayor derailthe
processof being sentto thefront.Militaryofficialspreferredto explain
the riotspurelyin termsof the firstfactor,but thisexplanationbecame
lessand lessplausibleas thewarwenton. Whenthesecond tierofthemi-
litiawascalledup in September1915and riotsexploded again,thefiction

37. RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3, d. 1154,11.238-41 (reportofcommanderofKazan' mili-
tarydistrict o warminister2, 4July1914).

38. Accountsoftheseeventsare collectedin RGIA,f.1292,op. 1,d. 1729.
39. "Svedeniiao chisle lits,postradavshikhvo vremiabyvshikhv iiule mobilizatsiiu
1914g. bezporiadkovvnekotorykhmestnostiakhimperii,"RGIA,f.1292,op. 1,d. 1729,11.
129-30.

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278 Slavic Review
thatriotingreservistws antednothingmorethanbooze provedimpossible
to maintain.40

Justas explanationsthat"Russia"respondedmonolithicallyto thewar
are unconvincing,so are attemptsto understandthe responsebyusing
broad socialcategorieslike"worker,"peasant,"or "elite."Withineach of
thesegroups,therewas noticeabledifferentiationFo. r,at the same time
thatmanyyoungeliteswithlegal deferralsand exemptionsflockedto
conscriptionofficestovolunteerforservice,a significanptortionoftheir
compatriotws howeredue to appear spentJulypullingstringsto obtaina
reprieve.SergeiDobrorol'skii,thehead ofthemobilizationdepartment,
read "allkindsofrequestsand petitions"fromyoungmenfrom"ourcul-
turedsocietyand fromthemidstofthebourgeoisie.""Theypressedevery
possiblebutton,"and,he resignedlyadmittedf, orthemostpartsucceeded
in theirattempts.4'

The divergenceofopinionwithinsocial groupsextendedall theway
downthe social ladder.Atthe same timethatsome workersin Riga and
St.Petersburgwereraisingbannersstating"downwiththewar,"workersin
Tula wereactivelychasingdownTolstoianspostingantiwarleafletsaround
townand threateningthemwithmobjustice.42Meanwhile,invillagesand
smalltownsacrosstheempire,proudpatriotic itizenswereturningin their
neighborsforavoidingthe draftand desertingthe army.The volumeof
thesedenunciationshad reached such "enormous"proportionsby1915
thatA. A. Polivanov,thewarministerb, egan to suspectthattheMinistry
ofInternalAffairws asbeinginsufficientaltytentivetotheproblemofdraft
evasionand wrotetheministerofinternalaffairtso protest.43

These civiliancomplaintswerebroadlyframedand wereoftensentto
specificcentralstateinstitutionsT.heywerenot the parochialspasmsof
ignorantpeasants.Norweretheyonlytargetedatspecificindividualst; hey
wereoftencriticalofstatepolicyaswell.One groupofruraldwellerswrote
totheDuma urgingthatpolicemenbe draftedbeforeonlysonswere."The
peasantry,t"heyclaimed,"seesthatthemotherlandgroansunderthebur-
dens ofwar.And thepeasantryis readyto bear . .. thehorriblesacrifice
ofwar,butitappeals to the.. . StateDuma and requeststhatfairnessbe
seen in everything.... It is necessary that everyone, regardless of class or
propertyqualificationsd,efendthemotherlandW. iththatfairnessv,ictory
overtheenemywillbe guaranteed."44These anonymousauthorsclaimed
to speak forthewhole peasantryO. ne otherruraldwellerwrotein even

40. Fora summaryofthe1915riots,see "Perechen''besporiadkov,u' chinennykhrat-
nikami2-gorazriadaprizyva5 sentiabria1915g.,sostavlennyvidepartamentepolitsii,"se-
cret,2 November1915,RGIA,f.1292,op. 1,d. 1729,11.131-81.

41. Citedin Golovin,Voennyuesiliia, 2:121.
42. See accountof theconflictbetweenworkersand Tolstoiansin Tula in thecourt
proceedingsagainsttheTolstoiansin Gosudarstvennymi uzeiistoriireligii(GMIR), f. 13,
op. 1,d. 376.
43. RGVIA,f.2000,op. 3, d. 1196,1.91 (letterfromPolivanovto Shcherbatov5, Au-
gust1915).
44. RGIA,f. 1278,op. 5, d. 1193,1. 106-106ob. (letterfrom"The peasantry"to the
StateDuma, 5 August1915).

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 279

more grandiosetermsthathe knewthatthe "wholpeeopleis terriblyun-
happywithconscriptionpolicybecause it is unequallyapplied and not
everyonehas to serve."45The authorsof theseletterswere usinga new
politicalframeworkbydemandingequalityforall citizensand bymak-
ingpoliticalclaimson thebasisofrepresenting"thepeople." Thatframe-
work,as wewillsee below,wasnationalin formand in content.

The Questionof theRussianNation
The argumentoutlinedabove has been "deconstructive.I"have argued
thatthe commonassumptionsabout the behaviorof Russiansupon the
outbreakof war in 1914 are problematic,if not untenable. "Peasants,"
"workers,a"nd "elite"did not act monolithicallyN. either,of course,did
"Russia."But deconstructionis not enough, forthe evidence supports
a more"constructivea"nalysisofpoliticalcommunityand politicalbehav-
iorin Russiain 1914.Morespecificallyt,hereactionofreservistasnd their
familiesto theoutbreakofthewarallowsus to askratherdifferenqtues-
tionsabout theformationoftheRussiannationthanwerepossibleto ask
withintheold historicalparadigm.

The firstquestion to ask is one most recentlyaddressed by David
Moon: did peasantsbecome Russiancitizensin thewaningyearsofRoma-
novrule?46Both the questionand Moon'sanalysisdeservea detailedre-
sponse. Moon saysthatpeasantsdid not become citizenspriorto 1917,
claimingthatsince the Russianstate"had not (yet) devoured itspeas-
ants... thesepeasantshad not become Russiancitizens."4T7he basisof
Moon'sargumentis an extensiveand eruditecomparisonbetweenthesit-
uationin "constitutionaRl ussia"(ca. 1905-1917) and thatoftheFrench
ThirdRepublicdescribedbyEugen Weberin hiscelebratedbookPeasants
intoFrenchmenT:heModernizationofRuralFrance,1870-1914.48 The cruxof
theproblemofnationhoodforMoon is notwhetherpeasantswereaware
ofeventsofnationalsignificance(theyhad been awareofthese,as Moon
pointsout,forquitesome time)butwhethertheywouldactas "members
ofa wider,nationalsocietywithwhichtheyfelttheysharedmorecommon
intereststhantheyhad sourcesofconflict."49

Moon is quiterightI, think,toinsistthatactionisas importantocon-
sideras "awareness"or "consciousness."Nationsdo presideoverthe site
wherethoughtand behavior,cultureand politics,intersectU. nfortunately,
I thinkthathe errswhen he attemptsto definenational belongingin
termsofunityS. egmentsofthepopulationdo notneed to "devour"each

45. RGVIA,f.400, op. 19, d. 147, 1.5 (letterfrom"a peasant"to thewar minister,
20January1915). Emphasisadded.

46. David Moon, "PeasantsintoRussianCitizens?A ComparativePerspective,R" evo-
lutionarRyussia9, no. 1 (June 1996): 43-81.

47. Ibid.,76.
48. Eugen Weber,PeasantsintoFrenchmenT:heModernizatioonfRuralFrance,1870-
1914 (Stanford,1976).
49. Moon, "PeasantsintoRussianCitizens?"44.

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280 Slavic Review
othertobe co-national;neitherdo theyhaveto "sharemorecommonin-
terests"thantheyhavesourcesofconflictU. nityis a nationaldesire,nota
preconditionforthe nationitself.This is an errorcommonlymade not
onlybynation-buildertshemselvesw, ho idealize thenationpreciselybe-
cause itpromisesunanimityb,utbycriticsofnationalismas well.Marxists
in particularviewednationalismas an ideologythat"masked"dissentby
paintinga veneer of nationalunityover "real"class divisions.It was the
great(and, forMarxistse,xasperating)successofnationalismthatitcre-
ated a "falseconsciousness"in themasses.

Thisfocuson "consciousnessw" henanalyzingnationalismisstilla com-
monone. As PrasenjitDuara has pointedout,thebiggunsofrecenttheo-
rizingon thenationlikeErnestGellnerand BenedictAndersonalso focus
on nationalidentityas a "distinctivme ode of consciousness:the nation
as a wholeimaginingitselfto be theunifiedsubjectivityI.n" Duara's view,
though,the nation is not the unifiedproductof collectiveimagination
butis a siteofsignificanti,ndeed oftenheated,contestationabout iden-
tityand power.The problemwithmostearliertheoriesaboutnationalism,
he claims,isthe"generalpostulateofa cohesivesubjectivity."5I0fullyagree
withDuara's moveawayfromAndersonand Gellnerand withRogersBru-
baker'ssimilarcall to focusmoreupon thenationas a "categoryofprac-
tice"95'thanupon statesofconsciousnessor propertiesofcollectivities.

The nation,likeall politicalfields,is an arenawheremultiplesubjec-
tivitiesand multiplebehaviorsinteractwithincertainparameters.They
playaccordingto a shortlistof rules,a set of governingideals. Among
theseis theidea thatcentral"national"institutionosughttosupersedelo-
cal powerstructurest,hebeliefthatno membersofthenationshouldpos-
sessspecial rightsand privilegesthatothermembersdo not possess,and
thenotionthata historical,territorializecdommunityis thelegitimizing
politicalforcein thecountryF. inallya,s Moon suggestst,hereliestheidea
thatcitizensmustbe politicalactors.

To get to theheartofquestionsrelatingto thenation,thereforew, e
mustanswerthequestionofhowpoliticalactionis framed.It is here that
Moon'sargumentis weakestin regardto RussianbehaviorduringWorld
WarI. He arguesthatthesimultaneousmutiniesoftheFrenchand Rus-
sianarmiesin 1917werefundamentalldyissimilarc,itingLeonard Smith's
conclusionthatthe Frenchmutinywas primarilya politicalcontestbe-
tween"citizen-soldiersa"nd theircommanderswhilethedisintegrationof
the Russian armywas precipitatedby peasant-mutineerasnd deserters
whowere "primarilyconcernedwiththeirowninterestsas peasants"and
"had onlya veryweaklydeveloped senseofnationalconsciousness."5H2 e
derivesthisconclusionfromAllanWildman'smagisteriasltudyofthearmy
in 1917,butI read WildmanmuchdifferentltyhanMoon does. Wildman

50. PrasenjitDuara, "HistoricizingNational Identityo, r Who Imagines What and
When,"in GeoffEleyand Ronald GrigorSuny,eds.,BecominNgational:A Reader(Oxford,
1996), 152-53.

51. RogersBrubaker,NationalismReframedN:ationhooadnd theNationalQuestionin the
NewEurope(Cambridge,Eng., 1996), 21.

52. Moon, "PeasantsintoRussianCitizens?"45, 47.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 281

argued thatRodzianko elicited cheers fromsoldiersin 1917 when he
appealed to a "newMotherRussia,"thatpeasantsoldiersin 1917 "keenly
sensed theirownpowerto impose changes,"and thattheirbreaches of
disciplinewereconnectedalmostwhollywithsuspicionsthattheirofficers
wereviolatingthe popular will. "This Revolution,"Wildmanconcludes,
"shouldbe regardedas the conquest bythe massesof undividedSoviet
power,therealizationoftheirvisionofdirectdemocracywithoutcompro-
miseswiththepropertiedelements,and theimmediateexecutionofthe
agenda oftheRevolutionon land,peace, and workers'controlofindus-
try."5T3hese conclusionshardlyseem to fitwiththepictureofparochial,
prepoliticalpeasant-soldiers.54

Moon wiselydid notpresshisargumentthatsoldiersactedparochially
as peasantsbut moved on to assertthatitwas the peasantsleftat home
whoweremostimportantin 1917and thereforde eserveprimaryattention.
Here again,though,he is on shakyground.He acknowledgesthatduring
thewarthere"werecases ofpeasantslynchinglandownerswithGerman
surnames,claimingthattheyweretraitorsa,nd seizingidlelandinorderto
increasefoodproductionforthewareffort,b"uthe claimsthatthese'jus-
tificationsw"ereself-serving"T: he notionsofgoingwithouttosupportthe
nation'swareffortor 'diggingforvictoryw' ouldnothave metwithmuch
resonancein theRussiancountrysideduringtheFirstWorldWar,unless
peasantscould see some advantageforthemselves."55

In thefirsptlace,ithardlymatterws hetherthe'justificationsw"ereself-
servingor not.Ifwe disqualifyall nationswhose"rules"havebeen manip-
ulatedbyself-interesteadctors,thena greatmanyscholarsofthenation
willgo hungryI.ndeed,we mightarguethatmanipulationprovebs oththe
ubiquityof the nationas a politicalfieldand the need to appeal to it to
makepoliticalclaims.The powerofideology,nationalideologyincluded,
liesnotin inspiringbeliefbutin structurinagction.AsV'aclavHavel once
noted about a somewhatdifferentideo-politicalstructure,"individuals
need not believe in all these [ideological] mystificationbsu, t theymust
behave as though theydid.... It is enough for them to have accepted
theirlifewithitand in it.Forbythisveryfact,individualsconfirmthesys-
tem,fulfiltlhesystemm, ake thesystema,rethesystem."56

In thesecond place, Moon adduces no evidenceto supporthisclaim
thatthe"notionofgoingwithouttosupportthenation'swareffortw" ould
havebeen alien toruralRussians.Forgood reason,too,sinceLarsLih,in
the mostextensivestudyof ruralattitudestowardproductionand con-

53. Wildman,End oftheRussianImperiaAl rmy1,95-96, 375, 379, 380.
54. Moon conscientiouslyacknowledgeshere thathis interpretation"conflictws ith
some recentworkon the evolutionof Russiannationalidentityamong peasants,"citing
theworkofA. V Buganovon collectivememoryandJeffreByrookson popular literature
in particularH. e deals withtheformerbyagreeingwithDavid Ransel'scriticismthatBu-
ganovhad a weakconceptualizationofnationalconsciousnessand withthelatterbyclaim-
ing thatBrooksinadequatelydealtwith"thecriticalanalyticalproblemof recreatingthe
attitudesofthereadersratherthanthecontentofwhattheyread."Moon, "Peasantsinto
RussianCitizens?"47.
55. Ibid.,49.
56. VaclavHavel, OpenLettersS:electeWd riting1s,965-1990 (NewYork,1992), 136.

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282 Slavic Review
sumptionduringWorldWarI, claimsthat"inlinewiththeviewofthestate
as essentiallya protector,the peasant producersmade a sharp distinc-
tion betweengraindeliveriesforthe armyand deliveriesforthe town.
The peasantsunderstoodthenecessityofsupplyingthearmybygivingup
hisgrainwithoutcompensation,buttheysawno such necessityto supply
thetown."57

Lih's addendum to thisclaim highlightsthe essentialdifferencebe-
tweenmyanalysisand Moon's:"Thisattitudeexasperatedfood-supplyoffi-
cials,whoobviouslyfeltthepeasantsweretoo backwardtograspthatsup-
plyingthecitieswasa civicdutyon a parwithsupplyingthearmy."5T8he
progressivep,atrioticfood-supplyofficialsju, st liketheprogressivep,atri-
oticmilitaryreformerws ho blamed peasant parochialismforthe loss of
thewar,assumedthatbecause manyruralRussiansdid notagreewiththeir
visionofthenation,theydidnothavea visionofthenation.The Russianre-
formersM, oon, and indeedWeberhimselfall presumedthatsincethena-
tionrequiresunityt,hepreconditionfortheriseofthenationis urbanity.
Anythingelse is "backward"or "pre-political."

Even more problematicallyt,hese nationalistsand theoristsall as-
sumedthatnationalunityalso impliedloyaltyto thegovernmentB. utthe
nationalpoliticalformdoes not requireagreementor loyaltye,itherbe-
tweensegmentsofthepopulationorbetweencitizensand theregime.In-
deed, thenationbydefinitionopens up thisspace ofcontestationi:fthe
politicalcommunityis separatefromtheregime,thentheremustalways
be thepossibilitythatmembersofthatcommunityi,ndividuallyor collec-
tivelyw, illmake theclaimthatotherpoliticalactorsdo notrepresentthe
"true"politicalwillofthecommunityW. hatis importantis nota "unified
subjectivityb"ut theframeworkof politicalaction.

To understandthatframeworkin regardto 1914,we need to under-
standtherelationshipbetweenmassmobilizationand the emergenceof
a nation.Brubakerprovidesa clue withhis argumentthatwe should re-
gard "nationness"as "an event... somethingthatsuddenlycrystallizes
ratherthangraduallydevelops,as a contingentc, onjuncturallyfluctuat-
ing,and precariousframeofvisionand basisforindividualand collective
action,ratherthanas a relativelystableproductof deep developmental
trendsin economy,polity,or culture."59This is Brubaker'smostoriginal
contributionto theliteratureon thenation,and itis implicitlycriticalof
earlierapproaches (likeGellner'sand Weber's)thattreatedthenationas
one of the manyby-productsof industrializationand "modernization."

I prefera physicalratherthana chemicalmetaphor.Nationnessis an
event,but it is a kineticeventthatrequiresthe buildingup ofpotential
energybeforehand.Nationnessis bothan eventthatsuddenlycrystallizes
andone thatis theproductofdeep developmentaltrends.Itisnot,there-
fore,thatAnderson,Gellner,and Weberarewrongtopointto theimpor-
tanceofprint-capitalismin,dustrializationr,ailroadbuilding,and military
conscriptionas factorsin nationformationb, ut thattheydo not exhaust

57. Lars Lih,BreadandAuthoritiynRussia,1914-1921 (Berkeley,1990), 71.
58. Ibid.
59. Brubaker,NationalismReframed1,9.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 283

thatanalysis.The compression and homogenization ofspace and time,the
increase in literacyratesand awareness of the outside world,the economic
integration with other communities, and the construction of a national
literature are all factorsthat built tremendous potential national energy
throughoutEurope and theAmericas in the nineteenth century.But these
processes in themselvesdid not "build" nations. They built up the poten-
tial formass national politics. The nation would not emerge until thatpo-
tential formass national political action was mobilized, made kinetic.

Those processes that built up national potential happened in Russia
as theydid in westernEurope, though a bit later and not quite as compre-
hensively.Moon, indeed, spends the second halfof his article provingjust
this point. He outlines withgreat subtletyand knowledge the muted way
in which the great "nation-building" institutionsformed and developed
in Russia after the Great Reforms. Railways and rural-urban migration
had an "undeniable impact on at least sections of the peasantry,"but peas-
ant societyand culture proved resilient,and as a result only "a verysmall
proportion of peasant-migrants assimilated to urban culture." Primary
schools and literacycourses came to the village, but those schools "failed
to achieve the state's objective of 'civilising' peasant children and giving
them a 'heavy dose of patriotism' . . . in spite of theireducation and liter-
acy, they remained peasants." Universal militaryconscription was intro-
duced, but onlya minorityofpossible conscriptswere actuallydrafted.Cit-
ingJohn Bushnell, he claims that because even those men drafted spent
much of their active dutyworkingaccording to peasant cycleswithinthe
regimental economy it was "scarcely credible that militaryservice could
have done much to reshape peasant mentality."In short,he claims that"in
Russia the rural population 'peasantised' the veryfactorsthat,in Weber's
argument, served as the 'agencies of change' which acted as conduits for
the transmissionof national culture to the French peasantry.."60

But whyshould "peasantization" preclude the building up of potential
national energy?The answer, as I suggested above, is thatMoon and We-
ber both implicitlyassumed thatnationness is essentiallyurban. Moon ac-
knowledged thatWeber took a great deal of criticismon precisely thisis-
sue fromscholars likeJames Lehning, who stressedthatpeasants were not
passive recipients of change and argued thatthe institutionsidentifiedby
Weber were not so much sitesof one-waypeasant assimilation as theywere
sitesof "culturalcontact."'6'But Moon does not followthrough on the im-
plication of this revision, namely that in other contexts peasant culture
mightprove strongerand more influentialthan it had in France and that
the question of whether these institutionswere predominantly urban or
rural is farless important than the fact that a site of cultural negotiation
had been opened up. Though institutionsmayhave been 'peasantized' in
Russia, thisdoes not implythat theywere therebyrendered nonnational.

Moon is on much firmerground, though,in his concluding section. He
argues there, on the basis of works by Scott Seregny,Francis Wcislo, and

60. Moon, "PeasantsintoRussianCitizens?"55- 67.
61. JamesR. Lehning,PeasantandFrenchC: ulturalContactin RuralFranceduringthe
NineteentChentury(Cambridge,Eng., 1995).

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284 Slavic Review
David Macey,thatit was not the peasantrythatimpeded the formation
of the Russiannation,but stateofficialsP. artof theblame laywithwell-
meaningreformisotfficialswho wantedto integrateruralRussiansinto
politicallifebutfailedto articulatetheirvisionto the "masses."The real
barriersto nation-formationth, ough,weretheconservativestateofficials
who fearedan activepopulace and scuttledplans forformalincorpora-
tionofpeasantsintonationalpoliticalstructurews henevertheycould. "It
wasnot,"Moon concludes,"thatpeasantswereunawareofnationalpoli-
ticsin the yearsof the constitutionalexperiment;theywere excluded
fromparticipatingin themin anymeaningfuwl ay."62

The potentialnationalenergyi,n otherwords,had been builtup, but
since mostruralRussianscould not act nationally,thatenergyhad not
been made kineticM. orepreciselyt,hatenergyhad notbeen made kinetic
on a mass scale. The politicallymobilizingeventsfamiliarin otherhis-
toricalcircumstancesm, ostnotablyvoting,but also participationin so-
called civilsocietyor in tradeunions,neveroccurredon a massscale in
Russia prior to 1914. Several partiallymobilizingeventshad occurred
in thelateimperialperiod,mostnotablyin 1904-05, butthenine partial
dmisilciotnartyimnouboiulsiz,aantdiobnesdfuurdidnlgetdhsoeRciualssaon-dJpapolainteicsWaelmarorbeiplilzicatatioendtsohveejerrtkhye ,
same period.

Partof the reason forthe "failures"of these mobilizations,perhaps
thelargestpart,wasideological.No shiftofpoliticalframesoccurspain-
lesslyorsmoothlya,nd Russiain 1905wasno exception.Partofthereason
forthe disjointednatureof the eventsin 1905 was uncertaintyregard-
ingthemosteffectivoer mostappealingframeforpoliticalaction.As Gen-
eral A. N. Kuropatkin,the ministerof war and commanderof Russian
forcesduringthe firsthalfof the Russo-JapaneseWar,worriedlynoted:
"beliefin God, devotionto theTsar, [and] love of theFatherland"were
thefactorsthathad previouslymade the "uneducatedpeasantry... fear-
less and obedient,but these principleshave latterlybeen much shaken
amongstthepeople."63Likewise,FatherGapon'sanguishedcryon Bloody
Sundaythat"thereis no tsar"signalednot so much the end of a naive
monarchistconsciousnessas theincapacitationof themonarchistpoliti-
cal frameworkt,hefailureofwhichwasfeltevenat (perhapsespeciallyat)
thehighestlevelofthepoliticalelite.64Withtheold frameworkcrippled,
thecontestwason between1905 and 1914 forone to replaceit.

In themilitaryt,hatcontestwasgraduallybeingwonbyyoungmilitary
reformercsonvincedthatthe loomingwarwould be a massivetotalwar.
Modernwar,theyargued,could onlybe won bysoldiersimbuedwitha
civicspiritw, itha senseofinitiativei,ndependence,and witha strongdose
of masculinevigor.They turnedimmediatelyto the citizen-soldiersof
westernEurope as theirmodel. Even more important,theyrecognized

62. Moon, "PeasantsintoRussianCitizens?"68-73.
63. General [A. N.] Kuropatkin,TheRussianArmyand theJapaneseWar,trans.A. B.
Lindsay,2 vols. (London, 1909), 1:296.
64. The definitivwe orkon theideologicalcrisisamong Russianelitesin thisperiod
is AndrewM. Verner,The CrisisofRussianAutocracyN:icholasII and the1905 Revolution
(Princeton,1990).

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 285

thatthe coming warwould be won on the home frontas surelyas itwould
be on the battlefield.In the words of one of these reformers,"preparation
forwar must come fromall cornersw, iththeefforotfeveryonea,nd withall the
moraland materialstrengthosfthestate... we must prepare forwar,not only
in the purelymilitarysense, but also fromthe point of view of societyf,rom
the point ofviewofpolitics,and finally,in the broadeconomicsense".65 These
vibrant reformers articulated their vision of the militarized nation to
other influentialsocial and political actors,most notablyAleksandr Guch-
kov,the leader of the Octobrist Party,who spoke oftenin the Duma about
the need forarmyand societyto become national in nature.66

As a resultof thisbroader shiftin Russian politics,the outbreak ofwar
in 1914 was marked byintensive and extensive mobilization. The military
mobilization in Julywas the firstgeneral mobilization of reserve armed
forces in Russian history,and itwas followed by mobilization in nearlyall
realms of social life,frommedical care to economic production to sports
activities.From the start,thismobilization was political, massive, and con-
tentious.Patrioticrallies and draftriotstook place in the same small towns
across the empire in lateJuly,sometimes on consecutive days.67The mobi-
lization was thereforemultidirectional,but people were politicallyactive.

They acted, moreover, within the same political framework,because
the war itselfprovided the context for all the mobilization activityA. s we
saw in the passage fromKuchernigo, the warwas understood not as a fight
between indeterminate enemies and parochial Viatskiebut within the
frameworkof a broad community,as a fightbetween Russians and Ger-
mans. This was so not simplybecause of a general awareness on the part
of rural Russians about possible international conflicts,but more specifi-
cally because of the stridentlynational militarytrainingthat the vast ma-
jorityof reservistshad received during the ascendancy ofyoung reformers
in the militaryestablishmentin the yearsbetween 1905 and 1914. That re-
serve base was comprised of young men, and itwas a good deal more lit-
erate than the population as a whole. Only 36.7 percent of the young men
inducted in 1909 were illiterate,and that number was dropping by more
than 1 percent a year. In 1912, 32.6 percent could neither read nor write,
a number high by late twentieth-centurystandards, but quite in line with
early twentieth-centurystandards.68When the United States conducted a
draftof itsyoung men in 1917, forinstance, 24.9 percent were illiterate.69

65. Col. A. G. Elchaninov,Vedeniseovremennyvkohinyi boia (lektsiia)(St. Petersburg,
1909), 12, 13. Emphasisin theoriginal.

66. See A. I. Guchkov,K voprosuogosudarstvennoobioroneR:echiv Gosudarstvenndouime
tret'iagsoozyva1908-1912 gg. (Petrograd,1915).

67. See the1August1914reportfromNizhegorodincludedin "O bezporiadkakhna
sbornykhpunktakhvovremiamobilizatsii,r"eportfromDepartmentofPolice to theMVD
ConscriptionAdministration1,914,RGIA,f.1292,op. 1,d. 1729,11.106-7.

68. These statisticisnJoshuaA. Sanborn,"DraftingtheNation:MilitaryConscription
and the Formationof a Modern Polityin Tsaristand SovietRussia,1905-1925" (Ph.D.
diss.,UniversityofChicago, 1998), 541. These are literacyratesat the timeofinduction.
Readingclassesin thearmyitselfmeantthatbythetimea soldierleftthearmyhe wasstill
lesslikelyto be illiterate.

69. Meirionand Susie Harries,TheLastDaysofInnocenceA: mericat War,1917-1918
(NewYork,1997), 137.

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286 SlavicReview
Furthermorem, ilitarytrainerws eregivena newsetoftextsthatstressed

theimportanceofinitiativaend independenceforsoldiersand placed the
interestofthe"nation"atleaston a parwiththeinterestofthetsar.Young
junior officerasnd noncommissionedofficerismbibedthisnewethosea-
gerlyM. anyspenta largeamountoftimewithnewrecruitst,rainingthem
in thewaysof thesoldierwithfraternaalffectionratherthanpatriarchal
disdain.70Increasinglyt,heybegan to disparage theirolder colleagues,
wholooked upon militarystudyas a wasteoftimeand upon theirsoldiers
as theirchattel.7E' ven thosesoldierswho had old-styleofficerws erenot
insulatedfromtheinfluenceofnationalisttrainingf,ortheyweretargeted
directlythroughspecial publicationsfor soldierssaturatedwithrefer-
ences to thenationalcommunity.72

It should be noted thatthiscommunitywas not primarilyethnically
definedin 1914.Instead,membersofmanydifferenetthnicgroupstalked
oftheirinclusionina multiethniRc ussian(rossiiskibi)rotherhoodA. mul-
lah in thecityofUral'skprayedwithhisflockfor"all troopcommanders
and soldiers"to "defeattheGermans,thoseopen enemiesofourmother-
land who initiatedthiswaragainstus."73In Riazan' province,thegover-
nor noted thatthe Muslimpopulation responded to the crisisof war
with"a completeconsciousnessoftheimportanceand seriousnessofthe
moment"and thattherewas "no differencebetweenreservistRussians
[russkiea]nd Muslims."74For theseMuslimsand theirethnicallyRussian
Orthodox neighbors,involvementin the common businessof the war
overrodeethnicdifferencea,nd the warwas articulatedas a fightcon-
ducted bythe "people" fortheir"motherland,"quite a differentypeof
wartimeideologyfromthose traditionallyused in autocraticstates,in
whichwaris thebusinessoftherulerfortheruler.75

Evenamongthepopulationsthathad theleastreasontobe concerned
withtheeventsunfoldinginGaliciaand Poland,likenomadsinTurkestan

70. Recent studiesof the competenceofjunior officersand soldiersmore broadly
haveemphasizedtherelativesuccessoftheirtrainingin theyearsbeforeWorldWarI. For
thejudgmentof thepreeminentAmericanhistorianof thetsaristarmyto thiseffects,ee
Bruce Menning,BayonetbseforBeullets:TheImperiaRl ussianArmy1,861-1914 (Blooming-
ton,1992), 273; see alsoJacobKipp,"Mass,Mobilitya,nd theOriginsofSovietOperational
Art,1918-1936,"in Carl W. Reddel,ed., TransformatiionnRussianand SovietMilitaryHis-
tory(WashingtonD, .C., 1990), 94. Despitethedatesin thetitleofKipp'sarticle,he spends
thefirstpages ofhisarticlediscussingthetsaristera.

71. See thecommentsmade byone suchjunior officertoSirAlfredKnox.Knox,With
theRussianArmy2,:452-53. See also the dislikeand scornforold-styleofficersamong
thejunior officerisn Fedor Stepun'sartilleryunitevidentthroughouthiswartimeletters.
F. Stepun,Iz pisempraporshchikaratillerist(Pa rague,n.d.).

72. The mostprolificprivatepublisherforsoldierswas thepublishinghouse ofV A.
Berezovskiiw, hichhad publishedmore than3,000books and severalperiodicalsforsol-
diersby1910. See S. V Belov,"Izdatel'stvoV A. Berezovskogo(Iz istoriiizdaniiavoennoi
literaturvyRossii)," Voenno-istorichezshkuirinal,1989,no. 11:85-90.

73. RGIA,f.821,op. 133,d. 603,1.64ob. (translatedprayerfroma mullahin Ural'sk).
Emphasisadded.

74. RGIA,f.821, op. 133,d. 603, 1.26ob. (letterfromthegovernorofRiazan' prov-
ince toE. V Menkin[chiefoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsD' epartmentofSpiritualAf-
fairs]16 September1914).

75. PeterParet,UnderstandinWgarE: ssaysonClausewitaznd theHistoryofMilitaryPower
(Princeton,1992), 41, 44.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 287

who were stillexempt fromthe draftin 1914, officialsnoted that "every-
one is interestedin the war."76Another officialdealing withdraft-exempt
nomads added thatalthough the Kirgizwere "barelycultured ... and al-
most completely uninterested in questions of statelife,"even theydid not
remain "indifferent"to the "moment ofextremefloweringofpatrioticfeel-
ing thatRussia is experiencing."77

As in all the belligerent countries of the Great War, mobilized par-
ticipation in general affairswent well beyond men in uniform.In Russia,
as well as in the rest of Europe, the mobilization was especially notewor-
thyamong women, who had had farfeweropportunities to transformtheir
potential energy into kinetic energy.78Over the course of the war, both
civilian men and women activelyworked in charityorganizations, in the
Red Cross, in Zemgor, and in the War-Industrial Committees, and they
became political actors through their economic production, which was
explicitlylinked to the war effort.7T9he war mobilized and framed nearly
all political action. Not all political frameworksmarked bymass mobiliza-
tion are national in theirparticularities (that is, not all posit a territorial-
ized cultural communitythatconferslegitimacyupon a ruli'ngregime and
in which all communitymembers are formallyequal in status), but most
have been.

Russian political practice during the war was certainlynational in its
particularities,a factmost clearlyseen in mobilizational material. Here a
significantchange had occurred in the years between the Russo-Japanese
War and the outbreak ofWorld War I. The officialarmycatechism during
the Russo-Japanese War, as Kuropatkin attested, had been that soldiers
served for "Faith,Tsar, and Fatherland," but the mobilizational literature
during the Great War paid farmore attention to the people (narod) and
the motherland. Here isjust one example of many:

The typeofpeople determinesthetypeofarmyL. et ourenemiessaywhat
theywantaboutus,butin difficulttimesforthemotherlandt, heRussian
narodis alwaysable to provethatitis a greatnarod,thata blazingflame
burnsin the Russianspiritwithall thatis good, blessed,and excellent,
and thatthereis somethingtherethatis strong.... In orderto feeland
toactthisway,one mustbe a heroin spiritand notonlyfearnothing,but
also have a heartthatbeatswitha hotloveforthemotherlandf, orone's
comradesin arms,and forpeople in general.80

76. RGIA,f.821,op. 133,d. 603,1.77 (letterfromSaltykov[militaryveterinarian]to
thegovernor-generaolfTurkestans,ecret,1 November1914).

77. RGIA,f.821,op. 133,d. 603,1.102 (letterfromthedirectoroftheChancelleryof
theSteppe Regionto E. V.Menkin,28 November1914).

78. The literatureon women'smobilizationand WorldWarI is large and growing.
See, forinstance,MargaretRandolphHigonnetet al., eds.,BehindtheLines:Genderand the
TwoWorldWars(New Haven, 1987); AngelaWoollacott,On HerTheirLivesDepend:Muni-
tionsWorkeirns theGreatWar(Berkeley,1994).

79. See here especiallyLih, Breadand Authoritiyn Russia,Semina, Tragediiarusskoi
armii,and LewisH. Siegelbaum,ThePoliticosfIndustriaMl obilizatioinnRussia,1914-17: A
StudyoftheWar-IndustriCeosmmitte(eNsewYork,1983).

80. "Nasha slava,"publicationof Sel'skiivestniki,ncluded in RGIA,f. 821, op. 133,
d. 603,11.40, 43.

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288 Slavic Review
Nor was this simply the way that propagandists framed questions of

political action and political loyalty.Regardless of ethnicity,soldiers spoke
of fightingtogether withina multiethnic brotherhood. Even when com-
plaints were voiced in private letters,recruitsusually framed their anger
in termsof disappointed promise, as one Muslim soldier's intercepted let-
ter revealed:

the Russianshave clergymenin warwho administerthe sacramentsto
theirsoldiers,butforus Muslimsthereisnothing.Theydon'tassignmul-
lahs to us,notwithstandingthefactthatmorethanhalfthesoldiers[in
theunit] are Muslim,who die withoutmullahs,and who are buriedto-
getherwithRussiansin a singlegrave.I thinkwe shouldbringthisto the
attentionofthegovernment.8'
Again, the idea that questions of ethnic relations and cultural respect
should be mediated by the central government is a crucial one, for it
reflectsthe fact that even those Russian citizens who were traditionally
classed as outsiders and were the victimsof discriminationwithinimperial
society often considered themselves part of a single political community
withall the many ethnic groups thatwere ruled by the imperial state.
I have intentionallyused evidence gathered fromthe peripheryof the
countryin the last fewparagraphs to show that the idea of a multiethnic
nation flourishedeven in areas thatwere not ethnicallyRussian, where the
project ofpropagating a national idea was hardest,and where the presence
of a discriminatoryimperial ideology among ethnic Russians was stronger
than itwas in the center of the country.The evidence fromcentral locales
is quite similar.
As we saw earlier in this essay, the theme of fairness dominated the
popular response to mobilization and the war,as regular reservistsand ci-
vilians alike articulated theirfeeling thateveryRussian citizen should bear
an equal burden and that the tsarand government had to serve the army
ratherthan the otherwayround. Both the theme of the equality ofcitizens
and the idea thatstateswere the servantsofterritorializedculturalcommu-
nities were national ones, and both were ubiquitous in public discourse
throughout the war.82From throughout the empire, the complaints were
the same and echoed thisone:
YourExcellencyT. hroughoutKievprovince,and maybethroughoutRus-
sia,thereisatpresenta massofpeople evadingtheirdutybeforeThrone
and Fatherlandbyanypossiblemeans.... Atpresentanyonewhodoesn't
wanttoservein thetroopsserveson therailroad.On therailroads,guards
are freed(I don'tknowwhatthey'reguarding),portersare freed(I don't
knowwho they'reopeningdoorsforat present),guardsforrailroadgar-
dens,gardeners,assistantsa,nd others(I don'tknowwhocan thinkabout
gardensata timelikethis,and anywaythegardenwouldn'tdie ifthegar-
dener leftitfora halfyearor a year).And anywaythe "necessary"Rus-
81. RGIA,f.821, op. 133,d. 603,1.89 (letterfromKazan' governorto E. V Menkin,
10 November1914).
82. For a more detailed explorationof thistopic,see JoshSanborn,"Conscription,
Correspondence,and Politicsin Late ImperialRussia,"RussianHistory/HistoRiruesse24,
nos. 1-2 (Spring-Summer1997): 27-40.

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TheMobilizationof1914 and theQuestionoftheRussian Nation 289

sianpublicislivinginclover,and evenallowsitselftoreproachthosewho
wentto thewar... I cannotin myheartblame governmentcirclesfor
this,butI wantjust to tellyouthis,YourExcellency.
The "wivesof reservists"who authored thisletterwrote in conclusion that
they relied on "His Excellency's fairness,as all Russian people do. The
whole Russian narod will stand in the ranks of the army,not even exclud-
ing cripples, to defend against the enemy,but onlywhen fairnessis seen in
everything."83It bears noting as an aside that the ideal of national equal-
itywas expressed partiallyin a class keyin thisletter.These women artic-
ulated their anger at the "necessary"public thatwas better able to avoid
induction into the army,but could not yet,in 1915, "blame government
circles" forthe chicanery of wealthycitizens. That hesitancywould disap-
pear over the next twoyears.
In sum, the extant evidence related to social response to the 1914 mo-
bilization supports ratherdifferentconclusions than those thathave here-
tofore dominated the historical literature. "Russia" did not go offto war
patriotically,nor was there unanimitywithinsociologically defined groups
about the wisdom of the war effortP. atriotsand protesterswere present in
all walks of Russian lifein 1914.
The factof dissent, however,does not implythat the other major pil-
lar of the dominant paradigm, the lack of a sense of national identityon
the part of Russian peasants, holds firm.In fact,quite the opposite is the
case, forwhen we look at how thatdissentwas expressed byrural Russians,
we find that it was framed in "national" terms,not local ones. Country
dwellers turned to central stateinstitutionswithcomplaints, constantlyre-
ferredto the need to protect the "interestsof state"in theirdenunciations
of their shirkingneighbors, articulated an ideal of civic equality,and ap-
pealed to a historical,territorializedcommunityas the legitimizingpoliti-
cal forcein the country.That relativelynew sense ofthe nation as the dom-
inant frameworkof political practice in the land grewstrongerduring the
war,and the antinational autocracy weakened correspondingly.The final
fallof the monarchy in 1917 and the withdrawalof the soldiers froma war
that had been unpopular from its inception were therefore signs of the
tangible presence of the Russian nation, not of itsabsence.
83. RGIA,f.1292,op. 7, d. 298,1.125 (letterfrom"wivesofreservistsT"at'iana lare-
menko,SinklatiaBozheiko,and SerafimaTotskaia[fromRadomysl']to ministerofinter-
nal affairs8, October 1915).

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