Effectiveness of international environmental regimes ...

Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: PERSPECTIVE
Existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and
research strategies

Oran R. Young1
Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-5131

Edited by William C. Clark, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, and approved November 2, 2011 (received for review July 28, 2011)

International environmental regimes—especially those regimes articulated in multilateral environmental agreements—have been
a subject of intense interest within the scientific community over the last three decades. However, there are substantial differences of
opinion regarding the effectiveness of these governance systems or the degree to which they are successful in solving the problems
leading to their creation. This article provides a critical review of the literature on this topic. It extracts and summarizes what is known
about the effectiveness of environmental regimes in the form of a series of general and specific propositions. It identifies promising topics
for consideration in the next phase of research in this field. Additionally, it comments on the research strategies available to pursue
this line of analysis. The general conclusions are that international environmental regimes can and do make a difference, although
often in conjunction with a number of other factors, and that a strategy of using a number of tools combined can help to improve
understanding of the determinants of success.

| | | |institution problem solving fit interplay scale

A common observation among efficacy or relative failure of other regimes regimes. The second step centers on
those people concerned with created to deal with large-scale environ- identifying and discussing the most im-
solving environmental prob- mental problems is equally evident. portant things that we have learned about
lems and more generally, pro- Prominent examples include the climate the determinants of institutional effec-
moting sustainability in human–envi- regime, the arrangement created to com- tiveness. Step three features an exploration
ronment relations is that governance sys- bat desertification, and some (but not all) of cutting-edge themes or areas ripe for
tems work relatively well at the national of the regional fisheries management re- increased attention on the part of
level but poorly or not at all in efforts to gimes. Many regimes fall between these researchers going forward. The fourth
solve international, transnational, and es- polar categories. They achieve a measure step turns to a discussion of the tools
pecially, global problems (1).* Although of effectiveness, although it is often hard available for tackling these themes and
the state is a positive force in managing to place them precisely along a continuum recommends strategies likely to produce
natural resources and regulating pollution ranging from total failure to clear-cut policy-relevant results. The article high-
in domestic settings, the anarchic charac- success. Cases that fit this description in- lights findings about the determinants of
ter of international society treated as a clude the regime dealing with pollution of effectiveness in environmental regimes
society of sovereign states constitutes a the sea from ships, the regime focusing on that are relevant to efforts to strengthen
barrier to successful governance at the pollution in the North Sea, the regime existing regimes or create new ones. The
international level. However, both ele- governing trade in endangered species, take-home message is one of cautious
ments of this argument are open to ques- and the regime articulated in the Great optimism. There is much that we can do to
tion. Failures to tackle environmental Lakes Water Quality Agreement. Not add to our understanding of the effec-
problems effectively, much less to achieve surprisingly, some regimes are successful tiveness of international environmental
sustainability in human–environment re- for a time but subsequently decline or regimes, despite the impacts of some ob-
lations, are common not only in societies even collapse (e.g., the regime for North vious as well as some more subtle limi-
facing severe problems of poverty and Pacific fur seals), whereas others are tations on the methods available for
hunger or saddled with the curse of natu- slow to gain traction but become more pursuing this goal.
ral resources but also in advanced in- effective with the passage of time (e.g.,
dustrial societies (3). Although efforts to the transboundary air pollution regime Author contributions: O.R.Y. designed research, performed
address the grand challenges of climate in Europe). research, and wrote the paper.
change, loss of biological diversity, and
degradation of ecosystem services leave a How can we account for this mixed re- The author declares no conflict of interest.
great deal to be desired, international en- cord in efforts to address problems of en-
vironmental governance does not present vironmental governance in international This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
a uniform picture of failure. society? Are there identifiable factors that
contribute to success or cause failure? Can 1E-mail: [email protected].
Some international environmental gov- we formulate conclusions that will be of
ernance systems or as they are commonly interest both to those people responsible *Some observers adopt a more radical stance, asserting
called, international regimes are success- for implementing the provisions of envi- that the existing approach to environmental governance,
ful in the sense that they contribute to ronmental regimes and those people en- which emphasizes distinct initiatives at different levels of
solving international problems. Arrange- gaged in efforts either to strengthen social organization and focuses on intergovernmental
ments widely regarded as effective in these existing arrangements or create entirely agreements at the international level, is fundamentally
terms include the regime created to protect new ones? In this article, I address these flawed and bound to fail (2).
the stratospheric ozone layer, the gover- questions in four steps. The first step
nance system applicable to Antarctica, and involves conceptual and definitional issues; †There are dissenters even in these cases. Some people see
the multilateral arrangement established to it focuses on clarifying the meaning of ef- evidence that countries have reduced emissions of chlor-
clean up the Rhine River.† The lack of fectiveness with regard to environmental ofluorocarbons voluntarily and point to the fact that heal-
ing the ozone layer will take decades (4). Others
emphasize the role of nonregime factors in the effort to
clean up the Rhine and comment on the slow pace of
negotiations in this case (5, 6).

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What Do We Mean by Effectiveness? we want to compare the actual course of arguably reflecting skeptical attitudes to
events regarding the relevant problem governance systems common among
The concept of effectiveness as applied to with what would have happened in the economists, typically raise doubts about
environmental regimes is complex and no-regime counterfactual. Although this the roles that regimes play. The large N
subject to a variety of formulations (7, 8). comparison is easier to do with regard to studies have sought to move beyond this
Perhaps the core concern is the extent to some measures of effectiveness (e.g., out- divide, endeavoring to discriminate among
which regimes contribute to solving or puts) than others (e.g., problem solving), cases in which regimes matter a lot or
mitigating the problems that motivate documenting the consequences resulting a little and seeking to identify the deter-
those people who create the regimes (9). from the creation and operation of a re- minants of success and failure.
However, there are other ways of thinking gime is always demanding. Additionally,
about effectiveness that are both less regimes invariably operate in complex General Findings. Although it may be a source
ambitious and more ambitious than this settings in which a variety of other forces of frustration to those people hoping for
focus on problem solving. Less ambitious are at work. Separating the signal attrib- simple generalizations regarding the
conceptions of effectiveness direct atten- utable to the operation of a regime determinants of effectiveness, differ-
tion to what are known as (i) outputs or from the noise associated with a variety of ences in the findings flowing from the
regulations and infrastructure created to other forces at work at the same time is three bodies of evidence are under-
move a regime from paper to practice and a difficult task. I will discuss tools available standable. In virtually every case, a re-
(ii) outcomes or changes in the behavior to those people endeavoring to address gime constitutes only one of a number of
of actors relevant to the problem at hand these issues in the last section of this distinct but interacting forces influencing
(10). Success in these terms does not article on methods available to those the course of human–environment rela-
guarantee progress in solving the relevant people seeking to augment our current tions. What is notable is that there are
problems. More ambitious conceptions understanding of the effectiveness of re- some general findings about the effec-
seek to assess the performance of regimes gimes. Suffice it to say for now that some tiveness of environmental regimes arising
relative not only to the probable course differences of opinion regarding the ef- from the research carried out so far. In
of events in their absence (i.e., the no- fectiveness of regimes are more apparent this subsection, I comment on what seem
regime counterfactual) but also to some than real in the sense that they are arti- to me to be the most important of these
conception of an ideal outcome known as facts of the definitions of effectiveness findings.
the collective optimum. The effectiveness selected or the procedures used to evalu- Some regimes matter in the sense that they
of a regime (E) is then measurable as ate effectiveness rather than substantive
the location of actual performance (AP) disagreements about the actual perfor- make a (sometimes sizable) difference not only
on the spectrum ranging between the mance of specific regimes.
no-regime counterfactual (NR) and the in terms of outputs and outcomes but also in
collective optimum (CO) or (Eq. 1) What Do We Know About Effectiveness?
terms of solving the problems that lead to
E ¼ AP − NNRR: [1] Scientists understandably focus on cutting- their creation. It is easy to overestimate the
CO − edge questions that constitute the frontiers success of environmental regimes. Quan-
of research in their areas of interest, titative case studies, rooted in a rational
Normalizing this equation by setting NR a practice that directs attention to issues choice paradigm, have suggested that key
equal to zero and CO equal to one pro- that we do not understand or at least, do actors may reduce emissions of ozone-
duces a way to compare and contrast the not understand well. However, in this depleting substances or airborne pollutants
effectiveness of different regimes on discussion of the current state of knowl- voluntarily, that nonregime factors may
a common scale that is conceptually at- edge regarding the effectiveness of envi- account for as much or more of the success
tractive but hard to operationalize (11–14). ronmental regimes, it is appropriate to in dealing with water pollution as the
begin with an account of what we have operation of the regime, and that actual
Several other aspects of effectiveness learned so far about this subject. I address outcomes fall short of the collective opti-
deserve notice at the outset. A regime’s this topic under three headings: general mum in most cases. However, in-depth
participants may differ both in the impor- findings about effectiveness, findings about qualitative case studies, making extensive
tance that they attach to the problem and specific determinants of success, and use of procedures like process tracing and
in the way that they frame it for consid- findings about institutional interplay. thick description, have concluded that
eration in policy forums. Those people regimes have contributed to the de-
who create regimes may harbor unstated Three distinct bodies of evidence de- velopment of social practices that have
goals that differ significantly from those serve attention in assessing this subject: played important roles in dealing with long-
goals spelled out in constitutive docu- qualitative case studies typically carried out range transboundary air pollution in
ments. The effectiveness of regimes may by analysts trained as political scientists Europe (16), the depletion of the strato-
vary through time. Some regimes go from (15–19), quantitative case studies most spheric ozone layer (17), the control of
strength to strength with the passage of often produced by analysts with a back- pollution in the North Sea (18), and the
time. Others are relatively ineffective at ground in economics (4, 20–23), and management of commercial fisheries in
quantitative analyses that seek to develop the Barents Sea (19). In an effort to
the outset but gain strength over time or generalizations about effectiveness draw- reconcile these findings, several teams
vice versa. Many of those people seeking ing on evidence from sizable universes of of researchers have created databases
to assess the effectiveness of regimes add cases (24–26). The conclusions emerging containing sufficiently large numbers of
other measures of success to the core from these bodies of evidence overlap, cases to allow for the development of
concern of problem solving, including but they are not entirely compatible. empirical generalizations about the effec-
economic efficiency, various measures of Those people who have carried out the tiveness of environmental regimes. The
fairness or equity, some criterion of sus- qualitative case studies, perhaps reflecting work by Miles et al. (24), drawing on
tainability or resilience, and one or more a positive attitude to political institutions a dataset including 37 cases, reports that
considerations embedded in the idea of common among political scientists, tend 50% of these regimes produced behavioral
good governance (8). to find evidence of the significance of changes and 35% played a significant
regimes in addressing environmental role in terms of problem solving (p. 59 in
Evaluating the effectiveness of environ- problems. The quantitative case studies, ref. 7). The work by Breitmeier et al. (25),
mental regimes is a challenging task under using a dataset encompassing 172 cases,
the best of circumstances (7). In every case,

19854 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111690108 Young

reports that, in situations where problems mulgation and implementation of pre- success. Others are positive, pointing to
improved slightly or considerably, regimes scriptive regulations setting forth factors that are commonly associated
had a significant or very strong influence prohibitions, requirements, and permis- with success.
52% of the time (p. 59 in ref. 7).‡ Envi- sions are important functions of many
ronmental regimes can make a difference. regimes. However, these institutional Active participation on the part of a single domi-
However, they do not always work, and arrangements regularly perform other
they never operate in a vacuum devoid of functions as well (9). Regimes may per- nant actor (commonly known as a hegemon) is not
other causal forces (26). form procedural functions (e.g., setting
Anarchic character of international society is not total allowable catches in fisheries on an a necessary condition for success in solving inter-
annual basis or establishing phase-out national environmental problems. Dominant
always an obstacle to the capacity of regimes to schedules for ozone-depleting substances), actors are important, especially when they
contribute to problem solving. Many observers and they often oversee programmatic value a regime’s products more than the
regard the absence of a government at activities (e.g., carrying out remedial ac- cost of supplying them, making the relevant
the international level as a severe imped- tion plans aimed at alleviating the effects social system what is known as a privileged
iment to the establishment of effective of pollution in lakes or marine systems). group (33). However, the absence of an
regimes, primarily because it rules out the Often overlooked is the function of re- engaged hegemon does not spell failure in
use of enforcement mechanisms of the gimes in generating knowledge about the this realm. What does seem important is
sort that states use to induce their subjects problems to be solved and contributing to the existence of a coalition of influential
to comply with systems of rules and regu- a shared understanding of the issues at actors prepared to take the lead in jump-
lations. Although this lack of government stake among participating actors (25). starting a regime at the outset and to pro-
is certainly a concern in some cases, it vide an extra push at critical junctures along
does not loom large in situations where Environmental regimes are dynamic in the sense the road to success (34).
compliance on the part of most members of
the group is unnecessary, the parties to that they change continually after their initial Success in the implementation of international
environmental agreements have no in- formation. After established, institutional
centive to cheat, factors other than sanc- arrangements do not remain static over regimes is likely to require the establishment
tions in the ordinary sense provide subjects time. Environmental regimes wax and
with good reasons to comply, or various wane in terms of their capacity to solve and maintenance of maximum winning coali-
forms of private or hybrid governance problems. Some take on roles or are
are able to exert pressure on subjects to brought to bear in efforts to address tions rather than minimum winning coalitions.
comply (9, 27). There is no basis for problems that were not on the agenda at Regimes are public goods, although in-
complacency here when it comes to deal- the time of their creation. It is possible dividual members of the group of subjects
ing with the great issues of our times, such to identify a number of patterns that may value them differently. In the extreme,
as climate change and the loss of bi- constitute common pathways of in- some may regard them as public bads.
ological diversity. However, neither is stitutional development and that take the This issue makes it desirable to maximize
there a basis for dismissing the capacity form of emergent properties (32). Some the size of coalitions supporting regimes
of regimes to contribute to solving a range regimes (e.g., the ozone regime) go from rather than form minimum winning coali-
of problems. strength to strength. Others (e.g., the tions of the sort common in domestic
Regime design is often a more significant de- Antarctic Treaty System) develop by fits legislative settings (35). Given the exis-
terminant of effectiveness than some measure and starts in a pattern of punctuated tence of the temptation to free ride,
equilibrium. Still others (e.g., the climate leading actors will have an incentive to
of whether the problem is benign (i.e., easy to regime) run into roadblocks that produce make participation attractive to others
solve) or malign (i.e., hard to solve). Poorly a pattern of arrested development. rather than minimize the number of those
designed regimes can produce disappoint- groups entitled to a share of the joint
ing results, even in cases where problems Success of environmental regimes is highly gains. This finding is particularly true
are straightforward and relatively easy to sensitive to contextual factors. Context mat- where regimes require ongoing im-
solve; well-designed regimes can produce ters as a determinant of the effectiveness plementation on the part of individ-
positive results, even in dealing with of regimes. An arrangement that works ual members.
problems that are widely regarded as perfectly well in one setting may fall flat in
malign. This problem has given rise to another setting. It is always important to Maintenance of feelings of fairness and legit-
a stream of research on what has become think about scope conditions in assessing
known as the issue of fit (28) together with propositions about the effectiveness of imacy is important to effectiveness, especially
a growing interest in institutional diag- environmental regimes. Some of the most
nostics (29–31). Whereas the effort to notable features of the ozone regime, for in cases where success requires active par-
conserve Atlantic tunas among generally instance, are unworkable in addressing the
friendly states has produced poor results, problem of climate change. This issue ticipation on the part of the members of the
leading states were able to join forces to explains the importance of the propositions group over time. Neorealist perspectives
launch a successful regime for Antarctica that we must go beyond panaceas in suggest that both the formation and
during the height of the Cold War. devising regimes to address real world implementation of regimes are about
Sizable proportion of the success of en- problems (30) and that it is essential to power—perhaps including soft power as
adopt a diagnostic approach in efforts to well as hard power—all of the way down
vironmental regimes is attributable to activities design regimes to solve specific problems (36, 37). The role of power is not only
(29–31). important in such settings, but it is also
that are not regulatory in the ordinary sense. a topic requiring more intensive analysis
There is a strong tendency to think of Specific Findings. Beyond these general on the part of those people interested in
regimes in regulatory terms. The pro- findings, regime analysis has generated international regimes. However, this issue
a variety of more specific propositions does not eliminate the role of consid-
‡In both studies, cases are defined in such a way that they about the effectiveness of environmental erations of fairness and legitimacy (38,
include regime elements or components rather than dis- regimes. Some of these findings are nega- 39). Given the underdeveloped character
crete regimes. The climate regime, for example, encom- tive in the sense that they disconfirm of enforcement procedures at the in-
popular notions about requirements for ternational level, it is hard to elicit com-
passes three components in the study by Breitmeier pliance on an ongoing basis from actors
et al. (25). that do not accept a regime’s prohibitions
and requirements as fair and legitimate.

Casting arrangements in the form of legally

binding conventions or treaties do not ensure

higher levels of compliance on the part of
subjects. Many analysts assume that the
normative pull associated with legally

Young PNAS | December 13, 2011 | vol. 108 | no. 50 | 19855

binding arrangements will have a positive level governance) as well as interactions tween the global trade regime and a
effect on compliance. However, the avail- among distinct institutional arrangements variety of multilateral environmental
able evidence does not support this prop- operative at the international level (45). agreements involving the use of trade
osition (25). Although hard law ar- Similarly, there is an important distinction restrictions as a policy instrument (e.g., the
rangements may be desirable for other between interplay that is largely un- regimes dealing with endangered species,
reasons, there is often a price to be paid intended and often unforeseen and in- hazardous wastes, protection of the
for pursuing such arrangements in terms terplay involving intentional moves on the stratospheric ozone layer, and climate)
of the depth of the substantive provi- part of actors desiring to either manage (53, 54). The central challenge is to work
sions adopted. interplay to promote problem solving or out a modus vivendi allowing individual
exploit interplay to advance their in- regimes to make progress toward solving
Arrangements featuring private governance and dividual interests (29). Others have moved the problems motivating their creation.
on from this point of departure. Particu- Regime complexes offer a way forward in situa-
hybrid systems encompassing both public and larly important in this regard are Stokke’s
(19, 46, 47) accounts of the mechanisms of tions that do not lend themselves to the creation
private elements can solve some types of cognition, obligation, and utility maximi- of a single integrated governance system. Many
environmental problems. It is easy to exag- zation as determinants of the effects of issue areas (e.g., climate, biodiversity,
gerate growth in the role of nonstate actors interplay on problem solving and Raus- and marine pollution) feature networks
(e.g., multinational corporations and en- tiala and Victor’s (48) concept of in- of distinct regimes or “loosely coupled set
vironmental nongovernmental organ- stitutional complexes as loosely coupled [s] of specific regimes” (p. 7 in ref. 55)
izations) at the international level as well sets of arrangements operating in a single that grow up over time in the absence of
as the emergence of global civil society issue area. Although the study of in- an overall blueprint. Such complexes
(40). However, although nation states stitutional interplay is a central concern may range along a continuum from com-
remain core actors, other actors are gain- at the domestic level, it constitutes a rela- prehensive and integrated governance
ing ground. This finding opens up oppor- tively new area of research at the in- systems for entire issue areas to total
tunities to solve problems through the ternational level. Nevertheless, some fragmentation (55). Regime complexes
development of hybrid systems (e.g., the findings are already emerging from analy- offer the advantage of being more flexi-
system for classifying ships) and even pri- ses of such matters (49, 50). ble across issues and adaptable over time
vate regimes (e.g., the Forest Stewardship than more tightly coupled governance
Council) rather than limiting the roles Institutional interplay is just as likely to produce systems. They may be easier to create than
of nonstate actors to efforts to influence fully integrated systems and more resil-
the operations of intergovernmental positive or even synergistic results as it is to lead ient to the sorts of stresses occurring at
regimes (41). the international or global level today.
Multiple pathways can lead to success in efforts to interference between or among regimes. This Regime complexes are likely to be com-
to solve many environmental problems. It is stream of analysis arose from a concern mon in many areas during the foresee-
generally a mistake to assume that there is that tensions or even open conflict between able future.
one true path that must be identified and or among distinct regimes would become
followed in efforts to solve specific envi- an increasingly prominent feature of the What Are the Cutting-Edge Issues in
ronmental problems. Alternative solutions institutional landscape in international This Realm?
may vary in terms of other considerations, society (42). The logic underlying this
such as fairness or various notions of good concern is simple. As the number and Taken together, these findings derived
governance. However, what systems theo- variety of regimes operating in a given from hundreds of individual studies have
rists call equifinality is a common phe- social space grow, the overlap between significant implications for policy. It is
nomenon in the realm of environmental and among them will increase. Because worth bearing in mind, for instance, that
governance. This proposition applies with this overlap is typically unintended and not all regimes are regulatory in character,
particular force to the selection of policy often unforeseen in nature, it seems rea- that legally binding arrangements are not
instruments (e.g., incentive systems vs. sonable to expect that tensions will ensue always preferable to softer arrangements,
command and control regulations). (51). However, the research done so far that institutional interaction sometimes
on institutional interplay fails to confirm produces synergistic results, and that re-
Findings About Institutional Interplay. Envi- this expectation. Interactions may gener- gime complexes may prove more successful
ronmental regimes often interact with ate tensions. However, institutional in- than fully integrated regimes. Above all,
both one another and regimes operating in terplay often produces positive results and it is critical to understand the problem of
other areas like trade and finance. The may even prove synergistic, like in the case fit and as a result, discard hopes for pan-
growth of interest in what is now known of the regulation of substances under the aceas and sharpen the skills needed to
as institutional interplay is a recent de- ozone regime that are also greenhouse engage in institutional diagnostics.
velopment fueled by the observation that gases (49, 52).
the number of distinct regimes operative in At the same time, there is much more
international society has grown rapidly in There is generally scope for resolving actual or that we can learn about the effectiveness of
recent decades (42, 43). A simple point of environmental regimes that will be of in-
departure in thinking about interplay, potential conflicts between regimes through terest to policymakers. This section iden-
pioneered by the long-term project on the tifies a series of topics that constitute
Institutional Dimensions of Global Envi- negotiations leading to mutual accommodation cutting-edge concerns in this field (56, 57).
ronmental Change, features two primary There is no need to forge a consensus re-
distinctions: one between horizontal and rather than by subordinating one regime to the garding the precise content of the research
vertical interactions and the other between agenda. However, it is helpful to get
functional (or unintended) and political other. For the most part, resolving such a sense of where we are headed regarding
interactions (44). Because much of the conflicts is not a matter of applying legal research on the effectiveness of environ-
responsibility for implementing the provi- doctrines involving criteria like specificity mental regimes.
sions of international regimes falls to their and temporal sequencing to determine
individual members, it is essential in which regime should take precedence in Deep Structure. Environmental regimes
thinking about effectiveness to consider the event of conflict between distinct are specialized arrangements embedded
vertical interplay (often known as multi- arrangements. Rather, it is a matter of in and reflecting the deep structure of
negotiating workable compromises that
allow the regimes in question to operate
effectively without undue interference in
each other’s domains (50). The most
striking examples involve interplay be-

19856 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111690108 Young

international society (7). To be effective, we need to know here is whether we are ozone regime proved effective in reducing
such arrangements must be generally doomed to suffer the consequences of drastically the production and consump-
compatible with the essential features of hard problems like climate change or tion of ozone-depleting substances, it has
the prevailing deep structure (58). There is whether we can come up with innovative also proven more effective in reducing
little point, for instance, in creating a re- strategies to address such problems given emissions of greenhouse gases than the
gime complex for climate that requires the the emergence of effective leadership and climate regime itself (69). What we need
imposition of fundamental restrictions on the will to collaborate on the part of to know in this case centers on scope
the sovereignty of member states or the key actors. conditions. Under what conditions is it
creation of enforcement mechanisms that realistic to expect institutional evolution
rely on severe sanctions to elicit compli- Power. The role of power as a determinant to work as a mechanism for deepening
ance with the regime’s rules. However, of regime effectiveness is complex and commitments in a manner required to
it is easy to carry this line of thinking too contested, especially if we construe power ensure success in efforts to solve
far. The deep structure of international to encompass soft as well as hard power, problems?
society is not static (59). The familiar cognitive as well as structural power, and
power structure of the postwar era is issue-specific as well as general power (64). Compliance. We already know a lot about
shifting dramatically. We need to recog- Critics of regime analysis have sometimes the sources of compliance (70–72). Be-
nize the growing importance of nonstate dismissed institutions as epiphenomena cause many observers regard compliance
actors and the emergence of global civil that reflect underlying distributions of as the Achilles heel of international gov-
society and think about the implications of power and that change as these dis- ernance, however, this subject remains
these developments for perspectives built tributions shift (36). Those people study- on the list of research priorities. The ab-
on the assumption that environmental ing regimes sometimes seem to ignore or sence of a government in the ordinary
governance is largely a matter of in- at least, marginalize the role of power as sense in international society makes it
tergovernmental relations (60–62). As a determinant of the capacity of these ar- hard to use sanctions—graduated or
long as the normative gap is not too great, rangements to solve problems. How can otherwise—effectively as a means of per-
the development of innovative regimes can we come to terms with these diverging suading or compelling those people sub-
play a role in driving the evolution of the perspectives on the role of power? Re- ject to a regime’s rules to comply with
deep structure of international society. gimes are embedded in overarching polit- their obligations. However, is this flaw
What we need to know in this realm is ical orders, and they reflect the general fatal (9)? In single best effort situations
more about the constraints and opportu- principles of political discourses dominant where one or a few actors can solve the
nities associated with deep structure as at the time of their creation. However, problem, compliance is not a critical issue
they pertain to the operation of gover- this finding does not mean that they are of (27). Compliance is not a concern with
nance systems for specific problems like no significance in their own right, espe- regard to regimes that are not fundamen-
climate change and the protection of cially when treated as intervening forces tally regulatory in character. Even in reg-
biodiversity. that form links between the underlying ulatory settings, a management approach
drivers of human behavior and the out- is sometimes more effective than an en-
Problem Structure. It is intuitively appealing comes flowing from human–environment forcement approach as a means of maxi-
to adopt the view that some environmental interactions (65, 66). What we need to mizing compliant behavior on the part of
problems are harder to solve than others know here is how to think about the role a regime’s subjects (73). Other factors,
or to use the terminology in the work by of power as a driving force in world affairs such as the extent to which subjects have
Miles et al. (24), that we can locate specific that does not blind us to the significance engaged actively in the process of regime
problems on a benign–malign spectrum. of other forces. creation and the extent to which they feel
Climate change is a more challenging that a regime constitutes a fair deal, can
problem than the depletion of the strato- Participation Vs. Depth. Because participa- make a big difference in inducing actors to
spheric ozone layer. However, what tion in international environmental comply with a regime’s rules and regula-
exactly are the factors that make environ- regimes is voluntary, there is a tendency tory measures. What we need to know
mental problems harder or easier to solve, to settle for arrangements that are shallow here is more about the sources of com-
and can we devise a metric for assessing in terms of substance to make them pal- pliance (74). Because the emphasis must
problems in these terms (9)? Underdal atable to all relevant actors. This concern is be on governance without government for
(63) argues that environmental problems what Underdal (67) and others have de- the foreseeable future, we have a particu-
are hard to solve to the extent that they scribed as the law of the least ambitious lar need to deepen our understanding of
(i) are “long-term policy problems with program. The logic of those people who mechanisms that can produce compliant
time lags between policy measures . . . and advocate going forward even when com- behavior in the absence of the sorts of
effects,” (ii) “are embedded in very com- mitments are shallow is that it is important sanctions that we generally associate with
plex systems” clouded by uncertainties, to get the ball rolling and that institutional the idea of enforcement (75).
and (iii) “involve global collective goods” evolution will lead to a deepening of
not subject to single best effort solutions commitments over time. This argument is Fairness and Legitimacy. Despite the finding
(63). These factors do pose important intuitively appealing, and examples like reported in the preceding section, there
challenges for those people seeking to the regime for the protection of strato- is substantial variation in the views that
solve environmental problems. They go spheric ozone and to a lesser extent, the analysts have expressed regarding the roles
some way, for example, to explaining why regime dealing with long-range trans- of fairness and legitimacy as determinants
it is so hard to come to grips with the boundary air pollution in Europe suggest of the effectiveness of international
problem of climate change. However, that such a dynamic occurs under some regimes. Those people who follow the logic
there is considerable evidence to suggest conditions. However, there is no reason to of consequences (76) and frame issues in
that solutions to seemingly easy or benign assume that such an evolutionary process collective action terms have a tendency to
problems can prove elusive and that will occur in all cases (68). The contrast dismiss or downplay the role of fairness,
groups sometimes succeed in banding to- between the regime for stratospheric equity, and other normative concerns in
gether to make a serious effort to tackle ozone and the climate regime is striking in thinking about the success or failure of
seemingly hard or malign problems. What these terms. Not only has the stratospheric environmental regimes (77). Those people

Young PNAS | December 13, 2011 | vol. 108 | no. 50 | 19857

who think in terms of the logic of appro- diversity, we must prepare for a world that scale systems and large-scale or global
priateness (76) and approach issues in features rising levels of interplay between systems with regard to the need to produce
social practice terms, by contrast, are more and among distinct regimes. As Keohane governance without government (88).
receptive to the idea that such consid- and Victor (55) observe, regime complexes However, there are also differences
erations are important determinants of or loosely coupled sets of specific regimes between these settings. Although many
effectiveness (38, 78). This divergence is dealing with broad and complex issues like analysts use the term international com-
not peculiar to the analysis of governance climate change may well prove advanta- munity in discussing global issues, for
systems or regimes. It mirrors a larger and geous in terms of flexibility across issues example, there are major differences be-
ongoing debate about the role of norma- and adaptability over time (47). The im- tween local and global systems with regard
tive considerations as driving forces in plication of this proposition is that we must to what is meant by the idea of commu-
global society. We do not need to resolve shift our attention from intensive studies of nity. What we need to know here is more
this overarching debate in analyzing the individual regimes to more expansive ac- about the limits of generalizability across
effectiveness of international environ- counts of institutional interactions and es- levels of social organization regarding
mental regimes. However, we do need pecially, regime complexes. Long familiar factors that determine the effectiveness of
an understanding of the conditions under in domestic systems, this perspective is governance systems.
which fairness and legitimacy are signifi- relatively new at the level of international
cant forces in this realm. This knowledge society. What we need to know here is What Are the Most Promising Research
will have important implications for those more about the conditions leading to Strategies?
people designing regimes to address synergy rather than interference in in-
specific environmental problems, such stitutional interactions and the conditions What tools are available to those people
as climate change or loss of biological under which regime complexes produce desiring to tackle these themes? How can
diversity. flexibility and adaptability rather than we use these tools to greatest effect to
chaos and confusion (50). deepen our understanding of the deter-
Policy Instruments. The ideas of those peo- minants of regime effectiveness and gen-
ple who espouse incentive mechanisms, Nonlinearity. As we move deeper into erate conclusions that will prove helpful to
such as tradable catch shares or carbon a world of human-dominated ecosystems, those people responsible for designing and
taxes, in contrast to the more traditional the need to improve our understanding administering these arrangements? The
mechanisms that we generally lump under of thresholds and tipping points triggering proper response to this question is to think
the heading of command and control nonlinear changes has become urgent (81, in terms of a methodological portfolio
regulations have dominated the discussion 82). Nonlinear changes are often abrupt, or toolkit containing a range of distinct but
of policy instruments for several decades irreversible, and nasty from the perspec- complementary modes of analysis and
(79). Clearly, the emphasis on such tive of human welfare. This finding makes urge those people seeking to understand
mechanisms has been salutary. Incentive it important not only to devise procedures the effectiveness of regimes to use multiple
mechanisms can alleviate the dynamic to provide early warning regarding the methods whenever possible (41, 43, 89).
giving rise to the tragedy of the commons; onset of such changes but also, to create Taking this proposition as a point of
they also can give subjects reason to focus governance systems able to adjust nimbly departure, several specific observations
on innovation on an ongoing basis. How- to the impacts of these changes. The trick about strategies for analyzing the effec-
ever, it would be unfortunate if this issue is to create governance systems that have tiveness of environmental regimes come
were to lead to a situation in which one set the staying power to be effective combined into focus.
of tools dominates our thinking about with the adaptability to adjust quickly to
governance to the exclusion of others. changing circumstances. A regime that As in other fields of study, finding ways
There are important cases (e.g., climate changes too readily and therefore, lacks to combine quantitative and qualitative
change) in which it is difficult to make resilience cannot be effective. However, methods is a priority in studies of effec-
calculations regarding both the costs of a regime that is too rigid in the sense that tiveness. Quantitative procedures produce
leaving the problem unattended and the it is unresponsive to major changes in the measures of association but are limited in
costs of taking effective action to alleviate socioecological environment will be vul- terms of their capacity to reveal the causal
the problem. There are also cases in nerable to forces leading to institutional mechanisms underlying the relationships
which we have good reasons to override collapse in a world in which nonlinear identified. Theoretical case studies, by
the use of discount rates of the sort com- changes are common. What we need is contrast, can probe the causal forces at
monly considered in conjunction with a major step forward in our understanding work in specific situations but do not
incentive mechanisms. It may make good of how to structure governance systems to produce results that are easy to generalize
sense in such cases to use command and maximize resilience, while at the same (10). The mainstream of research on en-
control measures in place of or as a sup- time, including procedures allowing for vironmental regimes consists of studies
plement to incentive mechanisms. Main- timely adjustments of the sort needed that provide in-depth analyses of in-
taining a well-stocked toolkit is clearly to maintain a good fit between socio- dividual regimes or a handful of regimes
a good idea (80). What we need to know ecological conditions and institutional examined from a common perspective.
in this regard is more about the conditions arrangements (83, 84). There is every reason to continue to nur-
under which specific policy instruments ture this flow of research (90). A priority is
are likely to prove effective and how to Scale. Scale in this context is a matter of the to build up the stock of large N quantita-
make use of diagnostic procedures to generalizability of findings regarding the tive studies to facilitate triangulation in
bring this knowledge to bear on specific effectiveness of governance systems across efforts to enhance our understanding of
cases (31). levels of social organization (23). To what the determinants of effectiveness (91).
extent do findings about issues like avoid- Research of this type has already yielded
Interplay Management. Institutional interplay ing the tragedy of the commons derived insights regarding the importance of
is on the rise. Whatever the attractions of from analyses of small-scale or local cases knowledge production as a source of re-
creating comprehensive and integrated apply to comparable issues at the in- gime effectiveness, the role of pushers vs.
governance systems to address problems ternational level and vice versa (85–87)? laggards in making regimes effective, and
like climate change and loss of biological There are clear parallels between small- the occurrence of synergy in contrast to
interference in situations involving in-
stitutional interplay (26, 49). Small

19858 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111690108 Young

universes of cases impose limits on what is goods, as outcomes of interdependent Environmental Change, exemplify
possible in this realm. However, they do decision making in which participants se- this strategy.
not rule out progress in applying quanti- lect strategies that seem rational in in-
tative methods to develop empirical gen- dividualistic terms but that lead to socially Moving to Pasteur’s Quadrant
eralizations about effectiveness (92). undesirable outcomes (27, 34). The facts
that the dynamic of the tragedy of the Research on the determinants of effec-
Another priority is to devise methods commons can be represented in terms of tiveness in international environmental
that can shed light on the role of complex the game theoretic construct known as regimes constitutes a young field. However,
causality as a determinant of effectiveness. prisoner’s dilemma and that the choice it has already generated results of interest
Complex causality occurs when clusters generally labeled defect constitutes a both to practitioners charged with admin-
of causal forces interact with one another dominant strategy for each participant do istering regimes dealing with specific
in ways that make it difficult to pull them not allow us to predict that actors relying problems and analysts seeking to un-
apart through the use of normal statistical on common property arrangements to derstand the nature of governance, par-
procedures (66, 89). What is needed manage the use of common pool resources ticularly in social settings where there is
to illuminate situations of this kind are are bound to come to grief. Taking this no government in the ordinary sense of
methods that direct attention to (i) con- concern as a point of departure, analyses the term. My own experience has con-
junctural causation (e.g., Ragin’s qualita- of real world cases make it clear that the vinced me that many rewards flow from
tive comparative analysis) (93, 94), (ii) tragedy does not always occur (96). How- a strategy of working back and forth be-
emergent properties of complex systems ever, using the prisoner’s dilemma to tween the worlds of analysis and praxis. It
(e.g., simulations using agent-based mod- model such interactions has sharpened our would be naïve to suppose that this line of
eling) (92), and (iii) recurrent relation- understanding of the issues involved. research can reveal simple solutions to the
ships that become apparent in examining Similar remarks are in order regard- great issues of our times, like controlling
large numbers of comparable case studies ing the role of privileged groups, coalitions climate change and preventing loss of bi-
(e.g., metaanalysis) (95). Whereas re- of pushers, and burden-sharing arrange- ological diversity. However, it would be
ductionist methods are especially use- ments in situations involving the supply of equally inappropriate to dismiss the role
ful in separating out the effects of in- things like clean air, which can be con- of environmental regimes, because they do
dividual variables and assigning weights to strued as public goods (33, 34). not provide us with simple solutions to
them as distinct factors in accounting for such overarching concerns. The way
outcomes of interest, methods focusing on Research carried out by individual forward in efforts to enhance our un-
causal clusters concentrate on identifying scholars will always play an important role derstanding of the determinants of effec-
combinations of interacting forces that in this field. However, research teams tiveness is to make use of a suite of
together constitute necessary or more of- and networks are becoming more impor- complementary modes of analysis. When
ten, sufficient conditions to produce re- tant as we endeavor to use this toolkit to the results converge, our confidence in
sults like the success of environmental increase understanding of the effective- the relevant findings rises. When they
regimes in solving problems (89). We need ness of international environmental diverge, we are presented with puzzles of
to pursue both pathways in examining regimes. The works of Miles et al. (24) and the sort on which science thrives. With
the sources of effectiveness. Breitmeier et al. (25) resulted from the persistence and a certain amount of good
efforts of integrated teams. More re- fortune, we will succeed in producing re-
Another method that has proven helpful cently, researchers have focused on the sults that are of interest to analysts and
in studies of regime effectiveness is formal development of larger and looser net- practitioners alike and as a result, that
modeling. Modeling of this sort is based works of individuals working indepen- land us squarely in the domain of Pasteur’s
on a strategy of abstracting away many dently but adhering to a common science Quadrant (97, 98).
factors to highlight the core logic of social plan. The project on the Institutional
relationships in contrast to developing di- Dimensions of Global Environment ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. I thank Bill Clark, Ron
rectly testable hypotheses. A particularly Change (1998–2007) (56) and the Earth Mitchell, Matthew Stilwell, Arild Underdal,
productive effort of this sort focuses on System Governance project (2009–) (57), Durwood Zaelke, and three anonymous re-
understanding dilemmas of collective both core projects of the International viewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of
action, like the tragedy of the commons Human Dimensions Program on Global this paper.
and free ridership in the supply of public

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19860 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1111690108 Young