Authoritarianism Regimes: Institutions & Practices

Authoritarianism Regimes: Institutions & Practices

Rutgers University, Spring 2012 (790:389)
M/W 7:15 – 8:35pm, Hickman Hall Room 201

Instructor: Andrew M. Spath; email: [email protected]
Office Hours: TBD, Hickman Hall 312 (and by appt.)

Course Website: http://www.andrewspath.com/teachings/authoritarian-regimes

COURSE DESCRIPTION:
In this new Political Science Topics Course – being offered for the first time at

Rutgers – students taking “Authoritarian Regimes: Institutions and Practices” will
examine the politics of authoritarianism in theory and in practice. Until very recently,
autocratic systems have been the most prevalent form of government since the
beginning of organized political systems, and they remain widespread today. This
course therefore begins with two fundamental questions about authoritarian
governance: 1) how do authoritarian regimes differ from democracies, and 2) what
frameworks are available to differentiate between the diverse forms of authoritarian
regimes?

The second component of the course will use theoretical readings and case
studies to address two “puzzles” of authoritarian governance. First, how can
authoritarian governments mobilize necessary political support while simultaneously
restricting political freedoms? Second, how can authoritarian governments encourage
economic development and investment without political institutions to limit
exploitation by government officials?

The third component of the course will engage students in a simulation of
authoritarian governance. Students will be placed in groups and required to devise
“action plans” responding to “significant domestic events” (i.e. economic crisis,
leadership succession, influx of rents, external military threats). In group-written action
plans, students will explain potential courses of action and justify their initial responses
to each event. The simulation puts concepts and ideas into practice through first-person
learning.

This course will appeal to Political Science majors and minors, particularly those
interested in comparative political systems. It will also interest students from any field
who are interested in political activism under authoritarianism.

By the end of the course, students will have a nuanced understanding of non-
democratic political systems. They will be able to distinguish between the wide variety
of institutions and practices used to maintain these regimes, their implications for
economic and political development, and the unique challenges they face. Students will
ultimately be able to observe global politics and scrutinize current political debates with
greater comprehension and awareness.

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REQUIREMENTS & GRADING:

Exams:
Exam 1 .................................................................. 25%
Exam 2 (cumulative final) .................................... 25%

Simulation:
Position Paper & Action Plan (Group) ............. 15%
Individual Report ............................................... 10%

Analytical Essays:

Three Essays x 5% each ...................................... 15%
In-Class Contribution ................................................ 10%

ANALYTICAL ESSAYS:
Students are required to sign up for an account at www.wordpress.com with the e-mail
address provided on the first day of class. I will then add you as an „author‟ on the

course blog so you have posting privileges. You can access it on the course website or
directly: RUdictator389.wordpress.com.

A blog for this course is used for many purposes – I will communicate course
announcements here, and you may find it a good place to ask administrative questions;
to discuss topics and issues covered in class or in the readings; to clarify in writing an
argument you were making (or wanted to make in class); to set up study times; to
consult one another‟s help or advice; and to post news or other materials you find
interesting and relevant to the class.

You will post your three analytical essays to the blog. Each essay constitutes 5% of your
course grade. To fulfill this requirement, you will create THREE unique posts of your
own. Each essay should be 700 – 800 words. These essays should be written as
analytical responses, not summaries. Consult the „Writing Analytically‟ handout on the
website to be sure you are approaching this assignment properly.

You will write two (2) essays according to instructions for (A):
A. Write a response to the readings and lecture for a recent class including at
least one of the recommended readings assigned for that class

And you will write one (1) essay according to instructions for (B):
B. Collect basic research on a current case (country) that you can analyze in
light of the readings and lectures from a recent class

Finally, you are required to read and respond to at least two (2) of your classmates‟
essays throughout the semester and within one week of their essay being posted.
Failing to provide thoughtful responses nullifies one of your essay responses.

ATTENDANCE AND IN-CLASS CONTRIBUTION:

Attendance is mandatory and expected. Students are allowed up to three (3) absences
for any reason (excused or unexcused). These absences do NOT include exam and

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simulation days; you simply must be present for these classes. More than three
absences will result in a zero (0) for participation. If you are unable to commit to
attending 90% of the classes, you will want to find another course. Punctuality also
matters. Lateness of more than 15 minutes counts as an absence. If you expect to miss
one or two classes, please use the University absence reporting website
https://sims.rutgers.edu/ssra/ to indicate the date and reason for your absence. An
email is automatically sent to me.

Beyond the basic need to attend class, students should be prepared to answer questions
about the readings or other course materials to demonstrate their engagement with, and
understanding of, this material. Students will receive grades for In-Class Contribution
according to the following scale:

0-1 .......................Student does not contribute; does not respond to questions;
does not comment on the ideas of classmates

2-4 .......................Nominal contribution; responses to questions are sparse and
occasionally comments during class discussions

5-7 .......................Student regularly responds to questions and actively
participates in class discussions

8-10 .....................Student offers reasoned analytical responses to questions
and actively contributes comments and ideas that advance
our understanding of the subject at hand

READINGS, TUTORIALS, AND REQUIRED TEXT:
You can only succeed in this class if you read the assigned readings as they are an
integral part of this course. I selected readings to ensure that completing them for each
class is completely feasible. You are required to know the key arguments and concepts
from the readings and will be tested on them in the exams. All readings are to be
completed prior to the class for which they are assigned.

The only required text you will need to purchase for this class is:
Brooker, Paul. 2000. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (2nd edition).
This book is available at the Rutgers Bookstores and NJ Books.

All other readings are posted on the course website. I will give you the password to
these readings on the first day of class. In addition to the assigned readings, I will
occasionally assign videos to be viewed prior to the class for which they are assigned.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY:
Academic integrity is expected and required of all students. Ignorance of what
constitutes plagiarism and violations of academic integrity do not excuse guilt of
committing these offenses. To avoid committing any offenses, intentional or not, see the
academic integrity code: http://academicintegrity.rutgers.edu/.

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Course Schedule:

Nota Bene: Starred readings (*) are required. The others are recommended (though
remember the analytical essays assignment requires you to read and respond to
recommended readings). See me for other suggestions or readings on other topics.
Also note that Spring Recess is from March 10 – 18 and regular classes end April 30.

PART I: CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND INSTITUTIONS

1. January 18 – Introduction & Central Questions
Course introduction, course structure, syllabus review

Nicolo Machiavelli. 1984. The Prince. Bantam Classics.

2. January 23 – The „End of History?‟ Not so fast…

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), “Introduction” p.1-15
* Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (1998)
* Jason Brownlee, “Low Tide after the Third Wave; Exploring Politics under

Authoritarianism,” Comparative Politics, 34:4 (July 2002), p.477-498
Wolfgang Merkel, “Are Dictatorships Returning? Revising the „democratic

rollback‟ hypothesis,” Contemporary Politics, 16:1 (2010), p.17-31
Lucan Way, “Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime

Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova,
Russia, and Ukraine,” World Politics, 57:2 (2005), p.231-261

3. January 25 – What is Authoritarianism?

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Chapter 1 “Theoretical
Approaches” p.16-45

* John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian
Valley (1980), pp. 3-21 & 33-44

* Juan Linz. 2000. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, “Introduction” p.49-63

Leonard Wantchekon, "The Paradox of 'Warlord' Democracy: A Theoretical
Investigation", in APSR 98/1 (February 2004): 17 – 33

Richard Snyder, “Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Non-
Democratic Regimes,” in Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism, p.219-231

4. January 30 – Non-Democratic Regimes I: Personalist Rule
** Simulation Roles Assigned **

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Chapter 2, “Monarchical and
Personal Rule” p.46-80

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* Robert Jackson & Carl Rosberg, “Personal Rule in Theory and Practice in
Africa,” Comparative Politics, 16:4 (1984), p.421-442.

Dan Slater, “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist,” Comparative Politics 36:1 (October 2003),
p.81-101

Michael Bratton & Nicholas van de Walle, “Neo-Patrimonial Regimes and
Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics, 46:1 (1994), p.453-489

5. February 1 – Non-Democratic Regimes II: Military Rule

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Ch. 3, “Military Rule,” p.81-104
* Amos Perlmutter, “The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations,

Aspirations, and Achievements,” World Politics, 33:1 (1980), p.96-120
* Karen Remmer, Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973-

1987. Comparative Politics, 21:2 (1989), p. 149-170.
J. Alamgir, “Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma,”

Pacific Affairs, 70:3 (1997), pp. 333-350.
Tanel Demirel, “Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case

in Comparative Perspective,” Armed Forces & Society, 31:2 (2005), p.245-271
Remmer, Karen. 1978. “Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin

America.” Latin American Research Review 13, 2: 39–54.
Finer, Samuel. 1988. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press. (selections)
Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni, “A Theory of Military

Dictatorships,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2:1 (2010), p.1-42

6. February 6 – Non-Democratic Regimes III: Hegemonic Party Rule
** Simulation Day – Group Meetings

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Chapter 4, “One-Party Rule,”
p.105-129

* Beatriz Magaloni. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its
Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.1-28

Benjamin Smith, “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and
Persistence under Single-Party Rule,” World Politics 57:3 (Spring 2005),
p.421-451

Kenneth Greene, “The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party
Dominance,” Comparative Political Studies, 43:7 (2010), p.807-834

7. February 8 – Origins of Authoritarianism: Competing Theories

* Ronald Wintrobe, “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches,” in Carles Boix and
Susan C. Stokes (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, New
York: Oxford University Press (2007), p.363-396

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* Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American
Political Science Review, 87, 3 (1993), p.567-576

* Hassner, Pierre. “Russia‟s Transition to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy, 19:2
(April 2008), p.5-15.

Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, “Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian
Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science, 33(2), 1989, pp. 319-347

8. February 13 – Dealing with Ambiguities: Hybrid Regimes
** Final Day for Essay 1

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Chapter 8,” Semi-Dictatorships
and Semidemocracies” p.233-268

* Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy, 13:2
(April 2002), p.21-35

* Marc Morje Howard and Philip Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science,
50:2 (2006), p.365-381

Levitsky & Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 13:2 (April 2002), p.51-65

Gerardo L. Munck, “Drawing Boundaries: How to Craft Intermediate Regime
Categories,” in Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism, pp. 27-40.

9. February 15 – Courts in Authoritarian Regimes

* Peter Solomon, “Courts and Judiciaries in Authoritarian Regimes,” World
Politics, 60:1 (October 2007)

* Gretchen Helmke, “The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations
in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy,” The American Political
Science Review, 96:2 (June 2002), p.291-303

* Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa. 2008. Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in
Authoritarian Regimes, New York: Cambridge University Press, p.1-22

Anthony Pereira, “Of Judges and Generals: Security Courts under Authoritarian
Regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,” in Ginsburg and Moustafa (eds.),
Rule by Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, p.23-57

Tamir Moustafa, “Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The
Judicialization of Politics in Egypt,” in Ginsburg and Moustafa (eds.), Rule
by Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, p.132-155

Peter Solomon, “Judicial Power in Authoritarian States: The Russian
Experience,” in Ginsburg and Moustafa (eds.), Rule by Law, New York:
Cambridge University Press, p.261-282

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10. February 20 – Institutional Change and “Authoritarian Upgrading”

* Stephen Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,”
(selections)

* Dan Slater, “Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and
Autocratic Agency in Indonesia,” in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen
(eds.) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010), p.132-166

* Kellee Tsai. “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional
Change in China,” World Politics 59 (October 2006), p.116-141

Andrew Walder, “The Decline of Communist Power: Elements of a Theory of
Institutional Change,” Theory and Society, 23:2 (1994), p.297-323

Courtenay Conrad, “Constrained Concessions: Beneficent Dictatorial Responses
to the Domestic Political Opposition,” International Studies Quarterly (2011),
p.1-21

11. February 22 – Claims to Power and Regime Legitimacy

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Chapter 5, “Consolidation,
Legitimacy, and Control” p.130-144

* Barbara Geddes and Jon Zaller, “Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian
Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science, 33:2 (1989), p.319-347

* Lisa Wedeen, “Acting „As If‟: Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40:3 (July 1998), p.503-523

Eric Davis. 2005. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in
Modern Iraq. Los Angeles: University of California Press, p.1-28

12. February 27 – Midterm Exam
* Bring a pen.

PART II: POLICIES AND PRACTICES

13. February 29 – Language Module I: Language of Compliance
* Reading TBA

14. March 5 – Succession and the Transfer of Power
** Simulation Day

* Henry Hale, “Regime Cycles, Democracy, Autocracy and Revolution in Post-
Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics, 58:1 (October 2006), p.133-165

* Jason Brownlee, “Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies,” World
Politics, 59:4 (July 2007), p.595-628

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* Andrew Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience: China‟s Changing of the Guard,”
Journal of Democracy, 14: 1 (January 2003), p.6-17

Bert Hoffman, “Charismatic Authority and Leadership Change: Lessons from
Cuba‟s Post-Fidel Succession, “ International Political Science Review, 30:3
(2009), p.229-248

Anonymous, “The President, the Son, and the Military: The Question of
Succession in Egypt,” Arab Studies Journal, Fall 2001/ Spring 2002, p. 73-88

Lowell Dittmer, “Patterns of Elite Strife and Succession in Chinese Politics,” The
China Quarterly, no.123 (September 1990), p.405-430

Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith, “The Impact of Leadership Turnover on
Trading Relations between States,” International Organization, 58:3
(Summer 2004), p.567-600

15. March 7 – The Survival of Autocrats and Their Governments

* Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the
Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative Political Studies, 40:11 (2007), p.1279-
1301

*Beatriz Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian
Rule,” Comparative Political Studies, 41:4/5 (2008), p.715-741

* Arang Keshavarzian, “Contestation without Democracy: Elite Fragmentation in
Iran,” in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (eds.),
Authoritarianism in the Middle East, (2005), p.63-87

Ryan Kennedy, “Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical
Support for „Selectorate Theory,‟” International Studies Quarterly, 53 (2009),
p.695-714

Beatriz Magaloni and Jeremy Wallace, “Citizen Loyalty, Mass Protest, and
Authoritarian Survival,” presented at the conference on Dictatorships: Their
Governance and Social Consequences, Princeton University, 2008.

Robinson, Glenn. “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” IJMES. August, 1998,
pp. 387-410

Spring Break (March 10 –18)

16. March 19 – Coups d‟Etat
Film: “The Other 9/11: Chile” BBC or “Soviet Files: Three Days in August”RT
* Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, “Coups” in Dictators and Dictatorships:
Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their Leaders, New York:
Continuum International Publishing, 2011, p.96-112
* Rosemary O‟Kane, “Towards an Examination of the General Causes of Coups
d‟Etat,” European Journal of Political Research, 11(1981), p.287-308

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17. March 21 – Organized Opposition
** Final Day for Essay 2

* Ellen Lust, “Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political
Opposition,” Comparative Politics, 36:2 (2004), p.159-179

* Kathryn Hochstetler, “Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential
Falls in South America,” Comparative Politics, 38:4 (2006), p.401-418

* Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and
Liberalizing Arab Regimes,” Comparative Politics, 36:2 (2004), p.181-204

Hanne Fjelde, “Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil
Conflict, 1973-2004,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 27:3 (2010),
p.195-218

18. March 26 – Protest and Policing

* Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of
Political Science Vol. 10 (2007), pp. 1-23.

* Kurt Schock, “People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement
Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma,” Social Problems
46:3 (1999), p.355-375

* Karen Rassler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian
Revolution,” American Sociological Review (February 1996), pp. 132-152.

Ronald A. Francisco, “After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh
Repression,” Mobilization 9 (2004), p. 107-126.

Vince Boudreau. 2004. Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast
Asia, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 17-36.

Arang Keshavarzian, “Contestation without Democracy: Elite Fragmentation in
Iran,” in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (eds.),
Authoritarianism in the Middle East, (2005), p.63-90

Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European
Revolution of 1989,” World Politics, 44:1 (1991), p.7-48

19. March 28 – Contesting Authority at the Margin

* James C. Scott. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance. (selections)
* Asef Bayat. 2010. Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East,

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. (selections)
* Rachel Stern and Kevin O‟Brien, “Politics at the Boundary: Mixed Signals and

the Chinese State,” Modern China, 20:10 (2011), p.1-25
Recommended TBA

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20. April 2 – Political Economy I: Dictatorship and Development

* Atul Kohli, “Democracy and Development: Trends and Prospects,” in Atul
Kohli, Chung-in Moon, and Georg Sorensen (eds.), States, Markets, and Just
Growth: Development in the Twenty-first Century (2003), pp. 39-63.

* Joseph Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures
Affect Economic Growth and Investment,” American Journal of Political
Science, 52:2 (April 2008), p.322-343

* Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian
Model: How Putin‟s Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Foreign Affairs, 87:1
(January/February 2008), p.67-84

Baum, Matthew A. and David A. Lake. 2003. “The Political Economy of Growth:
Democracy and Human Capital.” American Journal of Political Science 47(2):
333-47.

Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, “The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions,” Comparative Politics, 29:3 (1997), p. 263-283

Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in
Postcommunsit Transitions,” World Politics 50:2 (1998), pp.203-234

Stephen Haber, “Authoritarian Government,” in Oxford Handbook of Political
Economy

21. April 4 – Political Economy II: Wealth & Rentierism

* Leonard Wantchekon, “Why do Resource Dependent Countries Have
Authoritarian Governments?” Journal of African Finance and Economic
Development 2 (2002) 57–77.

* Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon, “Resource Wealth and Political
Regimes in Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 37, 7 (2004), pp. 816-841.

* Michael Ross, 2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, 53, p.325-61
Michael Herb, “No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development and

Democracy,” Comparative Politics 37(3), April 2005, pp. 297-317
Michael Ross. 1999. “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World

Politics 51, p.297-322

22. April 9 – Authoritarian Breakdown & Regime Transition
** Position Paper and Action Plan Due

* Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes (2000), Chapter 7 “Democratization and
the Demise of Dictatorship” p.197-232

* Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown”
Jan Kubik. 1994. The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. University

Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. (selections)

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Michele Angrist, “The Outlook for Authoritarians,” in Marsha Pripstein
Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (eds.), Authoritarianism in the Middle
East, (2005), p. 221-232.

J. Ulfelder, “Contentious Collective Action and the Breakdown of Authoritarian
Regimes,” International Political Science Review, 26:3 (2005), p.311-334

23. April 11 – Comparing Strategies of U.S. Influence
* Required readings TBA
Epstein, Serafino, and Miko, “Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign
Policy?” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 2007
Chris Zambelis, “The Strategic Implications of Political Liberalization and
Democratization in the Middle East,” Parameters (Autumn 2005): 87-102
Pearl T. Robinson, “Democratization: Understanding the Relationship Between
Regime Change and the Culture of Politics,” African Studies Review (1994) 1,
2: 39-67
Patricia Owens, “Theorizing Military Intervention,” International Affairs, 80:2
(2004), p.355-365
W. Michael Reisman, “Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea,”
American Journal of International Law, 98:3 (2004)
Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World
Politics 49/3 (1997): 401-429

24. April 16 – Language Module II: Language of Opposition
** Final Day for Essay 3

25. April 18 – Simulating Autocracy I

26. April 23 – Simulating Autocracy II

27. April 25 – Simulating Autocracy III

April 29, 12:00 pm (Noon) – **Final Individual Report Due**

28. April 30 – Simulation Debriefing

Final Exam: Monday, May 7th, 8p – 11p