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Published by quingalvin, 2017-03-03 05:06:17

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Introduction

History is no stranger to conflict or dissonance, in fact one could argue that the
majority of history is the tracking of the waging of conflict within and between groups.
Much of the conflict on which the many historians spend their time studying is that which
involves both state and non-state actors, often times with the two forces faced in
opposition. When it comes to revolution, there are certain elements that tend to help or
harm a resistance movement. There have certainly been armed resistance and
revolution movements that were successful in their efforts to enact change in the
governments they perceived faulty; however, there is a new wealth of research that
studies the success of revolutions that utilize violent versus nonviolent means. In their
study “Why Civil Resistance Works”, Maria Stephen and Erica Chenoweth created clear
conceptual definitions to determine a movement successful or unsuccessful and found
that compared to the 26 percent success rate of movements that utilized violent means,
nonviolent resistance movement celebrated a 53 percent success rate. One such
success story is that of the East German revolution of 1989.

Background

In the aftermath of World War Two, a temporary measure was set in place that
stationed troops from Great Britain, The United States, France, and the Soviet Union in
divided quarters of Germany. It became clear that this temporary measure became
permanent as the country remain divided and the East German zone became an
independent state by 1949. This state was lead by the Socialist Unity Party (SED).
During the years leading up to the 1989 movement, citizens of the German Democratic
Republic fostered many complaints against the governing party. Some of these
complaints are enumerated in Sharon Erickson Nepstad’s book “Nonviolent
Revolutions”; these include the enforcement of stringent work quotas, a slow moving
economic system, the repression of groups and institutions that “hindered the socialist
agenda” (Nepstad 2011, 39).

The years preceding the revolution of 1989 were not quiet and void of resistance
themselves. Many believe that the uprising and resistance efforts made by East
Germans in 1953 paved the way for civil resistance efforts in the German Democratic
Republic and the subsequent nonviolent revolution. Starting with a workers strike and
then moving forward with marches and demonstrations, June of 1953 proved itself to be
a turning point in the German Democratic Republic.

The Eastern Government declared martial law and moved forward with a severe
crackdown on its people, resulting on the the arrest of thirteen thousand people
between June and August of 1953 alone (Nepstad 2011, 40). This was made possible

through the employment of the Ministry of State
Security-- also known as the Stasi-- the secret police
force of the German Democratic Republic under the rule
of SED. Just as support for worker’ and people’s
movements gained support, government support also
skyrocketed. The Stasi work force grew from 1,100
members in 1950 to over 91,100 members by the late
1980s, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of
civilian informers (Nepstad 2011, 40).

The presence of such an ever-present law
enforcement agency caused mass apprehension and
paranoia that kept overt opposition to the SED to a
relative minimum. However, thanks to a very interesting
set of circumstances, opposition groups not only endured this harsh political climate, but
also expanded their resistance in a way that lead to the large scale revolution of 1989.
One element of this time that fostered revolution was the free space for civilian
assembly and the inability of the government to interfere. Another element that
contributed to the proliferation of opposition groups was the role of the GDR in
international relations, as many outside states were placing pressure on the East
German government to adhere to standards of human rights. A third element of the
years leading up to the revolution of 1989 was the economic troubles of Eastern
Germany. These were the elements at play that helped to make the Eastern German
people’s movement so successful and that contemporary nonviolent movements can
attempt to duplicate in the pursuit of nonviolent conflict waging.

The Loophole that Developed the Movement

The socialist German Democratic Republic had a reputation for oppressing
groups and institutions that acted as a threat to social ideals- including religious
organizations and alternative news and information outlets. Due to the stigma of the
church as an enemy to socialist ideology, there were very few practitioners and by the
1980s, only ten percent of the population reported “active religious faith” (Nepstad 2011,
41). It was with this knowledge that the East German government representative Erich
Honecker participated in 1978 talks with church leaders that resulted in the
maintenance of churches as a protected domain only if they “operated as churches
within socialism”. Retrospectively, the condemnation and underestimation of religious
spaces only served to act against the best interests of the GDR.

The emergence of the Church as a free space for alternative interest and
opposition groups was strongest in the East German city of Leipzig. According to

Steven Pfaff in his book “Exit Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany”,
Leipzig had a “church establishment sympathetic to dissidents [and] diverse intellectual
milieus less dependent on official resources” which helped foster a climate in which
“pacifists, environmentalists, writers, and activist Christians evolved” (Pfaff 2006, 94).
However, the church based meeting and demonstration were not only for those of a
practicing faith; there were and are signs in and around St. Nicholas Church in Leipzig
reading “offen für alle” or “open to all”.

There were many interest groups that took advantage of the freedoms the church had to
offer and helped cooperating clergy set up printing studios, workshops, and meeting
places in which activist were free to present on their interests following prayer services,
the most famous of which were given by Pastor Christoph Wonneberger of the historical
St. Nicholas Church. This certainly ruffled the feathers of many politicians and some
fellow clergy members who saw this as a blatant over stepping into political territory--
something that is not typically included in the duties and responsibilities of the church.
This did not stop the Monday Peace Prayers, as they were now known; in fact, this
incited further anger and frustration from activists who felt they were being censored
and ignored by their government and lead to a spike in attendance for Monday Peace
Prayer services, as seen in a graph from Roland Bleiker’s 1993 monograph “Nonviolent
Struggle and the Revolution in East Germany”.

Through the actions of active clergy members like Wonneberger, East Germany
saw an increase in sources of information regarding the environment, human rights, and
antinuclear and peace movements. The meetings could become very impassioned, so
much so that Wonneberger felt the need to establish the Initiative Group for Life, a
group that promoted nonviolent action and the preservation of life as the most important
part of any opposition movement and undertook the responsibility of educating
members on effective nonviolent resistance tactics (Pfaff 2006, 95).

This action did not go unnoticed by government officials or the Stasi, in fact,
following one particularly well attended demonstration on January fifteenth of 1989,
demonstrators filed into the streets for a silent march that would fail to reach its
destination due to the mass arrest of movement leaders as well as more than one
hundred event attendees (Pfaff 2006, 97). As in many nonviolent resistance
movements, these arrests gained the attention of fellow East Germans as well as those
human rights activists beyond the GDR’s borders. This negative attention towards the
German Democratic Republic had a powerful effect on the Politburo. Following this
specific case, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe pressured the
GDR to show restraint towards peace protesters and, counter to past SED policy, those

arrested during the January demonstration were released after only weeks of
detainment.

Contemporary movements can use the experiences and the victories of the East
German demonstrators in a way that vastly benefits any nonviolent movement. From
studying the East German revolution we have a new understanding about the power of
information in regimes in which information and speech is highly regulated. In cases
such as these it is important to seek an outlet that is both easy for civilians to access
and hard for the regime to condemn; for example, movements that utilize music, art,
performance, religion and other important aspects of culture and daily life have been so
successful. To deny the people of the right to otherthrow the government is deeply
wrong and undemocratic, however, to deny the people their culture is something that
very few outside actors could condone. This leads to the next important element: the
German Democratic Republic existing in a system of international actors.

The Attention that Pressured the Powerful

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as discussed above
was not unique in its disapproval of the treatment of East Germans by their government.
During the years leading up to the 1989 revolution, there was important work being
done regarding the warring ideologies of the Cold War period. Many scholars and
diplomats were working to foster a culture of peace between opposing Cold War forces,
an effort that brought about the Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights-- which, despite
its focus on ethics in the medical field, has strong undertones regarding respect for
human life and a “c​ oncern for the interests of the subject must always prevail over the
interests of science and society” (Pfaff 2006, 97). Further, even the Soviet forces were
causing panic in the Politburo of the GDR with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev in
1985 who advocated a “détente with Western nations in hopes of reducing exorbitant
military expenditures propelled by the arms race” (Nepstad 2011, 43). This was a move
that severely weakened the authority of the East German government as Soviet powers
were now withdrawing economic and military aid to the GDR. Gorbachev gave a moving
plea to SED​ officials during an October seventh meeting with members of the Politburo:

The people demand a new social atmosphere, more oxygen in the society,
especially because we are talking about the socialist regime. I am saying this to
remind you of the problems that we are facing at home. Figuratively speaking,
people want not only bread but the entertainment also. If you take it in a general
sense, we are talking about the necessity to build not only the material but also the
socio-spiritual atmosphere for the development of the society. I think it is a lesson
for us. It is important not to miss our chance here. The party should have its own
position on these issues, its own clear policy in this respect also. Life itself will
punish us if we are late.

These iconic words would serve as the precursor to one of the most important
demonstrations in the East German conflict in which there were more than 70,000
participants. The October ninth action was the very first mass demonstration by the East
German people and although there were rumors of government orders to “shoot-to-kill”
and threats by Stasi members throughout different publications, demonstrators
maintained nonviolence (Nepstad 2011, 48). It was this peaceful protest in the face of
an armed and dangerous police force that caught the attention of many outside eyes
and made it very difficult for the government to justify any type of violent government
crackdown to the global eye.

The attention of outside forces and international actors had a large impact on the
SED’s authority in this conflict. An extremely important aspect in many a nonviolent
movement is a hypervigilance for nonviolence and a strong media coverage. What a
grassroots nonviolent movement such as this lacks in coercive power and economic
strength, it makes up for with an ability to elicit sympathy and support from those who
may not have been exposed to the conflict otherwise. There is a solemn strength in
seeing a crowd dedicated to nonviolence even when faced with those who are armed
and equipped to incite violence. It was also this objection to violence that struck
members of the Stasi in a way that deeply affected the SED’s influence and authority
throughout the ranks of law enforcement.

The Strength that Exposed Stasi Vulnerability

Citizen opinion of the Stasi was abysmal and
nonviolence in action did not stop demonstrators from
berating Stasi members verbally and through posters
and signs, like the one to the right which reads,
“Against Pig-Headedness and Corruption (Making the
History of 1989)”. However, the majority of
demonstrators rejected these polarizing statements
and opted for shouts and banners expressing a
desire for “No Violence!” and establishing their
movement as one for the people with signs reading
“Wir sind ein Volk” or “We are a people” (Bleiker
1993, 19).

A powerful turning point for the opposition of
the Socialist Unity Party came with the clash of
demonstrators with their neighbors in uniform. Many
members of the Stasi were forced to realize that,
even if they harbored a passionate love for their
country, an affinity for Socialist ideals, or a dedication
to promoting law and order, the armed coercion of their fellow citizen was an impossible

and intolerable act; further, many resented their commands as they felt they were being
forced “to do the Party’s dirty work. (Pfaff 2006, 178)” Nepstad offers a poignant
testimony given by a former militia member.

I can tell you that this deployment was a turning point in my life. What we expected
there… was a real disillusionment. We said to ourselves, we will never allow
ourselves to be used like this by party leadership again (Nepstad 2011, 49).

This proved to be a major downfall for the SED, as they had now lost Kremlin
military support as well as the support of local militias. Their power over the citizens of
the German Democratic Republic was wavering dangerously. Pfaff recounts Politburo
mood towards militiamen who resigned:

In connection with the statement of purpose to ensure law and order in the city of
Leipzig by the militia, it seems that some comrade militiamen have given into the
slander of the enemy and have announced their withdrawal from the militia. In
doing so, they cite the statement made by militia commander Lutz, who, on
October 6, 1989,made it clear in the pages of the L​ eipziger Volkszeitung that, if
necessary, members of these socialist organizations would defend the GDR with
weapons in their hands. This was not acceptable to them, and they took the
position that they would refuse to use weapons against so-called peaceful
demonstrators (Pfaff 2006, 176).

The Vulnerability that Strengthened the People: Economic Weakness

One tactic used by East German citizens is known as the “exit strategy”.

For example, in October of 1989, Erich Honecker, the very SED member who
underestimated the church's power as a free space, was forced to resign not a week
after demonstrators and government representatives met to address concerns (Bleiker
1993, 15).


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