“Liberty, in our constitutionalscheme, is not a gift of the State butits first obligation.”Hon’ble Justice Vikram Nath, SupremeCourt of India01/02QQUOTE UOTETHE LEGALADMINISTRATORIssue 35: January2026LAL BAHADUR SHASTRINATIONAL ACADEMY OFADMINISTRATION,MUSSOORIELAL BAHADUR SHASTRINATIONAL ACADEMY OFADMINISTRATION,MUSSOORIE
Nullus Commodum CapereProtect De Injuria Sua PropriaNullus Commodum CapereProtect De Injuria Sua PropriaNo man can take advantage of his own wrong.Maxim Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria is one ofthe salient tenets of equity and good faith, and does not allow a wrong doerto take action against another party when his own action is the cause ofaction. It means that a party may not derive an advantage from its ownunlawful acts. It prevents the wrongdoer from taking advantage out of hiswrong and extends protection to the aggrieved person.It has a clear mandate of law that, a person who by manipulation of aprocess frustrates the legal rights of others, should not be permitted to takeadvantage of his wrong or manipulations.If a person does a wrong that causes nuisance to the opposite party, such aparty may have no choice other than to take lawful preventive measures,and in doing so the wrongdoer’s rights may get violated. This principleprotects the 2 party and does not allow the wrongdoer to take any actionagainst the 2 party. The 2 party’s acts are not actionable as that partywas compelled to act and would not have violated the rights, if thewrongdoer had not caused the nuisance to him.ndnd nd
The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980(Agricultural Lease on Forest Land not permitted)State of Karnataka v. Gandhi Jeevan Collective Farming Co-operative Society LimitedCivil Appeal No(s). 3661 of 20112025 INSC 1461Facts: The State Government of Karnataka hadgranted a ten-year lease for agricultural purposesover 134 acres of forest land to the Gandhi JeevanCollective Farming Co-operative Society in the 1976.The members of the respondent-Cooperative Societycleared the trees from the forest areas and startedcultivating the same in 1985.After the lease expired, the State refused renewal andterminated the arrangement. The forest departmenttook possession of the land in question on 23rdJanuary, 2007 by drawing mahazars of even date.After drawing the panchnama, sign boards of thedepartment were placed on the forest land,cautioning against the unauthorized entry into theforest.Multiple legal proceedings initiated by the Societyagainst the termination of the lease were rejected bythe Courts. Civil suits and appeals resulted only inprotection orders against forcible dispossessionwithout due process. Eventually, forest authoritiesinitiated eviction proceedings under the KarnatakaForest Act and took possession in January 2007.Despite this, the Karnataka High Court directed thatthe Society be allowed to make a representation tothe Central Government for continuation of thelease.Held: On 18 December 2025 the Hon’bleSupreme Court held that forest land cannot beleased or continued to be used for non-forestpurposes such as agriculture without priorapproval of the Central Government. Itemphasised that any such lease cannot belegitimised through post-facto representationsor extensions.“… we are of the firm opinion that the verygrant of lease to the respondent-CooperativeSociety for agricultural purposes wasuncalled for because it led to devastation anddeforestation of huge forest areaadmeasuring nearly 134 acres. Therespondent-Cooperative Society, havingenjoyed cultivator possession over the forestarea for a period of more than 10 years, wasnot entitled for any further extension of thelease which was in the first place illegallygranted. As per the extant statutes, forestlands could not be allowed to be used for nonforestry purposes which would includeagriculture.”
The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980(Agricultural Lease on Forest Land not permitted)State of Karnataka v. Gandhi Jeevan Collective Farming Co-operative Society LimitedCivil Appeal No(s). 3661 of 20112025 INSC 1461Analysis: The Supreme Court accepted the State’sappeal, and set aside the High Court’s impugned orderas not sustainable in the eyes of law. It held that theSociety was not entitled to further extension of leaseas it had enjoyed 10 continuous years of possession,and ordered the Forest Department, State ofKarnataka to restore the forest on the 134 acres ofreleased land by planting indigenous plants, trees indue consultation with the experts within twelvemonths.The Apex Court relied upon a catena of decisionswhich had passed numerous mandatory directionsprohibiting dereservation of forest. Grantingpermission to cultivate the forest land wouldessentially require clearing of forest and such a courseof action is in the teeth of Section 2 of the Forest(Conservation) Act, 1980, which precludes dereservation or use of forest land for non-forestrypurposes without prior approval of the CentralGovernment. Thus, no permission could have beengranted to perpetuate the illegality committed whilegranting the lease of the forest land to the respondentCooperative Society.https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2009/31755/31755_2009_2_1501_67123_Judgement_18-Dec2025.pdf
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996(Substitution of arbitrator after expiry of mandate under section 29A is a must)Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors.SLP (C) No.13759 of 20252025 INSC 1409Held: On 10 December 2025 the Hon’bleSupreme Court held that that once the mandateof an arbitrator has terminated by operation oflaw under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration andConciliation Act, 1996, the continuation of thesame arbitrator is impermissible under thescheme of the Act.In such a situation where the arbitrator’smandate stands automatically terminated bylaw, the Court not only has the power, but is alsoobligated to substitute the arbitrator underSection 29A(6) while extending time forcompletion of arbitral proceedings.Facts: The appeals arose from arbitral proceedingsbetween parties to a 1992 partnership deed whichcontained an arbitration clause, as per which the DelhiHigh Court appointed a sole arbitrator in March 2020.He repeatedly directed deposit of administrativeexpenses, and applications were filed seekingtermination of his mandate under Sections 14 and 15 ofthe Arbitration Act. These were dismissed in January2022 on the ground that all the expenses are required tobe paid on actuals. It was also held that the solearbitrator is neither de jure nor de facto ineligible to actas an arbitrator.Upon expiry of the statutory period for making theaward, the appellant moved the High Court underSection 29A(6) seeking substitution of the arbitrator andextension of time. The High Court in April 2025 declinedsubstitution, however, extended the time to conclude thearbitral proceedings within a period of four months.In appeal, the appellants contended that the power ofsubstitution of an arbitrator is wider under Section29A(6) of the Act and is not restricted to the groundsin Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. Per contra, therespondents submitted that since the petitions filed bythe respondents under Sections 14 and 15 of the Acthave been rejected on 24.01.2022, therefore, asubstitute arbitrator under Section 29A(6) of the Act,could not be appointed.Analysis: Upon appeal, the Supreme Court set asidethe High Court order holding that it had erred ingranting an extension. The sole arbitrator remainedunder an obligation to pass the award within thestipulated time (excluding the period affected by theCovid-19 pandemic) and failed to do so without anyextension under Section 29A(3) or Section 29A(4).The Court held that the arbitrator, therefore, becamefunctus officio under Section 29A(4). It further heldthat Section 29A(6) empowers and obligatesthe Court to substitute the arbitrator.
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996(Substitution of arbitrator after expiry of mandate under section 29A is a must)The Apex Court appointed a new sole arbitrator. Thearbitral proceedings were directed to resume fromthe already reached stage and be completedwithin six months from the date of judgment.A. Automatic Termination under Section 29ASection 29A was inserted in the Act in 2016 andamended in 2019, due to widespread criticism of delayin conducting the arbitration proceedings, as delay isagainst the avowed object of the Act i.e., speedyresolution of the dispute. Section 29A aims toensure time bound disposal of arbitrationproceeding, within a period of 12 months, whichis in consonance with the object of the Act.Section 29A of the Act is remedial in nature and ismade applicable to all pending arbitral proceedings ason 30.08.2019. Section 29A(1) mandates that anaward has to be made within a period of twelve monthsfrom the date of completion of pleadings under Section23(4) of the Act. Section 29A(3) enables the partiesby consent to extend the period specified in sub-section(1) for making the award for a further period notexceeding six months. Section 29A(4) mandates thatif the award is not made within the period mentioned insub-section (1) or the extended period specified in subsection (3), the mandate of the Arbitrator shallterminate, unless the court, has, either prior to orafter the expiry of the period so specified, extended theperiod. Section 29A(6) provides that while extendingthe period referred to in subsection (4), the court maysubstitute one or all of the Arbitrators and if one or allof the Arbitrators are substituted, the arbitralproceeding shall continue from the stage alreadyreached.In view of mandate contained in Section 29A(1) of theAct, the sole Arbitrator was under an obligation to passan award within a period of one year from 01.03.2022,i.e. on or before 28.02.2023. However, the soleArbitrator failed to do so. The parties did not apply forextension of period to pass an award. The solearbitrator, in view of mandate contained in Section29A(4) became functus officio.B. Substitution under Section 29A(6)An Arbitral Tribunal with the consent of the partiesdecides their disputes. In the instant case, as statedsupra, the mandate of the sole Arbitrator hadterminated on 28.02.2023. When mandate ofarbitrator has expired, his continuation isimpermissible. Section 29A(6) empowers andobligates the Court to substitute the Arbitratorwhen the mandate has terminated.The fact remains that on expiry of initial period orextended period, the arbitrator cannot proceed with thearbitration proceeding and his mandate terminates,subject to an order which may be passed by the Courtin a proceeding under Section 29A(4) of the Act.C. Distinction of Section 29A from Sections 14and 15The Act provides separate remedies in thecircumstances mentioned in Sections 14, 15 and 29A ofthe Act. Sections 14/15 address personal issues withthe arbitrator (e.g., unable to perform his functions/fails to act without undue delay/ he withdraws from hisoffice). In contrast, Section 29A provides a separate,distinct remedy triggered by the expiry of the statutoryperiod. The power under this section is not restrictedto the grounds in Sections 14 or 15.https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/23850/23850_2025_12_1503_66744_Judgement_10-Dec-2025.pdf
The Passports Act, 1967( Pending criminal proceedings not an absolute bar for Renewal/Issuance of passport )Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India & Anr.SLP (Civil) No. 17769 of 20252025 INSC 1476“Liberty, in our constitutional scheme, is not a gift of the State but its first obligation. Thefreedom of a citizen to move, to travel, to pursue livelihood and opportunity, subject to law, isan essential part of the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The State may,where statute so provides, regulate or restrain that freedom in the interests of justice, securityor public order but such restraint must be narrowly confined to what is necessary,proportionate to the object sought to be achieved, and clearly anchored in law. Whenprocedural safeguards are converted into rigid barriers, or temporary disabilities are allowedto harden into indefinite exclusions, the balance between the power of the State and the dignityof the individual is disturbed, and the promise of the Constitution is put at risk.”It must also be noted that denial of renewal of a passport does not operate in a vacuum. ThisCourt has repeatedly held in a catena of judgements6 that the right to travel abroad and theright to hold a passport are facets of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of theConstitution of India. Any restriction on that right must be fair, just and reasonable, and mustbear a rational nexus with a legitimate purpose.”Held: On 19 December 2025 the Supreme Courtset aside the Calcutta High Court’s order,holding that Section 6(2)(f) of the Passport Actcannot be treated as an absolute bar to theissuance/renewal of a passport in view of anycriminal proceeding pending against theapplicant. Persons against whom criminalproceedings are pending are not absolutelydisentitled to a passport under Section 6(2)(f)of the Passports Act, 1967.“We are unable to sustain the approachadopted by the learned Single Judge and theDivision Bench. Both have treated Section 6(2)(f) as an absolute bar so long as any criminalproceeding is pending, without giving fulleffect to the statutory exemption mechanismunder Section 22 and GSR 570(E), andwithout adequately appreciating that thecriminal courts actually dealing with theappellant’s cases have consciously permittedrenewal while retaining stringent controlover any foreign travel. They have, in effect,converted a qualified restriction, designed tosecure the presence of an accused, into a nearpermanent disability to hold a valid passport,even where the criminal courts themselves donot consider such a disability necessary.”
The Passports Act, 1967(Pending criminal proceedings - not an absolute bar for Renewal/Issuance of passport )Facts: Mahesh Kumar Agarwal, the appellant, soughtrenewal of his ordinary passport after its expiry in 2023,while two proceedings against him were pending before(a) the NIA Court, Ranchi, (for extortion, levy collection,and related activities in coal mining areas, includingalleged funding of a proscribed organization), and (b) acriminal appeal against conviction in a CBI coal blockmatter (wherein he stood convicted and sentenced to amaximum term of four years imprisonment) before theDelhi High Court which had suspended thesentence.The NIA Court granted no objection for renewaland directed him to re-deposit the renewed passportimmediately with the Court office, along with otherconditions. The Delhi High Court also had noobjection, holding that there was no basis to denyrenewal or issuance of passport to the appellant for aregular period of ten years, subject to the condition thatthe appellant shall not leave the country withoutpermission.The Regional Passport Office, Kolkata declinedrenewal by invoking Section 6(2)(f) of thePassports Act read with GSR 570(E) notification datedAugust 25, 1993, stating that the appellant could beexempted from the statutory bar only if the competentcriminal court had expressly permitted his departurefrom India and specified the period of travel.Since the NIA Court had only granted no objection forrenewal (but did not mention “ten years” in its order)and had not granted permission to actually travel abroadin the pending NIA case, the statutory bar under Section6(2)(f) continued to operate, and a regular ten-yearpassport could not be issued.The Calcutta High Court dismissed the writpetition, and the appeal in view of thestatutory embargo under Section 6(2)(f) on thegrounds of the pending proceedings before the NIACourt and the subsisting conviction in the Delhi case,and that, in the absence of an order from competentcriminal courts permitting the appellant to departfrom India in terms of GSR 570(E), the PassportAuthority could not be directed to re-issue a passportfor ten yearsAnalysis: Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Courtheld that the bar under Section 6(2)(f) of thePassports Act is not absolute and is subject to theexemption under Section 22 read with GeneralStatutory Rules notification No. 570(E) dated 25August 1993. It distinguished between possession of apassport and permission to travel abroad. It directedre-issue of an ordinary passport to the appellant forten years.Once the criminal courts, with full knowledge of thepending proceedings, consciously allowed renewalsubject to the condition that the appellant shall nottravel abroad without their permission and, in thecase of the NIA Court, required redeposit of therenewed passport, the underlying concern of Section6(2)(f) stood adequately addressed under judicialsupervision. The view of the Calcutta High Court thatthe criminal court must simultaneously authorise aspecific foreign trip for a defined period was held asan unduly narrow interpretation of GSR 570(E).Nothing in the Passports Act requires thecriminal court to convert every permissioninto a one-time licence to undertake aparticular journey. The statute equally permits the
The Passports Act, 1967(Renewal of passport pending criminal proceedings permissible under certain circumstances)court to allow renewal of the passport while retainingcomplete control over each instance of foreigntravel by insisting on its prior leave, as bothcourts have done in the present case.The NIA Court granted no objection for renewal,released the passport for that limited purpose, directedredeposit after renewal and prohibited the appellantfrom obtaining any visa or travelling abroad without itspermission. The Delhi High Court, dealing with theconviction in the CBI case, then expressly held that therewas no basis to deny renewal “for a regular period of tenyears” and granted permission accordingly, whilecontinuing the condition that the appellant shall notleave the country without its permission. Read together,in the manner envisaged by the OM dated 10.10.2019,these orders supply both the requisite judicialpermission and a clear indication of the period ofvalidity. In such circumstances, the Passport Authorityand the Calcutta High Court were not justified in treatingSection 6(2)(f) as continuing to operate in full force so asto deny renewal altogether.The Calcutta HC’s approach overlooks twofeatures of the statutory scheme.First, Section 6(2)(f) is a ground for refusal at the stageof issue or re-issue, but it is expressly made subject to“the other provisions” of the Act, which include Section22 and the exemption carved out through GSR 570(E).Second, GSR 570(E) does not compel the criminal courtto authorise a particular journey. It proceeds on thebroader premise that where the criminal court permitsthe applicant to depart from India and the period ofvalidity can be anchored either in the court’s order or inthe default periods mentioned in the notification, theembargo in Section 6(2)(f) stands lifted to that extent.In the present case, both criminal courts have adopteda different but equally legitimate method of control byallowing renewal while reserving to themselves thepower to regulate each instance of foreign travel. Thatmethod satisfies the statutory concern ofsecuring the accused’s presence as effectively as,if not more effectively than, a one-time permission fora single trip, observed the Apex Court.“In the present case the conditions of bail alreadystipulate that the appellant shall not leave thecountry without prior permission of the courtconcerned, and the same court then grants noobjection to renewal of the passport without relaxingthat condition, the requirement that departure fromIndia shall be subject to judicial permission is builtinto the very terms of the exemption. The passportauthority is not required, at the renewal stage, todemand a schedule of future journeys or visas whichmay not yet exist. Its task is to see whether, despitepending proceedings, the criminal courts have chosento keep the possibility of travel open under theirsupervision. Once that position is clear, GSR 570(E)applies and the bar under Section 6(2)(f) cannot beinvoked to refuse renewal altogether.”
The Passports Act, 1967(Pending criminal proceedings - not an absolute bar for Renewal/Issuance of passport)The Apex Court noted that the right to travel abroadand the right to hold a passport are facets of theright to personal liberty under Article 21 of theConstitution, as established in a catena ofjudgments. Any restriction on this right must befair, just, and reasonable, and must bear arational nexus with a legitimate purpose.The Court observed: \"When procedural safeguardsare converted into rigid barriers, or temporarydisabilities are allowed to harden intoindefinite exclusions, the balance between thepower of the State and the dignity of theindividual is disturbed, and the promise of theConstitution is put at risk.\"An indefinite denial of passport renewal, when twocompetent criminal courts have carefully considered thecircumstances and granted permissions subject tosafeguards, would constitute a disproportionaterestriction on liberty that is not justified by thestatutory objective.Scheme of the Passport ActThe legitimate purpose behind Section 6(2)(f)and Section 10(3)(e) is to ensure that a personfacing criminal proceedings remainsamenable to the jurisdiction of the criminalcourt. That purpose is fully served in the present caseby the conditions imposed by the NIA Court, Ranchi,and the Delhi High Court, which require the appellantto seek prior permission before any foreign travel and,in the NIA case, to re-deposit the passportimmediately after renewal. The Apex Court noted thatto add to these safeguards an indefinite denial of evena renewed passport, when both criminal courts haveconsciously permitted renewal, would be adisproportionate and unreasonable restriction on theappellant’s liberty.From a conjoint reading of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8of the Passports Act, a structured schemeemerges. Section 5 is the starting point. Itprescribes the manner in which an application for apassport is to be made and requires the passportauthority, subject to the other provisions of the Act, todecide the application by issuing or refusing thepassport through a written order. Section 6 qualifiesthat power and sets out, in an exhaustive manner, thegrounds on which the passport authority shall refuseto issue a passport or travel document.Section 6(2)(f) obliges the authority to refuse issueof passport where there is the pendency of criminalproceedings before a criminal court in India.GSR 570(E) was issued under Sec 22, creatinga controlled exemption from the bar in Section
The Passports Act, 1967(Pending criminal proceedings - not an absolute bar for Renewal/Issuance of passport)6(2)(f) in favour of persons facing criminalproceedings who obtain permission from theconcerned court and comply with the conditionsset out in that notification.The Ministry of External Affairs issued an OfficeMemorandum (OM) on October 10, 2019,directing all Passport Authorities to apply GSR570(E) strictly in cases where criminalproceedings are pending, to insist on an undertakingin terms of the notification, and to treat a “no objectioncertificate” or permission granted by a criminal court asprevailing over an adverse police report.The Apex Court observed that GSR 570(E) recognisesthat persons facing criminal proceedings are not to betreated as absolutely disentitled to a passport.“Instead,it permits such persons to obtain a passport,notwithstanding Section 6(2)(f), where the concernedcriminal court has applied its mind and passed anorder in relation to issuance or use of the passport andwhere the applicant furnishes an undertaking to appearbefore the court as and when required. Secondly, itstructures the exercise of that exemption by tying thevalidity and use of the passport to the terms of thecourt’s order. Thus, where the court specifies a periodfor which the passport is to be issued, the passportauthority must honour that period. Where the courtdoes not stipulate any period, the notification providesdefault rules, including issuance for a shorter period,ordinarily one year, in appropriate cases. What thenotification does not do is to create a new substantivebar beyond Section 6(2)(f), or to insist that the criminalcourt must, in every case, grant a prior blanketpermission to “depart from India” for specified dates asa jurisdictional precondition to the very issue or reissue of a passport.”As regards the OM dated 10.10.2019, the ApexCourt observed that it does not create a newregime.“It reiterates that GSR 570(E) must be“strictly applied”, explains the procedure wherecriminal cases are pending and makes it clear that a“no objection certificate” or permission from thecriminal court, read with the applicant’sundertaking, may override an adverse police reportwith reasons recorded by the Passport Officer. It alsocontemplates situations where more than one court isdealing with the matter and indicates that the ordersof all such courts are to be read together. The OM isthus an administrative restatement of the positionunder Section 6(2)(f), Section 22 and GSR 570(E),and cannot add to or cut down the exemption whichthe notification itself grants.”A clear distinction between an accused “facingtrial in a criminal court” and a person who hasbeen convicted and is pursuing an appeal.The Court emphasized that Section 6(2)(f) relatesto persons facing trial and is directed at thepre-conviction stage, while Section 6(2)(e)relates to persons already convicted withspecified sentences. The pendency of a criminalappeal after conviction does not fall within Section6(2)(f), as clarified in Vangala KasturiRangacharyulu.In the present case, while the appellant had beenconvicted in the Delhi case, the sentence had beensuspended by the High Court pending appeal. Thissituation did not fall within Section 6(2)(e) (as theconviction was under appeal with suspended
The Passports Act, 1967(Pending criminal proceedings - not an absolute bar for Renewal/Issuance of passport)sentence) nor did it create an absolute bar under Section6(2)(f) when the court had granted explicit permissionfor renewal. While keeping in view that in cases coveredby Section 6(2)(f) the passport is ordinarily to be issuedfor a shorter period, consistent with the scheme of thePassports Act and the Passport RulesThe Apex Court noted that it was important tokeep distinct the possession of a valid passportand the act of travelling abroad.“A passport is a civil document that enables its holder toseek a visa and, subject to other laws and orders, tocross international borders. Whether a person who ison bail or facing trial may actually leave the country isa matter for the criminal court, which can grant orwithhold permission, impose conditions, insist onundertakings, or refuse leave altogether. In the presentcase, both criminal courts have done exactly that. Torefuse renewal on the speculative apprehension that theappellant might misuse the passport is, in effect, tosecond-guess the criminal courts’ assessment of riskand to assume for the passport authority a supervisoryrole which the statute does not envisage.”The reliance placed by the respondents and theCalcutta High Court on the fact that the applicationfor re-issue was made after the original passport hadexpired was also held as misplaced. The Passports Actcontemplates passports that “continue in force” for aprescribed period. It does not create a separatedisability for applicants whose earlier passports havelapsed.“Re-issue after expiry is a routine occurrence. Theonly relevant question remains whether any of thestatutory grounds of refusal under Section 6(2)continue to apply in the face of an exemption grantedunder Section 22 by way of GSR 570(E). For thereasons already discussed, we are of the clear viewthat they do not in the present case.”https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/34940/34940_2025_2_1502_67136_Judgement_19-Dec2025.pdf
The Protection of Children from SexualOffences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act)(Bail not to be granted on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring material evidence)X v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & AnotherCriminal Appeal No. 164 of 20262026 INSC 44Held: On 09 January 2026 the Supreme Courtset aside the bail granted to the accused(Respondent No.2) by the High Court ofAllahabad under the POCSO Act, holding thatwhile bail is not to be refused mechanically, itmust not be granted on irrelevantconsiderations or by ignoring material evidence.“Where an order granting bail is founded on anincorrect appreciation of facts or suffers frommaterial omissions or where it results inmiscarriage of justice, the Courts areempowered to interfere. In the present case, thegrant of bail by the High Court is vitiated bymaterial misdirection and non-consideration ofrelevant factors rendering the same manifestlyperverse.”Facts: As per the statement of the minor victim who is14 years old, Respondent No. 2 repeatedly establishedphysical relations with her by threatening her andpointing a locally made firearm (katta) at her over thepast six months; that along with Respondent No. 2, his 4friends used to abuse and molest the minor victim andalso attempted to establish physical relations with her.Medico-legal examination report revealed the gravity ofthe sexual offence committed against her. Prosecutionwas instituted against Respondent No. 2 – accused onthe basis of a complaint lodged by the uncle of the minorvictim inter alia alleging commission of gang-rape,sexual assault and recording of the incident on amobile phone for the purpose of blackmail.Subsequent to the filing of the FIR, his bailapplication was dismissed by the District and SessionsJudge. However, after the filing of chargesheet,Respondent No. 2 obtained bail from the High Court.Analysis: The Apex Court cancelled the Bail anddirected the accused to surrender before thejurisdictional Court within a period of two weeks,noting that offences were heinous and grave involvingrepeated penetrative sexual assault upon a minorvictim committed under armed intimidation andaccompanied by recording of the acts for the purposeof blackmail. Such conduct has a devastating impacton the life of the victim and shakes the collectiveconscience of society.The Apex Court noted that not only did the HighCourt fail to take into account the nature and gravityof the offences and the statutory rigour under theprovisions of the POCSO Act, there was also anomission to notice that the chargesheet had alreadybeen filed, coupled with the prima facie materialemerging from the victim’s statements. This renderedthe exercise of discretion by the High Court manifestlyerroneous. Moreover, the High Court failed to applythe settled parameters governing the grant of bailincluding the gravity of the offence, the vulnerability
The Protection of Children from SexualOffences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act)(Bail granted without due consideration of material factors warrants interference)of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation.The High Court’s mechanical reliance uponprecedent without factual correlation wasimpermissible as authoritatively held by theConstitution Bench in Padmausundara Rao (Dead) andothers v. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2002) 3 SCC533.The Apex Court was of the considered view that theimpugned judgment suffered from serious infirmities.The present case involved allegations of gang rape of aminor, coupled with the recording of sexual assault andthreats of circulation. The submission advanced onbehalf of Respondent No. 2 regarding a consensualrelationship was wholly untenable in law, particularlywhere the allegations extended beyond a single accusedand involved coercion, intimidation and multipleperpetrators. The statements of the victim recordedunder Section 183 of the BNSS read with the Medicolegal examination report prima facie established thecommission of the alleged offences.“… the victim resides in the same locality asRespondent No. 2. The counselling report of the ChildWelfare Committee records that the victim is underfear and psychological distress. The post-releasepresence of Respondent No. 2 gives rise to a real andimminent apprehension of intimidation and furthertrauma to the victim. In offences involving sexualassault against children, the likelihood of tamperingwith evidence or influencing witnesses constitutes agrave and legitimate concern. The safety of thevictim and the need to preserve the purity of the trialprocess assume paramount importance.”https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/26489/26489_2025_13_1502_67326_Judgement_09-Jan2026.pdf
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016(the ‘Code’)(Promise by a third party (like a promoter) to the borrower to infuse funds or arrange resources to help the borrowermeet its obligations does not amount to a guarantee to the creditor to pay the debt if the borrower fails.)UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. Electrosteel Castings LimitedCivil Appeal No. 9701 of 20242026 INSC 14Held: On 06 January 2026 the Supreme Courtupheld the concurrent findings of the NCLT andNCLAT, holding that an undertaking to infusefunds into a borrower, so that it may meet itsobligations cannot, by itself be equated with thepromise to discharge the borrower’s liability tothe creditor. A mere Covenant to ensurefinancial discipline or infusion of funds does notsatisfy the statutory requirements of Section 126of the Act.Facts: One Electrosteel Limited (ESL) had availedof financial assistance amounting to INR 500 croresfrom SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited (SREI), videsanction letter dated 26.07.2011. SREI was theoriginal creditor, which subsequently assigned allits rights and interest in favour of UV AssetReconstruction Company Limited (ARC).The sanction letter did not stipulate anyrequirement for a personal or corporateguarantee from Electrosteel Castings Limited (ECL),the erstwhile promotor of ESL. However, ECL, being thepromoter of ESL, was required to furnish anundertaking to arrange for the infusion of funds,and undertook a limited obligation to arrange forinfusion of funds into ESL. Clause 2.2 of theaforesaid guarantee provided that ECL shall arrangefor infusion of such amount of funds into the ESL, asmay be necessary to enable ESL to comply withstipulated financial covenants.State Bank of India, one of the lenders of ESL,filed an application under Section 7 of the Code,before NCLT Kolkata, and the resulting ResolutionPlan was implemented. Claiming a residual debt,ARC filed an application under Section 7 of theCode before the NCLT, Cuttack, asserting that; (i) aresidual debt, subsisted despite the implementation ofthe Resolution Plan, and (ii) ECL had furnished acorporate guarantee for the debt of ESL.The NCLT dismissed the same, holding that theentire admitted debt of ESL stood repaid anddischarged and that ECL was not a guarantor and thatconversion of debt into equity resulted inextinguishment of liability. The NCLAT held thatECL could not be construed as a guarantor to SREI forthe financial facilities availed by ESL, that it cannot besaid that, after approval of the Resolution Plan, theentire debt stood extinguished and no recourse can betaken by the ARC against ECL. Nevertheless, theappeal was dismissed as ECL was not a guarantor.Hence, the present appeal.
The The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016(the ‘Code’)(Promise by a third party (like a promoter) to the borrower to infuse funds or arrange resources to help the borrowermeet its obligations does not amount to a guarantee to the creditor to pay the debt if the borrower fails.)Analysis: The Apex Court concurred with theconcurrent findings of NCLT and NCLAT thatClause 2.2 of the Deed of Undertaking did notconstitute a contract of guarantee and that ECLcannot be treated as guarantor for the financialfacilities availed by ESL.Under Section 126, a guarantee requires theseessential ingredients: (a) a principal debt, (b) defaultby the principal debtor, and (c) a promise by the suretyto discharge the liability of the principal debtor to thecreditor upon such default. The Supreme Court held thatthe surety’s promise must be to the creditor todischarge the monetary or performance liabilityof the principal debtor upon the debtor’s defaultin order to be classified as a Guarantee. Section126 of the Act mandates a guarantor to ‘perform apromise’ or ‘discharge the liability’ of a third personwhich necessarily implies a direct performance ordischarge.A promise by a third party (like a promoter) to theborrower to infuse funds or arrange resources tohelp the borrower meet its obligations is afacilitation covenant.It does not amount to a guarantee to the creditorto pay the debt if the borrower fails. The intent ofthe parties, gathered from the primary loan agreementand contemporaneous documents, is paramount.“For an obligation to be construed as a guarantee underSection 126 of the Act, there must be a direct andunambiguous obligation of the surety to discharge theobligation of the principal debtor to the creditor.The clause neither records an undertaking todischarge the debt owed to the creditor nor does itcontemplate payment to the lender in the event of thedefault. The clause contains a promise, not to thecreditor to pay the debt upon default, but to theborrower to facilitate compliance with FinancialCovenants. An undertaking to infuse funds into aborrower, so that it may meet its obligations cannot,by itself be equated with the promise to discharge theborrower’s liability to the creditor. A mere Covenantto ensure financial discipline or infusion of fundsdoes not satisfy the statutory requirements of Section126 of the Act.The sanction letter dated 26.07.2011 does notcontemplate any personal or corporate guarantee.On the contrary, it specifically identifies the securitiesfor the facilities and does not require ECL to stand assurety. The fact that no guarantee was furnished byECL is also borne out from the following documents:(i) information memorandum in the CIRP of ESLdoes not reflect any guarantee from the Respondentin connection with SREI’s Facility under the categoryof Guarantee or Security Interest; (ii) In Schedule 1to the Assignment Agreement, against the columntitled “details of the guarantor/co-borrower”, theparties to Assignment Agreement stated ‘Nil’ and (iii)Audited Financial Statement of ESL does not reflectany guarantee obligation towards SREI. Thus,contemporaneous documents reinforce theconclusion that parties never intended to create acontract of guarantee.”https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/11108/11108_2024_6_1501_67227_Judgement_06-Jan-2026.pdf
Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs)(Directions by the Apex Court)Amit Kumar & Ors v. Union of India & Ors.Criminal Appeal No. 1425 of 20252026 INSC 62“There also exists some debate as regards the extent or nature of responsibility that the HEIshold in ensuring the mental well-being of students. The tussle in particular is regarding whethera clear line can be drawn between student autonomy and institutional responsibilityrespectively… there exists a predisposition to “shift the blame” and individualise the incidenti.e., to attribute individual-specific reasons and personal short-comings as the closely-relatedcause. There is hardly any introspection into the institutionally normalised ‘stressors’ whichmay have had any contributory effect. However, irrespective of upon whom the culpability maylie from a strict penal perspective, all that we are trying to convey is that HEIs cannot shirkaway from their fundamental duty to ensure that their institutions as a whole are safe,equitable, inclusive and conducive spaces of learning.”Held: On 24 March 2025, the Apex Court hadclarified the law as regards the mandatoryregistration of an F.I.R. in the event ofdisclosure of a cognizable offence, andsimultaneously reminded the Administration ofevery Educational Institution that, it is theirunequivocal moral and legal obligation topromptly lodge an F.I.R. with the appropriateauthorities, if an incident of suicide occurs oncampus.In light of the same, a National Task Force (NTF)to address the mental health concerns ofstudents and prevent the commission of suicidesin HEIs, was constituted by the Apex Court.Subsequently on 15 January 2026, after thereceipt of the interim report, the SupremeCourt issued the following directions inexercise of its plenary powers under Article142 of the Constitution of India:i. The Sample Registration System data on Suicides,especially those falling within the age group of 15-29 years, must be centrally maintained for betterand more accurate estimates of Deaths by Suicide ofstudents in Higher Educational Institutions (HEI).The mechanisms for obtaining and maintaining thesame, may be developed with the help of experts inthe field of public health and demography.ii. The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), inits annual report, must distinguish between schoolgoing students and students of higher education inits categorisation of “student suicides” in order toaid the study of the trends of student suicides inHEIs.
Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutionsiii. All HEIs must report any incident of suicideor unnatural death of a student, regardless ofthe location of its occurrence (i.e. on campus,hostels, PG accommodations, or otherwiseoutside the institutional premises), to the policeauthorities no sooner they come to know aboutthe incident. This should cover all students -irrespective of whether they are studying in theclassroom, distance or online mode of learning.iv. In addition to the above, an annual report ofstudent suicides or unnatural deaths must alsobe submitted to the UGC & all other relevantregulatory bodies for professional courses (e.g.AICTE, NMC, DCI, BCI etc.). In case of CentralUniversities and Institutes of National Importance (forshort, the “INIs”), or any HEI that does not fall withinthe above-mentioned framework, it must be reported tothe Department of Higher Education, Ministry ofEducation, Government of India.v. Every residential HEI must have access toqualified medical help round the clock, if not oncampus, then within a one-km radius to provideemergency medical health support to students.vi. Keeping in mind the faculty shortages which havebeen reported in several HEIs, both public and private,it must be ensured that all vacant facultypositions (both teaching and non-teaching) befilled within a period of four months, withpriority given to posts reserved for candidates frommarginalized and underrepresented communitiesincluding those posts reserved for PwDs. Specialrecruitment drives may be held for faculty recruitmentthat come under various forms of reservations as percentral and state government rules.vii. Appointment and filling of vacancies ofthe post of Vice Chancellor, Registrars, andother key institutional/administrativepositions, must also be made within a periodof four months. Moreover, it must be ensured as amatter of practice that, these positions are filledwithin a period of one month from the date on whichthe vacancy arises, in order to ensure the smoothfunctioning of HEIs. Since the date of retirement isknown much ahead in time, recruitment processesmust begin well in advance to ensure that such postsdo not remain vacant for more than a month. AllHEIs must report on an annual basis to the Centraland relevant State Governments, as to how manyreserved posts are vacant, how many are filled,reasons for non-filling, time taken, etc., so thatperiodic accountability is ensured.viii. The backlog of any and all pendingscholarship disbursements must be clearedwithin a period of four months by therelevant Central and State governmentauthorities. If there exists any reason behind thenon-disbursal of the same, a notice with reasonsmust be sent to the relevant HEI along with thestudent recipient, within a period of two months. Itmust be ensured that the disbursement of all futurescholarships are done with clear timelines, withoutany delay by the relevant Central and StateGovernment authorities. Disbursal dates andschedules must also be made known to the studentrecipient. Even in cases of unavoidableadministrative delay, HEIs must not, as a policy,make the student recipients accountable for paying
Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutionsor clearing their fees. No student should beprevented from appearing in an examination,removed from hostels, barred from attendingclasses, or have their marksheets and degreeswithheld because of delays in disbursal ofscholarships. Any such institutional policy,may be viewed strictly.ix. All HEIs, are particularly put to strict notice,to remain fully compliant with all theregulations that have a binding effect on themincluding inter-alia the UGC Regulation onCurbing the Menace of Ragging in HigherEducational Institutions, 2009; the UGC(Promotion of Equity in Higher EducationalInstitutions) Regulations, 2012; the UGC (Prevention,Prohibition and Redressal of Sexual Harassment ofWomen Employees and Students in Higher EducationalInstitutions) Regulations, 2016; the UGC (Redressal ofGrievances of Students) Regulations, 2023, amongstothers. More, particularly, the establishment of AntiRagging Committees and Anti-Ragging Squads, AntiDiscrimination Officers, Internal ComplaintsCommittees and Student Grievance RedressalCommittees along with the procedures detailed for therespective grievance redressal mechanisms, must bestrictly adhered to.Facts: On March 24, 2025, the Apex Court hadconstituted a National Task Force (NTF) chaired byformer Supreme Court Judge, Justice S. Ravindra Bhatto address mental health concerns of students and toprevent the rising suicides in higher educationalinstitutions. Its mandate was to investigate and preventthe increasing suicide rates in college students.These directions were passed in a petition filed by theparents of two students from IIT Delhi, who allegedlydied by suicide due to caste-based discriminationand academic pressure; they alleged institutionalharassment, which was ignored by the authorities.Despite repeated complaints, the Police failed toregister an FIR, prompting the families to seek legalintervention.Analysis: The report highlighted that the“massification” and “privatisation” of thehigher education system in India has brought inunprecedented levels of student enrolment, whichhas brought with itself some substantial challengesand unprecedented pressure on academicstandards. The purely quantitative expansionwithout any adequate institutional supportframework, has left students vulnerable.The Apex Court noted that all students enteringcollege life may not be similarly placed in all aspects.The lived realities of students belonging tomarginalised groups (SC/ST/OBC), persons withdisabilities (PwDs), transgender persons, women,students from rural backgrounds, non-Englishspeaking students etc. remain different even withinthe college atmosphere. Affirmative actioncannot stop at merely ensuring their entryinto higher education. It must also reflect in thecreation of adequate support systems whichameliorate instead of exacerbate existing inequities.The existence of such systems would significantlydisarm a significant host of stressors whichdisproportionately affect students from marginalisedgroups and disadvantaged communities and as aconsequence, ensure their overall mental well-being.
Student suicides in Higher Educational Institutions“The menace of ragging still seems to persistwithin several HEIs with the same also beingnormalised and touted as a “bonding exercise”or a “friendly ice-breaking effort”. We would beremiss if we did not acknowledge thatsignificant steps have been taken to rideducational campuses of the problem ofragging. However, what seems to be theconcern of many is that while HEIs obtain antiragging declarations from students on paper, inthe event of such incidents occurring, they arenot properly addressed and the consequencesfor erring students are minimal or absent.”The Apex Court noted that increased academic pressurewas a factor. The transition from school to university is aphase in young adulthood that brings with it someunique responsibilities, challenges and difficulties butwithout proper support systems. During the NTF’sinstitutional visits, many students shared how they gofrom being academically exceptional to one of manyover-achievers at their college/university. Thiscombined with the institutional culture whichpersistently creates anxiety and heightenedstress levels to compete and excel, brings about asharp rise in mental health issues.Extremely rigid attendance policies, overburdening andunplanned phasing/scheduling of the academiccurriculum, exam assessment methodologies, facultyshortage, vacant teaching posts, excessive reliance oninexperienced guest faculty, non-transparent or nonexistent placement processes etc. were all pointed out asstressors by the responses received by the NTF fromstudents. Medical students, in particular, spoke aboutthe entrenched borderline exploitative academic culturecoupled with on-call hours being stretched wellbeyond the prescribed limit – going as far as 36-48hours at a go.In technical institutions offering PhD programmes, itwas pointed out that high research demands,burnout, financial difficulties were combined withuneven and inconsistent relationship with theirsupervisors, lack of adequate lab equipment etc.Engineering college going students also highlightedthe intense nature of academic expectations heavilydriven by placements and salary packages. Severalother course-specific and discipline-specific issueswere raised in these responses.https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/40105/40105_2024_7_301_67552_Judgement_15-Jan2026.pdf
Cancellation of highest bid in public auction due to expectationof a higher bid in a subsequent auction cannot be a reason tocancel an auction held in accordance with law.Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.SLP (Civil) Nos. 18095-18096 of 20242026 INSC 22Held: On 06 January 2026, the Hon’ble SupremeCourt held that:(a) where a public auction has been conducted inaccordance with law,(b) the highest bid is above the reserve price,and(c) there is no fraud, collusion or materialirregularity,the auctioning authority cannot cancel the bidmerely on the expectation that a higher pricecould be obtained in a future auction; such acancellation is arbitrary and violative of Article14.“An auction process has a sanctity attached to itand only for valid reasons that the highest bidcan be discarded in an auction which isotherwise held in accordance with law. If avalid bid has been made which is above thereserve price, there should be a rationale orreason for not accepting it. Therefore, thedecision to discard the highest bid must have anexus to the rationale or the reason. Merelybecause the authority conducting the auctionexpected a higher bid than what the highestbidder had bid cannot be a reason to discard thehighest bid. In the instant case, no other partyhad placed a bid higher than the appellantherein. There was no infirmity in the conduct ofthe auction.”Facts: The appellant, Golden Food Products India,participated in an auction conducted by therespondent Ghaziabad Development Authority(GDA), for the allotment of an industrial plotmeasuring 3150 square metres under the MadhubanBapudham Yojana. The appellant’s technical andfinancial bids were approved and in the open auctionconducted thereafter, it was declared the highestbidder at Rs. 29,500 per square metre, which wasabove the reserve price of Rs. 25,600 per squaremetre. There were only two bidders.However, the GDA cancelled the auction on theground that smaller plots of 132 square meters in thesame scheme had fetched higher prices per squaremetre (upto Rs. 1,21,000/-), and announced that afresh auction would be held. The Allahabad HighCourt dismissed the writ petitions of theAppellant, holding that the appellant had noindefeasible right to insist upon allotment and theexecution of a sale deed in its favour.
Cancellation of highest bid in public auction due to expectation of a higher bid in a subsequentauction cannot be a reason to cancel an auction held in accordance with law.The Appellant approached the Apex Courtsubmitting that cancellation of the appellant’s bidamounted to rewriting the tender after the bids wereopened, which is not permitted in law. It was contrary toArticle 14 of the Constitution of India as it was arbitrary,for a statutory authority to cancel a valid bid on groundsthat were not mentioned in the auction brochure; Thatcomparing the appellant’s bid with dissimilar plots(which were smaller) amounted to imposing new tenderconditions after the auction.The GMD submitted that the respondent’s decision tocancel the action was based on objectiveconsiderations (the prevailing market rates and theneed for safeguarding public revenue). Comparable plotsin subsequent auctions had obtained significantly higherprices and therefore the decision to re-auction the plot inquestion was a measure intended to maximise publicbenefit. Further, the tender document expressly statedthat the decision of the Vice-Chairman/Authority inmatters of allotment is final and binding. Therefore, thecancellation in the present case was not withoutauthority and was within the scope of the tenderconditions made available to the appellant.Analysis: The Supreme Court set aside the HighCourt’s orders, directing the GDA - respondent No.2to allot the subject plot and conclude the auction processin favour of the appellant. The Apex Court held thatmerely because the smaller plots measuring 123 to 132square metres were auctioned and sold at a higher priceas compared to the subject plot measuring 3150 squaremetres which is a large sized plot, could not have beenthe basis for cancelling the auction insofar as the subjectplot is concerned. The bid of the appellant being abovethe reserve price and the highest bid, GDA - respondentNo.2 was under an obligation in law having acceptedthe bid offered by the appellant to issue the allotmentletter instead of cancelling, and the auction on thebasis of irrelevant considerations that too behind theback of the appellant. In the circumstances, theappellant had a legitimate expectation to receive anallotment letter vis-à-vis the subject plot as it was thehighest bidder.The Apex Court also noted that RTI responsesshowed that an adjacent plot of the same scheme wasallotted without any benchmarking against smallerplots. The Court observed that demand for smallerplots is ordinarily higher and that intentionally, anidentical reserve prices had been fixed for plots ofdifferent sizes owing to a lower demand for alarger plot. There were only two bidders who bid forthe subject plot measuring 3150 square metres.Otherwise, a higher reserve price could have beenfixed by the GDA for the subject plot. Merely becausethe area of plot in the instant case was 3150 squaremetres and it was a larger plot, the reserve pricecould not have been higher. Therefore, the reserveprice fixed for the smaller plot as well as what hasbeen fixed for the subject plot was uniform i.e. Rs.25,600/- per square metre. The Apex Court heldthat the comparison of the appellant’s bid for a largeplot with bids received for much smaller plots was anirrelevant consideration and the cancellation wasarbitrary, whimsical and irrational. Once the highestbid was found to be above the reserve price, the GDAwas under an obligation to proceed with allotment.The cancellation was held to be arbitrary andirrational.https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2024/33449/33449_2024_4_1502_67224_Judgement_06-Jan-2026.pdf
Limits to Subordinate Legislation in Tax MattersAdani Power v. Union of IndiaSLP (C) 24729/20192026 INSC 1Held: On 06 January 2026, the Hon’ble SupremeCourt held that the Executive cannotretrospectively impose tax liability withoutexplicit legislative authority. Further, theExecutive cannot retain the amount collectedunder a levy which was imposed without theauthority of law.“Article 265 of the Constitution requiresauthority of law for every tax levy andcollection. The levy imposed was ultra viresbecause there was, in substance, no “importinto India” that could trigger the charge underSection 12 of the Customs Act. Since the allegedtaxable event did not exist in law, the chargingof the levy was illegal. The absence of a taxableevent is a jurisdictional defect.The power conferred by Section 25 of theCustoms Act is a power to exempt goods fromduty otherwise leviable; it is not a power tocreate a fresh levy in the first place. The use ofan exemption notification to impose duty is,therefore, a colourable exercise of delegatedlegislation and falls foul of administrative lawprinciples.”“We must also underline a basic propositionof fiscal jurisprudence: a tax or duty can onlybe levied where there is:(i) a clear charging provision enacted bycompetent legislature;(ii) an identifiable taxable event; and(iii) a statutory rate-making mechanism.The machinery provisions may regulateassessment and collection. Exemptionnotifications may relax or remit the levy. Butneither machinery provisions nor exemptionnotifications can substitute for the absence ofa charge.”Facts: The Finance Act 2010 introduced a 16 per centcustoms duty on electricity cleared from a SpecialEconomic Zone (SEZ) to a Domestic Tariff Area(DTA). This was to operate retrospectively from 26June 2009. In February 2010, the Union governmentissued a notification (25/2010), which stipulated thatelectrical energy cleared from an SEZ to the DTAwould suffer customs duty at 16% ad valorem, withretrospective effect from 26 June 2009.Based upon this notification, the authorities raiseddemands upon the appellant for payment of duty at16%, not merely prospectively but going back to June2009, which levy was challenged in the Gujarat HighCourt, on the ground that no customs duty at all couldbe lawfully imposed on the clearance of electricalenergy from an SEZ into the DTA, having regard to thestatutory scheme and constitutional limitations.
Limits to Subordinate Legislation in Tax MattersWhile this petition was pending, the Union altered theduty structure and issued a notification by which theearlier 16% ad valorem duty was replaced by a specificrate duty of ₹0.10 (ten paise) per unit (91/2010). Later,in 2012, this was reduced to 3 paisa (26/2012). Thesesubsequent notifications did not have the retrospectivecomponent of the 25/2010 notification, and werethemselves prospective in nature.In 2015, the Gujarat High Court held that nocustoms duty could be imposed on electrical energygenerated within India in an SEZ and wheeled to buyersin the DTA as it is not a case of “import into India”. AnSEZ, while fiscally distinct in treatment, is not a foreignterritory, and the retrospective levy of tax violatedArticle 265 of the Constitution. The High Court held,thirdly, that the retrospective fastening of a 16% levyfrom 26 June 2009 violated the discipline of Article 265of the Constitution which declares that no tax shall belevied or collected except by authority of law. The Courtfound that the executive could not, by subordinatelegislation, retrospectively cast a tax liability for a pastperiod absent of a clear charging sanction fromParliament. Once the basic levy was itself ultra vires, itsretrospective application necessarily fails. The offendingnotification and the enabling clause in the Finance Actwere quashed to that extent as being ultra vires both theCustoms Act and the Constitution. The appellant’s bankguarantee was directed to be released. The High Courtthus, in substance, declared that, on the statutoryscheme as it then stood, customs duty could not bedemanded on the appellant’s SEZ-to-DTA powerclearances. The appeal by Union of India in theApex Court was dismissed and the declaration of lawmade by the High Court, therefore, attained finality atleast as between the parties, and in practical termswithin the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court.Thereafter, with effect from 16 February 2016, theUnion withdrew the levy, prospectively.The appellant sought a refund of the tax collectedunder the notifications, stating that customs duty wasstruck down by the High Court. A co-ordinate Benchof the High Court rejected this second writ petition in2019 and held that the notifications, 91/2012 and26/2012, were not expressly struck down in the 2015judgment which had struck down only the 25/2010notification, and that the relief granted was explicitlylimited to15 September 2010.Analysis: The Supreme Court set aside the HighCourt Judgement, holding that the 2010 and 2012notifications did not create a new levy but onlycontinued the levy in an altered form. Further, itstated that the change in arithmetical rate to the levyof tax does not cure the lack of authority principle.Moreover, it added that the restitution of the amountis necessary when illegality is discovered.(1) The Apex Court summarised the 2015Gujarat HC judgement as follows:(a) there is no lawful charging event in respect of thiscommodity when cleared from an SEZ to the DTA;(b) the Union cannot use an exemption notification tocreate a duty that Parliament has not imposed;(c) retrospective demand without statutory sanctionviolates Article 265; and(d) the structure produces arbitrary double burden.It follows therefore that the 2015 judgment was notconfined, in principle, to a single notification or to aparticular cut-off date. The declaration of lawextended to the very authority to levy customs duty onelectrical energy cleared from an SEZ to the DTA in
Limits to Subordinate Legislation in Tax Mattersthe statutory setting then prevailing. Absence a changein that setting, that declaration governed all periodsstanding on the same footing.“The reasoning of said decision went to the very root ofthe taxing power i.e., it identified the absence of acharging event, the misuse of the exemption power, andthe inherent arbitrariness of the scheme. Once such adeclaration of law was rendered and affirmed by thisCourt, it acquired binding normative force andgoverned all transactions resting on the same legalfooting. The essence of that pronouncement was nottemporal but structural; it struck at the authority tolevy, not merely at the rate or the period. The 2015judgment therefore stands as a general exposition oflaw, and its ratio decidendi covers the subsequentperiod unless a demonstrable change in the legalfoundation is shown.”(2) “A classic instance of a colourable exercise ofdelegated power”:The High Court in 2015 had correctly detected theinversion: a provision designed to grant relief(exemption) had been inverted to impose a burden(levy). Such inversion is not a mere irregularity; it is anillegality at source, observed the Apex Court.The said finding of the High Court was found to be inconsonance with settled principles of law declared bythe Apex Court.Section 25 of the Customs Act confers a power toexempt, not to impose. To use it as an instrument oflevy transgresses the limits of delegated legislationand amounts to usurpation of the legislative function.“A delegate cannot do indirectly what it hasno authority to do directly. The power toexempt is not a power to tax. The two standon opposite constitutional planes. Theessential legislative function of imposing atax or duty rests with Parliament and must belocated in a charging provision. The executivecannot, by subordinate instrument, enlargethe field of taxation under the pretext oftailoring an exemption.Delegated legislation is subject to judicialreview not only for substantiveunreasonableness, but also for purpose.Where the dominant purpose for which adelegated power is conferred is departedfrom, and the power is pressed into service toachieve an end for which it was nevergranted, the exercise is ultra vires. Theimmunity of a fiscal notification fromscrutiny is no greater than that of any otherform of subordinate legislation.”https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/35277/35277_2019_16_1501_67204_Judgement_05-Jan2026.pdf
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002(Right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature ofthe offence)“The court while dealing with the prayer forgrant of bail has to consider gravity of offence,which has to be ascertained in the facts andcircumstances of each case. One of thecircumstances to consider the gravity of offencesis also the term of sentence i.e., prescribed for theoffence, the accused is alleged to have committedThe court has also to take into account the objectof the special Act, the gravity of offence and theattending circumstances along with period ofsentence. All economic offences cannot beclassified into one group as it may involvevarious activities and may differ from one case toanother. Therefore, it is not advisable on the partof the Court to categorize all the offences into onegroup and deny bail on that basis. It is wellsettled that if the State or any prosecutingagency including, the court, concerned has nowherewithal to provide or protect thefundamental right of an accused, to have aspeedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of theConstitution, then the State or any otherprosecuting agency should not oppose the pleafor bail on the ground that the crime committedis serious. Article 21 of the Constitution appliesirrespective of the nature of the crime. Theaforesaid proposition was quoted with approvalby another two-Judge Bench of this Court and itwas held that long period of incarceration foraround 17 months and the trial not even havingcommenced, the appellant in that case has beendeprived of his right to speedy trial.”.Arvind Dham v. Directorate of EnforcementS.L.P. (Crl.) No. 15478 of 20252026 INSC 12Held: On 06 January 2026, the Hon’bleSupreme Court whilst granting bail to theAppellant held that that prolongedincarceration of an undertrial, withoutcommencement or reasonable progress oftrial, cannot be countenanced, as it has theeffect of converting pretrial detention intoform of punishment. Economic offences, bytheir very nature, may differ in degree andfact, and therefore cannot be treated ashomogeneous class warranting a blanketdenial of bail.Apex Court observed that courts are requiredto examinethe gravity of the offence,the prescribed punishment,the object of the special statute, andthe attending circumstances of the casewhilst granting bail.The right to speedy trial, enshrined underArticle 21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsedby the nature of the offence.
Right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is noteclipsed by the nature of the offencepunishment and that documentary evidence alreadyseized by the prosecution eliminates the possibility oftampering with the same.The Apex Court noted that the appellant had joined theinvestigation, and even prior to his arrest he hascooperated with the investigation. The investigationqua the appellant had concluded. The maximumsentence which can be imposed on the appellant isseven years. The appellant has been in custody for pastaround 16 months and 20 days.“It is pertinent to note that various Benches of thisCourt, while taking into account the period ofincarceration which ranges from 3 months to 17months in several cases have granted bail to theappellants therein. In the instant case, no cognizancehas been taken on the prosecution complaint and theproceeding is at the stage of scrutiny of documents.No material has been placed on record to show thefate of the application filed by the ED on 27.09.2025seeking day-today hearing even after period ofapproximately three months has expired. There are210 witnesses to be examined in the proceeding. Thereis no likelihood of trial commencing in the near future.The continued incarceration in such circumstances,particularly where the evidence which is primarilydocumentary in nature, is alreadyFacts: The appellant Arvind Dham, 64 years of age, aformer promoter and non-executive Chairman of theAmtek Group, was the only person arrested by theEnforcement Directorate in July 2025 under Preventionof Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, after he wasaccused of being the ultimate beneficiary of diversionand siphoning of public funds. Banks alleged a fraudexceeding ₹670 crore, and prosecution complaint wasfiled on 02.08.2025 against 40 accused persons i.e., 22individuals and 18 companies. He had remained incustody for over 16 months. His bail plea was rejected bythe Special Court and the Delhi High Court, on theground that he did not satisfy the proviso to Section 45of the PMLA.The gravamen of the allegation against the appellant wasthat he was the ultimate beneficiary of the fraud whichwas a well orchestrated scheme, executed at his behest,involving diversion and siphoning of public fundsthrough layered entities, resulting in substantialwrongful loss to Public Sector Banks.Analysis: The Apex Court relied upon V. Senthil Balaji’scase v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024SCC OnLine SC 2626, which has held that under thestatutes such as PMLA, where maximumsentence is seven years, prolonged incarcerationpending trial may warrant grant of bail byConstitutional Courts, if there is no likelihood ofthe trial concluding within a reasonable time.Statutory restrictions cannot be permitted toresult in indefinite pretrial detention in violationof Article 21.A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of PadamChand Jain reiterated that prolonged incarcerationcannot be allowed to convert pretrial detention into
Right to speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, is noteclipsed by the nature of the offencein custody of the prosecution, violates the right of theappellant to speedy trial under Article 21 of theConstitution of India.”The record revealed that the prosecution complaint wasfiled on 06.09.2024. The Special Judge issued notice on07.09.2024 to all proposed accused persons under theproviso to Section 223 of BNSS. The respondentchallenged the said order before the High Court,resulting in eight months stay of proceedings, before theSpecial Judge, which was lifted on 23.05.2025 only uponwithdrawal of the petition. The delay in the trial was thusattributable only to the respondent. The appellant hadbeen in custody since 09.07.2024. The disposal ofimmovable properties occurred on 24.12.2024 and17.02.2025 and pertained to M/s Marichika Properties,with which no material link to the appellant had beenestablished. There was no evidence that the appellantwas signatory to any sale document. The allegation ofdissipation of proceeds of crime by him was, therefore,untenable at this stage, held the Apex Court.https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/55164/55164_2025_6_1502_67227_Judgement_06-Jan-2026.pdf
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947Held: On 27 January 2026, the Hon’bleSupreme Court upheld the Maharashtragovernment’s decision to refer a disputeinvolving contract labour to adjudication,holding that an industrial dispute need notalways be preceded by a formal demand byworkers.The Apex Court held that under the IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947, the State may interveneeven when a dispute is only apprehended, andthat such intervention should not be derailedby technical objections thus converting amechanism of immediate relief into an engineof delay.The Apex Court reiterated the principle in theConstitution Bench ruling in Steel Authority ofIndia Limited v. National Union WaterfrontWorkers and Others (2001) 7 SCC 1 (SAIL) thatsuch challenges must be adjudicated byIndustrial Courts and cannot be blocked at theM/s Premium Transmission Private Limited v. The State Of Maharashtra AndOthersS.L.P. (Civil) No. 9970 of 20232026 INSC 87threshold by denying theexistence of a dispute.Further, as per the ratio of SAIL (supra), thecontract labour is given the option to questionthe contract as a sham and nominal, and prayfor appropriate reliefs.Facts: There existed a long-running dispute between acompany manufacturing transmission engineeringproducts based in Aurangabad and the workersengaged through licensed labour contractors.The workers, represented by a trade union, approachedthe Conciliation Officer directly in 2019, on the groundthat the workers faced imminent termination due tochanges in contractual arrangements. The Trade unionalleged that the contractual arrangement was a orcamouflaged or a sham devised to deny thempermanent status, equal wages and other statutorybenefits.However the Conciliation proceedings failed, and theDeputy Labour Commissioner referred the dispute tothe Industrial Court.“The power to refer an 'apprehended' dispute is the statutory application of the old adage 'astitch in time saves nine'. It enables the State to intervene before the industrial peace isshattered. Consequently, permitting Preliminary Objections to stall this urgent process negatesthe preventive intent of the statute, converting a mechanism of immediate relief into an engineof delay. The appropriate Government, in its armchair, while referring an Industrial Disputefor resolution, keeps in its perspective industrial peace and prosperity, to enable workers towork out their just and economic demands and avoid strikes and lockouts. The administrativedecision merely looks at an Industrial Dispute or an apprehended Industrial Dispute. The meritor otherwise of the dispute is for the adjudicatory body to decide.”
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947The management challenged the order of reference inthe Bombay High Court, on the grounds that no“industrial dispute” existed because the union had notfirst served a charter of demands on the company andobtained its rejection before actually availing themechanism of conciliation under Section 12 of the IDAct. However the High Court refused to interfere,and the appeal landed in the Apex Court.Analysis: The Apex Court noted that in the backdropof well-settled principles of law, a workman workingunder a contract has to determine their remedies ondiscontinuation or termination before the IndustrialCourt. The next question was whether the referencewas illegal for want of a prior demand before theManagement.Rejecting the appeal the Apex Court held that neitherSection 10 nor Section 12 of the IndustrialDisputes Act mandates a prior demand noticeas a condition precedent for conciliation orreference, except in the case of public utilityservices. In fact, the appropriate government isspecifically empowered to refer a dispute that either“exists or is apprehended” under Section 10 of the Act.The provision enables the State to step in beforeindustrial tensions escalate into strikes, lockouts ormass termination of workers. Section 12 does notstipulate that a condition precedent to invoking itsjurisdiction is to first approach the Management andreceive a reply, and then knock on the doors of theConciliation Officer. The process of reference isadministrative in nature and is not tested on thetouchstone of a judicial or quasi-judicial order by astatutory authority or a court.Hence, the Management's preliminaryobjection was illegal and without merit. Further,as per the ratio of SAIL (supra), the contract labour isgiven the option to question the contract as a sham andnominal, and pray for appropriate reliefs.The Apex Court noted that the management, in theinstant case, objected to the status of workers as itsworkmen and, at the same time, cannot be heard toargue that the status asserted by them is notadjudicated by the Industrial Court. The inconsistencyis that the preliminary objection is raised to reject theongoing proceedings in Reference, as there is nodemand made to the management before approachingthe conciliation officer, and thusseeks to nip thealleged industrial dispute in the budThe Apex Court also rejected the 2 contention thatthere was no employer–employee relationship betweenthe Appellant company and the workers, since theworkers were engaged through licensed contractorsunder the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)Act, 1970, CLRA and accordingly there was noindustrial dispute that existed between them.nd
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947The Apex Court noted that the Trade Union or theworkers can move the labour court for a declarationthat the contract between the Management and thecontractor is sham and nominal and, consequently, thatthe contract labour is entitled to enter into the rolls ofthe Management and regularisation, etc.“The Management had agreed that the labour contractcomplies with the provisions of law, including theCLRA. Being so, the issue was limited to the benefits towhich the employees are entitled under the CLRA. Therelief a party is entitled to before the Industrial Courtis dependent on the case pleaded and proved by bothparties.”https://www.sci.gov.in/view-pdf/?diary_no=177732023&type=j&order_date=2026-01-27&from=latest_judgements_order
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